



# War Museums in Postwar Lebanon: Memory, Violence, and Performance

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## ABSTRACT

This article examines three museums that address Lebanon's history of conflict: the newly opened Beit Beirut on the capital's former Green Line, the Hezbollah-run Mleeta Resistance Tourist Landmark in south Lebanon, and Umam Documentation and Research's online archive "Memory at Work." Each testing the parameters of what the term museum can mean in Lebanon today, these cases highlight the still-contested nature of war narratives. While many Lebanese youth express desire for a shared national history of the civil war, the affective complexities of recuperated memorial sites and the inconsistent involvement of the state suggest that the possibility of publicly staging such a history is far from secure.

## Introduction

Almost three decades after the end of Lebanon's civil war (1975–1990), Beirut has opened its doors to its first museum and cultural center addressing the history of the war, Beit Beirut. While its bullet-pocked exterior bears witness to its location along Beirut's former Green Line, or "intersection of death" (*takaata al-mawt*), the lack of curator or permanent collection evidences Lebanon's ongoing contestation of its war memory. Lebanon has been diagnosed by scholars, activists, and artists as suffering from social amnesia (lost memory), hypomnesia (poor memory), and hypermnesia (enhanced memory).<sup>1</sup>

Consequently the search to uncover, learn from, or move beyond the past remains a highly politicized field shaped by dominant "memory cultures"<sup>2</sup> and competing "regimes of memory"<sup>3</sup> vying for representative forms and interpretative power. In the absence of state-led memorial projects, privately funded museums and archives are shaping civil war discourses and debates and are responding to Lebanon's contemporary political realities. This article examines three distinct initiatives commemorating conflict in Lebanon—Beit Beirut Museum and Urban Cultural Centre, Mleeta Resistance Tourist Landmark, and Umam Documentation and Research's (D&R) "Memory at Work" database<sup>4</sup>—situating them within internal debates about authenticity and historical truth and international disputes about the memorialization of trauma, conflict, and pain. This research results from a decade-long interest in war memory in Lebanon,<sup>5</sup> and more explicitly site observations and semi-structured interviews carried out with museum founders, curators, artists, activists, and visitors during January–September 2018.

47 Ethnographic fieldwork was supplemented by website and secondary-source analysis,  
48 and the creation of an online survey examining the local responses, attitudes, and experi-  
49 ences of Lebanese to war memorials and museums (40 respondents during  
50 January 2018).

51 Each case study under review tests the parameters of the term *museum* in ways that  
52 point toward its complexity in contemporary Lebanon. The article therefore begins by  
53 situating the Lebanese case studies within a contemporary genre of museology exempli-  
54 fied by memorials and so-called dark tourism sites across the world, which emphasizes  
55 the decentering of knowledge from rigid pedagogical narratives in favor of the participa-  
56 tory and affective experience of viewers. While seeming to shift the balance of agency  
57 toward visitors, the effects of this move are not unproblematic, because the powerful  
58 affective force of such experiences can foster ideological monopolization. The three  
59 Lebanese museums discussed here are located on sites closely connected to the histories  
60 in question, exacerbating their experiential intensity and narrative force. In the second  
61 section, we discuss how the memorial sites themselves are inscribed with meaning.  
62 Finally, we will look at the implications of these projects for national narratives of war,  
63 in particular focusing on the presence (or indeed, the absence) of the state in each case.  
64 Given the unwillingness of the Lebanese state to participate in or endorse memory-mak-  
65 ing with respect to the civil war, we address how each museum has negotiated its rela-  
66 tionship to the nation and its axes of power, and what this reveals about the current  
67 predicament of war memory in Lebanon.  
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## 70 **Memory and war museums in divided societies**

71 Since the early 1990s, a new genre of museums and museology has emerged, entailing a  
72 shift from institutional history and pedagogical instruction to a decentered approach to  
73 knowledge production through oral testimonies and collective mnemonic participation.<sup>6</sup>  
74 The proliferation of “memorial museums,” often located on physical sites of historic suf-  
75 fering, attests to the growing conflation of commemorative practice and emotive narra-  
76 tativization of the past.<sup>7</sup> Holocaust museums can now be found in more than 30, while  
77 similar memorial museums have been created within former prison camps (Perm-36  
78 Gulag, Russia; Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, Cambodia), on massacre and burial sites  
79 (The Nanjing Massacre Memorial Museum, China; Kigali Genocide Memorial,  
80 Rwanda), and on urban spaces of terrorist attacks (9/11 Memorial Museum, New York).

81 The moral imperative of such museums, according to Silke Arnold-de Simine,  
82 encourages visitors “to empathize and identify with individual sufferers and victims, as  
83 if “reliving” their experience, in order to thus develop more personal and immediate  
84 forms of engagement.”<sup>8</sup> The idea of “secondary witnessing”<sup>9</sup> as a deterrent against  
85 future violence may be compelling, yet critics have questioned whether such mnemonic  
86 empathy actually fosters “ethical thinking” or “elicits tolerance and deeper under-  
87 standing.”<sup>10</sup> As Susan Sontag suggests, “perhaps too much value is assigned to memory,  
88 not enough to thinking.”<sup>11</sup> Other commentators accuse such memory projects of leading  
89 to the banalization and commodification of horrific events for mass consumption. The  
90 sale of “Twin Tower” hoodies and Search and Rescue toy dogs at the 9/11 Memorial  
91 Museum gift shop is a case in point.<sup>12</sup> Yet the most challenging critique of memorial  
92

93 museums surrounds the affective, ideological strategies employed through exhibition  
 94 narratives and images.<sup>13</sup> In divided and post-conflict societies, where the past remains a  
 95 contested field, emotive memorial museums are more often representational battle-  
 96 grounds for competing historical narratives, communal identities, and the determination  
 97 of society's victims, heroes, and aggressors.

98 For Patrizia Violi, the power of such memorial sites derives from their "spatial con-  
 99 tiguity with the trauma itself."<sup>14</sup> Such traces provide testimonial authenticity and emo-  
 100 tional intensity to be both interpreted and transformed through the visitor's embodied  
 101 experience of the site. A performative understanding of memorial sites and activities  
 102 such as historical reenactment sees visitors as active co-creators engaged in cultural  
 103 imaginings.<sup>15</sup> As such, space not only is *acted out* through existing narratives and  
 104 patterns of behavior but also can be imagined differently. It moves away from the  
 105 mnemonic privilege accorded to artifact, monument, and text, instead focusing on  
 106 "embodied memory: performances, gestures, orality, movement, dance, singing—in  
 107 short, all those acts usually thought of as ephemeral, non-reproducible knowledge."<sup>16</sup> At  
 108 memorial sites, space and memory are therefore performed "live" by bodies saturated  
 109 with social meaning.

