Blast Theory: Intermedial Performance Praxis and the
Generative Conditions for Performance Subjectivity

J. Luis Manuel Campos

In Submission for the Degree of Doctorate in Philosophy

The Royal Central School of Speech and Drama
University of London, 2014
Dedication

This manuscript is dedicated to my late grandmother, Dolores, and late aunt, Rosario, who continue to guide me with their courageous spirits.
Declaration of Plagiarism

I hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own and that all sources have been properly referenced.

Signature:

London, 22nd August 2014.
Acknowledgments

My deepest gratitude is for Dr. Tony Fisher, my first supervisor, for his unique and unrelenting vision and for being an extremely generous and supportive individual. You have been an exemplary participant subject to this research event and I cannot thank you enough for your belief in the project. You are here between the words.

I would also like to thank Dr. Zachary Dunbar who took over the role of my second supervisor in the middle of the project for all his support and continual inspiration. Thank you for your generous contributions of ideas, practical scholarship, emotional support and energy.

Thanks are also due to my colleague and friend Dr. Experience Bryon for her frank and honest words of wisdom throughout this process. I have learnt so much from you.

I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Andy Lavender for all his support, supervision and advice during the early stages of this research. Also, I am grateful to Professor Robin Nelson who made innumerable suggestions on the final stages of this project without which this thesis would not be what it is today.

My gratitude also goes to Matt Adams and the Blast Theory team. Matt, thank you very much for “opening the drawers” of Blast Theory and allow me to navigate through trajectories of documentation.

Thanks are due to my colleagues at Rose Bruford College Professor F. Jane Schopf and Rebecca Pollock who read and made comments on the final versions of this manuscript as it moved towards its current state. Also, I very
much appreciate the support of my colleagues at the European Theatre Arts department, Andy Crook, Thomas Wilson, Alexia Kokkali and, especially, Anka Makrzanowska for their support during the final year when full-time lecturing became multiple and intensive and when, at times, it was difficult to territorialize my mind and focus.

Thanks are also due to the library staff at The Royal Central School of Speech and Drama – especially Sara – for always providing me with a caring and welcoming space.

Rachel Cockburn and Rebecca Reeves, you both have been truly an inspiration and very good friends throughout this project. I would not know where to begin expressing how important you two have been. Your traces inhabit these pages. Also, thanks are due to my best friend Corey Olin. Your support and friendship never go unnoticed.

Heartfelt thanks are due to my immediate family for showing me that life is always tending-towards. Thank you for installing in me the belief that I could accomplish anything that I set out to do in life. This is also dedicated to my sister Pilar and my nephew Marcos who has a remarkable adventurous spirit and an insatiable curiosity for the new.

As always, my warmest thanks go to my partner, Paul Williamson, who has, through everything, provided me with unconditional and unwavering support and love. You belong to a new solar system. Thank you for making me brave and for showing me the wonders of the present where time and space pass us by. This is a project I could never have carried out without you. You are a thousand beautiful things and, like lovers do, always handsomely know how to make the change from major to minor.
ABSTRACT

J. Luis Manuel Campos

Blast Theory: Intermedial Performance Praxis and the Generative Conditions for Performance Subjectivity

The work of the British theatre company Blast Theory explores intermedial dramaturgies that this thesis claims can be categorized as radical because they present a generative characteristic. Intermediality, understood here as the impact of analogue and digital technologies in theatrical performance, establishes complex relationships between physical and virtual spaces, structures that create a rich polyphony of multiple temporal orchestrations, and narratives that present a multiplicity of performative arrangements. Intermedial performance, as a performative and experiential event, encompasses a triad of performative interactions between performers, spectators and the media itself executed at and concentrated on the moment of the performance encounter. This research argues that this encounter displays a generative character – a moment at which all the attending performance variables come together in a constant process of performative re-activation thus generating the intermedial performance event.

Within this descriptive parameter, this research claims that recent performance conceptualizations fail to account for the work of Blast Theory. Contemporary performance and liveness debates focus principally on the ontology of performance. So, notwithstanding their differences, performance theorists such as Lavender (2002), Fischer-Lichte (2008), and Schechner (2003), and presentness/presence theorists such as Phelan (1993) and Power (2008) all agree that performance is an ontological, ephemeral, and fleeting event. While there are many valid points in these diverse approaches,
they only offer a partial account of the specificities of the work of Blast Theory and, by extent, the intermedial performance event.

This thesis therefore relocates the terms of the debate on a constructivist epistemological basis. In this way, the thesis proposes that an intermedial performance event must be understood beyond the ontological approach by specifically interrogating the conditions of intelligibility; that is, its operative and intelligible architecture of attending elements and the participating subject. The key hypothesis shared is that in introducing a constructivist reading of epistemology, as described by Alfred Whitehead and Gilles Deleuze, a new account of intermediality in performance emerges as a radical dramaturgy, incorporating generative aspects, and with this, a unique type of intermedial performance subjectivity is enabled.
Table of Contents

Dedication. Page 2
Declaration of Plagiarism. Page 3
Acknowledgments. Page 4
Abstract. Page 6
Table of Contents. Page 8
List of Figures. Page 11

Introduction. Page 14
1. Blast Theory: An Instance of Intermedial Performance Practice.
3. Intermediality: Some Initial Considerations.
4. The Organization of the Chapters.

Chapter 1.
Methodology: The Introduction of a Constructivist Reading of Epistemology. Page 55
1. The First Onto-epistemic Condition: A Constructivist Reading of the Temporality of the Event.
3. The Third Onto-epistemic Condition: A Constructivist Reading of the Narrativity of the Event.

Chapter 2.
Execution: Blast Theory’s *10 Backwards* (1999). Page 110
1. *10 Backwards*: Description of Practice.
2.2. 10 Backwards: Repositioning Actuality.

2.2.1. 10 Backwards: Actuality as a Construction of Multiplicities and Mutualities.

2.2.2. 10 Backwards: Actuality as a Rhythmic and Differential Construction of Slowness, Waiting, Repetition and Imitation.

2.3. 10 Backwards: Becoming, Final Thoughts and Problematics.

Chapter 3.
Execution: Blast Theory’s Something American (1996).

1. Something American: Description of Practice.


2.2. Something American: Intermedial Spatiality as Landscape.


2.4. Something American: Becoming, Final Thoughts and Problematics.

Chapter 4.

1. Day of the Figurines: Description of Practice.


2.1 Day of the Figurines: Intermedial Dramaturgy as Spatial and Temporal Inter-engagements of Narrative Occasions and Dramaturgical Assemblages.

2.2. Day of the Figurines: Spatial and Temporal Expansions in the Generation of Intermedial Narrativity.

2.3. Day of the Figurines: Intermedial Narratives as Multiple Intertextual Worlds.
Chapter 5.
The Execution of the Intermedial Performance Subject in the Construction of the Event.

1. The Intermedial Subject: The univocity of Being.

2. The Intermedial Subject as a Learner: Hermeneutics, Multiple Literacies, Learning, and Affect.
   2.1. The Intermedial Subject: Learning as Engaging with Multiple Literacies.
   2.2. The Intermedial Subject: The Affective Dimension.

3. The Intermedial Subject as Intersubjective.

4. The Intermedial Subject: Final Thoughts and Problematics.

Conclusion.

Bibliography.
List of Figures

Chapter 2 figures:

Figure 1: 10 Backwards. Production poster. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 113

Figure 2: 10 Backwards. Still image. Niki in 1999 against a background showing a different time frame. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 114

Figure 3: 10 Backwards. Still image. Niki is being recorded and projected on the screens. There is also a live feed element. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 116

Figure 4: Diagrammatic map showing temporal intensities on the large screen during the first 26 minutes of the performance. P. 123

Figure 5: Diagrammatic map showing the performers' temporal activity during the first 26 minutes of the performance. P. 123

Figure 6: Diagrammatic map showing temporal intensities on the small screen during the first 26 minutes of the performance. P. 124

Figure 7: Diagrammatic map showing temporal intensities of theatrical attending variables such as costumes and sound effects during the first 26 minutes of the performance. P. 124

Figure 8: Diagrammatic map showing temporal intensities during the first 26 minutes of the performance. The dotted lines show moments where clusters of temporal attending variables amalgamate. P. 125

Figure 9: Diagrammatic map showing temporal intensities during the 17-26 minutes of the performance. The graphic shows that all elements are interconnected to produce temporality. P. 126

Figure 10: Diagrammatic map showing the temporal intensities of the first 26 minutes of the performance. The colours highlight the moments in which the occurrence of the temporal attending variables creates temporal clusters. P. 127

Figure 11: Diagrammatic map showing different presentational temporal aspects of the small screen. P. 142

Figure 12: 10 Backwards still image. Niki sees herself magnified on the screens. This magnification both slows down and speeds up the movement of the image on the screen. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 144

Figure 13: 10 Backwards still image. Niki records herself and projects the images using live feed on the screen. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 145
Figure 14: Diagrammatic map showing temporal loops and fragmentations. The same material is repeated on the small screen every minute. P. 149

Figure 15: Diagrammatic map showing interrupted temporalities on the small screen. P. 159

Figure 16: Diagrammatic map showing the C1 in the experiential present as a continuous present. P. 153

Chapter 3 figures:

Figure 1: *Something American*. Production poster. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 168

Figure 2: *Something American*. Still image. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 169

Figure 3: *Something American*. Still image. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 170

Figure 4: *Something American*. Still image. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 171

Figure 5: Diagrammatic map showing intensities in relation to the use of the screen and the “actual” stage. P. 180

Figure 6: Diagrammatic map showing the observed different articulations on the screen between minutes 4 and 10. P. 181

Figure 7: Diagrammatic map showing the different articulations on the screen between minutes 7-19, highlighting the use of graphic design elements. P. 182

Chapter 4 figures:

Figure 1: *Day of the Figurines*. Production poster. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 211

Figure 2: *Day of the Figurines*. Still image showing the operating panel. Photo taken at SONAR, Barcelona. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 215

Figure 3: *Day of the Figurines*. Still image showing the figurines. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 216

Figure 4: *Day of the Figurines*. Still image showing the metal cut out surfaces of the locations. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 217

Figure 5: *Day of the Figurines*. Still image showing the augmented board. Photo taken at SONAR, Barcelona. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 218

Figure 6: *Day of the Figurines*. Still image showing another angle of the augmented board. Photo taken at SONAR, Barcelona. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 218

Figure 7: *Day of the Figurines*. Still image showing the figurines on top of the board. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 219

Figure 8: *Day of the Figurines*. Still image showing audiences observing the board. Photo taken at SONAR, Barcelona. Copyright: Blast Theory. P. 220
Figure 9: *Day of the Figurines*. Diagrammatic map showing patterns of narrative orchestrations. P. 238

Figure 10: *Day of the Figurines*. Diagrammatic map showing the metropolitan area of Barcelona. The city centre is highlighted. P. 239

Figure 11: *Day of the Figurines*. Diagrammatic map showing the configuration of the streets in Barcelona’s city centre. P. 240

Figure 12: *Day of the Figurines*. Diagrammatic map showing the development of DOF narrative in relation to Barcelona’s landmarks. The lines represent the narrative development and expansion – 15th June 2006. P. 240

Figure 13: *Day of the Figurines*. Diagrammatic map showing the development of DOF narrative in relation to Barcelona’s landmarks. The lines represent the narrative development and expansion – 16th June 2006. P. 241

Figure 14: *Day of the Figurines*. Diagrammatic map showing the development of DOF narrative in relation to Barcelona’s landmarks. The lines represent the narrative development and expansion – 17th June 2006. P. 242

Figure 15: *Day of the Figurines*. Diagrammatic map showing the development of DOF narrative in relation to Barcelona’s landmarks. The lines represent the narrative development and expansion – 17th June 2006. The different tones in the colours represent the different intensities in narrative execution. P. 243

Figure 16: *Day of the Figurines*. Diagrammatic map showing the virtual and actual realization of the narrative. Each black dot represents a participant activating a task around Barcelona’s city centre – 17th June 2006 at around 3.30pm. Each grey dot represents the different narrative alternatives as virtual potentialities that each participant was given. P. 244

**Chapter 5 figures:**

Figure 1: The onto-epistemic intermedial subject: a visual conceptualization. P. 298
Introduction

The British theatre company Blast Theory explores dramaturgical modes of theatrical performance that this thesis claims can be categorized as intermedial. Intermediality, broadly understood as the use of analogue and digital technologies in theatrical performance, establishes complex relationships between physical and virtual spaces; structures that create a polyphony of numerous temporal orchestrations; and dramaturgical narratives that present a multiplicity of arrangements. The particularities of these spatial, temporal and narrative compositions enable and construct, this thesis proposes, intermedial dramaturgies that present a radical potential in their configurations.

‘Dramaturgy’ is here broadly defined as a relational mode of theatrical ‘composition’, ‘structure’ or ‘fabric’, stressing the mutual relationships between the enabling and participating elements in a performance and the production of performance processes at the very moment of the performance event (Turner and Behrndt, 2008: 3). Dramaturgy is also employed to specifically highlight the operative strategies that make possible the realization of a given intermedial performance event as an assemblage of narrative lines, points of connections and an intertwining of divergent dramaturgic materials into a compositional scaffolding. The term ‘radical’ is used drawing on its etymological meaning. It derives from the Late Latin adjective radicalis, meaning ‘of roots’ and ‘relating to a root’ and also from the Classical Latin noun radix, meaning ‘root’. It is applied in this research as implying two aspects: first, ‘of and relating to’; that is, the inherent constitution of a given entity or event; and, second, as ‘requiring a different reading of’ and as ‘favouring a fundamental change in the understanding and conceptualizing of a given entity or event’. Put simply, by calling it radical, this thesis stresses that a new conceptualizing reading of intermediality is needed to fully account for its dramaturgical distinctiveness. This thesis argues that the use of analogue and digital technologies implies a reconfiguration of the experiential
nature of the dramaturgical event into a radical dramaturgical aesthetic, which is filled with generative potential and novel intertwining (temporal, spatial and narrative) experiences. Seen thus, the radical nature of intermedial dramaturgy proposed here stresses modes of construction in which constant processes of mediality are activated through the entanglement of human and non-human agencies, enabling continuous information transfers in complex knowledge-making dramaturgical systems.

Intermedial performance encompasses, as Robin Nelson (2010) explains, a triad of performative interactions between performers, spectators and the media itself at the moment of the performance encounter: ‘[a mode of performance] where devices, events and activities are formed out of relationships, necessary interdependences, and mutually co-relating entities’ (Nelson, 2010: 17). The performative is broadly understood here via theorists such as Judith Butler and Amelia Jones to mean ‘reiterative enactments across time’ (Jones, 2012: 12) of acts of constitution of both worldly structures and human subjects. From this perspective, these acts of constitution engage in continuous processes of emergence, creation and action. In this sense, here we understand these temporal constitutions as seeing both the emergence of the subject and the dramaturgical structures as executed at the moment of performance and not as ontologically pre-given as a fixed essence; that is, the performative implies ‘a world in which subjects and objects have not yet come into being and, even if materialized, are always in a constant state of flux and transformation’ (Salter, 2010: xxvi).

Drawing directly on Nelson’s understandings of the performative encounter, this thesis proposes that such a triadic encounter is to be understood in terms of a ‘generative theory’ or what this thesis calls a ‘generative characteristic’. The term generative here means a construction of a system whose dynamics are able to generate multiple performative variations and modes of being. Thus, a generative characteristic is the moment at which all the attending performance variables come together in a constant process of re-activation, which is articulated, this thesis claims, through performative and constructive
frames that re-configure and generate the potential of performance constantly. This performative triadic encounter is here termed ‘the execution of the event’.

This thesis offers an alternative to a range of other approaches to intermedial performance, notably intervening in debates around the ontology of performance, as well as liveness and presentness, in order to conceptualize the intermedial transaction and the participating subject in the intermedial dramaturgical event. In differentiating itself from these alternatives, the argument here gives priority to a constructivist reading of epistemology in order to offer a definition of intermedial performance to determine the limits of such performance by offering a critical account of its generative characteristics.1 Epistemology is broadly understood as the philosophical enquiry into the nature of knowledge and the examination of the subjective contribution to the event where the subject is grasped in a constitutional role. The understanding of epistemology that this thesis employs as a methodological framework is not to be understood in terms of the classical ‘idealist’ epistemological tradition, but in terms of a constructivist epistemology as theorized by Gilles Deleuze and Alfred North Whitehead. This constructive epistemology, roughly defined for now, discusses epistemology and ontology as non-separated philosophical fields – it recognizes onto-epistemic features – and conceives processes of actualization and individualization as an onto-epistemic construction in which object/world and subject get constructed as a unity and as an event, actively highlighting the intertwining of agential human and non-human entities.2 Put simply, this thesis claims that only by introducing a Whiteheadian and Deleuzian reading of epistemology can a

---

1 The epistemological approach advocated requires a more fluid understanding of the interrelationship between epistemology and the theatrical event than the standard view has allowed, which, apart from very few cases such as David George (2007), has seen, in general, performance and epistemology as two different fields of enquiry (George, 2007: 27-28).

2 The term constructivism is informed by the writings of Whitehead, Deleuze and Whiteheadian and Deleuzian scholarship. This research’s understanding of Whitehead as a constructivist philosopher also comes from Isabelle Stengers’ monumental scholarship on Whitehead (2002) and the works of Steven Shaviro (2009), Keith Robinson (2006) and Gilbert Simondon (2005). Deleuzian scholarship such as Claire Colebrook (2004), Laura Cull (2011) and James Williams (2011) has been highly influential. For Stengers (2006) and Shaviro, philosophical constructivism is a non-foundationalist and non-anthropomorphic epistemology.
clear and precise articulation of both the participating subject and the intermedial phenomenon be conceptualized. It aims to describe the unity of these two phenomena in terms of an onto-epistemic event. From this theorising perspective, this thesis argues that the execution of the event encompasses constructivist characteristics that see no difference between the notion of the intermedial performance transaction and the participating subjects – performers and spectators, both of whom are activated at the moment of the triadic encounter. Conceived thus, performers and spectators are seen here are equal partners in the performative acts of constitution. We put aside notions of a passive spectator that absorbs performance processes. Instead, the notion of spectatorship employed in this research highlights its agential participation and investment in the performative constitution of the execution of the event. As such, and most importantly, henceforth references to the term ‘event’ will imply the evental construction of both participating subject and intermedial phenomenon. We do not emphasize here the event of performance as an artwork as opposed to static works of art; nor do we stress a phenomenological point of view of an attending subject (performer and spectator) attending to a given worldly structure – a dramaturgy, in this instance. Instead, we highlight how the term event, within a constructivist reading of epistemology, encompasses the constitution of both dramaturgy and the participating subject as an evental unity that fully accounts for the entanglement of agencies in the constant creative process of evental execution.

3 The epistemic relationship between subject and object/world proposed here is not a transcendental reduction to the subject, as in Kant and Husserl. However, there is one aspect that I take from this tradition, that is, the impersonal or pre-individual conditions that make any experience the experience that it is. However, the position highlighted here is that these conditions are not given a priori, as Kant explains, but rather, these conditions, this thesis proposes, agreeing with Deleuze and Whitehead, cannot be dissociated from the actual way they are encountered. Hence, on the one hand, the ontological side which emphasizes the moment to moment of the encounter; and on the other hand, the epistemological that seeks the relationship between the non-subjective conditions which are bound to the moment of the event’s emergence – its generative structures – and the subjective conditions also understood as generative. In this sense, the Deleuzian and Whiteheadian onto-epistemic, in seeing the epistemological as a supplement of the ontological and both as a construction, accounts for the ontological moment to moment, and the subjective and non-subjective structures – the epistemological – of the generative encounter.
Seen thus, this research proposes that attempts to conceptualize the intermedial event on purely ontological grounds would only offer a reduced explanation of the particularities of such an event. What counts is not the mode of performance – its manner of being – as ontological approaches emphasize, but, rather, the pre-subjective and subjective conditions that make such being possible; that is, the articulation and constructive functionality of such an event – its epistemic manner of being – in relation to its temporality, spatiality and narrativity. Within these parameters, this research agrees with Erika Fischer-Lichte (2008), Marvin Carlson (1996) and Cormac Power (2008) insofar as they argue that theatrical performance opens up a liminal space, which gives central importance to the understanding of the nature of performance as event.\(^4\) However, it argues against them in positioning the radical dramaturgy of the intermedial event as neither a temporal linearity nor an ephemeral articulation that occurs restrictively in a “here and now” – the ontological emphasis – but, more exactly, as an event that in its generative and constructive manner can coherently be conceptualized by using an epistemological framework that accounts for the pre-subjective and the subjective elements of the triadic encounter. Here, it is argued that the ontological framework overlooks the generative nature of performance as such because of its overreliance on a vitalist “here and now” – a foundational reading of ontology and an ontological position framed as temporal linearity. However, because intermedial work stresses these generative conditions in the triadic encounter of the execution of the event, ontological approaches

\(^4\) Henry Bial (2004) introduces the concept of liminality to define a space in-between two different spaces with spatio-temporal qualities. In this context of understanding the liminal, Warren Linds (1996) also explains how the term liminal can be linked to the term *metaxis*, which derives from the Greek word *metaxu*, and was first used by Plato meaning between-in. In *Intermediality in Theatre and Performance*, Freda Chapple and Chiel Kattenbelt (2006) point to a number of important issues that arise when two creative media converge and when this convergence is mediated as a performance itself, which they define in terms of in-betweenness. They write, ‘intermediality is about changes in theatre practice and thus about changing perceptions of performance, which become visible through the process of staging. We locate intermediality at a meeting point in-between the performers, the observers, and the confluence of media involved in a performance at a particular moment in time. The intermedial inhabits a space in-between the different realities that the performance creates and thus it becomes, at the minimum, a tripartite phenomenon’ (Chapple and Kattenbelt, 2006: 12).
are, therefore, poorly positioned to make sense of the particularities of intermedial performance.

The argument proposes that intermedial scholarship will benefit by a greater clarity in articulating the radical potential of intermedial dramaturgy. Drawing on the epistemological writings of Deleuze and Whitehead, particularly highlighting their understanding of the event as one of internal multiplicities, process over completeness\(^5\) and dynamic orchestrations over single linearity, this thesis aims to undertake a corrective approach to the standard ontological debates with a view to clarifying the radical aspects of intermedial dramaturgy; that is, this research will articulate a theoretical articulation of intermediality as one in which the temporal, the spatial and the narrative enable radical dramaturgic constructions. As such, temporality, spatiality and narrativity are considered here as the ‘epistemic conditions’ (Allison, 1986: 15) that make the intermedial event possible.

This research aims to do this by focusing on three case studies drawn from the work of Blast Theory – 10 Backwards (1999), Something American (1996) and Day of the Figurines (2006). The work of Blast Theory is discussed as a platform to interrogate the application of this argument – through this argumentative application we will also present the dramaturgical particularities

\(^5\) Both Deleuze and Whitehead can be considered process philosophers. Nicholas Rescher (2000) describes process philosophy as a doctrine in which ‘becoming is no less important than being – but rather the reverse … [the] ever-changing nature [of reality] is to be seen as crucial to our understanding of reality … [a reality in which] processes are not “agents” but “forces” [that create the process]’ (Rescher, 2000: 4). Furthermore, ‘reality is not a constellation of things at all, but one of processes. The fundamental “stuff” of the world is not material substance, but volatile flux … process is fundamental … everything is a matter of process, of activity, of change (panta rhei). Not stable things, but fundamental forces and the varied and fluctuating activities they manifest constitute the world’ (Rescher, 2000: 5). Rescher also describes that process philosophy invokes some basic propositions: 1. Time and change are among the principal categories of metaphysical understanding; 2. Process is a principal category of ontological description; 3. Processes are more fundamental, or at any rate not less fundamental, than things for the purpose of ontological theory; 4. Several, if not all, of the major elements of the ontological repertoire (God, Nature as a whole, persons, material substances) are best understood in terms of processes; [and] 5. Contingency, emergence, novelty and creativity are among the fundamental categories of metaphysical understanding’ (Rescher, 2000: 5-6). He continues, ‘a process philosopher, then, is someone for whom temporality, activity, and change – of alteration, striving, passage and novelty-emergence – are the cardinal factors for our understanding of the real’ (Rescher, 2000: 6). Critically, emergence is the result of a given modus operandi. He explains that the classical principle operari sequitur esse (functioning follows upon being) is the reverse to esse sequitur operari. For process philosophy, he discusses, what a thing is consists in what it does.
that make the work of Blast Theory specific and unique. This thesis intends to prove that Blast Theory’s praxis fittingly maximizes the utilization of this thesis’ line of argument; that is, the work of the company aptly indicates and validates the generative characteristic that is proposed in this research because Blast Theory, as we shall see, opens up questions about the very nature of intermediality and rethinks the relationship between humans and non-humans in their practice, and, therefore, does not focus on a purely anthropocentric perspective in the company’s mode of creation and presentation. The work of Blast Theory cannot be simply described as a manner of staging technologies within dramaturgical environments. Instead, the company’s work creates a complex system of variables in which the organic and non-organic agential factors are intrinsic elements in the temporalizing, spatializing and narrativizing aspects of the dramaturgy. In other words, the media technologies are not simply employed as compositional framing mechanisms; rather, they activate the practice from within, setting the execution of the event in motion. Throughout its history, Blast Theory has created a range of pieces that, as complex systems, present different degrees of articulating openness in their dramaturgical configurations. Moreover, the company’s practice emphasizes and generates, we suggest, the conditions under which media technologies enable novel knowledge-making dramaturgical realities, intensifying the manner of constructing a variety of medial strategies. Hence, these works, we claim, can be called radical because they require a novel manner of conceptualizing.