110 Finally, traumatic memorial sites have increasingly been explained as dark tourism, in  
 111 which death, disaster, and atrocity are offered as neoliberal tourist products.<sup>17</sup> In  
 112 Belfast, ex-paramilitaries now offer tours of murals, peace lines, and former bomb sites  
 113 in the Post-Troubles city.<sup>18</sup> Religious pilgrims in Bethlehem pay homage at the graffiti-  
 114 adorned Separation barrier and visit Banksy's Walled-off Hotel and Wall Museum.<sup>19</sup> In  
 115 postwar Lebanon, a recent survey suggests the untapped potential of dark tourism, par-  
 116 ticularly among a receptive youth who listed their interest in visiting cemeteries (Rafik  
 117 Hariri; Wadih al-Safi and Martyrs' Cemetery *Rawdat Al-Shaheedayn*), former prisons  
 118 (Khiam), and battle sites (Mleeta).<sup>20</sup> Yet why should some sites be termed "dark" and  
 119 morbidly voyeuristic while others are privileged as "cultural heritage" or "negative  
 120 heritage"?<sup>21</sup> Does commodification and commercial exploitation lessen the authenticity  
 121 or pedagogical impact of a former conflict site? While it is important to situate  
 122 Lebanese war museums against a backdrop of communication and media technology,  
 123 the Holocaust museum industry,<sup>22</sup> and the marketization of memorial sites, it is essen-  
 124 tial to contextualize these sites more precisely to understand their purpose and appeal.  
 125 Each of the following case studies will be understood within its own unique historical  
 126 trajectory, examining its indexical nature, esthetic structure, and performative capacity.  
 127 As Violi astutely observes, the "conservation, transformation and memorialization of  
 128 places where slaughter, torture and horror have been carried out are key points for  
 129 understanding better the relationship between memory and history in the case of each  
 130 post-conflict society."<sup>23</sup>

### 133 **Site and affect**

134 The three Lebanese memorial sites discussed in this article are located on symbolic border-  
 135 lines and spatial rupture points: Mleeta is on the fringe of the former Israeli-occupied  
 136 security zone in south Lebanon; Beit Beirut is on Beirut's Green Line wartime division, and  
 137 Umam is in the Hezbollah-dominated Dahiyya suburbs of Beirut. These settings are not  
 138

139 coincidental but are integral to each museum's mnemonic narrative, allowing events to be  
140 "inscribed with salience and meaning, and episodes and actions (and omissions) [to be]  
141 repositioned in relation to the present."<sup>24</sup> Through this "spatial contiguity," each museum  
142 palimpsestuously layers the history of conflict with various regimes of memory and retro-  
143 spective affective associations. As Laurie Beth Clark reminds us, the spatial remnants of con-  
144 flict "do not do their work metonymically, that is, they do not stand in for the bodies of  
145 victims. Rather, they work affectively . . . deploying the visible residue of that trauma on the  
146 landscape."<sup>25</sup> This catalyzes some of the complexities of these museums, because it implies a  
147 particular claim to authenticity that non-site-specific monuments cannot access, yet more  
148 urgently poses the question of what an "authentic" narrative might tell us of the history of  
149 conflict by provoking a diverse and unpredictable affective response. In other words,  
150 through its spatial and affective work, the contiguity between content and context is likely  
151 to expand, rather than curb, the various reactions that each site might evoke in visitors.

### 153 **Mleeta, "where the land speaks to the heavens"**

155 Located on the decommissioned site of military clashes between Lebanese and Israeli  
156 fighters in the south of Lebanon, the Mleeta Resistance Tourist Landmark presents itself  
157 as a "natural museum."<sup>26</sup> This evokes both its relationship to the mountainous land-  
158 scape that surrounds it and the "naturalized" congruence between site and ideological  
159 message that the museum promotes. Inaugurated by the Lebanese political party and  
160 militia group Hezbollah in May 2010 (on the 10th anniversary of the south's liberation  
161 from Israeli occupation), the museum rehabilitates the pathways and tunnels used by  
162 Hezbollah fighters against Israeli forces. Indoor exhibition spaces and a cinema room  
163 showcase weaponry, artifacts, and photographs, while landscaped outdoor sections  
164 include viewing platforms giving onto the surrounding mountains, and a sculptural  
165 installation known as the Abyss. Argued by Mona Harb and Lara Deeb to play an  
166 important role in Hezbollah's creation of an "Islamic milieu" in Lebanon, Mleeta  
167 "brings history, memory and entertainment together and allows [visitors] to walk in the  
168 path of the fighters they admire and incorporate pride in the resistance into their senses  
169 of self."<sup>27</sup> Mleeta memorializes conflict and occupation in the south primarily through  
170 the narrative of Hezbollah's success in liberating the region from Israeli occupation and  
171 its ongoing legitimacy as a protector of Lebanese territory. As elaborated in the intro-  
172 ductory film, the museum narrates conflict at Mleeta within a continuous history of  
173 Israeli threat and Arab resistance dating back to 1948, incorporating the 1978 Israeli  
174 invasion of Lebanon and the 2006 conflict, when the enemy fell into a military and  
175 moral "abyss." The museum's architectural and curatorial design produces a site that  
176 can be "acted out"—or, more specifically in this case, reenacted—by visitors identifying  
177 with the resistance fighters who inhabited it, as well as a broader sentiment of Islamic  
178 resistance to Zionism.

180 Entering the site through an archway on which the museum's tagline "Where the  
181 Land Speaks to the Heavens" (*hikayat al-'ard lil -sama*) is emblazoned, visitors are first  
182 guided toward a group of low-rise buildings, housing an auditorium in the visitors' cen-  
183 ter where one can watch a film narrated by Hezbollah's secretary general Hassan  
184 Nasrallah, and an exhibition space. The architecture of these buildings, as well as the

185 archway at the entrance, makes use of sharp diagonals and tilted, irregular shapes, of  
 186 which the head architect Hajj ‘Adil has stated: “We brought in the military by using  
 187 diagonal walls, tilted ceilings, irregular openings, deep windows. We wanted to show  
 188 how architecture can challenge straight lines, just like resistance challenged the ene-  
 189 my.”<sup>28</sup> While this seeks to symbolize and embody the spatial principles and expertise of  
 190 the resistance, it also recalls the distinctive jagged architecture of other museums dealing  
 191 with histories of conflict and genocide, notably including Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish  
 192 Museum, which opened in Berlin in 2001. ‘Adil notes that the architectural team  
 193 surveyed museums in the United States and Europe, including Holocaust museums,  
 194 suggesting that Mleeta positions itself in relation to other war museums worldwide,  
 195 and more pointedly through contesting or competing with the predominance of  
 196 Holocaust memorials.

197 Following this section, visitors pass the Abyss, an installation comprising an Israeli  
 198 Merkava-4 tank and multiple weapons; sculptures, such as a spider’s web and destroyed  
 199 Hebrew lettering (the acronym for the Israel Defense Forces); and scattered IDF boots  
 200 and helmets. Given what Harb and Deeb describe as Mleeta’s implication in a  
 201 “transnational war of memory and history” as a “direct response to holocaust museums  
 202 around the world,”<sup>29</sup> these latter objects may or may not deliberately recall iconic  
 203 images of piles of shoes and other items of clothing stacked by the Nazis in concentra-  
 204 tion camps. Activating the visitor’s imagination through suggestion, their emptiness is  
 205 more, not less, evocative of the bodies that would have worn them. Tour guides explain  
 206 the symbolism of many of the objects: the spider’s web, for example, represents the fra-  
 207 gility of Israeli military force. The Abyss is said to be visible to Israeli satellites and  
 208 planes, and presents a vivid depiction of resistance might and Israeli downfall. Visitors  
 209 continue along a path through the trees, guided by panels in Arabic and English, and  
 210 through tunnels dug by the resistance, passing bunkers, a kitchen, and a prayer room.  
 211 The visit culminates at a large viewing platform at Mleeta’s highest point before passing  
 212 by the gift shop on the way out.

213 The land itself plays a key role in the ideological work of the museum; indeed, *land-*  
 214 *scape* may be a more suitable term for the natural environment experienced at Mleeta.  
 215 This distinction suggests that “the ‘nature’ that is landscape’s subject is never free from  
 216 cultural coding” and that landscape is as much a discourse as an originary environ-  
 217 ment.<sup>30</sup> Mleeta’s personifying tagline, “Where the Land Speaks to the Heavens,” scripts  
 218 the land itself into the narrative presented. Visitors are prompted to view the mountains  
 219 from locations affording splendid perspectives, such as the Lookout, an airy viewing  
 220 platform giving onto villages that, the panel states, were liberated by the resistance from  
 221 Israel in 1985. This is accompanied by the story of the martyr Sayyid Abbas al  
 222 Moussawi’s death in 1992, “preserving the Resistance.” A long flight of steps to Martyr’s  
 223 Hill, a large viewing platform offering stunning 360-degree views of the mountains, con-  
 224 cludes visitors’ experience. In both cases, messages invoking sacrifice for the liberation  
 225 and preservation of the Lebanese territory are underscored by idyllic perspectives over  
 226 the hills and villages of the south and the journey visitors make from the dark spaces  
 227 of the tunnels and pathways to the symbolic light and sense of futurity and hope lent  
 228 by the striking views. Mleeta also functions, then, as a “supernatural” site—a space  
 229 where sacrifice and martyrdom have sanctified and redeemed the land, creating a closer  
 230

231 proximity to heaven. The inscription at the top of Martyr's Hill commemorates not  
232 only a national restoration of the homeland but also a spiritual liberation: "the blood on  
233 this field triumphs over the sword . . . the blood shattered all the shackles."<sup>31</sup>

234 The naturalness of this memorial site is also constructed through the relationship it  
235 presents between the location itself and the ideological message it conveys. In other  
236 words, the site-specificity of the museum works toward *naturalizing* (disguising) its  
237 ideological work. Stories suggesting that fighters were sheltered by the natural environ-  
238 ment and their unique knowledge of the terrain contribute to a "discourse about the  
239 organic relationship of Resistance to land and nature."<sup>32</sup> Visitors are repeatedly  
240 reminded that they are standing on the actual site of the resistance, not least by  
241 Nasrallah himself, who begins the introductory film's narration: "Here, on the very land  
242 that you stand on, the resistance fought and withstood." The museum presents spaces  
243 and artifacts as remnants of historical action: one guide pointed out an exploded cluster  
244 bomb, which he noted had been used by the Israelis, evidence of their violation of inter-  
245 national human rights law. Walking "in the path of the fighters they admire," visitors  
246 situate themselves both spatially and ideologically within the legacy of the resistance.  
247 The visual strategies of the introductory film (e.g., filming through the weapon focal-  
248 izers that are later physically re-encountered in the tunnels) immerse the viewer per-  
249 spectively, and by extension discursively, within the material and ideological history of  
250 the site. Both the evidence and affect of this history are immanent to the environment  
251 around us.

252 Mleeta balances care for the visitor (e.g., through direction from signs and tour  
253 guides, and through water fountains) with a level of physical hardship resulting from  
254 the heat and hilly terrain. This heightens the persuasiveness afforded by reenacting  
255 movement through the terrain and physically empathizing with the struggle of the  
256 resistance fighters. Along the paths and in the tunnels, lifelike mannequins of fighters  
257 occupy scenographies of flags, weaponry, and supplies. A newly opened Simulation  
258 Centre (summer 2018) further enables visitors to take up arms in a first-person shooter,  
259 multiscreen military simulation to defend Lebanon against an inevitable future Israeli  
260 invasion. Combining elements of reenactment, symbolism, and evidentiary material,  
261 then, Mleeta invites the visitor to participate in staging a richly personal relationship to  
262 the history of the site.

### 263 **Beit beirut: the urban fragments of war**

264  
265 If the site-specificity of the Mleeta landmark functions to legitimize a dominant narra-  
266 tive of the past, that of Beit Beirut is far more ambiguous. Beit Beirut occupies a reno-  
267 vated villa dating from 1924, known as the Barakat Building (after the family who  
268 commissioned its design), situated on the northeast corner of the Sodeco crossroad on  
269 the Green Line of civil war demarcation. Offering a 270-degree perspective over the  
270 crossroad, the building was occupied by Lebanese Forces snipers during the war and  
271 suffered extensive material damage. In 2003, the Barakat building was expropriated on  
272 the grounds of public interest, and architect Youssef Haidar's renovation finally began  
273 in 2012, funded by Beirut's city council with guidance from the Mairie de Paris, the  
274 Institut Français, and a scientific committee made up of members from the cultural,  
275  
276

277 academic, and civil society sectors. The restoration stabilized the structure and created  
 278 high-specification facilities for exhibition and events inside the building, but much of  
 279 the damage to the fabric has been kept visible.