From this perspective, in choosing the three case studies, first, we have decided to review and acknowledge the production arc that Blast Theory has undergone in its trajectory as a company; that is, we forefront the historicity of the company. In this sense, the first two case studies examine performances produced prior to Blast Theory’s engagement with The Mixed Reality Lab at the University of Nottingham – a milestone in the direction of its work. The final case study reviews a production created after that collaboration had started. Apart from this “chronological” reason, second, each of the case studies was selected because each performance explores a different modality of praxis, ranging from a dance-theatre piece to a pervasive performance-
game. Third, and final, the three case studies will show different modes of
dramaturgical openness in their configuring parameters.

Although each case study will interrogate the three suggested epistemic
conditions, each of the three analyzed performances will also focus on a
different angle of the enquiry into the proposed radical characteristic. Hence,
the chapters will develop the argument of this research progressively by
discussing areas of differentiality, relationality and mereotopological structural
complexity in relation to the suggested radicality of the three epistemic
conditions. In this way, this theoretical legwork will capture the pre-subjective
generative features of each proposed epistemic condition. Additionally, at the
end of each chapter, the thesis will discuss a myriad of suggested possibilities
by which intermedial performance also informs a reading of a constructivist
epistemology; that is, simply put, what intermedial performance tells us about
epistemic constructivism.

To assist the articulation of these findings, this research explores
diagrammatic mapping strategies, as described by Deleuze in his discussion
of non-linearity and non-hierarchy. Diagrammatic mapping strategies will
visually amplify these concepts as they emerge in the course of the argument.
In *Foucault*, for instance, Deleuze (1988) describes the diagram as ‘the
presentation of the relations between [elements] … or the distribution of
particular features’ (Deleuze, 1988: 72-73). Within these parameters, the
diagrammatic mapping employed here is not used as an analytical tool. Rather, it creates an illustration of the conceptualizing relations analyzed in
relation to Blast Theory’s performance instances.

Once these epistemic structures have been examined, the argument will
participate in the intermedial performance debate and create new knowledge
by drawing, within the framework of a constructive epistemology, a succinct
formulation of why exactly intermediality is so potentially radical: it generates
a new way of understanding the performance subject; that is, a subject that,
as opposed to Kantian classical epistemology, ‘no longer says I’ (Deleuze,
1994: 276) and it is not conceived as a disinterested and contemplative
observer of a pre-given and pre-established work of art. This is not a subject that attends to and intends to a given performance transaction. Instead, we propose a conceptualization of the subject whose, on the one hand, identity is executed as a set of continuously renewed relations and instantiations between himself and the environment in which he is situated and whose, on the other hand, process of constructing subjectivity is continually generating consciousness, perception and modes of experience and interpretation – all these instantiated at the very moment of practice. The epicenter of the argument, then, is a theory that understands the aesthetic event not in terms of an attending subject that apprehends an object but a subject who is generated alongside dramaturgically generated orchestrations such that both ‘prehend’ one another (Whitehead, 1929: 312). This is a subject that is neither pre-existent nor stable, but always in the process of becoming, individuated by inherent dramaturgical differences and multiplicities – a conceptualization of the subject’s identity as an event that incorporates the human and the non-human through processes of creativity. As we shall see, creativity, within a constructivist reading of epistemology, is considered the ‘ultimate category’ (Whitehead, 1929: 25); that is, creativity accounts for the experience and onto-epistemic co-constitution and co-emergence of both subject and worldly structures. From this point of view, the explored notion of the subject will be identified as a learner. We offer a conceptualization of the subject that emphasizes his performative engagement with the constitution of the conditions of intelligibility of the execution of the event in a constant process of creating and applying the new knowledge that arises out of the emergent dramaturgical structures – a learner who is in an incessant process of activating concepts and ideas, thinking in practice, experiencing perceptions, exploring interpretations and developing knowledge in a dramaturgical world of affects and embodied cognition that sprouts in performative and situated practice.

The analysis here will produce a new concept of the performance subject that will be called the ‘onto-epistemic intermedial subject’, incorporating both an ontological understanding of the ‘experiencer’ (Nelson, 2010: 45) of performance as well as an epistemological analysis of the elements that are
constitutive for it – the non-subjective conditions of the experience. The argument will show that a new conceptualization of the intermedial performance subject will begin to “fill the gap” left open by standard approaches to the performance subject, which rely simply on a phenomenology of the performance experience. These standard approaches such as Lapage, 2008; Dixon, 2003; Causey, 2006; Nelson, 2010; and Fischer-Lichte, 2008 have been modelled, generally, on hybridity, ephemerality, co-dependence, fragmentation, extension, fluidity and the lack of ontological and epistemological unity.

1. Blast Theory: An Instance of Intermedial Performance Practice.

Blast Theory, led by Matt Adams, Ju Row Farr, and Nick Tandavanitj, is a theatre company based in Brighton and London. The company creates work that operates across boundaries between practices, exploring a variety of media landscapes and using different artistic disciplines such as computer-generated environments. Blast Theory is renowned internationally for their interdisciplinary approach to performance using interactive digital media, at least in their most recent work, to create original and unique forms of performance and mixing performance genres and modes of presentation across the Internet, live performance and digital broadcasting.

Since the company started, its work has interrogated the relationships emerging between the development of technologies and theatrical performance, exploring artistic processes in which different media platforms are used to create dramaturgical environments, emphasizing the conditions under which the spatial, the temporal and the narrative are particularly constructed within these environments. For the company, analogue and digital media present the basis of a unique artistic engine for the creation of aesthetic experiences, exploring the inter-relations between digital and physical worlds and mixed-reality praxis. Blast Theory explores novel forms of dramaturgical articulation, thereby taking the incorporation of technology as a
compositional and articulating starting point, rather than simply embedding technologies in traditional theatre structures. As such, the group has developed innovative ways of translating technological schemes and structures into dramaturgical compositions, vitally stressing the emergence of novel human-technological relationships throughout the history of the company. In this way, the dramaturgical strategies developed by them explore the potentials of interdisciplinary artistic practices and redefine commonly accepted dramaturgical parameters such as narrative linearity. Central to the making of Blast Theory’s work is the constructing of an artistic experience that is always culturally mediated and negotiates the relationships between the various processes that enable art to come into being such as matters of medially and the role of technologies in the modes of production and presentation.

Through the use of analogue and digital technologies in their performances, they also present a direct engagement with the participant subject, the site of performance and artistic practice. Media technologies are used as a platform to develop the conditions for such practices. In this sense, its work has been characterized as emphasizing the ambiguities and boundaries of artistic exploration and modalities through which the artwork reveals the interfaces between itself, the technology applied to its development, and the participating subject in it (see Giannachi and Benford, 2004, 2011; Crabtree, 2003; and Crabtree, Capra and Benford, 2007). In general, their works present interactivity as a form of dramaturgical participation that creates a multi-layered and open-ended artistic engagement – interactivity for Blast Theory not only is a process of interaction, but a mode of interpretation and a means of production and reception – all carefully orchestrated through the use of media technologies.

Within these creative dramaturgical parameters, Blast Theory has been a major partner in two research projects: The Integrated Project on Pervasive Gaming (2004-2008) including partners such as the Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Sony and Nokia; and Participate, a UK project exploring mobiles devices that included the BBC, BT and Microsoft Research.
Additionally, the group collaborates with The Mixed Reality Lab, University of Nottingham.

The company explains their approach as,

Collaborative [and] interdisciplinary work that is highly innovative in its process and execution. To maintain this practice requires long rigorous periods of development followed by international showings over several years that are usually context specific. (www.blasttheory.co.uk. Accessed, 01-09-2012)

The company also focuses on the social, ideological, ethical and political aspects of technology in relation to the politics of new media – although these are aspects of the work that lie beyond the immediate aims and scope of this thesis.\(^6\) In describing the artistic ethos of Blast Theory, Matt Adams (2010) states that the company is committed to ‘reaching outside the boundaries typically addressed by performing arts, visual art, or digital art’ (Adams, 2010: 15-04-2010, interview notes). In doing so, the company explores the inter-links and crossings between everyday life and art, particularly in the context of their collaboration with The Mixed Reality Lab.\(^7\) He also explains how, in their performance pieces, ‘the company creates hybrid worlds of aesthetic engagement’ (Adams, 2010: my interview notes), thematic and operational possibilities. Moreover, he (2007) describes how,

\[\text{themes are one thing but the set of internal relationships in an interactive work is paramount and this is where the most fascinating things are going on and by not announcing a}\]

\(^6\) For a thorough analysis of these socio-political, ideological and ethical aspects in relation to technology with a particular emphasis on the work of Blast Theory see Benford and Giannachi, 2008, 2011; Adams, Benford and Giannachi, 2008; and Crabtree, 2003.

\(^7\) From this perspective, the work of the company could be also described as new avant-gardism, where one finds the experimental extension of the personal and the socio-political of a given epoch as explored in artistic movements such as Fluxus and Happenings during the 1960s and 1970s. Interestingly, in relation to intermedial performance, Greg Giesekam (2007) offers a definition of intermediality that highlights aspects of experimental compositions. He says that intermediality creates a very specific mode of production, which he categorizes as: ‘assemblage productions, which create “compositions”, where a breakdown of hierarchies can be observed. The constructability of the intermedial work encourages performance explorations that are more oriented ‘towards discovering new relationships between images, texts, and performances through open-ended experiment’ (Giesekam, 2007: 14). His describing parameters coincide with some of the categorizing remarks discussed to explain the avant-garde movements.
concept or theme so clearly you invite people to inhabit these spaces and then be implicated much more directly in the relationships that emerge and the ways that technology is mediating their relationships … [between participants] and the artwork generally. (Adams in Giannachi, 2007: 59)

Relevant here are Adams’ remarks regarding the functionality of the engagement, the relationships between participants and artwork and his view on the emergent possibilities of the encounter. Within this context, he also describes the work of Blast Theory as,

an enquiry of the technological relationships established within a given artwork and within electronic and physical spaces. Blast Theory uses emergent dynamics as dramaturgical composition. For us, it is important not to pre-plan narrative and dramaturgical closure. This has always been our purpose since we started to work together as a company. (Adams, 2010: 15-04-2010, interview notes)

In relation to these emergent dynamics described by Adams, the work of Blast Theory sees a shift in the focus of performance away from a complete artwork to the idea of process and the generation of dramaturgical diversity and complexity; that is, Blast Theory’s performances are never the result of linear processes of dramaturgical articulations, but always emerge from a plurality of relations between the constantly mutating parameters of the performance’s attending variables – variables, moreover, that are always already complex in themselves. In other words, the generative characteristic of their work allows for the creation of complex dramaturgical forms and highlights the significance of the multiple relations that compose each single performative frame occurring during the internal orchestrations of the execution of the event – again, we suggest, pointing to its radical nature.

The work engages with specific dramaturgical strategies to create a systematic environment where elements of narrativity, temporality and spatiality are combined to articulate performances that could be categorized as architectures of complexity. These dramaturgical architectures – where each attending variable intertwines and connects to produce a performative fabric of experience at the very moment of the execution of the event – are multifaceted and intricate. Now, given the radical dramaturgical parameters
suggested by Blast Theory’s work, how adequate is it to describe, analyze and categorize such innovations in terms of the standard critical positions that characterize performance debates around the categories of the ontological, liveness and presentness positions that only offer a reduced account of the generative manner of the execution of the event? It is to these questions that we now turn.

2. Liveness, Presentness and the Ontological Debate.

Most contemporary performance and liveness discussions take the ontology of performance – its manner of being – to be the most significant aspect in determining the nature of the performance event. As a general introduction, these debates in performance analysis can be described as ontological for the following reasons: first, they have equated the mode of being of performance with the idea of the immediate and phenomenological presence of the performer – and thus restrict the proper definition of performance to an ontology of what has been termed the “here and now” by, for instance, Peggy Phelan (1993) and Erika Fischer-Lichte (2008); second, this “here and now” has also been connected with notions of non-reproducibility, authenticity and transformation prominent in debates around notions of liveness and ephemerality; and, third, the ontological approach asserts that the “here and now”, grasped as the “being” of performance, should be understood as the very essence of performance. Arguably, this approach is clearly favoured by most performance analyses and includes figures such as Fischer-Lichte (2008), Richard Schechner (2003), Andy Lavender (2002) and Patrice Pavis (1982). It is discussed most prominently in the dispute over the problem of liveness in the debate between Philip Auslander (1999) and Phelan (1993); but it also can be found in presentness theorists such as Cormac Power (2008). This ontological approach emerges from a disagreement with the semiotic, formalist, and materialist approaches to theatre and performance and stresses the “lived” component as well as the vitalism of the performance transaction. However, this thesis argues, in the first instance, this approach suffers from an over reliance on the vitalist aspect of performance – by this we
mean, the ontological principles of vitalism, which, broadly, consider living things to be governed by laws different from those governing inanimate objects; the attempt of this approach was to make a clear dichotomy between static objects of art such as a painting and performance as an “object” of art in process. In the second instance, here it is argued that the clear emphasis on the “here and now” as the prominent understanding of the mode of being of performance has obscured and reduced the understanding of performance considerably. In what follows, these questions are addressed explicitly by looking at some of the principal theoretical moves regarding these ontological readings, focusing on how these positions have been justified as well as what they omit.

Ontological analyses of performance, in general, have interrogated the temporal articulation and manner of being of the intervening elements of performance, focusing on performance in the widest sense: ‘the whole constellation of events … that take place in/among both performers and audience from the time the first spectator enters the field of performance – the precinct where the theatre takes place – to the time the last spectator leaves’ (Schechner, 1973: 8). Cormac Power (2008) explains that the starting position on these debates was formulated when Richard Schechner set the terms with his idea of art as an event – what he calls an ‘actual’ (Schechner, 2002: 59). This actualization, according to Roberta Mock (2000), encompasses both the evental creative condition of the performance as an event and the artwork itself conceived as an organic whole. Mock relates Schechner’s ‘actual’ to the temporality of performance by stating that,

> time is adapted to the event or else the event is organized around a consideration of time, that its production results from conscious or deliberate decisions and that its text or blueprint is repeatable (although necessarily alterable when actually [re-]presented). (Mock, 2000: 3)

---

8 In another definition, Schechner calls performance ‘the whole binary continuum efficacy/ritual-entertainment/theatre’ (Schechner, 2002: 141-2). However, in this definition, he seems to be mixing areas of ideology in relation to live performance with its ontological mode and manner of being that he also equates with temporal linearity.
Mock refers to the performance event in relation to areas of temporal linearity and notions of representation and reproducibility. In this way, she clearly places herself within the ontological debate by emphasizing a vitalist understanding of ontology.

Actively adding to the debate, Peggy Phelan (1993) states: ‘Performance’s only life is in the present’ (Phelan, 1993: 146). She discusses how ‘Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance’ (Phelan, 1993: 146). Furthermore, ‘performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivity … becomes itself through disappearance’ (Phelan, 1993: 146); She concludes that ‘performance in a strict ontological sense is non-reproductive’ (Phelan, 1993: 148). For her, broadly speaking, performance can only be considered a live event. In determining it as a live event, Phelan introduces, Power explains, two key elements into performance theory. First, she conceives performance as an ephemeral event, framed within a reading of ontology as a vitalist and essentialist “here and now”; and second, she equates the live with authenticity, thus, establishing a complete opposition to mediatized performance. Moreover, she writes,

To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology … For only rarely in this culture is the “now” to which performance addresses its deepest questions valued. (Phelan, 1993: 146)

Responding to this, Philip Auslander (1999) declares,

the qualities performance theorists frequently cite to demonstrate that live performance forms are ontologically different from mediatized forms turns out, upon close examination, to provide little basis for convincing distinctions. (Auslander, 1999: 159)

Auslander argues that it is both erroneous to qualitatively separate live performances from mediatized ones and that to somehow privilege live performance on the basis of its authenticity, repetition, intimacy, or resistance
to reproduction is to equivocate over the meaning of performance itself, ignoring its social, cultural and political context. He explains,

Live performance thus has become the means by which mediatized representations are naturalized, according to a simple logic that appeals to nostalgia for what we assume was the im-mediate: if the mediatized image can be recreated in a live setting, it must have been real to begin with. This schema revolves (or rather fails to revolve) into an impossible oscillation between two poles of what once seemed a clear opposition: whereas mediatized performance derives its authority from its reference to the live or the real, the live now derives its authority from its reference to the mediatized, which derives its authority to the live, etc. (Auslander, 1999: 38-39)

Auslander follows,

if live performance cannot be shown to be economically independent of, immune from contamination by, and ontologically different from mediatized forms, in what sense can liveness function as a site of cultural and ideological resistance. (Auslander, 1999: 7)

As such, he says that the ‘the relationship between the live and the mediatized is one of a competitive opposition at the level of cultural economy’ (Auslander, 1999: 11), not at the level of intrinsic ontological differences. He continues, ‘I do not see that opposition as deriving from the intrinsic characteristics of live and mediatized forms, but, rather, as determined by cultural and historical contingencies’ (Auslander, 1999: 11). Auslander concludes, ‘It is not realistic to propose that live performance can remain ontologically pristine or that it operates in a cultural economy separate from that of the mass media’ (Auslander, 1999: 40). Furthermore, he writes,

To understand the relationship between live and mediatized forms, it is necessary to investigate the relationship as historical and contingent, not as ontologically given or technologically determined ... prior to the advent of those technologies (e.g. sound recording and motion pictures) there was no such as thing as “live” performance, for the category has meaning only in relation to the opposing possibility. (Auslander, 1999: 51)

Contra Phelan, he claims that live performance has today been assimilated within a broader range of mediatized performance such as television and
cinema and criticizes how her position has become a ‘site of anxiety … [to] reassert the integrity of the live and the corrupt, co-opted nature of the mediatized’ (Auslander, 1999: 39).

However, two aspects in Auslander’s positions need to be mentioned: first, as Power explains,

by highlighting the reproductive and replicative potentials of mass media, in particular television, Auslander inadvertently draws our attention towards theatre as a representational form particularly well suited to critiquing the illusions of liveness. (Power, 2008: 173).

Second, as Mathew Reason (2004) discusses,

Auslander’s central aim of correcting the imbalance that he sees existing in the privileging of the live and neglect of the mediatized is significant. However, … it seems that serious consideration of the [experiential] perceptions … [is] neglected. While strong in his attempts to describe changing cultural attitudes to different forms of performance, Auslander ultimately seems uninterested in exploring what experiential distinctions might exist, even in the particular historical context in which he is writing. In seeking to debunk the unquestioning valuation of the live over the non-live, Auslander does not actually explore the phenomenological experience of the various forms of live … and non-live [performance]. (Reason, 2004: www.participations.org. Accessed, 12-10-11)

Additionally, Power fittingly summarizes how other recent contributions to the liveness debate such as Pavis and Lavender embrace a more conciliatory approach than Auslander and Phelan, but Power also points out that they, Pavis and Lavender, have not significantly altered the underlying terms. On the one hand, Pavis (1992) argues for the temporal flux of performance and speaks of the interferences between theatre and media, and, in the same vein

---

9 Auslander justifies his position from a cultural-historical shift. He states, ‘the ubiquity of reproductions of performances of all kinds in our culture has led to the depreciation of live presence, which can only be compensated for by making the perceptual experience of the live as much as possible like that of the mediatized, even in cases where the live event provides its own brand of proximity’ (Auslander, 1999: 36). Further, he says, ‘whatever distinction we may have supposed there to be between live and mediatized is collapsing because live events are becoming more and more identical with mediatized ones … ironically, intimacy and immediacy are precisely the qualities attributed to television that enabled it to displace live performance’ (Auslander, 1999: 32).
as Phelan, states that the ephemeral ontology of performance gets “polluted” with the incorporation of media forms or what he calls ‘technological and aesthetic contamination’ (Pavis, 1992: 134). Steve Dixon describes how ‘Pavis sees media and reproductive technologies not simply as an unavoidable influence on theatre, but as a specific “contamination” of it’ (Dixon, 2007: 124). Dixon also highlights how, champions of live performance such as Phelan and Pavis proclaim its uniquely ephemeral ontology in the face of both its increasing marginalization as a cultural form, and what is perceived as its gradual ontological erosion through the incorporation of (or contamination by) dominant media forms and paradigms. (Dixon, 2007: 125)

On the other hand, Lavender (2002), in an attempt to reconcile both sides of the liveness debate, describes how the introduction of media technologies in performance has had a decisive impact on the ontological understanding of performance. He explains,

In mixed media performance there is a state of being simultaneously elsewhere, of being doubled … Mixed media performances present spatial continuity (the stage remains the same) and discontinuity (screen space is fundamentally different from stage space). This is a multiple theatre, where perspectives, ontological states and meanings are not only plural, but simultaneously so. (Lavender, 2002: 189-190)

However, Lavender still insists that theatrical performance ‘has always traded in nowness, and at various points in its history has developed new ways in which to heighten the spectator's awareness of the present moment’ (Lavender, 2002: 189) – a position close to Phelan’s understanding, emphasizing the temporal linearity and essentialist immediacy of the “here and now”. Along the same lines, he discusses the intermedial theatrical experience as multiple but still happening in the “now”. He writes,

it is hardly surprising, then, that the intersection between theatre and new technologies, between the live and the mediatized, between stage and screen celebrates multiplicity at the very point of media merging. Faced with plurality of representational modes and meaning-effects, the spectator experiences a frisson of pleasure – now – at the wonderful synchronicity of their realization. (Lavender, 2002: 190)

Furthermore, he continues,
an experience of liveness is partly a question of being in fuller possession of this [phenomeno-experiential] moment ... liveness and its sibling nowness ... [allow us] to experience more fully the present moment – “live in the now”, as people ... say. [...] A phenomenological understanding of performance follows hot on this particular trait, emphasizing ... nowness, the singularity of experience in the present tense. (Lavender, 2002: 188-189)

Within the same contexts regarding the incorporation of media technologies in performance, Matthew Causey (2002) writes, ‘both “here and now” and “not here and now” [are] possible through the incorporation of technologies of digital media in such forms as video, hypertext, interactivity, and virtual presence within live performance’ (Causey, 2002: 182). As in the case of Lavender, Causey also points out notions of multiplicity in relation to digital performance environments. However, his positions are still described within the “here and now” ontological conceptualizing framework and a phenomenological perspective on liveness.

Recently, Power has proposed that, contra Auslander, Phelan understands performance ‘within rather than without a mass media economy... For Phelan, live performance highlight[s] the problematic status of the real in a mediatized age’ (Power, 2008: 170). Furthermore, following Lavender, Power argues that the ontological aspect of performance is defined by the relation between fixed and mobile stages implied by stage screens; that is, what is seen and represented onstage (Power, 2008: 170).

Additionally, Power describes how, against Auslander’s positions, Mock has argued that the spatio-temporal qualities of theatrical performance cannot be achieved in areas of film or “heavily” mediatized performances. Her understanding is similar to Phelan’s. However, Mock takes a position that might incorporate some mediatized elements within the processes of performance’s presentation. For Mock, liveness is now defined as ‘the potential for discourse between the processes of presentation (which are never finished until the performance is finished) and reception which is the characteristic of the live performance’ (Mock in Power 2008: 157). Yet again,
she seems to conceptualize these processes as temporal linearity and a phenomenology of an attending subject to the performance transaction.

In general, those who advocate the special ontological significance of performance have responded to Auslander by highlighting that performance can only be defined as a spatio-temporal ontological event, stressing the phenomenological aspect of it. Dixon discusses how,

perhaps, then, a phenomenological examination of liveness may provide a more solid foundation for unlocking its ontology, and more tangible perspectives on the debate. Even without recourse to raw dictionary definitions of liveness, in phenomenological terms, it must be agreed that liveness has more to do with time and now-ness. (Dixon, 2007: 127)

However, this thesis argues that these phenomenological readings are conceptualized from a point of view of a “pre-established” subject attending to a phenomenon, actively stressing an anthropologic implication.

In this context of a phenomenological reading of liveness and ontological ephemerality, Erika Fischer-Lichte (2008) states, ‘the central focus … [lies] on the bodily co-presence of actors and spectators and the so-called “liveness” of performance’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 67). For her, ‘it is necessary that actors and spectators assemble for a particular time span at a particular place and do something together’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2005: 23).