280 Curators and artists working in the building have engaged in diverse ways with—and  
 281 elicited varied responses to—its history. Scientific committee member Mona el Hallak, a  
 282 high-profile campaigner for Beit Beirut, has given guided tours in the building alongside  
 283 her exhibition of photographs, *The Photo Mario Project*. The first artistic exhibition to  
 284 take place there, *Sacred Catastrophe: Healing Lebanon* by the visual and performance  
 285 artist Zena el Khalil, addressed the building's associations with the civil war directly  
 286 through a 40-day installation of artworks, performances, and workshops (18 September  
 287 to 27 October 2017). Following this, the Arab Fund for Arts and Culture held a 10-year  
 288 anniversary celebration at Beit Beirut in the form of a two-week exhibition curated by  
 289 Rasha Salti (7–25 November 2017). Inviting more than 40 artists from 15 Arab coun-  
 290 tries, the exhibition leaned into its esthetic to gesture toward “the architectural incarna-  
 291 tion of an allegory of Lebanon’s Civil War, and perhaps the region’s embattled  
 292 contemporary reality.”<sup>33</sup> Both the interdisciplinary exhibition *Shifting Lights*  
 293 (7 December 2017 to 2 January 2018) and the solo exhibition that followed it, *Beirut:*  
 294 *Echo of the Silence* by Brahim Samaha (1–15 February 2018), used light as a metaphor  
 295 for political instability, yet although *Shifting Lights* encouraged personal introspection  
 296 stimulated by the “wounds” of the building, neither exhibition substantively fore-  
 297 grounded the building’s particular history.<sup>34</sup> Intercalated by an exhibition to celebrate  
 298 the fashion designer Elie Saab’s new dedicated postage stamp (31 March 2018), *Haneen*  
 299 (21 February to 4 March 2018) and *Nazra* (from 15 May 2018) have both staged explo-  
 300 rations of war memory in Lebanon, comprising exhibitions accompanied by events or  
 301 discussions; the latter (with German funding) regrouped organizations, including the  
 302 UNDP in Lebanon, the Lebanese Association for History, Committee of the Families of  
 303 Kidnapped and the Disappeared in Lebanon, Fighters for Peace, and International  
 304 Center for Transitional Justice. More recently, regular events, including book launches  
 305 and sales for products from mosaics to designer scarves, would suggest that the space is  
 306 used more for commercial hire than pedagogical curation.

307 For some of these interventions, the Barakat building provides an atmospheric back-  
 308 drop that lends a certain political urgency to exhibitions with only tangential connec-  
 309 tions to the histories of the space and the city. Such examples may imbue them with a  
 310 polyvalent association with the civil war that remains inclusive and open-ended, or  
 311 draw on the building’s history to make broader comments on political volatility in the  
 312 region. However, they also risk divorcing the esthetics of the space from the circum-  
 313 stances of its dilapidation, inducting the building into the same economy of nostalgia  
 314 that underlies much dark tourism in Lebanon.

315 The history of the space has been more directly confronted by interventions such as  
 316 *Nazra*, *The Photo Mario Project*, and *Sacred Catastrophe: Healing Lebanon*. *The Photo*  
 317 *Mario Project* displays a selection of some 10,000 negatives found in a photography stu-  
 318 dio that occupied one of the ground-floor shops in the building before the civil war. The  
 319 exhibition has much in common with other works by Lebanese artists of the wartime  
 320 generation that are based on found images—either real or imagined—and an interroga-  
 321 tion of the historiographical concerns of the archive.<sup>35</sup> Inviting visitors to “adopt” one of  
 322

323 the portraits in search of the characters and stories it represents, el Hallak's exhibition  
324 asks: "How can we engage the public in researching this archive, and through their  
325 research connect them to the city and its memory?"<sup>36</sup> Albeit within a framework of col-  
326 lective participation, the work thus invites a largely individualized, speculative engage-  
327 ment with prewar images. To an extent, this exhibition reclaims the building from its  
328 history of conflict into a celebration of the fashionable cosmopolitanism of mid-century  
329 Beirut, indexed by the stylized studio portraits: the civil war is mentioned only as a "time  
330 of resilience."<sup>37</sup> While el Hallak's fervent protection of and research on the building  
331 would suggest a more directly activist project, such recourse to prewar narratives of the  
332 city has also been the focus of nostalgic imaginaries that elide the social inequalities pre-  
333 sent on the eve of the war, emphasizing a largely middle- and upper-class experience  
334 that draws attention away from the causes of the war.

335 Zena el Khalil's *Sacred Catastrophe: Healing Lebanon* was in turn more direct in  
336 addressing histories of violence. Alongside other works in el Khalil's exhibition, *17,000*  
337 *x Forgiveness*, a large "forest" of green poles on the second and third floors, was  
338 installed in memory of the 17,000 people "disappeared" in the war, also evoking the  
339 foliage that gave the Green Line its name. The relative abstraction of such an installa-  
340 tion, however, as well as el Khalil's chosen mantras of "love, compassion and for-  
341 giveness," position her work within a universal humanist paradigm that arguably makes  
342 an exhibition such as *Sacred Catastrophe* acceptable (if not uncontroversial) to the state  
343 administration. In her view, that the intervention took the form of an artwork also  
344 helped it to pass below the political radar:

345 It's a controversial topic, the disappeared. Because who made the people disappear? The  
346 people who are in public office today. . . . [But] I wonder if, in general, people in Lebanon  
347 still think that art is not such a big deal. That they undermine it: it's just art.<sup>38</sup>

348 The views of those who have chosen to attend or avoid Beit Beirut have been varied.  
349 El Khalil describes young visitors born after the end of the war not recognizing the  
350 symbol of the Lebanese Forces on the walls and asking her the religion of the fighters:  
351 "And I'd always tell them, it doesn't matter, because this house is just like many other  
352 houses. So, we're not going to just identify one religion today. It doesn't matter if they  
353 were Christian or Muslim."<sup>39</sup> Visitors with first-hand or more partisan associations,  
354 however, brought their own stories to the space, such as a woman who remembered  
355 bringing food to the fighters in the building, or a former sniper who fought in the  
356 building as a teenager in the 1970s. According to the artist, the exhibition and work-  
357 shops elicited suppressed discussions between friends who had no idea what the other  
358 had experienced during the war and repeated visits from neighboring residents.

359 Through the exhibition, el Khalil sought to offer healing through closure and to  
360 encourage visitors to share untold stories, both of violence and acts of kindness.  
361 "Everybody wants to talk about the war," she argues. "Everybody has something to talk  
362 about. But there is no space, there is no platform, there is no community center, there  
363 is no environment where real discussions can be had. But within this space, Beit Beirut,  
364 discussions were coming up, confessions were coming up, release was coming  
365 through."<sup>40</sup> Despite any narrative that an exhibition or even permanent archival content  
366 in the museum might steer, however, the building has its own significations that are  
367 deeply personal. As one survey respondent confessed: "I couldn't care less about the  
368

369 exhibition to be honest. I was only interest[ed] in touring the building and I did”<sup>41</sup>; for  
 370 another, the continuing presence of the ruins themselves is the most powerful and  
 371 impactful reminder. While in el Khalil’s account and in the ambitions of civil society  
 372 players working in the space Beit Beirut offers opportunities for memory-sharing across  
 373 sectarian divisions, the powerful affects of the space—its testimonies to extensive and  
 374 largely unaccounted for acts of violence—could also have unpredictable and incendiary  
 375 potential. As one respondent described: “The energy I felt inside the space was almost  
 376 suffocating.”

377 The disruptive power of the building’s past is also matched by the socio-spatial sig-  
 378 nificance and volatility of its location along Beirut’s former Green Line. A political fall-  
 379 out in January 2018 between Amal (Nabih Berri) and FPM politicians (foreign minister  
 380 Gebran Bassil) about leaked video insults resulted in Amal supporters engaging in street  
 381 protests, road blockades, and tire burning in Mar Elias, Ras al-Nabaa, and Bechara al-  
 382 Khoury, which runs alongside Beit Beirut.<sup>42</sup> As Lebanese politicians and the army  
 383 scrambled to defuse urban tensions, it is evident that old fractures and rupture sites can  
 384 be quickly imbued with fresh crises.

### 385 **Umam: archiving the civil war**

386 Unlike the other museums, Umam’s memorial site is both physical and virtual. The  
 387 organization’s base and material archive is located within a traditional Lebanese villa  
 388 compound in Haret Hreik, in Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahiyya). Established in 2004  
 389 by German filmmaker Monika Borgmann and Lebanese publisher and activist Lokman  
 390 Slim, the emerging “citizen archive,” a collation of newspapers, journals, and memoirs,  
 391 has informed workshops, films, public discussions, and exhibitions held in an adjoining  
 392 gallery space called The Hangar. The intended aim of Umam is the creation of a citizen  
 393 resource center, which “helps boost collective reflection on the many different instances  
 394 of conflict and violence that have plagued Lebanon’s past, weigh heavily on its present  
 395 and have the potential to influence its future.”<sup>43</sup>

396 Alongside Umam’s material archive is the more recent addition of a digital web-based  
 397 portal titled “Memory at Work: A Guide for Lebanese on Peace and War.”<sup>44</sup> According  
 398 to its website, this project (which is “under constant construction”) aims to provide a  
 399 dynamic “radical criticism” of the civil war through the creation of a repository of  
 400 diverse voices and images.<sup>45</sup> The bilingual database contains video clips of historic bat-  
 401 tles, interviews with combatants and civil society initiatives, alongside archival sections  
 402 documenting Lebanese war memorials, political assassinations, the “disappeared,”  
 403 amnesty laws, war fronts, and maps of mass graves sites.<sup>46</sup> For some of our Lebanese  
 404 survey respondents, this project is long overdue and has the potential to create a collec-  
 405 tive, pluralistic database unhindered by local sensibilities or territorial divides. “I salute  
 406 the initiative. It’s a mammoth enterprise that needs to be undertaken, and the existing  
 407 [website] is the tip of the iceberg . . . Memory at Work needs more exposure and  
 408 deserves more attention from the public.” Other respondents, however, raised concerns  
 409 about the private nature of Umam D&R and the potential agendas of its international  
 410 sponsors (such as Heinrich Böll, EuropeAid, and Canada Fund), the tight control over  
 411 who uploads material, and its apparent Western-leaning perspective: “it seems like it is  
 412  
 413  
 414

415 designed by someone who doesn't live here." Such criticisms may reflect deeper con-  
416 cerns about foreign interference and political agendas; yet, a de-territorialized war mem-  
417 ory archive does not alleviate questions about accessibility, control, and which war  
418 narratives are privileged.

419 If "Memory at Work" offers an online portal into Lebanon's contested past as "the  
420 first virtual museum of the Lebanese Civil War,"<sup>47</sup> Umam's organizational base in the  
421 predominantly Shia suburb and Hezbollah stronghold of Haret Hreik speaks of a very  
422 contemporary struggle over urban imaginaries and political control. Umam occupies the  
423 family villa of Lokman Slim, a gardened and walled property whose mandaloun-style  
424 Ottoman windows look out onto the densely populated high-rise neighborhood of  
425 Dahiyya. The villa is not a traumatic memorial site but, rather, a space that has with-  
426 stood war, displacement, the transforming power of extensive Shi'i migration (Bekka  
427 and the south), and Hezbollah's political and administrative consolidation of the sub-  
428 urb.<sup>48</sup> According to the Slims the building's historical longevity bears material witness  
429 to a bygone cosmopolitan Beirut past where the Slim family (parliamentarian Mohsen  
430 Slim) would host parties for local and foreign dignitaries and the home would be an  
431 open space for communal discussion and debate.<sup>49</sup> In this sense, the villa that houses  
432 the organization's physical war archives exemplifies Umam's memorial project of exca-  
433 vating a lost, neglected past and providing a space for critical historical narratives amid  
434 its increasingly sectarian environs. As Katherine Maddox notes: "The house embodies  
435 the future the organization wishes to project as well as a version of the past."<sup>50</sup>

436 For Lokman Slim, Umam's strategic location is not just about nostalgic longing but a  
437 recognition of Dahiyya's increasing importance within contemporary Beirut and wider  
438 Lebanon: "What is today central? Is Downtown [Beirut] central politically-wise, or  
439 Haret Hreik? I think we are much more central in all senses. Dahiyya is much more  
440 central because it has this value of at the same time fascination and fear."<sup>51</sup> Dahiyya's  
441 centrality for Slim is linked to Hezbollah's growing orbit of power within Lebanese pol-  
442 itics—"we are a country which is itself under occupation." This is also felt through the  
443 Party's everyday inculcation of an Islamic urban milieu in the southern suburbs,  
444 embraced by their supporters as pious resistance and rejected by others as sectarian  
445 hegemony. Umam's secular and liberal credentials (serving alcohol, screening controver-  
446 sial films) challenge the religious conservatism of their neighborhood; more signifi-  
447 cantly, memorial projects such as "Collecting Dahiyya" provide alternative historical  
448 narratives that subvert Hezbollah's totalizing accounts. This exhibition, held in the after-  
449 math of Israel's destructive 2006 war, included posters, photos, interviews, *Dahiyehscope*  
450 (a series of short films shot during the war), and an interactive whiteboard map that  
451 encouraged guests to contribute to the dynamic recreation of the southern neighbor-  
452 hood. The testimonies and stories of Christian inhabitants before the civil war empha-  
453 sized the homogenizing logic of displacement and sectarian ghettoization. As Slim  
454 explained to a local newspaper reporter at the opening of the exhibition: "I don't want  
455 to live in a country that is a collection of Dahiyehs, yet I see that's what's happening.  
456 Without making an effort Dahiyeh has become the mirror of what . . . Tariq al-Jadideh,  
457 Chouf and others are becoming."<sup>52</sup>