From this perspective, she posits,

The bodily co-presence of actors and spectators to be the fundamental, essential defining factor, between and through which the performance happens as well as the bodily actions which both parties perform. This dynamic and, in the end, unpredictable process, during which unplanned and completely unforeseen things arise, excludes the notion of representation, expressing and mediating given meanings from elsewhere. (Fischer-Lichte, 2005: 25)

Agreeing with Phelan, she suggests,

A new dichotomy has emerged between the live performance constituted by the bodily co-presence of actors and spectators and the autopoietic feedback loop and mediatized
performance, which serve the co-existence of production and reception. Mediatized performance invalidates the feedback loop. (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 68)

She continues,

It [performance] is ephemeral and transitory; however, whatever happens and takes shape in its course comes into being *hic et nunc* (here and now) and is experienced by its participants as being present in a particularly intensive way … performances exhaust themselves in this presentness, that is in their permanent emerging and passing. (Fischer-Lichte, 2010: 31)

Moreover,

The bodily presence of actors and spectators threatens to disappear as a result of its own mediatization. These recorded sequences at least seem to interrupt the feedback loop. The spectators watch the video images, but … [can] not influence them … as far as the audience [is] concerned the feedback loop was interrupted. (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 73)

Fischer-Lichte's conceptualization of the autopoietic feedback loop of performance provides a fuller account of performance as an ephemeral ontological event regarding the internal functionality of the performance. However, it can be argued that her accounts are merely a developed explanation of Phelan's original proposals since they are still reliant on a vitalist emphasis on the essentialist living “here and now”.

Adding to the liveness debate, Fischer-Lichte explains that both sides of the dispute rely on denying each other's claims as a 'fundamental opposition between live and mediatized performance in order to prove the cultural superiority of one over the other' (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 69). According to Auslander, she explains, the mediatized and reproductive aspect of performance grants performance a cultural status. This, according to Phelan, negates the very constitutive aspect of performance. However, Fischer-Lichte proposes that 'neither Auslander's denial of the difference [between live and mediatized] nor Phelan's affirmation of its unique status solves the question of a so-called cultural superiority [of performance]' (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 69). She emphasizes that Auslander makes two important contributions, which are
fundamental to her understanding of performance. First, according to her, ‘the blurring of boundaries between live and mediatized performance in favour of a generic mediatization’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 69). He states,

the live event itself is shaped to the demand of mediatization … To the extent that live performances now emulate mediatized representations, they have become second-hand recreations of themselves as refracted through mediatization. (Auslander, 1999: 158)

Second, in relation to reproduction technologies, he writes, ‘almost all live performances now incorporate the technology of reproduction at the very least in the use of electric amplifications, and sometimes to the point where they are hardly live at all’ (Auslander, 1999: 158). To this second argument she responds that as a result of mediatization, the autopoietic feedback loop is threatened and interrupted. Furthermore, agreeing yet again with Phelan, Fischer-Lichte asserts that ‘the bodily co-presence of actors and spectators cannot be grasped by reproduction technologies’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 69). Both Phelan and Fischer-Lichte agree that performance cannot be saved and recorded.¹⁰ She states, ‘[a]s Peggy Phelan rightly notes, a performance cannot be “saved” retrospectively’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 75). Furthermore, ‘Performance does not consist of fixed, transferable, and material artefacts; it is fleeting, transient, and exists only in the present. It is made up of the continuous becoming and passing of the autopoietic feedback loop’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 75).

Performance, according to Fischer-Lichte, generates itself through the interactions between actors and spectators, which can neither be planned nor predicted. Performance relies, she proposes, on an autopoietic process characterized by its contingency. Moreover, in Performance as Event:

¹⁰ Within these parameters, however, Fischer-Lichte, disagrees with Phelan in one aspect of the argument; that is, Phelan’s view that performance cannot be documented. She explains that, in documenting the performance event, this archival and documentation is a platform to speak about past performances. She quotes, ‘talking about performance marks its absence, a loss. It only exists as an accessible object – to be referred to, discussed and evaluated – insofar as we recognized its disappearance, and this experience presumes the acknowledgement of inaccessible conditions … questions of artistic intent and subjective experience are irrelevant to the art of performance’ (Bormann and Brandstetter in Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 75).
Reception as Transformation, Fischer-Lichte (2010) puts the emphasis on defining and characterizing performance by its nature as events. Performance, she posits,

enables a specific mode of experience that corresponds to a particular form of liminal experience. Since a performance comes into being by way of the interaction between actors and spectators and produces itself as an autopoietic process, it is impossible to label it an artwork in the sense of an object … performance exists only in the process of performance; it exists only as event. (Fischer-Lichte, 2010: 37)

The autopoietic feedback mechanism, she explains, determines performance as a reciprocal and dialogical relationship of co-emergence between performer and spectator. She writes, ‘the relationship between actors and spectators [is established] as one of co-subjects’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 44).

Some aspects of her definitions are worth noting. First, as noted, her arguments are still underpinned by the ontological framework of the “here and now” – the spatio-temporal coordinates, on this view, are the main constitutive elements in articulating her proposed thesis of co-emergence. Second, her understanding of co-constitution and co-emergence relies on a “simplistic” phenomenal reading of the perceiver or experiencer as participating in – even co-acting in the development of the performance event. The psychologist Gilbert Garza (2002) explains that generally a classical reading of phenomenological co-emergence sees, on the one hand, the phenomena as fundamental ontological structures of the human experience as it is meaningfully and actively lived; and, on the other hand, following Husserl, sees the experiencing subject as primary to the experiential moment. Drawing on this conventional understanding, she conceives the relationship between the phenomena and the attending (and/or intending to, as in Husserl) subject to such phenomena as a mutual interplay that transforms one another. This dynamic interplay is what traditional readings of phenomenology also understand as co-constitution (see Husserl, 1964 and Moran, 2000); that is, very broadly put, the experiential bond between the person and the lived world, in which each is only comprehensible in terms of the relation between each other – in other words, a vitalist approach. Most importantly here, her
understanding of co-constitution is rudimentarily based on how subject and performance world inform each other, which is still erroneously reliant on a conception of a phenomenal subject attending to a given world/phenomena. She writes,

a constant exchange takes place between the perceiving subject and the object perceived, which dissolves the fundamental object and subject opposition … both autopoietic feedback loop and perception permanently glide back and forth between subject and object positions. Subject and object no longer form an opposition but merely mark different states of positions of the perceiving subject and the object perceived which can occur consecutively or, in some cases, simultaneously. (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 172)

In this definition, we clearly observe an essentialist reading of vitalism. Deleuzian scholar Claire Colebrook (2010) discusses that this limited and reductive reading of vitalism ‘in its narrow sense might be identified … as the ways in which systems … have their origin in animating life but then come to operate independently of the thought and sense that is their condition of emergence’ (Colebrook, 2010: 1). In this sense, within a given environment, subject and object are co-dependent of each other but still present independent characteristics.

With this in mind, and third, her ideas on autopoiesis are informed by a flawed reading of biological notions of autopoietic organisms as explored by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1980). She sees autopoiesis as a constant dynamic process of re-formation and re-configuration, which she then uses to justify the temporal self-forming and transformational dynamic of the performance event. The physicist Fritjof Capra (2003) fittingly defines the concept of autopoiesis within scientific backgrounds. He writes,

According to the theory of autopoiesis, a living system couples to its environment structurally, i.e. through recurrent interactions, each of which triggers structural changes in the system. For example, a cell membrane continuously incorporates substances from its environment into the cell’s metabolic processes. An organism nervous system changes its connectivity with every sense perception. These living systems are autonomous, however. The environment only
triggers the structural changes; it does not specify or direct them. (Capra in Bryon, 2014: 32)

However, on a close reading of Capra and Maturana and Varela’s writings, they do not explain autopoiesis as a mechanism of continual transformation, but rather the opposite, they describe autopoiesis as a mechanism that, although autonomous, tends towards stability and closure. They clearly point out how a given biological organism changes its internal dynamic and re-configures itself only when being affected by external – and the word external needs to be stressed – elements to the internal components/parts/cells of such organism.

Both Phelan and Fischer-Lichte, then, have equated ontology with a spatio-temporal framework. However, by focusing only on the “here and now” as the defining features for the ontology of performance, both theorists limit their analysis to a single aspect of the ontological structure of performance; what they miss, this thesis suggests, are broader questions concerning what it means for something to have being; or, in other words, what the conditions that make being possible are. As this research notes, reading performance in terms of its epistemology – that is to say, by taking into account the epistemic conditions of the experience, the moment in which the subject encounters the experience, and the encounter itself – will necessarily reveal a broader structural nexus that supports and makes possible the “live” performance event.

When extrapolated to intermedial performance, the consequence of this epistemic reading is that intermedial practice cannot be reduced to the mechanisms of autopoiesis, as explained by Fischer-Lichte, to capture the generative characteristics of the execution of the event. Nor does the “here and now” explain a given spatio-temporal narrative articulation of the kind we find in Blast Theory’s intermedial work. Most importantly, these ontological debates, this research argues, are, therefore, inadequately positioned to account for the proposed radical nature of intermedial dramaturgies. In this way, firstly, the significance of the increasingly complex interaction between
“live” forms and mediatized experience is bound to be anachronistic, and, secondly, the reduction to a vitalist “here and now” is insufficient to explain and account for the work of Blast Theory and, we suggest, intermedial performance in general. The framework provided by the notion of intermediality that this research follows moves away from the theoretical polarization of the live and the mediatized and provides a lens through which to explore the generative patterns manifesting across the execution of the event. The implications of this for intermediality are that technology, subjectivity and the artwork are inseparable and expand in a multiplicity of manners that only the application of a constructivist reading of epistemology to conceptualize the intermedial event can capture and make sense of.

3. Intermediality: Some Initial Considerations.

The concept of intermediality has been difficult to define because it has been widely used in a myriad of critical backgrounds. Klaus Bruhn Jensen (2008) offers what we may call a “standard definition” of the meaning of the term in relation to the use of media in performance and historicizes this development calling for an understanding of the ‘intermedial turn’. He writes,

intermediality refers to the interconnectedness of modern media of communication. As means of expression and exchange, the different media depend on and refer to each other, both explicitly and implicitly: they interact as elements of particular communicative strategies; and they are consistent of a wider cultural environment. (Jensen in Bay-Cheng et al., 2010: 15)

One aspect of the concept is always agreed upon in all definitions; that is, the mutual influence and interaction between media. Chiel Kattenbelt (2008) describes,

11 As an example of this widely debated aspect, Asuncion Lopez-Varela Azcarte (2008) argues that in considering intermediality from the point of view of comparative cultural studies – defined here as ‘a theoretical and methodological framework built on tenets of (radical) constructivism, inter-disciplinary and the contextual and empirical study of culture’ (Lopez-Varela Azcarte in Chapple, 2008: 10) – intermediality can be analyzed as ‘the relationship set in-between the employment practices of multimodal media in contemporary cultural practices’ (Lopez-Varela Azcarte in Chapple, 2008: 10). Thus, intermediality is located in the space where definite ‘territorial demarcations as their points of encounter constantly shift’ (Chapple, 2008: 10).
with respect to those co-relations between different media that result in a redefinition of the media that are influencing each other, which in turn leads to a refreshed perception. Intermediality assumes a co-relation in the actual sense of the word, that is to say a mutual affect. (Kattenbelt, 2008: 25)

The Theatre and Intermediality Research Group of the International Federation for Theatre Research (IFTR) stands at the forefront of the ongoing research discourse. In *Intermediality in Theatre and Performance* (2006), this group advertises intermediality by saying that it is located at the ‘intersection situated in-between the performers, the observers, and the confluence of media, medial spaces and art form[s] involved in performance at a particular moment in time’ (IFTR, 2006). Interestingly, the group places intermediality as an in-between state of dynamic reconfigurations through which the employed media produces a new experience.¹² In one of the chapters of the book, *Mise en Scene, Hypermediacy and the Sensorium*, Lavender (2006) describes how ‘the simultaneous coexistence, the mutual play of what might appear to be two distinct media – the screen and the stage – and the ways in which their very co-relation produces effects of immediacy that are deeply involving – more pleasurable – for spectators’ (Lavender, 2006: 56), stating that ‘one of the potencies of live performance is precisely its ability to involve the spectator in an awareness of the here and now, the uniquely present moment of current experience’ (Lavender, 2006: 64). In *Mapping Intermediality in Performance* (2010), the second book of the group, they describe the intermedial transaction as one of portals, interconnectedness, syncretism, nodes and networks, to list just a few (2010: 19-21). As a group convenor and panel speaker of the Intermediality in Performance working group at the IFTR conference in Barcelona (July, 2013), Sigrid Merx explained that the groups’ focus has shifted from the notion of the in-between towards the idea of a ‘both-and approach’ (Nelson, 2010: 15); that is, ‘a bridge between mediums’ (Nelson, 2010: 14) that work together as a system to accomplish

---

¹² Other theorists emphasize the role intermedial techniques play in the mode of theatrical production – for instance – Greg Giesekam (2007) offers a distinct definition of intermediality as a new mode of staging. He writes, ‘[the intermedial is a] type of production, where more extensive interaction between the performers and various media reshapes notions of character and acting, where neither the live material nor the recorded material would make much sense without the other’ (Giesekam, 2007: 8).

Liesbeth Groot Nibbelink and Sigrid Merx (2010) discuss the dramaturgy of intermediality regarding spectatorial addresses and staging modalities in terms of different and multiple perspectives and aesthetic implications. They write,

First, intermediality allows for a particular way of structuring the stage, employing aesthetic strategies such as montage (spatial, simultaneous) and collage, doubling, difference, framing and interactivity … A second aspect is related to the dramaturgy of spectatorial address: the structuring of the encounter between the stage and the spectator. Both principles organize the performance as process, and, in doing so certain themes emerge by which intermedial performance – as a theoretical object – reflects on its position within a digital culture. (Groot Nibbelink and Merx, 2010: 223-224)

However, one could argue that, within these descriptions, the in-betweeness, portals, and nodes of intermedial dramaturgy only refer, on the one hand, to the manner in which the placing of the media – its staging modalities – reconfigures the compositional dramaturgy of a given performance’s aesthetics; and, on the other hand, to a phenomenological account of intermediality. In regards to this second aspect, Maria Chatzichristodoulou

13 In relation to its aesthetic staging modalities regarding areas of multiple and dynamic modes of dramaturgical presentation and the importance of the spectatorial address, intermediality can be also grasped as a subset of post-dramatic theatre. Hans-Thies Lehmann’s (2006) proposals on post-dramatic dramaturgies discuss post-dramatic principles of dramaturgical composition in terms of their mode of presentation as a more open-ended and multiple mode dramaturgical composition, disrupting, as an example, classical notions of dramatic teleology.

14 Freda Chapple (2006) proposes that ‘intermediality becomes a process of transformation of thoughts and processes where something different is formed through performance’ (Chapple, 2006: 12). She points out the process of transformation occurring during the performative encounter. However, she only seems to imply that the relationship between theatre and performance requires a new form of thinking about the interpretative and categorizing possibilities ("what it is") that the staging inter-relation between the "live" and the technologies bring into question.
(2011), reviewing the group’s second book, states that its proposals focus “extensively” on a phenomenological account of intermediality. She writes, ‘the focus on experience suggests that the phenomenon of intermediality is defined on the basis of the audience members’ perception of it and the experience it affords her’ (Chatzichristodoulou, 2011: 231).

In contrast, Peter Boenisch (2006a) appropriately posits the idea of intermediality in performance as no longer reducible to the concept of using different technologies in live performance.15 Earlier in 2003, he wrote, rethinking the “inter” in the debate on intermediality and foregrounding instead the basic mediality of theatre, we may come to understand theatre no longer as something trans-historically fixed and stable, which in present days, all of a sudden, is challenged by new media – but will rather acknowledge that theatre itself constantly challenges its own history as a traditional medium of literate culture. (Boenisch, 2003: 44)

Moreover, in Aesthetic Art to Aisthetic Act: Theatre, Media, Intermedial Performance, he (2006a) describes intermediality as ‘an effect performed in-between mediality, supplying multiple perspectives and foregrounding the making of meaning rather than obediently transmitting meaning’ (Boenisch, 2006a: 103). In Mediation Unfinished: Choreographing Intermediality in Contemporary Dance Performance, he (2006b) writes,

The message has not already been made and is waiting in the wings to be decoded; signs do not represent, but only ever more forcefully present their yet undecided meaning: intermediality is indeed mediation unfinished. It becomes clear that the inter of intermediality is not performed in between dance and technology, in-between live theatre and mediatized screening, but touches directly on the very process of mediation. (Boenisch, 2006b: 161)

15 Peter Boenisch (2003) argues that in the context of understanding the conventions of theatre, the term intermediality has been “sneaked” into the performance debate. For him, theatre is intrinsically intermedial and, therefore, not reliant on the presence of projections or computer technologies to justify the use of the term. In 2006, he also writes: ‘Theatre itself is a media technology that utilizes, at its very heart, other media to transmit and store, while it highlights at the same time the process of processing information. Essentially theatre is a semiotic practice, which incorporates, spatializes, in disseminates in sensorial terms (thus: performs) the content and cognitive strategies of other media by creating multiple channels, and a multi-media semiotic and sensoric environment. It is exactly through this door where intermediality enters theatrical performance’ (Boenisch, 2006a: 113).
Furthermore, he states,

Intermediality, I suggest, is an effect created in the perception of the observers that is triggered by the performance – and not simply by the media, machines, projections or computers used in performance. I conceive intermediality as much more than yet another strategy to be simply devised, or than just the latest media-technological gimmick feature waiting to be switched on as explained by the instruction manual. (Boenisch, 2006a: 113-114)

Agreeing with Boenisch, this research proposes that the term intermediality is an effect of processes of mediality because both the “inter” and “medium”, etymologically, already mean an in-between. In this way, intermediality comes after the media is placed in a theatrical setting as its effect. Hence, intermediality cannot be simply conceptualized as the blending and placing of different media and technologies in “live” performance. The proposed reading of intermediality here, however, emphasizes that intermediality is better understood, with Deleuze and Whitehead, in terms of ‘what it does’ and ‘how it works’, rather than ‘what it means’ and/or ‘what it is’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 109) – as an ontological conceptualizing approach would do – since the intermedial is in itself produced and constructed by the effect of medial connections. Intermediality produces not just a new opportunity for performance or novel modes of staging, but also a new aesthetic of performance. Put slightly differently, intermediality, this thesis argues, cannot be just reduced to a description of technology and theatre – all theatre can be considered intermedial, as Boenisch points out – but rather as a distinct attempt to transform the theatre/performance aesthetic. Consequently, this research claims that once viewed in terms of its radical dramaturgical potential intermediality is framed as the creation of an aesthetic construction

---

16 Deleuze considers art in general as the field of aesthetic effects, sensations, feelings and affects. Elizabeth Grosz (2008) offers a thorough analysis of his writings on aesthetics.

17 Greg Giesekam (2007) also points out that intermediality is more than blending media in theatrical settings. He refers to Philip Auslander’s contention that ‘the incursion of mediatization into live performance is not simply a question of the use of certain equipment in that context. It also has to do with approaches to performance and characterization, and the mobility and meanings of those within a particular cultural context’. (Auslander in Giesekam, 2007: 15).
in which the attending dramaturgical variables and the participating subject come into being at the very moment of the execution of the onto-epistemic event.

Boenisch makes another pertinent remark in this regard, pointing to the relationship between making and transmitting meaning in relation to the interaction between the “live” and the technological elements. Drawing on his distinction, the intermedial definition sought here, following the philosophical positions of Timothy Barker (2009b), posits that when we think about the performative nature of both interaction and technology, ‘the distinction between the way in which something is performed and the way in which something is aesthetically comprehended cannot be maintained’ (Barker, 2009b: 17). As Barker suggests, we also highlight the manner in which the performative nature of the event,

unfolds both understanding and performing, the knowledge gained from the interaction cannot be separated from the performative action that provided the condition for this knowledge to emerge. Hence, process and experience are implicated in one another. (Barker, 2009b: 17)

Furthermore, he discusses how ‘the processes of systems, organizational structures, affects and the relationality of entities are important, not consciousness per se, which is merely an outcome of these processes’ (Barker, 2009b: 21). Extracting from these theoretical perspectives, this thesis stresses that the performative and creative characteristic of the execution of the event makes it impossible to distinguish an encoded object/transaction from the act of encoding. Hence, process, experience and knowledge-making are mutually and inseparably implicated in a constant process of re-formation, disrupting classical understandings of hermeneutics and transforming classical notions of representation into notions of re-presentation. In other words, the work of art is not “already there” waiting to be interpreted by an attending subject “towards” the performance; rather, the conceptualization of intermediality presented here places the participant

18 According to Peter Boenisch (2006a), intermedial performance presents three semiotic layers regarding the presentation onstage of a given digital object. He explains that this media object is simultaneously presented, present and representational (Boenisch, 2006a: 114).
subject inside the diegetic frame of content; the experiencer engages in a constant re-framing and self-positing of the diegetic frame itself from within. Seen thus, the diegetic frame and the human emerge through their mutual – the entanglement of agencies – performative co-constitution, enabling processes of medial onto-epistemic constructions.

The notion of medium becomes central to the proposed understanding of intermediality here. Christopher Balme (2001) offers some remarks in relation to the notion of medium and argues that intermedial discourse distinguishes three different understandings of intermediality,

The first refers to the transposition of the subject matter from one medium to another medium. The second is intermediality as a specific form of intertextuality and the third refers to intermediality as the re-creation of the aesthetic conventions on one particular medium within a different medium. (Balme in Chapple et al., 2006: 13)

Etymologically, the term medium can be simply defined as a channel – or even a system – of communication and as the technical means of, in this instance, artistic expression. In this conceptualizing framework, ready-made messages are encoded in a particular way, sent over the channel, and decoded on the other end. However, agreeing with Walter Ong19 (1982) and Mary-Laure Ryan (2004), we propose that the manner in which the communication is transmitted through the medium as a channel impacts in a central way the construction of the form and content of the transmitted, keenly stressing the ‘configuring action of the medium’ (Ryan, 2004: 17). What counts here is the how something is communicated, presented and experienced. Simply put, how the channel is constructed – not what it is or its manner of being, hence, placing the emphasis in the onto-epistemological construction rather than “simply” in the ontological.

A constant trait observed in the work of Blast Theory is the specific manner of exploring the use of the latest digital technology as an intrinsic and fundamental mode of creation and presentation. The use of the newest

---

19 Walter Ong (1982) offers his definition in relation to literacy and cultural studies in regards to digital technologies, but his remarks are also helpful here.
technologies, as Marshall McLuhan (1964) in the earlier stages of the intermedial debate pointed out, does not mean the obliterati
on of one technology by the newest one, but a continuous developmental use. He writes, ‘a new medium is never an addition to an old one, nor does it leave the old one in peace. It never ceases to oppress the older media until it finds new shapes and positions for them’ (McLuhan, 1964: 158). Interestingly, this is a process of technological development that requires new ways of reading, making sense and experiencing how a given medium affects the form and content of a given intermedial work. Most recently, along the same lines and in parallel with Boenisch’s reading, Susan Broadhurst (2006) explains how the use of media technologies requires the understanding of a performance transaction as one that requires different modes of reading, interpreting and understanding; that is, ‘a thinking that makes little distinction between the referent and meaning, or for that matter between reality and representation’ (Broadhurst, 2006: 148).

The incorporation of technological elements creates dramaturgies as inter-relations of performative mediations, where boundaries between the media blur. Accordingly, the performative combination of media in the work of Blast Theory produces a fabric of multiple experiential inter-relations and inter-engagements where re-mediation and re-presentation concurrently happen in a process of constant activation – the execution of the event.

Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin (1999) explain that in this co-relation of media a process of re-mediation occurs. They write,

A medium is that which remediates. It is that which appropriates the techniques, forms, and social significance of other media and attempts to rival or refashion them in the name of the real. A medium in our culture can never operate in isolation, because it must enter into relationships of respect and rivalry with other media. (Bolter and Grusin, 1999: 65)

From this angle, they define re-mediation as ‘the representation of one medium in another’ (Bolter and Grusin, 1999: 45). Kattenbelt (2008) explains that re-mediation, according to them, achieves different grades and levels in theatrical performance according to the artistic and aesthetic choices that the
performance makers take in placing media contexts in relation to other media contexts and inextricably media elements also in relation to one another (Kattenbelt, 2008: 25). Re-mediatization, for them, creates both a sense of immediacy and hypermediacy. Hypermediacy is understood here as immediacy in analogue, digital and virtual worlds and develops dramaturgical presentations that attempt to intensify the experience of the “real”: ‘the inseparability of mediation and reality’ (Bolter and Grusin, 1999: 55). Lavender (2006) explains that '[h]ypermediacy is not simply a question of multiplicity of sources, images or image systems. It is expressed through simultaneity: two or more sources, images, systems and effects in play at the same time in a shared ecology’ (Lavender, 2006: 56).