459 Umam's interventions provide a dynamic and shifting memorial landscape, one that  
460 seeks to entwine historic material archives (Villa Slim) and artistic engagement through

461 exhibitions, installations, and cultural events in The Hangar. The Hangar, as Maddox  
 462 explains, is a “space where ‘fictional potentialities’ and ‘interpretations of fact’ that arise  
 463 from the contestation of the nation are addressed through artistic and cultural interven-  
 464 tions with the hope of arriving at some definite answer.”<sup>53</sup> The fusion of material sour-  
 465 ces and imaginative interpretation represent the challenge of reconstructing the  
 466 Lebanese past within a very precarious present. Monika Borgmann’s story of Umam’s  
 467 encounter with the Ain el-Remmaneh bus is indicative of this struggle:

468 For three years between 2011 and 2013, the famous bus of Ain el-Remmaneh was in  
 469 UMAM. The civil war started with an accident with a bus. So, this bus was here. It was  
 470 first part of an exhibition we organized, then the exhibition after two months ended the  
 471 real bus stayed here in our place . . . We found the bus ourselves, the bus was in the  
 472 South. We brought it here, and then it stayed. And as it was attracting huge amount of  
 473 people, a lot of press and so on, today’s owner thought he could make a lot of money with  
 474 it. So, he asked us to buy the bus for US\$200,000. Which we didn’t have, of course. So, he  
 475 took his bus back. Now it’s somewhere in the South.<sup>54</sup>

476 Umam’s recovery and display of the bullet-ridden bus was inspired and accompanied  
 477 by Houssam Boukeili’s artistic exhibition of silkscreen prints of Lebanese buses, *A Bus*  
 478 *and its Replicas* (2011). Viewers were invited to make “critical leaps between memory  
 479 repositories and artifacts assembled,”<sup>55</sup> yet the activist–artist collaboration also raised  
 480 questions of appropriation. As Borgmann recounts, the discovery of this infamous war  
 481 relic did not lead to official preservation but, rather, resulted in a private dispute over  
 482 its financial value and ownership. Boukeili recalls a heated argument between the  
 483 current bus owner and the son of the former bus driver, upset that the bus had  
 484 not been passed on to him: “But why are you talking about my father? You do  
 485 not know my father, it is our history.”<sup>56</sup> Such memorial exhibitions not only  
 486 provoke debates about who has the right to tell Lebanon’s violent histories  
 487 but also reveal the emotive power of war artifacts to disturb and challenge pre-  
 488 sent realities.

## 491 **Narratives and nation**

492 With the exception of the city council’s somewhat inconsistent guardianship of Beit  
 493 Beirut, none of the memorial museums under review are officially state sponsored or  
 494 administrated sites, yet they cannot be disentangled from nationalist claims. The  
 495 absence of the Lebanese state is a common postwar lament, but in the case of each  
 496 museum there is a negotiation of the state’s (failed) role retold through memorial  
 497 practice.<sup>57</sup> At Mleeta, Hezbollah assumes the role of Lebanon’s national defender  
 498 against Israeli aggression, a consequence of the military failings of the state apparatus.  
 499 Umam takes up the mantle of archivists responding to the state’s deliberate  
 500 obfuscation of national war memory. Beit Beirut, in its incomplete status, indicates a  
 501 Lebanese state willing to acknowledge the urban legacy of violence but reluctant to take  
 502 responsibility for a critical historical examination of the past. Each memorial museum  
 503 thus provides a complex snapshot of the ongoing debates surrounding Lebanon’s post-  
 504 war politics.  
 505  
 506

### Wayn al-Dawala? Where is the state?

During Mleeta's inaugural year (2010–2011), the site was visited by former Lebanese president Emile Lahoud and tourism minister Fadi Abboud, and was embraced as part of the national tourist development plan for south Lebanon. Alternating Lebanese and Hezbollah flags flanked the entrance and stood side by side on the hilltop lookout, symbolizing the complementarity of both the Lebanese state and the Islamic resistance. Eight years later, only Hezbollah flags adorn Mleeta's entrance and the hilltop.<sup>58</sup> Memorabilia intermingling Lebanese and Hezbollah colors can still be purchased in the gift shop, but the nation state is less visible in the esthetic contours of this memorial site. This symbolic decision undoubtedly reflects the complexity of Hezbollah's relationship with the state since their unsanctioned military involvement in the Syrian civil war in early 2013. It may be interpreted as an attempt to uncouple Hezbollah's resistance operations from the Lebanese government's "disassociation" policy in Syria. Alternatively, it may simply reflect the Party's growing self-confidence that it does not need to prove its Lebanese credentials or indeed share its military victories with the Lebanese state. The latter reading supports Mleeta's overall resistance narrative, which exclusively privileges Hezbollah and erases all other Lebanese resistance histories (such as those of Amal, SSNP, and the Communist Party). Mleeta's curation and introductory film eschews Hezbollah's emergence and involvement in the Lebanese civil war, but rather imagines it solely as a liberatory people's movement engaged in an existential battle with an Israeli Zionist enemy that goes beyond national borders and state sovereignties. As Hatim el-Hibri explains: "The museum's task is twofold—to give institutional form to the party's (and therefore the people's) history of guerilla resistance to Israeli occupation, while at the same time making the claim that this specific history is one of national or even universal significance."<sup>59</sup> Hezbollah's current military engagement in Syria, absent from the discourse at Mleeta, is similarly framed as a fight to protect the Lebanese State (and all of its people) through an existential battle against another exclusionary ideology threatening the Middle East: "Salafi takfiri terrorism."<sup>60</sup>

The Mleeta museum has a claim on Lebanon's future as well as its past. Its key ideological imperative is to promote Hezbollah's ongoing necessity in continued resistance to Israel. As much as the spaces, artifacts, and audiovisual material make use of evidentiary and symbolic tropes to persuade visitors of a certain narrative of the past, so they must also tell a particular story about the future. In the words of our survey respondents, Mleeta "helps to keep the creation of an enemy happening"; "You come out [from the museum] ready to fight for your rights"; "It not only recounts past history but the present and all the propaganda that goes with it."

### Truth telling from below

Umam presents itself as cultural custodian of Lebanese war archives, independent from the state and antithetical to the ongoing policy of public censure and denial: "the collection being built by UMAM D&R is destined for Lebanon's public, and . . . is open to everyone *without the restrictions imposed by State or academic entities.*"<sup>61</sup> In this, civil society is seen as autonomous and separate to the state. Umam is certainly a challenger of the Lebanese political establishment, yet its commitment to promote debate and

public discussion of the civil war (and its legacy) through “multiple narratives” of the past is not without agency or political intent. In the organization’s own words, it seeks to challenge “the country’s faulty national memory” and provide a platform “upon which to assess and help deal with Lebanon’s current problems and challenges.” A number of Umam’s projects shift between past and present temporal frames, moving from “truth seeking” to “truth telling,” addressing the Lebanese disappeared (*Missing*, 2008), war crimes and amnesties (*What Is to Be Done? Lebanon’s War-Loaded Memory*, 2008–2009), military (in)justice (*Martial Justice for All? Lebanon’s Military Court: A “State of Martial Law” within a “State of Law,”* 2014–2015), and peace initiatives (*Peace upon You: Revisiting Past Attempts to End Lebanon’s Conflicts*, 2015–2016).<sup>62</sup> Two more recent projects directly confront the most pressing and sensitive of national topics: Syrian refugees and the nature of the Lebanese state. *Most Welcomed? Lebanon through its Refugees*, a series of papers and public workshops held in 2017–2018, offered a critical examination of Lebanon’s historic positions on asylum and refugees, seeking to move the debate beyond security concerns and economic cost and instead suggesting that the polarizing and partisan disputes about refugees represents “an integral component of the enduring debate over Lebanese national identity.”<sup>63</sup>

Umam projects are not explicitly policy orientated, yet the cannot be dissociated from secular liberal politics seeking to challenge Lebanon’s postwar sectarian status quo. Equally, while representing local voices and interests, Umam remains dependent on international funding and is therefore responsive to donor research agendas and global trends. The neoliberal influx of foreign capital into Lebanon following the end of the civil war (1990) and the Syrian withdrawal (2005) created new dependencies, audiences, and discourses for civil society and artistic initiatives. As Hanan Toukan persuasively argues, a 1990s and early 2000s cohort of Lebanese artists and cultural organizations “tied itself to international funding for cultural production and embedded itself within a process of producing and international exhibiting that valorizes culture . . . a professionalized form of art where, some have argued, politics becomes the art of display.”<sup>64</sup> This trend is perhaps evidenced by Umam’s privileging of the English language in publications, public events, and on their website (although Arabic translations are available for some of the work), or, indeed, reflected in recent internationally funded projects on Syrian prisons and prisoners (*Shared Suffering: Exploring the Abyss of Syrian Prisons*, 2012–2013) and the construction of a new online database *Memory at Work Syria: A Toolbox for Rethinking Syria* (2014– ) sponsored by IFA and the German Federal Foreign Office. The professionalization, or “NGO-ization,” of civil society initiatives, as Hammami warns from the Palestinian context, can both de-politicize and distance organizations from their social bases, who become “social groups in need of instruction” rather than “constituencies from which they take their direction and legitimacy.”<sup>65</sup> Umam D&R’s truth telling from below is certainly complicated by its funding from *barra* (outside), while its commitment to instruct and “guide” Lebanese into new narratives of the past seeks to affect real change in the present. This is not to critique Umam’s postwar contribution, but rather to identify that its memorial work is invested in reaffirming a cosmopolitan and pluralistic form of Lebanese nationalism. Among many of our Lebanese respondents, Umam still offers the greatest potential as a war memorial initiative, but it also requires an “expanded database,” which is fully

599 “open-sourced,” providing more space for the uploading of everyday “stories, pictures,  
600 diary records, newspaper articles that would give even more details about  
601 what happened.”  
602

### 603 **Political stickiness**

604 While Beit Beirut advertises itself as a museum and urban cultural center, it is not cur-  
605 rently operating as such, a conundrum indicative of what el Khalil euphemistically  
606 terms the “political stickiness” of state involvement in the project.<sup>66</sup> A competitive bid  
607 was held for curatorship of the space, and although a winner was selected a contract  
608 was never signed. The space is therefore ready, but lacking a permanent curator, and  
609 administrative and logistical delays are suspected by some to belie political unwilling-  
610 ness. As described earlier, a number of artistic and archival exhibitions have since taken  
611 place with varied relationships to the space, the history of Beirut, and the civil war  
612 (or none at all), but at the time of writing there is no permanent museum content and  
613 much of the building lies empty.  
614

615 The reemergence of war actors as part of the contemporary government makes the  
616 histories of violence told by the museum potentially irreconcilable with state narratives  
617 of willful forgetting. To install a permanent exhibition in Beit Beirut—that is, to turn  
618 the building from a memorial site into a museum—would be a radical step toward an  
619 official history of the civil war. In el Khalil’s words, through the involvement of the city  
620 council, “the government’s face is on this building.”<sup>67</sup> Not only would it be near impos-  
621 sible to agree on what this narrative should recount (given ongoing political-sectarian  
622 division concerning war history at both party-political and popular levels), it would also  
623 implicate the state in acknowledging the violent past of the present political elite. As  
624 Umam’s director Lokman Slim regretfully stated of Beit Beirut: “We don’t have any pol-  
625 icy to deal with the legacy of violence in this country. How can we imagine that such a  
626 project will find its way? The whole system finally is based on amnesia, just turning the  
627 page, non-accountability. It doesn’t work, it’s just delusional.”<sup>68</sup> While individual play-  
628 ers, such as the exhibiting artists, sympathetic civil society organizations, campaigners,  
629 and others, might express a certain position or narrative vis-à-vis the war through per-  
630 sonal projects and temporary interventions in the space, it is yet to be seen whether the  
631 museum can or will accommodate any permanent historical content under its official  
632 pedagogical remit, and thus whether the narrative(s) it presents will stake any claim to  
633 national representation.  
634

635 While the building is officially (and financially) in the care of the city council, the  
636 effort of el Hallak and the scientific committee was most visibly behind the expropria-  
637 tion and restoration, and Beit Beirut remains widely understood as a civil society pro-  
638 ject rather than a state one. As one survey respondent expressed, the restoration of Beit  
639 Beirut “is in contrast with the erasure of the war from the Beirut city center. So also  
640 political in many ways, maybe catering more towards the bourgeoisie left—with its arts  
641 exhibitions and programing.” In this case, and similarly to Umam, Beit Beirut is seen as  
642 diverging from the state’s approach to war memory, not least as a building that has  
643 been restored with the signs of violence left intact, rather than reconstructed in the  
644

645 Solidere fashion. Yet for this respondent, its programming remains political in leaning  
 646 toward the (“bourgeoisie left”) agenda of a middle-class civil society constituency.