Drawing on McLuhan, Bolter and Grusin describe how ‘what is new about new media comes from the particular ways in which they refashion older media and the ways in which older media refashion themselves to answer the challenges of new media’ (Bolter and Grusin, 1999: 15). Through this refashioning, according to them, re-mediation occurs. Following Bert Vandenbussche (2003), two important remarks can be drawn from their definitions. On the one hand, it can be implied that there is a sense of ‘repurposing’ (Bolter and Grusin, 1999: 45), as the ‘recycling of a particular subject matter [content] taken from one medium within another medium without displaying a formal interaction between the two media’ (Vandenbussche, 2003: www.imageandnarrative.be. Accessed, 10-07-2011) in order ‘to erase all traces of mediation’ (Bolter and Grusin, 1999: 5). On the other hand, for Bolter and Grusin, re-mediation is also understood as a ‘strategy to represent within a medium not the subject matter of another medium but the medium itself (Bolter and Grusin, 1999: 45)’ (Vandenbussche, 2003: www.imageandnarrative.be. Accessed, 10-07-2011). Here it is argued, instead, that what is important is not that one medium represents itself in

---

20 Bolter and Grusin explain how hypermediacy calls for a logic of immediacy, broadly defined as a desire to make the process of mediation imperceptible. In the context of Blast Theory works, I argue, instead, that the processes of mediation are made apparent and explicit. Blast Theory highlights the processes of mediation to foreground the participant subjects the experience of technological mediation in the construction of the performative mediated dramaturgical actions.
another medium, but that form and content should be interpreted as being constructed by the formal functioning of a given medium and how the medium makes the executing subjects aware of how a given medium is being used. Shifting away from McLuhan’s divisions between message and content, and drawing on Bolter and Grusin’s proposals, we highlight that re-mediation should be understood as the temporal and continuous process of medial transformation in which form and content are constructed.

In reference to notions of medium, Jensen (2008) explains that not only does the concept of medium in intermediality call for an understanding of form and content through re-mediation, but also for the specific manner in which a given medium approaches sensory modalities. He writes,

Three concepts of intermediality may be identified in communication research, deriving from three notions of what is a medium. First, and most concretely, intermediality is the combination and adaptation of spared material vehicles of representation and reproduction, sometimes called multimedia, as exemplified by sound-and-slide shows or by the audio and video channels of television. Second, the term denotes communication through several sensory modalities at once, for instance, music and moving images. Third, intermediality concerns the interrelations between media as institutions in society as addressed in technological and economic terms such as convergence and conglomeration. (Jensen in Bay-Cheng et al., 2010: 16)

It is in relation to the possibilities of the connection between intermediality and the human sensorium, this thesis suggests that we should understand Jensen’s claim that,

As a term and an explicit theoretical concept, intermediality has perhaps been most widely used in reference to multiple modalities of experience, as examined in aesthetic and other humanistic traditions of communication research. (Jensen in Bay-Cheng et al., 2010: 17)

Along the same lines of ‘multiple modalities’ of experience described by Jensen, Nelson proposes ‘intermedial theatre [as] both physically based and on-screen; experiences may be both actual and virtual; spaces may be both public and private; bodies may be present and absent’ (Nelson, 2010: 17). In this sense, intermediality can be said to ‘mark the concrete effects of being
definitely multiple and interrelational ... [and it is also] formed out of relationships, necessary interdependencies, and mutually co-relating entities' (Nelson, 2010: 17). Following Lavender (2002), Nelson also states that intermedial performance presents a sense of simultaneity. Lavender writes,

Mixed-media performance presents spatial continuity (the stage remains the same) and discontinuity (screen space is fundamentally different from the stage space). This is a multiple theatre, where perspectives, ontological states, and meanings themselves are not only plural but simultaneously so. (Lavender, 2002: 190)

Also, regarding the above-quoted ‘multiple modalities’, Lars Ellestrom (2010) explains that the intermedial is also multimodal. His theoretical framework explores notions of modality, explaining that four modalities – material, sensorial, spatio-temporal and semiotic – can be observed in various modes and degrees of configurations and modal appearances. These modal appearances are what he calls ‘basic media’ (Ellestrom, 2010: 30). He also speaks of ‘qualified media’ (Ellestrom, 2010: 30); that is, the use of media within specific historical context. As a result of these two, he discusses how any technical medium can be described as any object or body that realizes, mediates and displays basic and qualified media. He writes,

the defining features of a technical medium are its capacity to realize specific interfaces and the perceiver’s capacity to interact with these interfaces and with other users of the medium ... any technical medium, accordingly, can fully mediate certain basic and qualified media. (Ellestrom, 2010: 30-31)

This manner of mediation is what he terms ‘the operational and qualifying aspect of media’ (Ellestrom, 2010: 25). According to him, a technical medium can be described as form and basic and qualified media as content. In this sense, mediation, for him, is the ‘relationship between technical media and basic and qualified media’ (Ellestrom, 2010: 32). Interestingly, in his definitions, mediation, in its modal changes and operational aspects as a process, presents a transformational manner that can be potentially re-positioned as radical; that is, the articulating possibilities of a given intermedial dramaturgical arrangement can be modally and operationally re-activated generatively.
In the context of mediation as a process, Barker (2012) explains that medium as a process ‘provides the conditions for media entities to take form’ (Barker, 2012: 11). He also writes,

Mediation is a process that draws one media entity into a relationship with other pieces of media. By this it establishes a media ecology, where the relationships within the ecology direct the becoming of the singular media entity [the many become one] … the character of an entity it’s gained through its involvement in a system. (Barker, 2012: 11)

Agreeing with Barker’s position, this thesis also stresses that mediation as a process can be also considered a generation of process because each new mediated entity sets ‘the conditions for the becoming of entities. This is a temporal process generating particular conditions for becoming’ (Barker, 2012: 13).\(^{21}\) In this sense, the becoming flux of the process of mediation causes the media re-conditioning.

With all this in mind, and returning to the techniques through which intermediality accomplishes the activation of the human sensorium by means of constructing mediation, the writings of Deleuze and Whitehead, this research proposes, offer a distinct conceptualizing framework since their explorations of process and becoming can help theorize the techniques that intermediality explores such as transformation of the temporal order (linearity) of performance, and creates the sufficient and necessary conditions for dramaturgical multiplicity and complexity to arise. It is for this reason that we need to speak of a new kind of intermedial subject.

\(^{21}\) The work of Timothy Barker has been highly influential on this doctoral research, particularly *Time and the Digital* (2012). His explorations regarding notions of time, within the context of a process philosophy, in relation to digital technology, situating his book in ‘the intersection between technology and culture’ (Barker, 2012: 3), is a thorough attempt at ‘re-thinking the relationship between time and digital technology, taking an approach grounded in [process philosophy] and aesthetic theory’ (Barker, 2012: 7). Although he does not base his writings on a constructivist reading of epistemology, his account of Deleuzian and Whiteheadian process philosophy has illuminated this research. His *Time and the Digital* does not enter into discussions of consciousness per se’ (Barker, 2012: 7), which is the contribution to knowledge of this thesis.
The conceptualization of subjectivity in relation to intermedial praxis has not taken centre stage in recent debates. It is worth noticing, nevertheless, that, in articulating performance definitions, some of the key figures have pointed out, if broadly, some characteristic traits of subjectivity within performance. In their writings, Phelan, Schechner and Fischer-Lichte emphasize their understanding of the type of subjectivity that performance enables. Notwithstanding their differences, the three coincide in allocating some similar and specific traits to the idea of the performance subject. Phelan sees it, in line with her main ideas on performance, as ontologically ephemeral; Schechner stresses its ontological/actual aspects of being determined by and determining the performance transaction; and Fischer-Lichte conceptualizes the subject as purely intersubjective, co-dependent and ephemeral, generated by the dynamics of the autopoietic feedback loop and lacking the autonomous free will of the Kantian transcendental subject. Furthermore, intermedial performance scholarship such as Louise Lapage (2008), supporting her ideas with performance theorists such as Hans-Thies Lehmann (2006) and post-humanist thinkers such as Katherine Hayles (1999), calls the subject of intermedial performance a being ‘modelled on hybridity and fluidity’ (Lapage, 2008: 146) and a ‘schizzo subject who is constructed across and in-between technologies’ (Lapage, 2008: 143) opened up to shared ontologies between the technological and the human. Moreover, she describes how technological and media environments ‘refuse the subject his/her essential character as a conscious, autonomous, and intelligent, being located in a meaningful world’ (Lapage, 2008: 146). She also asserts the impossibility of a transcendental subject in intermedial work: ‘there is no transcendental subject’ (Lapage, 2008: 145). Furthermore, she claims that the subject ‘is precluded any possibility of free will’ (Lapage, 2008: 139). Along the same lines, Dixon

\[22\] Her post-human reading of the subject of intermediadity emphasizes the epistemological over the ontological: ‘critical to this discussion of post-human subjectivity and epistemology … [is the demonstration] that cognitive reality is derivative of particularized material instantiation … [As such, the performance world and] the subject … are formed of specific organizations which alter the very terms of cognition or consciousness’ (Lapage, 2008: 145). Furthermore, she highlights the epistemic ‘mutual and interdependent action between beings and objects’ (Lapage, 2008: 146). Hers is a post-human reading informed by Maturana and Valera’s postulates (Lapage, 2008: 144-145). This thesis, instead, highlights the onto-epistemic. In this way, cognition is not derivative, but emergent at the very moment that both subject and world constructively instantiate.
(2003) describes the subject in relation to digital practices as linked to the Artaudian ideas of the ‘double’ and the ‘uncanny’; and Matthew Causey (2006) sees the subject in digital performance as ‘extended’ and ‘reconfigured’ (Causey, 2006: 16). In a more articulated study, Nelson terms the participant subject of the intermedial event as the performative ‘experiencer’ and claims that this ‘experiencer’, in relation to post-structuralist assumptions, is ‘a conflicted, non-self identical subject who may end up perpetually performing her various identities in an endless process’ (Nelson, 2010: 23). In this sense, Nelson highlights the performative in relation to subjectivity. He also writes: ‘such digital paraphernalia do not necessarily entail the abandonment of a human paradigm … to explore the human condition in the [Kantian] Enlightenment tradition’ (Nelson, 2010: 23).

Arguing against these above-mentioned positions, as will shall see on chapter five, the onto-epistemic conditions, of both the performance transaction and the participating subject via performative, creative and generative frames, interrelates the intelligibility of the intermedial phenomenon and the concept-making and affect-feeling subject as a unified evental construction. In other words, this is not a case of a “chicken and egg syndrome” – of who or what comes first to explain the existence, emergence and mode of being of the other. Here, there is no intermedial performance without the intermedial subject and no intermedial subject without the intermedial performance. There is only the constructivist aesthetic of the intermedial dramaturgical event.

4. The Organization of Chapters.

Chapter one introduces a constructivist reading of epistemology as the methodological framework for this research. It establishes the theoretical parameters that articulate such a reading within the perspective of a Deleuzian and Whiteheadian understanding.

Chapters two, three and four present a detailed analysis of the chosen performances, as case studies, at hand – Blast Theory’s 10 Backwards
(1999), *Something American* (1996), and *The Day of the Figurines* (2006). Each chapter interrogates the presented onto-epistemic conditions, but focuses on a specific aspect of such conditions. For instance, chapter two will highlight notions of differential temporality in relation to the overall proposal. In this way, each of the case studies presents a more developed position by stressing a different perspective of the epistemic conditions that this thesis proposes as crucial to the understanding of intermedial performance in terms of radical modes of presentation, designing strategies and interfacial organizations.

Chapter five conceptualizes the notion of the ‘onto-epistemic intermedial subject’. The chapter articulates a subject definition that engages with and accounts for intermedial performance processes of constitutive experience, notions of constructivist creativity and dramaturgical generative forms. Further, the chapter proposes the indivisible connection between the intermedial phenomenon and the participating subject as an event.
Chapter 1

Methodology: The Introduction of a Constructivist Reading of Epistemology

This chapter introduces a constructivist reading of epistemology as the methodological framework for this research. An epistemological reading of intermediality aims to produce a definition of the performance event that takes account of its conditions of possibility seen here as the conditions that make the intermedial event intelligible and accounts fully for its manner of being. From this perspective, the epistemology of intermedial performance is the understanding and appreciation of the conditions under which intermedial performance is possible. In appreciating an intermedial performance artwork, this thesis proposes that we experience, make sense of, and take part in something that exists through a generative act, understood here, not in the Kantian manner of purely ‘subjective’ a priori categories, but in Deleuzian and Whiteheadian terms: as the point at which all the elements of performance and the participating subject come to an immanent point of synthesis – the execution of the event.

The concept of immanence, central to Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, is crucial to this research’s understanding of a constructivist epistemology. Laura Cull (2011) in a discussion of *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) and *What is Philosophy?* (1994), pertinently suggests that when Deleuze and Guattari speak of the ‘plane of immanence’, they mean a plane ‘that is characterized by the perception of movement rather than objects, by those who occupy it’ (Cull, 2011: 81). Within these defining parameters of compositional movement, immanence, according to Cull, is not to be understood as something that ‘is immanent to something else (such as phenomenological consciousness), but only as pure immanence’ (Cull, 2011: 82). In this way, the
idea of the generative condition of the execution of the event is best grasped according to Deleuzian categories. Deleuze writes, ‘we will say of pure immanence that it is a life, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life … a life is the immanence of immanence: absolute immanence’ (Deleuze in Cull 2011: 82). For Deleuze, life comprises the organic and non-organic, the individual and the pre-individual, at the moment of each given constructive encounter. Plainly, the focus here is that the proposed idea of generativity should be understood in terms of immanence and that immanence, in Deleuze’s sense, as Cull explains, is pure immanence, meaning, bluntly, immanence is all there is.

Cull also notes the Latin root of the word immanence. It derives, according to her, from the word *immanere*, which can be translated as ‘to dwell within’ (Cull, 2011: 82). Furthermore, she expands on the meaning of the word by adopting John Mullarkey’s (2006) understanding of the term as ‘existing or remaining within’, being ‘inherent’ and existing ‘within the physical world’ (Mullarkey in Cull, 2011: 82). In relation to the notion of immanence, Cull argues that Deleuze sees no ontological ‘separation between thought and being (or subject and object), which in turn proffers the possibility of a direct (rather than always-ready mediated) encounter with the real’ (Cull, 2011: 82). Seen thus, we can argue that there is no ontological difference within the immanent nature of the intermedial event in which both the performance phenomenon (the pre-individual) and the participating subject (the individual) are constructed in a constant and re-configuring set of relations (the ont-epistemic) at the very moment of execution. Both are produced immanently and concurrently through the performative movements of constant dramaturgical re-framing: the generative act. In *Pure Immanence: Essays on Life*, Deleuze (2001) writes,

Immanence is not related to Some Thing as a unity superior to all things or to a Subject as an act that brings about a synthesis of things: it is only when immanence is no longer immanence to anything other than itself that we can speak of a plane of immanence … [which may] be defined by a subject or an object that is able to contain it. (Deleuze, 2001: 27)
In other words, the plane of immanence for Deleuze should be approached in terms of the univocity of Being. It must be thought of in terms of the individual as a system interacting with the various systems present in worldly structures. Put simply, the plane of immanence as a system is the constant reworking and emerging of the worldly structures and the human as Being as an event – what we have called here the execution of the event. For Deleuze and Guattari, the notion of the event is explicitly linked to the emergence of the plane of immanence. They write,

THE plane of immanence is that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought. It is nonthought within thought. It is the base of all planes, immanent to every thinkable plane ... Perhaps is the supreme act of philosophy [considered as the creation of concepts]: not so much to think THE plane of immanence as to show that it is there, unthought in every plane, and to think it in this way as the inside and the outside of thought, as the non-external outside and the non-internal inside – that which cannot be thought and yet must be thought. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 59-60)

In relation to the notion of emergence, Experience Bryon (2014) offers a solid standard definition. She explains how,

emergence describes what parts of a system do together that they would not do alone, or how collective properties arise from the parts. It can also speak to a system’s function in that it can describe what something might do in relation to its environment that it would not do by itself. In this way it is very much about the dynamic relationships between things. (Bryon, 2014: 14)

Accordingly, a central question in a constructivist epistemology of intermedial performance is that of the relationship between the emergent generative act that brings the artwork into existence and the experiencers of that artwork. In this sense, at the epistemological level we see the interconnectivity and functioning of the performance’s attending variables and structuring choices. The epistemological level is also the level of the mechanisms and articulating

---

23 Some of the terminology employed in an understanding of the epistemological level as one of functionality, operativity and procedural processes may be similar to what David Davis (2004) designates as aesthetic functionalism and aesthetic proceduralism. As Davies describes, ‘the functionalist believes that, necessarily, an artwork performs a function or functions (usually, that of providing rewarding aesthetic experience) distinctive to art. By contrast, the proceduralist believes that an artwork necessarily is created in accordance with certain rules and procedures’ (Davies, 2004: 238).
relations. Furthermore, the epistemological level is the level of the conditions that make possible such a functioning and structuring, stressing how the emergent operability of these elements presents knowledge-making aspects.

Whiteheadian and Deleuzian scholar Steven Shaviro (2009) aptly describes how Deleuze and Guattari (1984) argue that there is no separation between the producer and the product, or, rather, between nature and subject. For them, he explains, both nature and subject belong to the same process of production as part of a constructive process. They write, ‘there is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the other’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984: 2). From this perspective, Deleuze bases his idea of Being on the rejection of any hierarchical and ontological distinction between mind and matter. Shaviro explains how this rejection, for Deleuze, involves a refusal of any distinction between worldly products and a transcendent producer in favour of the notion of Being as an event and rejects an anthropocentric point of view and notions of identity as guaranteed an ontological essence. Manuel DeLanda (2002) fittingly explains how Deleuze’s philosophy is not ‘about essences or any other transcendent entity, so in his philosophy something else is needed to explain what gives objects [and subjects] their identity through time. Briefly, this something is dynamical processes’ (DeLanda, 2002: 5). In this sense, and translating it into the performance paradigm, a performance transaction and the participating subject are intrinsic to each other and immanent at the moment of encounter between the co-constitutive relations as a dynamic process established between performance subject and performance phenomenon.

Epistemology, broadly, interrogates the conditions of possibility of a given event. Within the background of Kantian epistemology, Henry Allison (1986) coined the term ‘epistemic conditions’ (Allison, 1986: 15) in relation to such conditions of possibility. Kantian scholarship has devoted a large amount of critical thought to the notion of the articulation of the subject (see Paul Guyer, 2000; Henry Allison, 1986; Terry Eagleton, 1990; and Georges Dicker,
A full description of this literature is beyond the scope of this research. It is, however, useful to engage with some of the terminology that has sprung from these interpretations of Kant’s transcendental philosophy in order to position Deleuze and Whitehead’s own epistemological postulates.

In his epistemological critique, Kant defined the concept of transcendental idealism as the search for the necessary and sufficient conditions for the possibility of all possible empirical knowledge. The principal idea, he proposed, was that ‘the a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience’ (Kant, 1929: 138). Hence, it is argued, Mikel Dufrenne (1973) explains, that the conditions of experience are the conditions ‘which make the object an object – not in itself, but insofar as it enters into experience in such a manner that the subject can relate to it’ (Dufrenne, 1973: 443).

In Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Allison (1986) argues that these conditions of experience should be understood as ‘epistemic conditions’, a term, however, never used anywhere in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781). Gary Bahnam (2005) discusses that it is important to note that Allison’s replacement of the more traditional Kantian concepts of ‘a priori form of sensible intuitions’ and ‘categories of the understanding’ by ‘epistemic conditions’ was not simply a matter of updating and simplifying Kant’s highly technical language (Bahnam, 2005: 4). Instead, as Banham suggests, Kantian transcendental philosophy is an interrogation into the necessary and sufficient conditions for the creation of a given experience by a human subject; that is, the constitutive role of the subject in such an experience.

---

24 Paul Guyer (2000), Henry Allison (2004) and Terry Eagleton (1990) explain that by the late 18th Century, Kant tried to reconcile the rationalist and empiricist sides of our knowledge of the world around us. Eagleton (1990) explains how in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant’s transcendental philosophy tries to establish the necessary conditions for the possibility of our knowledge. On Kant’s analysis, very broadly, our knowledge is construed and essentially made possible by the structure of our own minds. Human cognition is the result of an application of concepts to sensations, creating “intuitions” of things in the world, not as they are in themselves, but as they appear to our senses, which, therefore, implies a subject-based component, a purely subjective representation in a spatial-temporal framework (Eagleton, 1990: 70-75).
Although this was seen as controversial within mainstream Kantian scholarship and interpretation, the concept of ‘epistemic conditions’ is, nevertheless, useful for the articulation of the argument that this thesis develops, since it accounts for the necessary and sufficient conditions for the creation of an experience – the technologically mediated experience of the intermedial performance event, in this instance. Two aspects of the term may appear problematic. First, the term refers specifically to the transcendental condition for the experience of objects, while a performance is always a ‘lived’ temporal event; and, as a consequence, second, although it enquires about the possibility of the experience of external objects, it is still heavily idealistic in its applications – presenting the conditions of time and space as ideal in a pure Kantian manner and, in this sense, not acknowledging that the performance event possesses its own spatio-temporal articulating framework and its own agency. However, the usefulness of the term is that it opens up the possibility to equate the conditions of the possibility of the experience with the conditions of the possibility of knowledge – and the subject – of the experience. Seen thus, this research repositions Alison’s ‘epistemic conditions’ on the basis of a Deleuzian and Whiteheadian becoming/eventual plane, an epistemology of the event as coinciding with the emergence of the subject – from Alison’s ‘epistemic conditions’ to this research’s ‘onto-epistemological conditions’.

If, according to Kant, the conditions of the possibility of the experience, Allison’s ‘epistemic conditions’, are the same as the conditions of the possibility of the articulation of the subject, then, following his argument, what can be extrapolated is the idea that the conditions of the possibility of the performance event, the epistemic conditions of performance, are the same as the conditions of the possibility for the existence of performance subject. In other words, the onto-epistemic performance phenomenon and the epistemic performance subject are intrinsically intertwined.

Deleuze offers a different and more critical perspective on Kant in relation to his account of individuation, which provides the transcendental conditions for thought and the transcendental conditions of experience. Deleuze sees no
difference between the event and the subjective individuation occurring in that
event. Edward Willat and Matt Lee (2009) discuss how while Kant and
Deleuze are at completely opposing poles on the philosophical spectrum,
nevertheless, on the most basic level, they are both, in principle, concerned
with the problem of describing the transcendental conditions of experience.

Willat and Lee discussing Quentin Meillassoux provide a useful summary of
this distinction. They write,

the great limitation of transcendental philosophy is then that it
limits thought to what is ‘for us’, excluding what it is in itself
(2008: 3-4). A process of cognition is ‘always there’ underway
(2008: 7) and if we start with this we only have an outside
relative either to consciousness and its forms of
understanding (as in Kant) or to consciousness of sensation
and its characteristics (Deleuze). (Willat and Lee, 2009: 7)

Furthermore, Willat and Lee suggest that both Kant and Deleuze are
concerned with the transcendental conditions of experience and sense and
the question of whether these conditions can account for the experience fully.
Deleuze does not reject the possibility of a transcendental philosophy, but he
terms his understanding of transcendentalism as ‘transcendental empiricism’
(Deleuze, 2004: 56). Although heavily influenced by Hume’s classical notion
of sense-data empiricism, Deleuze, Willat and Lee review, gives a
transcendentally inflected account of empiricism. He repeatedly insists that
transcendental empiricism seeks the conditions for the given. In Difference
and Repetition (2004) Deleuze says, ‘difference is not diversity. Diversity is
given, but difference is that by which the given is given as diverse’ (Deleuze,
2004: 280). For transcendental empiricism, ‘the given is not the origin, but is a
result, a product, an effect’ (Deleuze, 2004: 68-69). Put simply, Deleuze is
concerned with the conditions of the real experience rather than, as in Kant,
all possible experience as such.\(^\text{25}\)

In other words, we move away from the

\(^{25}\) Robert Pierc(ey (1996) describes how Deleuze’s work ‘advances an ontology of difference
— that is, a metaphysics in which differentiation and determination are seen as the principal
characteristic of what there is’ (Piercey, 1996: 270). At the same time, Piercey continues,
‘Deleuze’s ontology is a kind of transcendental philosophy. His ontological claims emerge
from something like transcendental analysis, in that they describe “not the sensible, but the
being of the sensible” (DR, 266). They are “transcendental empiricism” (DR, 56) –
“empiricism” because their subject matter is something “which can be perceived only from the
transcendental idealism of the Kantian First Critique ‘to a constructivist one … [that is,] from merely formal conditions of possibility to concrete conditions of actualization’ (Shaviro, 2009: 34).