647 However, universal, humanistic rhetorics can help to disguise politics. El Khalil’s  
 648 thinking on this issue is revealing: “Whoever becomes the curator is in a position of  
 649 great responsibility. Because they’re telling the story of the city. You see I just assumed  
 650 that it would be, like, one of us, you know? One of the good guys! But what if it  
 651 wasn’t?”<sup>69</sup> The apparently unificatory narrative of Beirut’s history (the “good” and  
 652 “right” narrative: “peace and love”) seems to achieve transparency as *the* appropriate  
 653 history of the city thanks to its apparently inclusive and conciliatory stance. Yet while a  
 654 number of the survey respondents suggested that a national museum of the civil war  
 655 should be managed by institutions such as the Ministry of Education or the nonprofit  
 656 and civil society sectors, none of these can be realistically considered apolitical nor dis-  
 657 interested in the implications of war memory in Lebanon today. The impasse at which  
 658 Beit Beirut finds itself is indicative of the contemporary politics of war memory in  
 659 Lebanon in which neither party, nor state, nor civil society is neutral, and in which nei-  
 660 ther reconstructed downtown Beirut nor the Green Line are universally experienced as  
 661 accessible sites of encounter.

662 Whether the historiographical ambivalence of many of the exhibitions at Beit Beirut  
 663 is employed strategically to induct political statements into the space “under the radar,”  
 664 the arts have been invoked as inclusive terrains on which remembering can take place  
 665 without directly undermining the current regime. However, artworks and events curated  
 666 in Beit Beirut hold messages and invitations to their viewers that are socially situated,  
 667 selective, and ultimately cannot avoid being political in nature. Despite the ambiguous  
 668 metaphors of light and sound in *Echo of the Silence*; the attention to personal, subjective  
 669 narratives invited by *The Photo Mario Project*; or the focus on universalist themes of  
 670 love, compassion, and forgiveness espoused by *Sacred Catastrophe*, such interventions  
 671 may well activate an array of unforeseeable responses from visitors inspired toward  
 672 accountability, reconciliation, or political action in Lebanon, particularly for those with  
 673 first-hand memories of the civil war. El Khalil’s account of a former sniper’s experience  
 674 of her exhibition in Beit Beirut attests to this:

675  
 676 Everybody who came, came because they needed to vent about the war, they needed to  
 677 share, they needed to communicate, to connect, they needed to release. There was a sniper  
 678 who used to fight there in the late ‘70s, and he hadn’t come back since then. During the  
 679 exhibition it was the first time he came through since he was 18 years old, 16 I think,  
 680 fighting there. He came in with his daughter, and it was a very big deal for him. And he  
 681 took her around and he showed her everything, and at the end he came and introduced  
 682 himself to me. And I was very surprised that he would openly say, I used to fight here. No  
 683 remorse in his voice. I told him why, you know, what made you carry a gun? And he said,  
 684 for love. Love of my people and our way of life. Against the other. And for him at that  
 685 time the other were the Palestinians. . . . And he thanked me, because when you first walk  
 686 in on the first floor there was a huge sculpture on the floor that said “Forgiveness”. There  
 687 were tiles with the word “Forgiveness” printed 108 times. So that’s the first thing you see  
 when you walk into the big space. And he said, I walked in and you forgave me.<sup>70</sup>

688 Such an encounter of forgiveness and closure allows for a discussion about the war to  
 689 take place without concrete demands for social justice or change in Lebanon. The  
 690 approach does not insist on the link between the wartime history of Beirut and the

691 aftermaths experienced by Lebanese youth: the injustices permitted by the Amnesty,  
692 political corruption and deadlock, breakdowns in public services, and widespread social  
693 inequality. Narratives of universal forgiveness—reconciliation without accountability—  
694 therefore risk failing to place young people in Lebanon in a position of informed agency  
695 with regard to the current political regime and the future of the nation.

## 697 Conclusion

698 To take these three case studies together evidences the still-contested nature of war  
699 memory in Lebanon. As members of the first generation to be born after the civil war  
700 now come of age as key stakeholders in the future of the nation, no clear way of mov-  
701 ing forward with shared narratives of the past is evident. As has been widely agreed  
702 since the early 1990s, the absence of coherent memory at a national level has led to the  
703 proliferation of narratives at the level of the family, neighborhood, and party as well as  
704 among a largely middle-class civil society struggling to represent national interests. As  
705 Hermez provocatively suggests, “civil society ensured the continual recollection of  
706 Lebanon’s war into the present, but unable to deal with the war’s causes, facilitated  
707 war’s anticipation into the future.”<sup>71</sup> These war museums attest to diverging accounts  
708 and strategies. Mleeta attempts to displace the legacy of a destructive and fractured civil  
709 war with a triumphant liberatory struggle against Israel—the failure of the Lebanese  
710 state replaced with the victory of the Islamic resistance. Umam seeks to uncover a sup-  
711 pressed past that will both challenge the basis of Lebanon’s sectarian politics and offer  
712 new ways forward. Beit Beirut, product of a decades-long struggle to preserve one of  
713 the city’s most evocative monuments, must now find ways to make good on its peda-  
714 gogical mission, even while negotiating the reluctance of the state to associate itself with  
715 histories of civil violence.

716 As Bharucha has argued, “the prefix of ‘post-’ . . . is deceptive in so far as it implies a  
717 clean break with the past, which, in actuality, continues to haunt the present through  
718 lingering legacies of violence, humiliation, and injustice.”<sup>72</sup> In Lebanon’s “post-”civil  
719 war moment, the country is clearly haunted by the fragments, architectures, and stories  
720 of past conflict, but it is also experiencing a present in which the political regimes that  
721 fostered war are have been retained or recast. For Lebanese youth, this has produced  
722 catastrophic levels of inequality, environmental damage, and political disenfranchise-  
723 ment, all of which stand to be renegotiated by this generation through effective engage-  
724 ment with the histories of the present. Interest in the three museums discussed here  
725 points toward desire among Lebanese youth for national war museums that could  
726 “bring together composite materials and multiple testimonies” from fighters, martyrs,  
727 victims, and citizens. While most agree on the pedagogical purpose—“to educate about  
728 the mistakes of the past,” “repentance and learning”—few, however, are ready to believe  
729 in its political feasibility or public acceptance.

## 732 Notes on contributor

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