Throughout the First Critique, Kant describes time and space as the pure forms of intuition or sensibility of the understanding, its two principal conditions, since even the other categories of the understanding that Kant describes such as quantity, modality, quality and relation are dependent on time and space. Following his proposals, this research also proposes time and space – or the orchestrations of time and space (temporality and spatiality) – as the two main epistemic conditions of intermedial performance. To these two, this thesis adds narrativity as the third epistemic condition of intermedial performance because narrativity can be considered the means through which the abstract components of space and time are rendered ontic, or real, or determinate. Temporality, spatiality and narrativity, it may be argued, are the three epistemic conditions of performance in general. However, it is the contention here that when applied to intermedial practices, as the three Blast Theory case studies will show, intermedial work can be better grasped in the way such works explicitly conceive these three conditions insofar as they break with the logic of traditional performance by executing dramaturgical orchestrations that explore notions of fragmentation, non-linearity and multiplicity. In short, intermediality transforms the epistemic conditions of performance thus allowing for a novel form of performance subjectivity to emerge. Put differently, this thesis argues that it is through narrativity that both the orchestrations of time (temporality) and the orchestrations of space (spatiality) are articulated synthetically. As a result, temporality, spatiality and narrativity are here proposed as the three main onto-epistemic conditions of intermedial performance – as a specific and real

standpoint of a transcendental sensibility” (DR, 144); “transcendental” because they describe not the material world itself, but the conditions of there being such a world. Deleuze’s ontology seeks “to determine an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field, which does not resemble the corresponding empirical field” (LS, 102), but which makes the empirical field possible’ (Piercey, 1996: 270). Steven Shaviro (2009) explains how Deleuze describes ‘the transcendental as a field of potential energies in metastable equilibrium. These potentials can energize or inform a subject, but they do not determine its nature ahead of time’ (Shaviro, 2009: 81).
experience of a given reality, using Deleuze’s terms. Therefore, the functionality of temporality, spatiality and narrativity needs to be interrogated to account for an epistemic definition of the radical nature of intermedial dramaturgies. In this sense, these three onto-epistemic conditions create intermedial dramaturgies that manifest their existence as a system that is in a state of immanence at the very moment of the execution and as the processes that create the generative conditions under which immanence is created, perceived, experienced and sensed, hence, these dramaturgies can be called radical.

In the introduction’s opening paragraphs, it was noted that the generative characteristic operates in a manner of constructive and generative frames executed as creativity. It is to these describing terms that we turn our attention now.

First, Jungmin Lee (2008) discusses how Deleuze in *Cinema I* (1986) offers some remarks on the notion of the frame, originally explored in cinematic and filmic contexts. Deleuze writes, ‘the frame is conceived as a dynamic construction in act [en acte], which is closely linked to the scene, the image, the characters and the objects which fill it’ (Deleuze, 1986: 13). This dynamic process, Lee explains, can be read to create in a manner of installing and enfolding. Conceived thus, a frame can also be a mechanism that encloses the functional mechanism and attending variables of a given event – and/or an internal fragment of a given event. Crucially here, Deleuze notes that framing is a mechanism of enclosing, which, at the same time, opens up the creation of a new frame. He writes, ‘[a frame] opens onto a play of relations … which weave a whole’ (Deleuze, 1986: 17-18). As such, each Deleuzian frame, Lee reviews, generates the next frame creating a chain of framing generations. Deleuze argues, ‘when a set is framed … there is always a larger set, or another set with which the first forms a larger one … on condition that it gives rise to a new [one]’ (Deleuze, 1986: 17). In this sense, Deleuze also highlights the processes by which each frame can be extended into a new one through compositional and transversing forces. From this perspective, the enclosing and the opening up of the framing constructs the
generative aesthetic proposed in this research. Dramaturgical framing is understood as the creation of dynamic and processes, enabling a systematic complexity. One question arises: What is the force that guides this dynamical framing? In the opening paragraphs of this chapter, we have discussed Deleuze’s notion of immanence and established, following Cull, that immanence is compositional movement. It is from this perspective of movement as a driving energy that we propose that framing is an ongoing process, engaging in relational activity. This relationality can be categorized as movement and as an organizing force between the attending elements. From this perspective, each frame is an instantiation, as installing and opening up, relationally generated, arranged, experienced and made sense of. Dramaturgical frames here are also seen as nodes and processes and, most importantly, these framing relations provide the context for the synthetic transitions between the compositional frames, creating connections through architectures of unfoldings. In this sense, the frames can be categorized as ontogenesis, constantly engaged in processes as thresholds; that is, from being to becoming, from one generative force to a framing construction to another generative force. A frame is creativity in movement.

The notion of the frame explored in this research can be also linked to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the ‘plane of composition’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 183), defined as an aesthetic field of possible sensations, affects, arrangements and the creation of thought. For Deleuze and Guattari, an artwork is both thought and pure sensations and affects. They explain how ‘composition is the sole definition of art’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 191). Furthermore, the plane of composition of a given aesthetic event expresses both the becoming of the artwork and its real conditions, conditions that define the genesis of a given aesthetic experience and not the conditions of a possible aesthetic experience, as in Kant. In doing so, the plane of composition enables art to ‘create the finite [each plane or frame] that restores the infinite [all the possible articulations and configurations that may enter into the constructive equation]’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 197). In this sense, through the performative construction of each plane of composition or frame, ‘the many become one and are increased by one’ (Whitehead, 1978: 21); that
is, the many participating elements become one as a univocal synthesis that is in constant transition to amalgamation. This continual transition can be also seen as the dynamic force that guides the constant process of reframing. Seen thus, this logic of multiplicities becoming one enables a multi-linear conception of the intermedial event that produces spatio-temporal and narrative frames, which brings the constructivist aesthetic suggested here to a mobile territory of constant dramaturgical re-configuration.

The plane of composition in art is also the ‘fundamental encounter’ between the attending variables to a given work of art and the participating subject (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 208). In this sense, each frame, as an aesthetic plane of composition, is an onto-epistemic construction in a constant process of self-positing and re-activation. Deleuze and Guattari write,

The work of art only applies by its internal consistency according to the principle that wants the self-position of the created (its independence, its autonomy, its life by itself). As such, by virtue of this principle, the work resembles nothing, mimics nothing. It must “subsist by itself”, on its own, without pointing or referring back to a world outside it, which it would reflect, or to a subject which it would express. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 163)

Apart from theorizing art as a percepts-and-affects compound that stands by itself, Deleuze and Guattari also describe art as thought because art creates concepts and generates intelligibility – as opposed to the Kantian postulates of the Third Critique in which aesthetic experience is disinterested and contemplative, but not intellectual. In relation to art as a concept-making plane of composition, Deleuze and Guattari insist that ‘the concept is not given, it is created; it is to be created. It is not formed but posits itself in itself – it is … self-positing’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 11). As self-positing, art is to be considered as given only in its tendency to become. Concept and plane are posited together in a mutual implication. In short, the self-positing manner of the artwork in constructing concepts is at once the work of establishing a plane of pure immanence. In this way, for Deleuze and Guattari, art is always immanent with life. They write, ‘there is no other aesthetic problem than that of the insertion of art into everyday life’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 293).
Deleuzian scholar Patricia Pisters (1994) explains that “according to Deleuze and Guattari, in aesthetic creation the boundaries between “reality” and “fiction” are no longer relevant, since the experience of the event is real” (Pisters, 1994: 152). Pister continues,

Essential to understanding the role of aesthetics is the fact that Deleuze does not make a distinction between art as a fantasy that presents us with possible but unreal experiences and art that reflects or represents reality. For Deleuze (and Guattari) aesthetic creation is not an experience of something else (unreal or second order), but the production of a real experience in itself. This conception of aesthetics is related to Deleuze’s general rejection of the idea of representation, which he develops in Difference and Repetition. (Pisters, 1994: 154)

In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze (1990) indicates that ‘Aesthetics suffers from a wrenching duality. On the one hand, it designates the theory of sensibility as the form of possible experience; on the other hand, it designates the theory of art as the reflection of real experience’ (Deleuze in Pisters, 1994: 153). Deleuze argues, according to Pisters, that these two aspects of the aesthetic need to be unified, so an aesthetic theory can account for the conditions of the real experience.26

In this context, we highlight Deleuze’s understanding of art as life itself. Through the central notions of becoming and immanence in A Thousand Plateaus and What is Philosophy?, art is conceived as precisely a place of

26 Gregory Flaxman (2008) describes how “[Deleuze considers that] “It is strange that aesthetics (as the science of the sensible) could be founded on what can be represented in the sensible” (1994: 56) … for the insistence upon rendering aesthetics according to conditions of possible experience, or what we can simply call the concepts of representation, paradoxically defines experience in advance of experience. In The Critique of Pure Reason, for instance, Kant seeks to elaborate a ‘transcendental aesthetic’ by defining the concepts that render sensation possible and intelligible. While Kant affirms that the mind must be affected in a certain way in order to provoke thought, and thence the very labour of critique, he finally turns away from the being of the sensible we experience in order to offer an exposition of the conditions of possibility for such experience. Hence, the conditions of possible experience are defined as a priori, but as principles that have the status of right these conditions must be applied to experience and, reciprocally, experience must be subjected to these conditions. “Representation means the synthesis of that which is presented”, Deleuze writes. “Synthesis therefore consists in the following: a diversity is represented, that is to say posed as contained in a representation” (1990: 15)” (Flaxman, 2008: 13-14).
passing. As Deleuze and Guattari (1994) remark, ‘Life alone creates such zones where living beings whirl around, and only art can reach and penetrate them in its enterprise of co-creation’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 173). Similarly, Deleuze (2001) bluntly states, ‘What is immanence? A life’ (Deleuze, 2001: 28-29). Claire Colebrook (2010) stresses that it is important to notice the use of the word ‘a’. By using it, Deleuze does not refer to life in general, but to a singularity, an evental instantiation (Colebrook, 2010: 1-2) – or to what this research calls a constructivist generative frame. In other words, within the constructivist aesthetic proposed here, each aesthetic plane of composition is an instantiation of life. In fact, for Deleuze and Guattari, ‘all art becomes creatively vital precisely through the plunging into the pure immanence of Life … [for them, art is] an act of co-creation with the vital and autopoietic forces of immanence’ (Ambrose, 2009: 112). In this context, autopoiesis as the process of life, following Shaviro, can be described as the processes of an entity that ‘is alive precisely to the extent that it envisions difference and thereby strives for something other than the mere continuation of what already is … Rather, life must be understood as a matter of “originality in response to stimulus”’ (Shaviro, 2009: 92). Furthermore, as Deleuzian scholar Simon O’Sullivan points out, in the interaction between the subject and the artwork, ‘art is not just made for an existing subject in the world, but to draw forth a new subject from within that which is already in place’ (O’Sullivan, 2010: 204). In this sense, the encounter between an artwork and a subject is not ‘the production of actual art-works or simply composed things in the world, but also the practices of a life and of treating one’s life as a work of art’ (O’Sullivan, 2010: 206). In short, ‘[l]ife means novelty’ (Whitehead, 1929: 104).

In relation to Deleuze’s understandings of art as creatively vital, as opposed to essentialist and foundational readings of vitalism as implied in the liveness debate, Deleuzian vitalism, John Protevi (2006) explains, conceives life as concerning the capacity for emergent properties in the self-positing and construction of a given organic and non-organic vitalist system; it also means the creation and constant renewal of a complex system, as a plane of
immanence, engaging in constant processes of relational activity (see also Protevi, 2011). Colebrook (2010) offers a clear explanation,

A living being, as a being, must have its own membrane or border and a milieu; but as a living being must be also open to a life that can never be reduced to any single form … [vitalism here] is at one and the same time committed to … the emergence of the milieu in which thought takes place while also confronting the thousand other plateaus that pass life through … for vitalism is at once an imperative to account for the dynamic emergence of forms, ideas, sense and structures … while acknowledging that which cannot be generated from within thought itself. (Colebrook, 2010: 7)

Furthermore, she (2008) writes,

vitalism has, in its dominant mode, always been a theory of internal relations, and has, therefore, been tied to organicism: something is what it is only because of its relation to a living whole, and the living whole is just the equilibrium, system or set of relations that grants each moment its individuation. On this picture, nothing could be understood as having an essence or potentially outside its definitive relation… Deleuze and Guattari’s vitalist philosophy stresses that relations are extrinsic: nothing has a proper potential that it strives to actualize, for various encounters will redefine any singular potential, and once actualized … singularities could always enter into other relations. (Colebrook, 2008: 130)

In this regard, in Of Life as a Name of Being, or, Deleuze’s Vitalist Ontology, Alain Badiou (2000), explains,

the key injunction of Deleuzian ontology is this: being cannot be bound to any category, to any fixed disposition of its immanent distribution. Being is univocal insofar as beings are never classed or distributed … this is the fundamental reason why being deserves the name of life. (Badiou, 2000: 192-193)

Life, for Deleuze and Guattari, becomes along what they call ‘threads’, ‘lines of flight’ or ‘lines of becoming’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 323). Critically, they describe these lines as lines of multiplicity and non-linearity:

a line of becoming is not defined by the points it connects to, or by the points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes between points, it comes up in the middle … a becoming is neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-between. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 323)
As such, life is an open-ended becoming that re-configures constantly. In this context, each performative encounter, each generative frame, can be described as the gathering together of immanent threads and lines of becoming.

Drawing on this point of view, the proposed notion of the execution of the event encourages us to think of the pre-individual attending variables and the individual as producing themselves creatively and in unexpected ways through their continuous mediating connection and interaction. This perspective, we suggest, renders problematic established definitions of interactivity in relation to art, particularly in digitally informed backgrounds. For example, Gabriella Giannachi (2004) in relation to virtual theatre art explains that it,

consists of a dichotomous paradox, torn between its ontological status which locates it as a part of the real and its aesthetic, through which it demonstrates its difference from the real. From this point of view of perception, a viewer experiences this dichotomy as the principal characteristic … [it] offers fluid and open forms that allow the viewer simultaneously to be inside and outside the work of art. (Giannachi, 2004: 123)

Also, Soke Dinkla (1997) explains that interactivity in art is the phenomenon by which the viewer encounters the work of art: ‘the dialogue with the system that becomes artistic material … [viewers are] at the same time spectators and actors’ (Dinkla, 1997: 41). For her, the encounter, located in time and space between the participants and the dynamics of the encounter, creates the work of art. She stresses that interaction takes place between the digitally informed system and users. On another definition, Katja Kwastek (2013) explains that interactivity in digital art forms tends ‘towards a relaxation of the rigid boundaries between digitally and analogically mediated interaction and between active participation in feedback processes’ (Kwastek, 2013: 8). In relation to the work of art itself, she writes, ‘its workliness is based fundamentally on the inseparability of the recipient’s action and the manifest entity of the system created by the artist … [t]he incorporation of interactivity
in its very structure is what makes interaction possible in the first place’ (Kwastek, 2013: 167).

As opposed to these positions, the argument here, although it fittingly acknowledges the encounter as constitutive of the aesthetic experience, does not emphasize an “enabler”/viewer attending to the work of art, which comes into being by the operational association between a human and an artwork – independently if the artwork has been pre-established and created to be interacted with. Here, we account for how the two emerge together in the co-constitutive relation between the individual and the pre-individual without being preoccupied about any dominating terms and stressing the agency of both the human and non-human at the very moment of evental activation.27

To quote Alberto Toscano (2006),

the interactionist position affirms instead that the modelling of the operations of individuations, and of the manner in which each and every time they bring heterogeneous interactants together, means that any single condition of individuation ... is necessary but necessarily not sufficient. (Toscano, 2006: 149)

Furthermore, he writes, ‘individuation creates a relational system that holds together what prior to its occurrence was incompatible’ (Toscano, 2006: 139). Toscano is here influenced by Horst Hendricks-Jansen’s writings. Taking from a biological theory referred to as ‘constructivist interactionism’, Hendricks-Jansen (1996) explains how,

Dynamical systems theory has made it impossible to conceive of complex behaviour as arising interactively from the structures of the environment in conjunction with the creature’s internal dynamics. We no longer need a hierarchically organized planning system to explain intricate temporal structure. A natural creature’s behaviour does not need to be preplanned. It does not have to exist as an abstract internal representation in the creature’s head before it can be executed. The complex structure emerges as and when it happens from the dynamic coupling between an

---

27 Performance debates regarding intermedial interactivity and digital environments have described the participating subject, for instance, as a 'participant' (Benford and Giannachi, 2011) and as a 'user' (Baker, 2012) and have highlighted the manner in which the interactivity between the subject and digital elements occurs, stressing the manner in which such interaction is informed by the digital elements.
organism and its environment. (Hendricks-Jansen, 1996: 325-326)

In this sense, individuation cannot be understood without the simultaneous actualization of the pre-individual elements. Put simply, actualization and individuation are intrinsic parts of the same mediating and evental process. We highlight the execution of the event as co-implication at its highest level where immanent relations perpetually determine new individuation and actualizations on each specific encounter. This position allows us to further problematize Fischer-Lichte’s notion of co-dependence, occurring during her understanding of the functioning of the autopoietic feedback loop because, although she acknowledges co-dependence, she still conceives the participating subject as aprioristic. She writes, ‘we experience ourselves as actively perceiving subjects and simultaneously pervaded by the perceived’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 173). Against her position, each generative dramaturgical frame, we argue, can be also grasped as a creative interaction where the simultaneity of producing and being co-produced happens in the ongoing and interfacial28 process of the radical aesthetic proposed in this research: the participant, the participated-in, the process of participating and the participating analogue and digital tools/elements are constructively entangled, creating, as Hendricks-Jansen points out, dynamics couplings. These couplings can be considered as an autopoietic feedback loop that is internal to the system, but this proposed autopoietic system, as opposed to Fischer-Lichte’s postulates, implies constructive co-constitution as a plane of immanence. Simply put, this thesis does not deny that the system, as explained by Hendricks-Jansen, can be also categorized as autopoietic emergence. Instead, it argues against the understanding of autopoiesis that Fischer-Lichte’s ontological and phenomenological postulates propose that see the system as constituting its own environment unilaterally – a position imbued in traditional readings of vitalism. Here, we put the emphasis on how the emergence of the complex structures comes into being as internal to a

28 In The Interface Affect, Alexander Galloway (2012) describes the notion of ‘interface’: ‘Interfaces are not simply objects or boundary points. They are autonomous zones of [aesthetic] activity. Interfaces are not things, but rather processes that affect a result of whatever kind … Interfaces themselves are effects, in that they bring about transformation’ (Galloway, 2012: vii)
system that fully acknowledges the human subject and its environment (the
dramaturgical structures in this instance) that constructively realize, both as
part of the same system, as Deleuzian vitalism, at the very moment of the
execution of the event.

Hendricks-Jansen explains that these dynamic couplings between
organism/subject and system/worldly structures occur in what he terms
‘situated activity’ and ‘interactive emergence’ (Hendricks-Jansen, 1996: 11).
He discusses that ‘all behaviour is situated activity and all situated activity
results from interactive emergence’ (Hendricks-Jansen, 1996: 30). He
describes,

Behaviour cannot be adequately described in terms of events
that take place inside a creature’s head. It cannot be
explained by rules that formalize neural activity or mental
activity, for it comes into existence only when the creature
interacts with ... its environment ... Emergence thus becomes
important as an explanatory principle because of use. It is
because of the emergent phenomena open up the
possibilities for behaviour that did not exists prior to their
emergence that an interactive explanation is essential.
(Hendricks-Jansen, 1996: 30).

Within these remarks of emergence and situated activity, and within the onto-
epistemic constructivist context of this research, this thesis finds physicist and
feminist scholar Karen Barad’s concept of ‘intra-action’ (Barad, 2007: 33) – as
opposed to the more “hierarchical” concept of interaction – more appropriate
because it ‘recognizes that there is actually no between as such [between
subject and technological element] and that human and non-human organism
... emerge only through their mutual co-constitution’ (Kember and Zyliska,
2012: 12). Barad (2012) develops her proposals regarding intra-activity in
relation to a philosophical position that she terms ‘agential realism’. Without
entering into the complexities of such a critical perspective, it can be defined,
very broadly, as crucially acknowledging the agential potentialities of both
matter and human subject as constantly emerging in processes of
transformative entanglements, without considering them as given a priori to
the moment of the encounter when mediality is generated. Barad describes
the crucial difference: ‘instead of there being a separation between subject
and object, there is an entanglement’ (Barad, 2012: 52). In this sense, Barad clearly stresses how,

agency is not held, it is not a property of persons or things; rather, agency is an enactment, a matter of possibilities for reconfiguring enactments … agency is about the possibilities for worldly re-configurings … it enlists, if you will, humans and non-humans. (Barad, 2012: 54-55)

In *Life after New Media, Mediation as a Vital Process*, Sarah Kember and Joanna Zyliska (2012) further describe the concept of intra-action,

the concept of intra-action postulates a more dynamic model of [subject] emergence of and with the world, whereby “the boundaries and components of phenomena become determinate” and the particular concepts [that arise with, in and through the intra-action] become meaningful only in active relation. Intra-action thus points out to the inherent performativity of [human and non-human] matter, and of the relations it enters into on many scales. (Kember and Zyliska, 2012: 81)

With this in mind, the notion of medium can be also grasped by applying a Deleuzian and Whiteheadian vitalist reading of the term. Kember and Zylinska describe how mediation can be discussed as a “theory of life”,

mediation becomes a key trope for understanding and articulating our being in, and becoming with, the technological world, our emergence and ways of intra-acting with it, as well as the acts and processes of temporality stabilizing the world into media, agents, relations and networks. (Kember and Zylinska, 2012: xv)

Put simply, the notion of intra-action conceptualizes that there is performative and agential action occurring between the human and the non-human. In this sense, the triadic encounter – media, performer and spectator – is conceived as a non-hierarchical relation, as both Toscano and Hendricks-

---

29 In relation to processes of mediation, this thesis argues that Barad’s philosophical notion of the ‘intra-actions’ within the context of a constructivist epistemology offers a stronger position than notions of intermediation as explored by Katherine Hayles (1999) and Louise Lapage (2008) within the context of post-human philosophy. Post-human readings of intermediation examine notions of agency and knowledge-making at the boundaries between the human and the non-human (the technological). However, as Barad (2003) points out, these post-human readings are mainly concerned with epistemology. In contrast, her concept of ‘intra-actions’ acknowledges the performative and agential aspect of a constructivist epistemology, hence, placing the emphasis in both the ontological and the epistemological and the human and non-human: ‘It is vitally important that we understand how matter matters’ (Barad, 2003: 803).
Jansen stress. Seen thus, the entanglement of their agencies during the execution of the event is fully accounted for. Each intra-action, as a frame or plane of composition, acknowledges the performative construction of experience and intelligibility. In a private conversation with Robin Nelson (16-02-2013) at The Royal Central School of Speech and Drama, Nelson discussed that the intermedial performative encounter should not simply be understood as physical manipulation occurring between subjects and media technologies, but rather as a performative experiential meeting of the intervening elements and the participating subjects. As such, the case studies interrogated here present three different modes of encounter and medial dramaturgical strategies. In the first one, 10 Backwards, the triadic encounter implies technical manipulation between the performers and the technologies; in the second one, Something American, there is no physical manipulation in the encounter by either the performer or the spectator, although in the articulation of its narrative aspects the performer responds to the content explored on the analogue screen; and in the third one, Day of the Figurines, there is physical manipulation by both the performer and the spectator. However, we argue here that, independently of the modality, in these three intermedial instances there is a performative, knowledge-making and experiential meeting between the technological intervening variables and the participant subjects in a manner of intra-actions and situated activity at the very moment of evental execution. This performative perspective, we stress, does not render the spectator as an object-spectator. Instead, it actively highlights his agency as a performative activator of intra-active processes of generating mediality.

Second, creativity, for both Deleuze and Whitehead, implies the creation of the new as a constant process of new instantiations. In relation to creativity, Deleuze understands creativity as an encounter with experimentation. This experimentation, according to him, makes the subject think because he is forced by something he cannot recognize – the newness of a given experience as a sensory, affective and intellectual contact with something new, the fundamental encounter. Regarding experimentation, ‘experience is rendered meaningful not by grounding empirical particulars in abstract
universals [in other words, a priori categorical imperatives, as in Kant] but by active experimentation on ourselves’ (Semetsky, 2004: 1). Deleuze describes creativity as a violent encounter and a disruption. This disruption creates and constructs new conditions for thinking and sensing, enabling the potential for new ideas to emerge. Regarding the notion of the new, in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze (1994) explains,

> The new, with its power of beginning and beginning again, remains forever new, just as the established was always established from the outset, even if a certain amount of empirical time was necessary for this to be recognized. What becomes established with the new is precisely not the new. For the new – in other words, difference – calls forth forces in thought, which are not the forces of recognition, today or tomorrow, but the powers of a completely other model, from an unrecognized and unrecognizable terra incognita. (Deleuze, 1994: 136)

In *Deleuze and the Production of the New*, Daniel W. Smith (2008) explains that the concept of the new in Deleuze,

> attempts to layout the conditions under which novelty itself would become a fundamental ontological concept (Being = Difference = the New) … For Deleuze, the problem of the new is coextensive with the attempt to determine the conditions of real experience (since the real is the new). (Smith, 2008: 151).

Deleuze explains that the real conditions of experience present a generative manner that accounts for the novelty of the new. In this sense, each real conditioning generates the next real conditioning. Smith writes,

> to be a condition of real experience, the condition can be no broader than what it conditions – otherwise it would not be a condition of real experience, capable of accounting for the genesis of the real. This is why there can be no categories (at least in the Aristotelian or Kantian sense) in Deleuze's philosophy, since the categories cast a net so wide that they let all the fish (i.e. the real) swim through it – or as Deleuze puts it at one point, they are like baggy clothes that are much too big (1990a: 44). But this requirement – that conditions not be broader than the conditioned – means that the conditions must be determined along with what they condition, and thus must change as the conditioned changes. In other words, the conditions themselves must be plastic and mobile, “no less capable of dissolving and destroying individuals than of
In this context, the conditions of a given real experience are 'determining both the condition and the conditioned' (Deleuze, 1990: 122-123) in a generative manner, presenting a constant and immanent process of re-articulation through the multi-directional and multi-dimensional activity of creation as Being.

In reference to Whitehead’s explanations of creativity, Timothy Barker (2009a) describes that ‘when Whitehead explains the notion of creativity, he is not discussing human creativity’ (Barker, 2009a: 1). Rather, he understands creativity as ‘the actual creativity of every moment of the world. He is indicating that each instant in time – and everything that exists in that instant in time – is a new creation’ (Barker, 2009a: 1). Every new creation includes process of actualization and individualizations enabled in continual becoming (Whitehead, 1978: 18-22). Furthermore, Shaviro points out, ‘for Whitehead, the experimenter cannot be separated from the experiment, because they are both present in the world in the same manner’ (Shaviro, 2009: 27). According to Reto Luzius Fetz (1990), Whitehead describes creation and creativity as analogous terms and discusses them as a ‘radical calling-into-being’ (Fetz, 1990: 199). For Whitehead, creativity is ‘the principle of novelty’ (Whitehead, 1929: 21), expressing the notion that each event is a process issuing in novelty. So, when Whitehead writes about the ‘past hurling itself into a new transcendent fact’ (Whitehead in Barker, 2009a: 1), he ‘is proposing that the transcendent fact … in his terms, is the becoming of the present moment’ (Barker, 2009a: 1) as a creative actualization – or what he calls ‘actual occasions’ (Whitehead, 1978: 19).

The term actual occasion is central to Whitehead’s philosophy. Whitehedian scholarship such as Robinson (2009), Shaviro (2009), and Faber and

---

30 Reto Luzius Fetz (1990) discusses the Whiteheadian notion of creativity in relation to the metaphysical postulates of Thomas Aquinas. He explains that Whitehead also, as Aquinas, links the concept of creativity in relation to other metaphysical notions such as the concept of God.
Stephenson (2010) emphasizes that the term ‘actual occasion’ is the principal conceptual element in Whitehead’s process philosophy. Each actual occasion is defined as a single moment of subject/object experiential and knowledge-making creative constructions.\(^{31}\) Importantly, ‘these entities are always in process. They are always happening’ (Barker, 2009a: 3). Whitehead posits that creativity is the actualization of potentiality and the process of actualization is an occasion of experiencing. Consequently, ‘the act of being of such actual occasions must be interpreted as creativity in the strict sense insofar as it involves the actualization of hitherto unrealized forms of definiteness’ (Fetz, 1990: 202). Furthermore, Barker explains that these creative constructions – the actual occasions – are rather complex as each single moment ‘bears with it relationships to all the creative moments that occur before’ (Barker, 2009a: 3) and after each creative actual occasion, hence, emphasizing multiplicity and complexity.

Whitehead proposes that object/world and subject do not exist as fixed entities, but as entities in the making through processes of creative becoming. Shaviro explains that both Deleuze and Whitehead think of the process of actualization of potential as the creative activity that drives the world (Shaviro, 2009: 17-19). Conceived thus, in Whitehead, we see that it is the process of entities that constitutes their existence – not their materiality, their manner of being, or what things are. In Whitehead’s view of the entire universe, there only exist things in the making as direct outcomes of the flux of events (Barker, 2009a: 2-3).

The concept of actual occasion articulates the constitution of any given onto-epistemic being and experience. Barker (2012) explains that an actual occasion is,

\[
\text{in a constant process towards its satisfaction, towards its becoming; once this satisfaction is achieved the actual entity begins to perish in order that another actual entity may begin its becoming. Whitehead attributes this process to every entity.}
\]

\(^{31}\) In *Process and Reality* (1928), Whitehead also refers to the term ‘actual occasions’ as ‘actual entities’.
in the universe, and it is this process, the becoming and perishing of actual entities, that produces time. (Barker, 2012: 40)

Shaviro reviews that Whitehead strictly distinguishes between events and occasions. He discusses how Whitehead uses,

the term event in the more general sense of a nexus of actual occasions, inter-related in some determinate fashion in one extensive quantum. An actual occasion is the limiting type of an event with only one member. (Shaviro, 2009: 17)

With this definition in mind, an event might be just one particular occasion, a single incident of becoming, but, more generally, an event may be described as a group of such incidents; a multiplicity of becomings; a series of entities. Understood as multiplicity, the event, throughout Whiteheadian thought, is also termed as a connection of ‘nexus’; that is, a ‘nexus’ understood as both temporal correlations and togetherness in relation to the attending singularities of a given event: ‘[a nexus is] a particular fact of togetherness among actual entities’ (Whitehead, 1929: 20). To clarify further, an occasion, Shaviro explains, is the process by which anything becomes and an event is an extensive set, or a temporal series, of such occasions. Put simply, an event is, according to Whitehead, an extension of occasions that extends, expands and overlaps with each other.

Barker also describes the temporal processes implied by the nexus. He writes,

For Whitehead temporal reality is produced by process: in particular, the creation of particular entities at any moment in time. An entity at one instance forms a nexus with another actual entity, at the next instant, exchanging information and subjective form, prior to its perishing, and thus creating continuity between entities over time. (Barker, 2012: 40-41)

Furthermore,

every moment for Whitehead, is a moment of becoming, as every actual occasion is a new creation at every instant. As both objects and subjects are remade at each instant in a unison of becoming … an actual entity is always in the state of becoming as it gathers information from other actual entities so that it may exist, or it is in the process of perishing
as it ceases to exist as a self-creating entity, making room for the next actual entity and making its content available for inclusion in this subsequent entity and actual entity is never static, it is always preexisting and postexisting. (Barker, 2012: 45-46)

In this sense, no actual occasion ‘comes into being ex nihilo, rather, it inherits data from past occasions’ (Shaviro, 2009: 19), creating a sense of tracing, and yet, ‘each actual occasion is also self-creating, or causa sui, by virtue of the novel way in which it treats these preexisting data or prior occasions’ (Shaviro, 2009: 19). Moreover, Shaviro explains that, in this sense, each occasion is a quantum, ‘a single incident of becoming’ (Shaviro, 2009: 18), which could be interpreted as becoming punctual and atomistic, but also implying a sense of renewal and repetition, ‘not as a continuity of becoming’, but ‘a becoming of continuity’ (Whitehead in Shaviro, 2009: 19). Put slightly differently, ‘each act of becoming is unique’ in the overall and continuous production of novelty (Shaviro, 2009: 20). In short, actual occasions, then, are describable in two ways: as Being and as becoming; that is, ‘how an actual [occasion] becomes constitutes what that actual [occasion is]’ (Whitehead, 1929: 87).

The process between actual entities creating nexus, becoming, forming and perishing to become something new again is what Whitehead describes as ‘prehensions’ (Whitehead, 1929: 176). One occasionprehends, grasps, gathers and incorporates the actual occasion datum – defined by Whitehead as the realized subject-world content of a single occasion – and, once satisfied, opens up to the possibility of a new prehension by the “about-to-become-datum” next actual occasion (Barker, 2012: 43). Put simply, this is how process occurs.32 In being and becoming, each occasion is constructed

32 The ontological scheme proposed by Whitehead is articulated by his notion of actual occasions (Stenner, 2011; Weber, 2006; Meyer, 2005; Kraus, 1998; Robinson, 2005). Stenner (2011) explains that this is a process-oriented assemblage of constructive human experiences that encompasses all things in the world. In this sense, each act of constructive experience must be grasped as an atomic moment; that is, the minimum possible experience in the context of a relational world of subject-world constructive experiences. This manner of seeing an actual occasion as atomic and with a self-realizing nature organized through the continuity of temporal nexus brings into mind Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of the ‘molar’ and the ‘molecular’. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) make a sharp difference between what they call ‘molecular’ and ‘molar’ structures. Roughly, molar multiplicities are organizab
and is constructing itself. Importantly, ‘this act of construction is based upon the continuity of a flux of information as the past is prehended in the present of the actual occasion’ (Barker, 2012: 43). As such, each occasion, as Paul Stenner (2008) explains, exemplifies a relation:

whereby a subject has a concern [Whitehead uses concern as implying a constructive facet] for its objects. Its objects are thus the components in the subjectivity of the occasion, but, importantly, the subject itself comes into being through its objective concerns. (Stenner, 2008: 98-99)

The consequences of this are: on the one hand, the becoming of highly complex processes and multiplicity of events; and, on the other hand, ‘it is not the subject/object relationship that is constitutive of experience; rather, experience should be thought of as the co-mingling of both consciously and non-consciously experiencing entities’ (Barker, 2012: 45). In this way, each generative dramaturgical intermedial frame can be also grasped as an actual (dramaturgical) occasion. In short, each dramaturgical variable and the participating subject – as a datum – are always in constant process of being and becoming in and through the relational, complex and open processes of generative characteristics – the radical aspect of the execution of the event.

In The Concept of Nature, Whitehead (2004) explains that the immanence of events is given by extension, that is, each event overlaps and extends over other events through the process of becoming. Also, in The Concept of Nature, Whitehead notes that the relations between events are transitive, and that events are parts of other events (Whitehead, 2004: 34). He writes, ‘in respect to extension two events are mutually related so that either one includes the other, or one overlaps without complete inclusion, or they are entirely separate’. (Whitehead, 2004: 34), Put simply, Whitehead (1995) writes: ‘events are lived through, they extend around us. They are the medium (hierarchical), disciplined, and display a stable nature; they are systems of territorialization or re-territorialization. Molecular structures are structures that display the quality of giving rise to more connections (to the outside) and to the potential for change in nature. They are not unifiable, nor totalizable, which is to say that these forms are most likely to give rise to revolutionary becoming. They write, ‘it effects a dissolution of form that connects the most diverse longitudes and latitudes, the most varied speeds and slownesses, which guarantees a continuum by stretching variation far beyond its formal limits’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 309).
within which our physical experience develops, or, rather, they are themselves the development of that experience’ (Whitehead, 1995: 62).

According to Stenner, an actual occasion ‘is not a substance or material, but an activity of realization’ (Stenner, 2008: 99). In relation to realization and activity, process, as becoming, is the manner through which both, realization and activity, come into being. As such, a process ontology replaces an ontology of substance (see Stengers, 1997). Stenner describes that ‘the word “actual” in actual occasions requires the distinction between the actual and the potential. Actuality is the realization of potential in a particular concrete form’ (Stenner, 2008: 99). Simply, an actual occasion can only be understood as a process of actualization within all its potential actualizing features.

Stenner also explains that ‘the realization of potential into actual form is called the process of concrescence in the sense of becoming concrete. Potential, when actualized in a given occasion, concretizes in a radical specific concrete form’ (Stenner, 2008: 99). It is through concrescence processes that actualization happens, creating a new unit where the many become one. Stenner describes that the process of unification ‘effects a reduction in the complexity of their prior potential. Actuality is thus a decision (in the sense of “cutting off”) amid potentiality’ (Stenner, 2008: 99).

This aspect of decision and inclusion of the potential that is actualized is the prehension, which Whitehead throughout his writings also calls ‘feeling’ as a being in relation to other entities (Whitehead, 1929: 176-177) – ‘a feeling is the operation of passing from the objectivity of an object to the subjectivity of an actual occasion. The concrescence of an actual occasion is thus effected by feelings through which objects enter into the real internal constitution of a subject’ (Stenner, 2008: 99). Stenner continues,

an actual occasion is thus a pattern grasped into the unity of the event or a selective and hence “evaluative” patterning of the many into one. In other words, an actual occasion is a passage from a state of disjunctive diversity to a state of conjunctive unity. (Stenner, 2008: 99)
Having reviewed the concepts of creativity and the generative aspect of the frames or planes of compositions as the pillars that support this research, we now turn to the description of the theoretical aspects that underpin the three proposed onto-epistemic conditions.

1. The First Onto-epistemic Condition: A Constructivist Reading of the Temporality of the Event.

From the point of view of a constructivist reading of epistemology any temporal articulation presents an intricate configuration that creates an architectural complexity of interrelated temporal elements articulated through a series of differential temporal multiplicities. These multiplicities operate within a set of relations and connections that can be described as immanent within the experiential creative moment. In this sense, the notions of becoming and immanence define any given temporal event.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze (1994) articulates the present moment as one of multiplicities. He presents an understanding of the now-time as becoming and as the unconditioned event; that is, an understanding of the event that cannot be reduced to historical actualizations but encompasses internal multiplicity and temporal differentiations. In *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari (1994) explain that, in understanding the event as pure becoming, the temporality of the event has ‘neither beginning nor end … the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its self-positing as a concept, escapes’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 110) and, hence, escapes a chronological articulation. In explaining the Deleuzian conceptualization of the event, Alain Badiou (2007) discusses that for Deleuze the event has a dual characteristic: on the one hand, the event can be articulated as a temporal composition-structure; and, on the other hand, the event is intrinsically linked to notions of subjectivity.

In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze (1990) explains what he calls the four axioms of the event – the first two related to the structural characteristics of the event,
the second two related to the event in terms of the construction of subjectivity. Influenced by Hume and Bergson, Deleuze (1994) describes time as ‘constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates in the repetition of instants’ (Deleuze, 1994: 70). Simply put, the present moment is a contraction of time from the continuous passage of moments that occurs in the mind by way of synthesis.

The first axiom defines the event as an ‘unlimited becoming [which] becomes the event itself’ (Deleuze, 1990: 9). The singularity of the event is one made out of multiplicities – a one-all structure. The event is the becoming of becoming with a sense of multiple and unlimited becomings. As such, the event is not fixed, but open to other events. In this sense, events, Badiou explains, are relational; they extend over each other in continuous becoming. Badiou writes, ‘events occur, and they do not stem from being qua being’ (Badiou, 2007: 65).

The second axiom conceptualizes the event as ‘always that which has just happened and that which is about to happen, but never that which is happening’ (Deleuze, 1990: 8). In this sense, the event is a synthesis of past and future – what Deleuze calls the ‘synthesis of time’ (Deleuze, 1990: 9). In other words, the future conceptualized as a dimension of the past and the present as including both past and future. Deleuze, in the ‘first synthesis of

---

33 The Deleuzian temporal synthesis has been the topic of immense critical and philosophical debates that are beyond the scope of this research. However, some aspects are worth mentioning. Deleuzian scholar James Williams (2011) explains that, on a Deleuzian account, time is made in multiple synthetic processes – his famous three syntheses of time. Williams explains that these multiple times cannot be reduced to one another according to an order of priority or hierarchy. Instead, the processes and the times are related according to a series of perspectives – these perspectives are what Deleuze calls syntheses. According to Williams, the syntheses are a network of related processes operating on one another. Deleuze identifies three syntheses. The first synthesis implies a process in the present determining the past and the future as dimensions of the process; that is, the present comprises the past and the future. The second synthesis focuses on the past as the primary process. Within these second synthesis parameters, the present becomes a dimension of the past. This, in turn, adds another process in relation to the first synthesis. Most significantly, Williams describes, it means that the present is not one process but many, dependent on its place as primary synthesis or as a dimension of another synthesis. The third synthesis is the dimension of the future as part of the present and a further and “farther” projection of the past. The present is the moment of the habit – broadly, the critical and practical skills. The past is the moment of memory and the future is the moment of desires and aims. In the Deleuzian synthesis, the memory-skills-desire present moment is the living present.
time’, considers the ontology of time as a figure with no separation between past and future. Badiou explains,

consequently, the event would not be what takes place between the past and the future, between the end of a world and the beginning of another. It is rather encroachment and connection … it exposes the unity of passage, which fuses one-just-after and one-just-before. (Badiou, 2007: 38)

Influenced by Hume, Deleuze discusses the notion of the living present in relation to the three syntheses of time. Broadly, the living present is a synthesis that encompasses a retention of the past and a projection into the future. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze (1994) proposes that the relations that activate the synthesis of time between past, present and future into the living present enables the experienced and the experiencer to be actualized through the experiencing. Two aspects of the Deleuzian event are crucial for the argument here: on the one hand, actualization, for Deleuze, happens in the living present of a “now”, which incorporates the future and the past and must be grasped as multiple and differential; on the other hand, as opposed to substance and essentialist event ontology, the Deleuzian event ontology, by contrast, is a temporary structure, a set of states of affairs, grasped as an interlocking and relational “movement of activity”, where creative forces re-activate constantly.

Simply, it is not what is happening, but ‘that in what happens, has become and will become’ (Badiou, 2007: 38). The Deleuzian event and the present moment of the event reject the conceptualization of the present as a chronological and essential “now” and demand the conceptualization of the present as an ‘operative paradox of becoming’ (Badiou, 2007: 38). Badiou discusses how this manner of understanding the event can be expressed in

---

34 Keith Robinson (2010) explains that, in general terms, for Deleuze and Whitehead, events are the fundamental constituents of their understanding of process ontology, replacing substances. On the contrary, ‘in [process] event ontologies, events are fundamental and things or substances can be variously viewed as “effects”, “products” or temporary “structures” of events, simple sets of properties or patterns recognizable in events’ (Robinson, 2010: 115). The event ontology of Deleuze and Whitehead is the immanent movement of creativity itself [as in the constructive creation of the generative frames proposed here], a self-realizing moment of activity [the performative aspects of the frames] out of which the actual makes itself. (Robinson, 2010: 115).
two ways: ‘[firstly] there is no present (the event is re-presented, it is active immanence which co-presents the past and the future); [and secondly] everything is present (the event is living as the essence of time)’ (Badiou, 2007: 38). It can be said, then, that the event is infinitely divisible and that this divisible characteristic incorporates the temporal realization of the event, its actuality.

The third axiom establishes: ‘the event is of a different regime than the actions and passions of the body, even if it results from them’ (Deleuze, 1990: 9). Badiou explains that ‘the event intensifies bodies, concentrates their constitutive multiplicity. It would therefore be neither of the same nature as the actions and the passions of the body, nor supervene on them’ (Badiou, 2007: 38). Badiou goes on, ‘the event is not identical to the bodies, which it affects, but neither is it transcendent to what happens to them or what they do, such that it cannot be said any longer that they are (ontologically) different to bodies’ (Badiou, 2007: 38).

The fourth axiom states: ‘A life is composed of a single and same event, lacking all the variety of what happens to it’ (Deleuze, 1990: 9). The event, Badiou explains, is what composes a life. Deleuze uses the analogy of a musical composition, which is organized by its theme but presents internal compositional variety – the variation of the musical notes creates the melody. As such, the musical composition as One is the convergence of the multiplicity of attending notes that create the overall theme and musicality of the composition. Simply, the One is all, but the One is also in and for itself. In this sense, the event ‘is not what happens to a life, but what is in what happens, or what happens in what happens, such that it can only have a single event’ (Badiou, 2007: 39) – a univocity. Put slightly differently, the Deleuzian event, ‘with regard to any multiplicity whatsoever … is of the essence of the Event to compose them into the One that they are, and to exhibit this unique composition in a potentially infinite variety of ways’ (Badiou, 2007: 39).

Cliff Stagoll (2010a and 2010b), in The Deleuze Dictionary, explains that for
Deleuze an event arises from a set of particular forces, ‘marking every moment … as a transformation’ (Stagoll, 2010b: 90-91). In his definition of Deleuze’s concept of becoming, Stagoll writes: ‘every event is but a unique instant of production in a continual flow of changes evident in the cosmos. The only thing 'shared' by events is their having become different in the course of their production’ (Stagoll, 2010a: 26).

In relation to this research argument, a significant aspect of Deleuze’s event is the notion of potentiality. Brian Massumi (2002) describes potentiality as ‘the immanence of a thing to its still indeterminate variation, underway’ (Massumi, 2002: 9). He explains the Deleuzian distinction as ontological, which means that the way things are is completely different from the way their potentialities are. Also in relation to the notion of potentiality, Dag Petersson (2004) explains that ‘a potentiality does not change in the same way actual beings change’ (Petersson, 2004: 40). Thus, it can be said that ontogenetically – broadly defined as the becoming of things – the two belong to two different modes of existence. In this sense, the ontogenetic difference between an actual thing and its potentiality can ‘be defined by the way changes relate to an event’ (Petersson, 2004: 41). Furthermore, Petersson explains,

The being of a thing changes, and constitutes an event, when that being is affected by another being (another thing or force), as in, for instance, a car crash. The being of a potentiality changes immediately with the change of another corresponding potentiality, and that constitutes an event immanent to the change itself [as for instance, a market company acquiring another competency, which allows it to develop a new market – the change in the company is different from the change in the car (the car goes from being a thing to being a wreck; the company changes, but it still preserves its status)]. Thus, an event constituted by a changing thing is different from an event immanently constituted as a change in potentiality … when potentialities change, the event is the transition between a set of variables. (Petersson, 2004: 41-42)

---

35 Deleuze’s notion of potentiality can be traced back to Aristotle. Aristotle stated that, unlike a thing, a potentiality could manifest itself without existing as an actual thing. In this sense, realization, materiality and potentiality could appear to be interrelated, but show themselves as different.
Vitally here, the notion of potentiality in Deleuzian thought is intrinsic to concepts such as intensity, multiplicity and heterogenesis – these three are linked to generative movement of attending compositional forces, as Deleuze would say.

Intensity can be described as the order of movement in relation to differential and heterogeneous fluxes. Further, intensity, in its heterogenesis, is compositional and constructive. It can simply be described as a density of events, as nestings occurring across time. Without entering into the full philosophical complexity of the term and Deleuze’s intricate and gruelling engagement with Bergson, Spinoza and Nietzsche, in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze discusses the term intensity as a system of creative and compositional forces. Deleuze specifies that an intensity presents a relationship with the notion of creation – as a singularization, fluctuation and the opening up towards the new – and multiplicity of a given event’s singularity. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze affirms that the true subject of intensity is singularity, or rather the construction of a singularity by the movement aspects of intensities – this intensive movement, Deleuze argues, directs itself at itself and at the other, creating chains of mutuality.36

The notion of intensity is important to help understand Deleuze’s proposals in relation to the event and the notion of temporality. Deleuzian scholarship such as Williams (2011), Boundas (2006), Colebrook (2009) and Bell (2006) all agree that evental intensity positions the temporality of the event in a clear opposition to a chronological reading of the present as foundational and essentialist. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze (1990) discusses how a given event ‘is eternally that which just happened and which will happen, never that which is happening … events are like crystals, they only become and grow by their edges [later on he describes edges as borderlines and surfaces]’ (Deleuze, 1990: 17-18). Moreover, In *The Fold*, Deleuze (1993) writes, ‘the

---

36 In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze defines a singularity as: ‘Singularities are turning points and points of inflection; bottlenecks, knots, foyers, and centers; points of fusion, condensation, and boiling; points of tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and anxiety, “sensitive” points’ (Deleuze, 1990: 52).
event is a vibration with an intensity of harmonics or sub-multiplicities, a sound wave or a light wave, or even a small part of space, smaller and smaller during a shorter and shorter duration’ (Deleuze, 1993: 105). Seen in this way, the Deleuzian event is one of unlimited potentialities through which each sub-part ‘become incarnate in fluxes’ (Deleuze, 1993: 109) of possible potential, compositional and constructive aspect. Deleuze places intensity at the level of the in-between, since creation and creativity always take place in the middle – in the creating of something new. Put slightly differently, intensity is linked to difference; it is related to fluidity; it is located in the in-between; it is creation; and, finally, it is also a mode of concretization.

Plainly, Deleuze argues against a conceptualization of chronological time that suggests that each experienced moment is securely established and follows a past-present-future cadence, problematizing traditional points of temporal reference in relation to the singularity of the “here-right-now”. Also, Deleuze, by providing concepts of immanence, dismantles the equilibrium of temporal succession and conceives time as a fractured composition of multiple perspectives. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze (1990) proposes that ‘the event is not what occurs (an accident), it is rather inside what occurs [the immanent functionality of what occurs]’ (Deleuze, 1990: 149), and, in this respect, what occurs ‘divides itself infinitively in past and future and always eludes the present’ (Deleuze, 1990: 5).

Apart from intensities and potentialities, the Deleuzian event presents another crucial characteristic for the argument followed here: the difference between the actual and the virtual. Deleuze describes, ‘the virtual must be defined as strictly a part of a real object – as though the object had one part of itself in the virtual into which it plunged as though into an objective dimension’ (Deleuze, 1990: 208-209). Deleuzian scholar Keith Robinson (2009) explains that Deleuze, throughout his writings, differentiates between what he terms the virtual and the actual. The virtual – not to be confused with notions of virtual reality – is conceptualized, very broadly, as the possible. Robinson writes,
the possible might be actual, but has no reality, whereas the virtual is not actual, but is real. In another sense the possible can be realized and the process of realization takes place through resemblance ... In contrast the virtual is not realized but actualized. (Robinson, 2009: 234)

Robinson continues, ‘in actualization the virtual differentiates itself in the creation of a novel actuality that does not resemble its virtual conditions’ (Robinson, 2009: 234). Further, Robinson points out that Deleuze sees actuality in contrast with, but not in opposition to, potentiality and virtuality. In general terms. For Deleuze, the potential must be grasped as the virtual rather than the actual. Against what could be considered a rigid distinction between the actual and the virtual, Deleuze argues that the real is always actual-virtual. Any actual thing is produced only from virtual possibilities. In Deleuze, ‘the activity of the event is described as dynamic and intensive ... all events “communicate” virtually and acquire determinate qualities actually’ (Robinson, 2010: 115).

Colebrook (2002) fittingly describes, ‘it is just not that the actual world is the effect of the virtual potential, [but that] each actual thing maintains its own virtual power. What something is (actually) is also its power to become (virtually)’ (Colebrook, 2002: 98). In short, the real, for Deleuze, is the actual (what something is) and the virtual (what something might be). Following these philosophical positions, it can be argued that, on the one hand, to equate the real with an essentialist reading of ontology and the chronological linearity of the “here and now” only offers a partial understanding of the particularities of a given event; and, on the other hand, the reality of the present moment not only encompasses the “It is”, but it also includes the “It will be”, “It might be”, “It might have been”, “It was”, “It has been”, “It had been” and “It will have been”.

In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze also outlines his proposals of transcendental empiricism through a division of time into two types, in relation to pure time: Chronos, the eternal past and future; and Aion, the moment of the present. Joshua Ramey (2006) discusses how Deleuze suggests that Aion is always
divisible, but never infinite. In contrast, the time of Chronos is a larger category inclusive of all instants, running through all of time. Deleuze highlights the instant of the present as a series of interrelated multiplicities. Within these parameters, the Deleuzian sense of becoming, a being in constant movement, can be contrasted with ontological notions that describe being as process and change, but that still allude to being as an essence. What is remarkable about his philosophical position, Ramey explains, is that Deleuze does not contradict that one can exist in the pure present, but rather that one might work towards existing in it (Ramey, 2006: 96). According to Ramey, this existing in the pure present is inscribed in the formations of the plane of composition and the plane of immanence both as the site of pure immanence as life as a singularity and immanent within the potentialities of the actual and the virtual. (Ramey, 2006: 27).

As noted, Deleuze defines the virtual as the intensive multiplicity of potential forces and elements immanent to the real – in contrast to the actual. In *Difference and Repetition*, he writes, ‘the virtual must be defined as strictly a part of the real object – as though the object had a part of itself in the virtual into which it plunged, as though into an objective dimension’ (Deleuze in Ambrose, 2009: 103). In this sense, Darren Ambrose (2009) explains that both the actual and the virtual are the real. For Deleuze, the virtual field is pre-individual prior to any pure consciousness. It is the real, yet virtual, condition of emergence of actualized phenomena as an ontological actuality. Ambrose describes,

> this movement of ontogenesis from virtual to actual “always takes place by difference, divergence and differentiation” (Deleuze, 2004: 264)”. Deleuze constantly pursues the emergent and divergent paths of differentiation and becoming from the virtual to the actual: these are lines of creation. (Ambrose, 2009: 104)

---

37 Darren Ambrose (2009) clarifies the distinction between the plane of immanence and pure immanence; whilst that which exists forms on the plane of immanence, Deleuze differentiates it from pure consciousness. Deleuze highlights that consciousness, as in Husserl, is of an object by a subject. This reading distorts the plane of immanence by stepping outside of it. Therefore, Deleuze posits that we cannot speak of immanence as pure consciousness, for this makes an object of consciousness. In doing so, as opposed to a subjective phenomenology as in Husserl, we can only speak of the phenomenology of the event and of pure immanence.
Interestingly, Ambrose points out the creative aspect from the virtual to the actual. Deleuze writes,

> Actualization breaks with resemblance as a process no less than it does with identity as a principle. Actual items never resemble the singularities they incarnate. In this sense, actualization or differentiation is always a genuine creation … For a potential or virtual object to be actualized is to create divergent lines which correspond to – without resembling – a virtual multiplicity. (Deleuze in Ambrose, 2009: 104)

In this sense, the work of art – the intermedial transaction in this instance – is the pre-individual waiting to be actualized as life – or pure immanence – at the moment of the execution of the event; that is, the intermedial phenomenon, as the pre-individual, only becomes evental during the triadic execution. The execution of the event can be thus defined as an evental process of actualization; that is, a fundamental encounter as a process of creation that includes a dynamic process of individuation. The temporal execution of the event is immanent to that creative process as a compositional process of self-forming – or self-positing – form that is engaged in processes of individuation. Ambrose describes, ‘the virtual thus becomes actualized, but also always remains something immanent within the actual, a virtual multiplicity always in reserve, still to come’ (Ambrose, 2009: 105-106).

The intermedial aesthetic plane of composition is, in this context, to be grasped as creative – a plane of the actualization of the virtual, enabling self-positing forms. The intermedial aesthetic plane of composition engages life ‘in an enterprise of co-creation’ (Ambrose, 2009: 106); that is, the construction as a co-creation – an autopoiesis now grasped as a constant process of self-positing – of the pre-individual and the individual during the event. In short, the intermedial aesthetic plane of composition breeds the multiplicities of the pre-individual virtual into a creative process of experiential and intellectual activity, always constantly re-formed in the plane of immanence – thought/subject and world/object as co-created immanently – as pure immanence or life. In other words, each intermedial aesthetic plane of composition is constructed within the plane of immanence, yet the plane of
immanence is that which constructs itself through self-positing, including processes of virtualization. Hence, this constant self-positing of the plane of immanence allows for the continuous re-activation and generative characteristic of each intermedial plane of composition.


A constructivist reading of epistemology sees spatiality conceived as a complex montage of layered spatial orchestrations. It redefines an environment that is in constant process of spatial dislocations and self-positing. In this way, such a reading explores a multiplicity of spatial presentations, both actual and virtual, that reposition the spatial boundaries of any given event.

In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari (1986) explore, among other topics, the particularities of space. Without fully entering into the rather complex explanations with regards to the socio-political aspects of a given spatial configuration, what some scholarship such as Colebrook (2004), Vidler (2002), Parr (2010) and Buchanan and Lambert (2005) argue is that the core theme of their understanding of space is the conceptualization of space as a performative activation in a constant ‘nomad’ movement (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 474).

In Plateau 14 of A Thousand Plateaus, titled The Smooth and the Striated, Deleuze and Guattari propose two types of space: the ‘smooth’ and the ‘striated’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 474). Edward Casey (1998) explains that both types of space act as processes, each one continually and mutually being translated and transversed into/by the other. Along the same lines, Colebrook (2004) notes that the relationship between the smooth and the striated elucidates the nature of space, its conceptualization and creation, as well as the process of subject actualizations.
While each type of space, according to Colebrook, can be distinguished and studied separately, the inextricable link between the two concepts constitutes an element of montage. Following Casey, striated space can be broadly defined as measurable, Euclidian and ordered space, the space that can be counted, ‘always from point to point’; and smooth space is the space that cannot be counted: it is ‘heterogeneous’ and presents ‘qualitative aspects’ (Casey, 1998: 303). It, therefore, resists exact Euclidian punctual location. As Deleuze and Guattari put it,

Smooth space is precisely the space of the smallest deviation: therefore it has no homogeneity, except between infinitely proximate points, and the linking of proximities is effected independently of any determined path. It is a space of contact, of small tactile or mutual actions of contact, rather than a visual space like Euclid’s striated space. Smooth space is a field without conduits or channels. A field, a heterogeneous smooth space, is wedded to a very particular type of multiplicity: non-metric, acentered, rhizomatic multiplicities that occupy space without counting it and can be explored only by legwork. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 371)

With this in mind, and in relation to the understanding of intermediality here, on the one hand, striated space corresponds to the geometric particularities of the physical performance space – what we can consider the infrastructural, including both the physical dimensions of the theatre venue and the physical dimensions of the scenographic elements such as the screen. In other words, the exact relation between the spatial points that predetermines and informs the development of spatial formations. Smooth space, on the other hand, describes the space of potentialities and the unfolding of the spatial planes of composition that, in turn, enables the generative becoming of intermedial spatiality. As Darren Ambrose (2009) discusses,

The smooth space of the virtual is defined as a relatively undifferentiated space and continuous topological space (hence smooth) which is incessantly undergoing discontinuous differentiation and transitions and is progressively acquiring determination until it condenses into measurable and divisible metric space (hence striated) … [in this sense, the materiality of space] is never a homogeneous substance that passively receives forms but is itself composed of intensive and energetic virtual traits. (Ambrose, 2009: 114)
Similarly, Manuel DeLanda (2002) clarifies,

Deleuze distinguishes the progressive unfolding of a multiplicity through broken symmetries (*differentiation*), from the progressive specification of the continuous space formed by multiplicities as it gives rise to our world of discontinuous spatial structures (*differentiation*). Unlike a transcendent heaven, which exists as a separate dimension from reality, Deleuze asks us to imagine a continuum of multiplicities, which *differentiates itself* into our familiar three-dimensional space as well as its spatially structured content. (DeLanda, 2002: 23)

By drawing on biological notions of morphogenesis, as Deleuze describes, the intrinsic combination of striated and smooth space conditions the emergence of the new. In this sense, a topological relationship happens at the intersection between the striated and the smooth, constituting continuous spatial formations that reject any notion of linearity between the spatial points. Dance scholar Kate Sicchio (2001) describes topology, a term normally used in mathematical, geographical and geological fields, as ‘sets of space that continuously transform in movement’ (Sicchio, 2011: 24). These spaces, she suggests, are ‘not measured in Euclidian geometric space but, instead, form relationships with other spaces through movement’ (Sicchio, 2011: 24). Similarly, Brian Massumi (2002) explains that topological concepts can be a valid platform from which to explore interdisciplinary approaches to performance-making since the spatial complexity they exemplify reveals how the creation of the dramaturgical frames interrelate in their composition. Regarding these spatial interrelations, topology, following Manuel DeLanda (2002), can also be described as ‘the one in which many discontinuous forms … [blend] into one continuous one’ (DeLanda, 2002: 24). In this context, intermedial spatiality is always in a process of taking form. This taking form is the dynamic of becoming. A relational merging occurs, implying a redistribution of the spatial processes in the making as ‘an opening to the complex fielding of multiplicities’ (Manning, 2013a: 8). From this perspective, we highlight how in the correlation ‘between points there are always more points … [which correspond to] finite segments internally defined by a unique arrangement of infinities’ (Parisi, 2013: xi). In this manner, the smooth and the striated are ‘at once extended and intensive’ (Parisi, 2013: xi). Conceived
thus, spatiality can be discussed as ‘how wholes (continuities) become parts (discontinuities)’ (Parisi, 2013: xii). In this way, the creation of the spatial new functions in a manner of constant spatial re-positionings and self-positings, continuously producing new spatial arrangements – what Deleuze calls processes of ‘territorialization’, ‘deteritorialization’ and ‘reterritorialization’ within his proposals regarding nomadology (uninterrupted movement).

For Deleuze, territorialization, deteritorialization and reterritorialization are concepts fundamental to his description of process. Using the analogy of an animal becoming man, Deleuze (2002) describes these processes as follows,

> We could go back to the commonplaces of the evolution of humanity: man, deteritorialized animal. When they say to us that the hominoid removed its front paws from the earth and that the hand is the first locomotor, then prehensile, these are the thresholds or the quanta of deteritorialization, but each time with a complementary reterritorialization: the locomotor hand as the deteritorialized paw is reterritorialized on the branches which it uses to pass from tree to tree; the prehensile hand as deteritorialized locomotion is reterritorialized on the torn-off, borrowed elements called tools that it will brandish or propel. (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 134)

In this definition, Deleuze presents a shifting processual territory whose heterogeneous elements – once established or territorialized – open up through processes of deteritorialization immediately to the new. In other words, to deteritorialize is to signify a freeing movement away from centralizing demands.\(^{38}\) Simply put, a movement that breaks away from the established to the creation of the new.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, smooth space drifts and moves away from fixed points towards polyvalent orchestrations of potentialities and directions. In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari explain, space is nomad, always moving and connecting – ‘always there rather than here ... in between here and there, this place and that place, distributed between them’ (Casey, 1998: 305).

\(^{38}\) The concepts of ‘territorialization’ and ‘deteritorialization’ have been used extensively in areas of politics in relation to the state apparatus, geo-political positions and relations of power-knowledge as explored by Foucault. It has also been linked to Jacques Derrida’s notions of deconstruction and ‘the metaphysic of presence’.
Shifting away from the specifically localized, nomad space always occurs as place – in a given place. Further, it is a place that is not simply “here”, in a precise unit of space, but in a locality that is unlimited. Casey writes,

For its non-delimitation, nomad space is no more a purely dimensional, empty physical infinity [as Kant would put it] than it is a condensed plenary ... despite its enormity, [nomad space] is not a strictly measurable space with definite borders. To inhabit such a region is not merely to be at a place in it, much less at a point in it (there are no points in nomad space). Nor is it to be at the centre of the vastness ... instead, the nomad is spread throughout ... as much there as here, always on the way between places. (Casey, 1998: 304)

Both Casey and Colebrook explain how the analogy with nomad life is evident in Deleuze and Guattari’s spatial thinking. A nomad inhabits the whole region, always between locations. Deleuze and Guattari write,

The life of the nomad is the intermezzo ... for the nomad ... locality is not delimited; the absolute, then, does not appear at a particular place but becomes a non-limited locality; the coupling of the place and the absolute is achieved not in a centred, oriented globalization or universalization but in an infinite succession of local operations. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 381)

Casey asks a relevant question: How are we to understand this concept of local operations? These operations, Casey explains, are ‘the basis of the constitution’ of experience, its conditions, and the constitutive aspect of smooth space (Casey, 1998: 305). Put simply, local operations are how one moves from space to space consisting for the most part of relays involving skilled motions such as using vehicles or ships. These local operations, Casey describes, in such a smooth and nomad space, make one experience space efficiently and intensively, moving from space to space as a ‘voyage in place’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 382). Furthermore, this aspect of intensity moves away from the Kantian understanding of space as extensio to what Deleuze and Guattari call intensive spatium. Casey writes,

Such a voyage in such a place/region is measured neither in terms of quantity of distance or motion or time nor in terms of its physical resonance; its intensity is not intimate but belongs to the very vastness of the region in which the journey is made. (Casey, 1998: 306)
According to Casey and Colebrook, this notion of *spatium* with its intensive qualities brings forth the idea of immersion. Immersion in a nomadic smooth space ‘is body-based and landscape-oriented’ (Casey, 1998: 306) – as Deleuze and Guattari explain the human subject moves from points of origin to points of destination continually appropriating directions and engaging in local operations (Casey, 1998: 306). What makes *spatium* intensive is precisely the way in which the human subject, being on the land, orientates himself by synthesizing landmarks, using transport and taking directions. On the ground, there is ‘no intermediary distance, all distance is intermediary’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 307); all is in relation to the experience happening in the land and the modalities of such experiences. In this sense, ‘each of these local operations establishes contiguity with the ground one is on, whether land or sea’ (Casey, 1998: 307). Subsequently, what one experiences and how one experiences it are an equal negotiation and construction – an onto-epistemic construction.

Also, in its intensive manner, the experience of the *spatium*, allows Deleuze and Guattari to equate the term *spatium* with what they also call ‘haptic space’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 307), broadly understood as a space of intensive experiences. They write, ‘the first aspect of the haptic, smooth space of close vision is that its orientations, landmarks, and linkages are in continuous variation; it operates step by step’ (Deleuze and Guattari in Casey 1998: 307). The haptic immersive environment synthesizes visual, auditory, and olfactory messages with tactile or vibratory information to create affective interfaces, enabling complete sensory experiences (Casey, 1998: 307). For Deleuze and Guattari, haptic space is fluid and intensive. Haptic space is deterritorialized and must be navigated by constant reference to the immediate concrete environment by perception, emotional connotations, affective responses, knowledge-making and experience, attending to the tangible properties and particularities of the physical environments that must be traversed – as walking through sand or snow (Casey, 1998: 307-308).

Deleuze offers another distinct conceptualization to describe intermedial spatiality: the notion of ‘any-space-whatever’ (Deleuze, 1986: 109). In his
Cinema 1, he (1986) describes this ‘any-space-whatever’ as a space freed from conventional location and opened to a totality of relational spaces. For him, the ‘any-space-whatever’ is, not an abstract universal, in all times, in all places. It is a perfectly singular space, which has merely lost its homogeneity, that is, the principle of its metric relations or the connection of its own parts so that the linkages can be made in an infinite number of ways. It is a space of virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible. (Deleuze, 1986: 109)

Deleuze also discusses the notion of ‘any-space-whatever’ as the space of the liminal and the interval. Far from understanding spatiality as a historical event, this thesis conceptualizes it as a self-distributing plane, a space that immanently unfolds itself, and, through this unfolding, conditions the spatial field it determines. In this sense, intermedial spatiality is an ‘any-space-whatever’ where multiplicity and heterogeneity are incorporated.

The idea of a folding and unfolding space with heterogeneous characteristics highlights Deleuze’s postulate of ‘the fold’ (Deleuze, 1993: 18), as an in-betweeness of spaces – as an evental inter-being and intermezzo. The Deleuzian fold also discusses the relation between the outside and the inside and how these interweave. As a concept, the fold creates a new layer in the conceptualization of the inside/outside model, where the structure of space is presented in the binary and boundary between what is included and what is not; what is part of and what is not; and what belongs to and what does not.

Deleuze describes the concept of the fold in relation to Baroque architecture. Yet, the concept presents a wider range of philosophical positions throughout his writing opus. Deleuze’s fold runs parallel in importance with his understanding of the event and, therefore, the construction to subjectivity: the third axiom of the Deleuzian event. In this regard, the concept presents limitless interrogating possibilities and has been used intensively in critical debates such as feminism, architecture or engineering. One aspect of the concept – its most basic, Deleuzian scholars such as Colebrook (2000) and
Buchanan and Lambert (2005) suggest – is the fold in relation to spatial multiplicities.

The fold, for Deleuze, represents the ontology of becoming – of multiplicity and differentiation. The fold, for him, is topological. He writes,

Thus a continuous labyrinth is not a line dissolving into independent points, as flowing sand might dissolve into grains, but resembles a sheet of paper divided into infinite folds or separated into bending movements, each one determined by the consistent or conspiring surrounding ... A fold is always folded within a fold, like a cavern in a cavern. The unit of matter, the smallest element of the labyrinth, is the fold, not the point, which is never a part, but a simple extremity of the line. (Deleuze, 1993: 18)

In this sense, the fold is in itself the multiple of the fold. It is a dimensional change, operating in multiple degrees of developmental intensities. He describes,

Folding-unfolding no longer simply means tension-release, contraction-dilation, but enveloping-developing ... The simplest way of starting the point is by saying that to unfold is to increase, to grow; whereas the fold is to diminish, to reduce, to withdraw into the recess of the world. Yet a simple metric change would not account for the difference between the organic and the inorganic ... It would fail to show that movement does not simply go from one greater or smaller part to another, but from fold to fold. (Deleuze, 1993: 19)

In Warped Spaces: Art, Architecture and Anxiety in Modern Culture, Anthony Vidler (2002), explains that Deleuze’s notion of the fold has proved to be a primordial conceptualizing topic for contemporary architects both as a material and a designing phenomenon. He writes,

as Deleuze expands on the implications of the fold, and its cognates the pleat and the crease, it gains an almost ontological status as the defining characteristic of baroque space and thought ... for Deleuze to say that the folds are manifested in “pleats of matter” is not simply to refer to a piece of cloth [Deleuze uses the example of Bernini’s sculpture of Santa Teresa]; matter is, in these terms, everywhere, in the void as well as in the solid and subject to the same forces. Folds then exist in space and time, in things and in ideas, and among their unique properties is the ability
to join all these levels and categories at the same moment.
(Vidler, 2002: 117)

Clearly drawing on a Leibnizian understanding, the Deleuzian fold is also in a continuous temporal movement, enveloping former folds and creating new ones. Deleuzian folds are constituted as forms of space in the pleat, under the pleat and between the pleats; a continuous pleating that erases the differences between the inside and the outside.\(^{39}\) In this manner, the fold both separates and brings together inside-outside spatial articulations.

Along the same lines, Martin Kornberger and Stuart Clegg (2003) explain that for Deleuze the term fold ‘reverses the relationship between inside and outside … is neither inside nor outside but the space in-between, the interstitial’ (Kornberger and Clegg, 2003: 83). Moreover, they posit, the fold is precisely a space in-between where the order of the inside/outside and its lineal causality is interrupted: there is no powerful, transcendent centre that determines the periphery. Instead, we are thrown in the middle of an active play of forces, where cause and effect are inextricably interwoven. (Kornberger and Clegg, 2003: 83)

This, according to Deleuze, creates a plane of immanence situated in a space in-between where the interfacial occurs and where spaces liminally co-construct each other. Furthermore, and as a final point, the fold, according to Kornberger and Clegg, is the space where the outside intermingles with the inside in a manner that can be categorized as an event – an event happening at the meeting of the interior and exterior forces of space. Kornberger and Clegg clarify that ‘from an inside/outside perspective, the fold as a space of passages and thresholds, as a liminal zone … is a point of transition’

\(^{39}\) In this regard, the spatial dramaturgical articulations that see the correlation of notions of inside and outside also imply a sense of spatial conjunction liminally. Taking from Gaston Bachelard (1958), Casey (1998) explains these conjunctions as ‘intimate immensity’ (Bachelard, 1958: 193). For Casey, the intimate immensity of a location connects place with space where the dichotomy between finite (place) and the infinite (space) is overcome. He writes: ‘in intimate immensity I enter space from place itself. I come to the immense from within rather than on the basis of exteriority … the in/out dyad has lost its divisive and diremptive character … Place and space shed their usual differentia: the clarity and distinctness of the near and small in one case, the emptiness of the far and the enormous in the other. They coalesce in a common immensity’ (Casey, 1998: 294-95)
(Kornberger and Clegg, 2003: 84). In understanding the fold as transitional, ‘one state of being shifts into another, thus, they are spatial zones of becoming’ (Kornberger and Clegg, 2003: 84). In this sense, the fold occupies the space of the topological – the space where spatial identity is constructed and immediately transformed as a system of relations. In other words, a system of relations, as Casey explains, in which locality is not identifiable in objective space and undermines notions of spatiality as “pure” temporal diachronism in favour of notions of spatio-temporal relational juxtaposition and synchronicity. In this sense, the fold can be grasped as combining both the synchronic and diachronic in its topological manner.

With all this in mind, we have seen that each spatial point in the world is an experience that unfolds the world from itself without an anticipated point in the future. In this regard, the creation of the spatial is the configuration of singular spatial actualities tending towards infinity, the renewal aspect of potentiality. In doing so, each spatial actuality, each spatial frame, deterritorializes the already territorialized to construct a new reterritorialization in a generative manner. This manner, this thesis suggests, is an all-encompassing spatial horizon. We suggest that spatiality spreads across temporality, creating a set of spatial relations that produce – while unfolding – spatial stability.

3. The Third Onto-epistemic Condition: A Constructivist Reading of The Narrativity of the Event.

As noted, narrativity, as the third onto-epistemic condition, can be considered the means through which the abstract components of space and time are rendered determinate. Here, it is argued that it is through narrativity that both the orchestrations of temporality and spatiality are articulated synthetically through the generative activation of the event’s constructive frames. Moreover, the proposed articulation of intermedial narrative via the generative triadic execution sees the construction of narrative engaged in a constant manner of performative re-activation: the unfolding and becoming of the radical aesthetic.
Within a constructivist reading of epistemology, we understand the term ‘narrative’ via a Deleuzian tripartite ontology (see Protevi, 2011; Shaviro, 2010; May, 2005). Seen thus, narrativity posits three interdependent registers: the virtual, the intensive and the actual. For Deleuze, as John Protevi (2012) explains,

in all realms of being [and narrative can be described as one for him] (i) intensive morphogenetic processes follow the structures inherent in (ii) differential virtual multiplicities to produce (iii) localized and individuated actual substances with extensive properties and differentiated qualities. Simply put, the actualization of the virtual, that is the production of actual things [narrative] of the world, proceeds by way of intensive articulating processes. (Protevi, 2012: 3)

Deleuze’s ontological project sees the virtual field as composed of thought and non-human entities as multiplicities, ‘which are constituted by the progressive determination of differential elements, differential relations and singularities’ (Protevi, 2012: 4); all related by ‘intensive processes’ (Protevi, 2012: 3) that re-configure ad infinitum. With this in mind, intermedial narrative is here understood as presenting mereotopological relationships.

In the previous section we have described topology, following Luciana Parisi (2013), as the study of continuities and connectivity within ‘the modulations of space and time’ (Parisi, 2013: 267). In this section, mereology is described as ‘the theory of parthood relations: the relations of a part to whole and the relations between parts within a whole’ (Parisi, 2013, 2013: 264). Combining them both, mereotopology ‘investigates relations between parts and wholes, parts of parts, and the boundaries between them’ (Parisi, 2013: 264).

In relation to the mereotopological, Parisi explains how connectivity,

becomes the motor of spatio-temporal differentiations … [creating] emergent environments … [and] resulting in adaptable’ spaces … a dynamically growing space infused with … continual variations driven by the asymmetric temporalities’ of the participants elements. (Parisi, 2013: 115)

She continues,
infused with the relativity of lived experience, thus announcing a radical transformation ... marked by ... indeterminacies ... the possibility that there are distinct spaces co-existing in the same time ... [in which no] point can be seen as an ultimate, privileged entry into the realm of intensive duration. (Parisi, 2013: 116)

She also highlights the relativity of the mereotopological. In this sense, the relativity,
does not coincide with fluid bending of space in time, but more importantly involves shears, cuts, gaps, and events suspending the [linear] continuity of space-time ... instead [it] enters into a relationship ... [where] there can be simultaneity between distinct space-times. What defines simultaneity is indeed the realization that there is another order of actuality. (Parisi, 2013: 122)

Additionally, in the context of theoretical understandings of mereotopological dynamics, Stamina Portanova (2008b) discusses how,
rather than dissolving into the whole which they co-constitute, and rather than being [ephemerally] erased by the continuous relations in which they are implicated, the parts maintain their indispensable ontogenetic status ... the relation generates the parts ... [but without] the parts no relation would take place. (Portanova, 2008b: 4)

The parts, according to her, are,
never ontologically prior to the relations, in which they are involved but always coexistent with them, like an atom, which is not pre-existing or previously distinct, but always distinguishable from its molecular relations' of which it is an intrinsic part. (Portanova, 2008b: 5)

Moreover,
each composing element or piece maintains its own singularity, like a precious tendency towards self-individuation, which finds its proper sense in the articulated ... continuum of the whole structure ... in turn, each of these singular worlds feeds of the particular collaborative relations appearing between its own composing elements ... and all these elements co-work towards ... with the notion of the in-between. (Portanova, 2008a: 7)
From this perspective, a mereotopological understanding of intermedial narrative conceives each narrative occasion as self-contained and self-constituted, but also as open to a network of other narrative relations: the narrative whole ‘is neither given nor giveable … because it is the Open, and because its nature is to change constantly, or to give rise to something new, in short, to endure’ (Deleuze, 1986: 9). In discussing intermedial narrativity around the notion of mereotopology, a distinct conceptualization arises regarding how the functional structuring of narrative form and content is established by creating a network of narratological modulations that disrupt classical understandings of narrative construction as a structural linearity.40

Narrativity is commonly grasped in terms of linear progression and the unity of acts through the composition of a narrative structure. Here, intermedial narrativity is discussed regarding the ways in which intermedial strategies release performance from classical conditions of narration and produce novel and radical possibilities. In general, intermedial narrativity draws attention to the structure of the narrative both as the basis of experience for the participant subjects and as a conceptual platform upon which the performance is built. In distinction to classical dramatic narrative structure, the narrative structures in intermedial practices emphasize its contingent nature within dramaturgical strategies along with its functional characterization. As this argument proposes, narrativity in intermedial praxis provides a platform that challenges both established narratological discourses such as structuralism, and well-defined narratological notions such as focalization – the point of view or how the narrative is told. We also stress how intermedial narrativity escapes conceptualizations of narrative text as a fixed structure and enters into the realm of hypertextualities, spatio-temporal expansions and mereotopological open-ended narrative occasions.

In general, Onega and Garcia Landa define narrative as,

---

40 The term modulation is used here to mean the functional aspect and the process of changing some phenomenon for the purpose of transmission and “display”. Deleuze (1992) also offers a description: ‘like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point’ (Deleuze, 1992: 3).
the semiotic representation of a series of events meaningfully connected in a temporal and causal way ... therefore, we can speak of many kinds of narrative texts. [The realms of these possibilities] Narrativization is one of the commonest ways of applying an order and a perspective to experience. (Onega and Garcia Landa, 1996: 4)

In broad-spectrum terms, narrative analysis explores the particularities of textual production, structure and reception. Every narrative medium has a specific narrative form since they all have a specific use of representational techniques and emplotment strategies. Moreover, David Herman (2009) defines a prototypical narrative as,

a representation that is situated in – must be interpreted in light of – a specific discourse context or occasion for telling ... a structured time-course of particularized events ... this representation also conveys the experience of living through the storyworld-in-flux, highlighting the pressure of events on real or imagined consciousness affected by the occurrences at issue ... it can be argued that narrative is centrally concerned with qualia, a term used by philosophers of mind to refer to the sense of “what is like” for someone or something to have a particular experience. (Herman, 2009: 1)

In relation to narrative, Mieke Bal (2009) defines narratology as ‘the ensemble of theories of narrative, narrative texts, images, spectacles, events and cultural artefacts that tell a story’ (Bal, 2009: 1). According to Bal’s definition, theory is understood as specifically linguistic and textual: ‘a systematic set of generalized statements about a particular segment of reality. That segment of reality, the corpus, about which narratology attempts to make its pronouncements consists of narrative texts’ (Bal, 2009: 1). It should be pointed out that most narratological studies have been developed within literature, language and grammatical fields. Given the context of this research, however, the narrative text must be understood as performance considered in itself as a narrative and geared towards facilitating an analysis of intermedial performance as text. In this sense, the performance text is here to be understood as a narrative system of interrelated elements.

Bal also defines text as a ‘finite and structured whole of signs [elements and meanings]’ (Bal, 2009: 5). This definition does not imply that a narrative
performance text must be fixed and static, but that it presents its ‘reader’ with a beginning and an end: it is a performance system shared between performers and auditors of the performance – the participating subjects. Such a narrative performance text employs more than linguistic means – indeed, according to Bal, it is ‘a text in which an agent or subject conveys to an addressee a story in a particular medium, such as language, images, sounds buildings or a combination thereof’ (Bal, 2009: 5). A story can be considered to be the content of that text, which has a particular mode of expression, a manner of being told or presented, a particular dramaturgy. The presentation of the story is typically defined as a ‘fabula’. A fabula can be conceptualized as a ‘series of logically and chronologically related events that are caused or experienced by agents [be it the participant subjects or the attending variables]’ (Bal, 2009: 5). But as the case studies will show, intermedial performance opens up a series of problematics for traditional narrative performance theory, where the spectator belongs to the extra-diegetic world beyond the play. As we shall see, in the context of intermedial narrative, the spectator becomes incorporated into the narrative. He is a diegetic narrative agent as part of the system of performative and emergent intra-actions.

What is suggested is that viewed as a unique dramaturgical strategy, intermedial narrativity as a radical performance text is not constrained by the lineal logic of traditional diegesis; instead, it is a network, a multi-dimensional and mereotopological narrative space, in which a variety of other narrative texts blend and clash, enabling a ‘composited heterocosm’ (Boenisch, 2010b: 202) of narrative planes of composition that ‘refuses a complete, surveyable totality: it creates, rather, an intermedial space of overlaps and imbrications’ (Boenisch, 2010b: 202). Understood in this way, the intermedial performance narrative text is a tissue of references drawn from innumerable centres of praxis: it is characterized by interdisciplinary interlinks. For example, it has intertexts; that is, it is a narrative network, presenting "internal" units of textual multiplicity. Each text, in its mereotopological characteristic, is considered as indefinitely divisible into other texts, placing ‘everything in variation’, (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 5).
In relation to the above-mentioned variation, the notion of ‘hypersurface architecture’, generally used in architectural backgrounds, becomes helpful to identify the onto-epistemic functionality of intermedial narrativity. Drawing on Deleuze’s fold, Stephen Perrella (1998) defines a hypersurface architecture as an,

enfolding of substances into differentiated topologies. The term hypersurface is not a concept that contains meaning, but an event, one with a material dimension … at the threshold of … [and] as a site of emergence for new intensities. (Perrella, 1988: 10)

Furthermore, he writes,

“Hyper” implies human agency reconfigured by digital culture, and “surface” is the enfolding of substances into differentiated topologies. The term hypersurface is not a concept that contains meaning, but an event; one with a material dimension. We are currently at the threshold of this new configuration as a site of emergence for new intensities. (Perrella, 1998: 10)

With this in mind, intermedial narrativity becomes a flux the outcome of which moves away from notions of spatial and temporal linearity and essentialist readings of the “here and now” to the parameters of the multiple, the relational and the differential. Perrella also stresses that such an emergent configuration can be categorized as a becoming of forms and influxes, increasingly grasped as fluid: ‘the co-presence of both material and image upon an architectural surface/membrane substrate is such that neither the materiality nor the image dominates’ (Perrella, 1998: 13). Moreover, ‘the hypersurface implies binary relationships such as image/form, inside/outside, structure/ornament [and] ground/edifice’ (Perrella, 1998: 8). In this sense, intermedial dramaturgy becomes ‘hypersurface’. Perrella also refers to the term as topological architecture, wherein space and time is constantly re-folding through and within surfaces as planes of composition. For Perrella, the notion of ‘hypersurface’ as event-architecture shares conceptualizing parameters with Delueze’s notion of the fold, where the unfolding and re-folding of the spatially actual and virtual is interwoven.
Within these parameters, Gabriella Giannachi (2004) offers another perspective. She explains that in conceptualizing areas of performance and virtual reality, the event moves through the ‘hypersurface’. She explains, the hypersurface is where the real and the virtual meet each other. It is materiality and textuality, real and representation. It is also the site of virtual performance. Through the hypersurface, the viewer [experiencer] can enter the work of art, be part of it, as well as interact with it. Because the hypersurface is a liminal space, the viewer can double their presence and be in both the real and the virtual environment simultaneously. In other words, the viewer may be part of both the realm of the image and the sphere of the real, and may modify one through the other … the theatre of the hypersurface is not immersive but it simulates immersiveness … In this sense, the hypersurface is the theatre par excellence – a hyper-sur-face, a space twice removed from the ‘face’, in other words, a place twice above or beyond the world of appearance. (Giannachi, 2004: 95)

In this sense, intermedial narrativity moves through medial folds and the creation of dramaturgically articulations – as one inside another, connecting through nexuses.41

With this in mind, the intermedial performance text is to be understood as a network and not primarily as an accumulative and progressive structure of narrative meaning. It generates meaning but as an ever-changing flux of relations, never identical to itself, always open to interpretations where the making and the transmitting – as pointed out by Boenisch – of meaning coincide. Intermedial narrativity thus places its participant subject in a process of constant narrative transformation as the narrative is transforming itself. Here, there is no limit to what Brian Massumi (1992) calls ‘spaces of interaction’ (Massumi, 1992: 98). Further, the construction of intermedial

---

41 Gabriella Giannachi (2004) also points out that the hypersurface is a surface with a meta-dimension. As noted by Perrella, ‘hypersurface is a reconsideration of often dichotomous relationships existing in the environment. These binaries include; image/form, inside/outside, structure/ornament, ground/edifice and so forth; not as separate and hence static entities but as transversally-constituted fabrics or planes of immanence. Hypersurfaces are generated in the problematic relationships that occur when binary categories conjugate because such divisions can no longer be sustained in isolation through either linguistic or material divisions’ (Perrella in Giannachi 2004: 99).
narrative is in itself the creation of the medium; that is, the narrative medium is here more than the representation of one medium in another medium during processes of re-mediatization – as in Bolter and Grusin. The narrative – as a constructive medium and the situated emergence of the constructivist intra-actions – results in a medium “charged with” and incorporating the peculiar medial characteristics of other medium – an all-encompassing of medial multi-modalities, as Ellestrom discusses, where ‘the operational and qualifying aspects of media’ (Ellestrom, 2010: 25) act as narrativizing platforms. Consequently, the narrative as a constructive medium should not only be interpreted as the traditional relationship between form and content during processes of re-mediation, but it should also be grasped as the functioning of a medium. In this context, the concept of becoming refers to an multiple capacity of intermedial performance to expand narrative networks, to explore narrative functionality; to the very process of narrative emergence, involving ‘creation, whereby human creative activity is accompanied … by the work of non human forces [as intra-actions]’ (Kember and Zylinska, 2012: 22); to produce endless intertextualities; and to resist as a fundamental impossibility the closure of meaning because of the constant re-working of the actual and virtual processes of medial fabulation.
Chapter 2

Execution: Blast Theory’s 10 Backwards (1999)

This chapter concerns the way in which the proposed radical aesthetic of intermedial work explores the differential aspect of the mereotopological narrative, particularly focusing on how such a radical dramaturgy needs to be grasped in terms of differential temporality within the presented constructivist reading of epistemology. In other words, the following will highlight how intermedial practices investigate, question, and experience the temporal aspect of the “now” and time in performance. Further, it addresses 10 Backwards (1999), a piece by Blast Theory, as a case study to describe this instance as a type of intermedial praxis in which the immediacy and actuality of the present moment is peculiarly elongated and fragmented in terms of its experiential intensity and dramaturgical articulation. The suggested differential quality will distinguish the proposals here from the notions established by the liveness and ontological debates and, therefore, will present differentiability as an intrinsic and defining part of the radical dramaturgy.

Intermedial performance, Edward Scheer (2010) points out, provides, perhaps, the most efficient materials conducive to the study of the temporal constitution of an aesthetic performance experience (Scheer, 2010: 119). Intermedial praxis, it can be argued, draws attention to the present both as the basis of experience and as a conceptual platform. Scheer notes,

an experience of the present may be construed as the revelation of trans-historical, ever-changing, durational flux that guarantees all experience of time – but in intermedial performance the breakthrough into real duration is framed as one phase of a performative act, not as a unidirectional escape from reality. It therefore provides a way to intensify our engagement with the world. (Scheer, 2010: 119-120)
In *10 Backwards*, the question of how time is produced – instead of what time is – highlights the particularities of intermedial temporality in its experiential and critical conceptualization.\textsuperscript{42} From this perspective and within the context of intermedial praxis, *10 Backwards* enables and constructs time – as a structural and functional element that articulates the onto-epistemic constructivist conditions at the moment of the execution of the event.

We explore here a novel concept of intermedial temporality in relation to process philosophy in order to understand the relationship between the use of media technologies in performance – technologies as a temporalizing element (Barker, 2012: 1-3) – and the participating subject. In this way, through the interrogation of *10 Backwards*, this chapter shows something unique about the manner intermediality produces temporality in performance; that is, its differential aspect. Time in *10 Backwards* is measured only dynamically and is no longer reduced to the thread of chronology where past, present and future are aligned on a linear continuum. Furthermore, time in *10 Backwards* is identified with the interlacing movement of the creative forces of each mereotopological narrative plane of composition. Once an essentialist reading of chronology is pulverized, time becomes differential, multiple and fragmented like many facets of a shattered crystal, as Deleuze would say. In this respect, the understanding of intermedial temporality shifts from linear chronology and the reductive “here and now” to an understanding of temporality as intensities and densities – grasped here as moments of occurrence, as clusters of temporal orchestrations enabled by the mereotopological interplay of the dramaturgical attending variables, and as temporal intersections where different temporal articulations meet.

Media technologies, *10 Backwards* emphasizes, highlight the manner in which the temporal past, present and future position intermedial temporality as produced by a process of agential entanglements between the human and

\textsuperscript{42} Edward Scheer (2012) describes how the notion of time in contemporary performance ‘implies a specific construction of time ...(yet it) has another quality that invokes the flux of temporal experience, the quality of time experienced in the doing of an action rather than simply the quantity of chronological time that a task might consume’ (Scheer, 2012:1).
non-human. Drawing on Whitehead’s and Deleuze’s process philosophy, notions of the event and vitalist frameworks within the background of a constructive aesthetic, this chapter discusses how time is produced through temporal dramaturgical structures that highlight both its differential, multiple and synthesizing aspects and its being continually produced. Comprehended in this way, the temporal intermedial event, in inter-relating the human and the analogue and the digital elements of the performance world through processes of dramaturgical constructivist mediation – as intra-actions – becomes itself a process that generates the particular – and necessary and sufficient – temporal conditions for the differential becoming of intermedial dramaturgy.

Intermedial temporality will be also explored as a temporal viscosity. Seen thus, intermedial temporality can be understood as a density that is both temporally fluid and consistent; as presenting both temporal thinness and thickness; as expanding and contracting; and as accounting for the differential temporal intensities that configure the intermedial event. This temporal texture explores multiple modes of presenting, experiencing and making sense of time, co-existing in the experiential present moment during the execution of the event. Looked at in this way, intermedial temporality can be discussed as non-linearity; as an interlacing turmoil of temporal flows; and as a multi-temporal aesthetic construction produced by dramaturgical processes in which the experiential present moment escapes the rigidity of the inappropriate essentialist ontological “here and now” and enters into the fluidity and convergence – the functional synthesizing – of the multi-temporal, containing in itself differential and intensive relations between the past, present and future and, hence, highlighting the mereotopological aspect of the radical dramaturgy.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section introduces 10 Backwards. The second section discusses differential temporality as the first defining element of the radical dramaturgical aesthetic proposed here. This second section is sub-divided into three sections whose objective is to reposition, for instance, notions of temporal actuality in opposition to the
ontological and presentness debates. The final sub-section looks at 10 *Backwards* within the lenses of the becoming and process philosophy and presents some questions and opens up some problematics.

1. **10 Backwards: Description of Practice.**

Blast Theory presented *10 Backwards* on the 11th of May 1999 at the Institute of Contemporary Art in London. Structurally and thematically understood, it is a 76-minute performance piece that combines live and pre-rendered mixes of video projections to articulate a dramaturgy that interrogates notions of personal identity in relation to temporal flows.  

Figure 1: *10 Backwards*. Production poster. Copyright: Blast Theory.

The piece’s staging and dramaturgical strategies articulate an interplay between different media such as pre-recorded materials and “live” dramatic action where the notion of what is a temporal in-between – the so called

43 Andy Lavender (2002) also uses this performance to discuss his proposals of liveness and ‘nowness’ (Lavender, 2002: 189).
liminal – finds the intra-activity of the performance’s attending variables and participating subject.

The narrative and dramaturgical intermedial strategies employed such as travelling through time and inhabiting multiple realities negotiate the limits of the performance’s temporal experience and places the execution of the temporal structures in a position that exponentially and differentially multiplies the manner in which temporality can be experienced and made sense of.

The intermedial dramaturgical elements explored throughout the piece engage the participant subject in a complex narrative that merges “live” action and pre-recorded material into a dramaturgical structure of juxtaposed elements, creating a manner of multi-temporal storytelling. One of the characteristics of the piece is that different narrative angles are engaged with
at the same time, exploring different temporalities as a variety of dramaturgical strategies are activated in order to create an experience of differential temporal modulations. In this sense, 10 Backwards becomes a piece about temporal perception, the prospectives of life and experiences where temporal perception, the exploration of memory and the potential projections into the future interlink. In this sense, the experience of time expands in a spatial and temporal extension of possibilities.

The plot concerns a woman, Niki, who travels ten years into the future (see figure 2). Within an hour, she is brought back to the present, where she engages with processes of recognition of past and future experiences. Niki attempts to understand her present identity via interacting with her past and future identities, which are shown and interacted with on screens, one large and one small, either side of an elongated stage. The piece also includes two other performers who sporadically interact with Niki. There are several rows of audience members at each side of the stage, so they can see and experience each other.

The production carefully explores notions of time and temporal materiality through a dexterous interlinking of the “live”, the pre-recorded video imagery and a live feed from a camera onstage. Throughout the piece, Niki becomes self-aware of her own positioning, constantly interpreting and trying to understand her own identity, memories and longings as the virtual and actual aspects of her own reality co-mingle so as to become indistinguishable. At times Niki videotapes herself in an almost compulsive manner, an emphasized aspect of the performance presentation. Furthermore, the relationship between her recordings, the live feed, and the pre-recorded material articulated as video diaries, through which she hypothesizes about her future and accesses future situations of what she might think to be her ideal life, while making a constant reference to her present state of being and her past experiences, enables her to experience and construct her present moment as clearly co-existing with layers of planes of the past and future as a system of the relationships of time.
The screens project a live feed of her stage acts as well as pre-recorded material such as newspapers clippings and city images that show her in past and future life situations. Sometimes, her image is pasted physically via a live feed on top of one of those images. At times, the projected images are paused. Other times, there are jumps on the live-feed images and repetition of single and specific movements. Sporadically, she interacts with the frozen images, tries to imitate them, and even makes fun of them as she attempts to make sense of the situation while trying to recognise linkages and logical connections. In this sense, Niki is in a continual process of learning about herself. At other times, we can see her present self on the stage, her past self on one screen, and her future self on the other screen concurrently. There are also moments in which a picture of another person who physically resembles her appears. Occasionally, the screens are off, but we never cease to see them as a dramaturgical element placed onstage – they can be activated at any time, emphasizing a time of possibility and potentiality. Further, periodically, there is also a voice-over that describes her temporal experiences. At times, it is her voice; at other times it is somebody else’s.
voice. Niki persistently explores and experiments with different manners of approaching the media elements. Affectively, her activities draws her and the audience into space-times of experiences that are in the process of being composed and opened to the indeterminacy of a present in the making. Through the scripted dialogue, the audience understands that Niki interacts simultaneously with her past, present, and future. Moreover, Niki also experiences time as presented spatially; that is, an experiential encounter where every perceived instant co-exists simultaneously next to each other in an encompassing frame of temporal possibilities and an agglomeration of all moments, a totalizing landscape of experienced, perceived and understood moments – a temporal dimension that lies at the heart of 10 Backwards' intermedial strategies.

10 Backwards shifts from lineal and one-dimensional conceptualizations of time to an understanding of time as temporal continua. In this sense, intermedial temporality becomes a temporal matrix that replaces notions of causal and linear progressions of temporal events for temporal notions in which temporality is grasped as intensities, densities and viscosities.\(^\text{44}\) 10 Backwards also rethinks time as re-presented spatially; that is, through the use of media technologies, pre-recorded material and live feeds the same moment in time is presented in different spaces, freeing the narrative from a fixed perspective and entering into the layering of the mereotopological. Its chronological narrative replaces causal temporal links with a chain of events that are presented as interrelated traces and a manifestation of multiple and mutual perspectives and modes of presentation.\(^\text{45}\)

\(^{44}\) This shift in dramaturgical articulations of time has been observed in theatrical performance practices since the 1960s in the work of artists such as John Cage, Richard Foreman, Gertrude Stein and Robert Wilson who challenged lineal chronological constructions and explored temporal landscapes where events happen simultaneously in an immediate present.

\(^{45}\) In this sense, 10 Backwards participates in the post-dramatic because it can be also explained as a composite of temporal presentations. In conceptualizing post-dramatic theatre, Hans-Thies Lehmann (2006) explains that the notion of absolute Newtonian time is obsolete – a postulate acknowledged here. He emphasizes that time becomes a dynamic relationship that has lost a linear ‘time frame’ (Lehmann, 2006: 155) and that time is ‘non-natural’ (Lehmann, 2006: 156). Further, he posits that post-dramatic performance departs from traditional understandings of the temporal experience as linear. Moreover, Lehmann states that ‘post-dramatic theatre is a theatre of the present’ (Lehmann, 2006: 143). Lehmann discusses the present as a “here and now” quest for presence. Furthermore, Lehmann,

Overall, *10 Backwards* can be understood as an articulation of temporality occupying a ‘continuous present’ (Bay-Cheng, 2010: 89). *10 Backwards* creates a temporality that encompasses intra and sub-events, expanding the “now” into a matrix of temporally traced intensities, disrupting temporal linearity and occupying the temporal “location” of the continuous present and, hence, becomes mereotopological.\(^{46}\) Also, this temporality can be said to allow for a performance experience that differentially combines present, past, future where the temporality of each of the planes of composition takes form in the construction and creation – as taking form – of time and space. The overarching present of the performance can be categorized as continuous, as Sarah Bay-Cheng (2010) points out, because it intertwines its temporal elements in a fashion that is fluid, mutual and ongoing. The piece embraces the creative potential of encountering the temporal multi-medial possibilities created through its dramaturgical strategies. It constantly shifts from lineal temporal experiential frames to a multiplicity of aesthetics and theoretical modes of exploring temporality in the current landscape of intermedial practices. As such, the piece, as with Blast Theory’s work in general, interrogates the very nature of intermedial practice. The temporal frameworks that *10 Backwards* articulates in its mode of execution reflect upon the temporal ontological implications that the processes of performative re-

\(^{46}\) Bay-Cheng (2010) explains that the notion of the ‘continuous present’ was first used by Gertrude Stein in 1934, particularly in relation to how drama manipulates time and articulates temporality (Bay-Cheng, 2010: 87).
mediation inflect regarding the use of media technologies in relation to notions of immediacy, the engagement with the present moment.

Within these parameters, Andy Lavender (2002) suitably states that intermedial performance presents a sense of simultaneity and multiplicity of times. He says, ‘this is a multiple theatre, where perspectives, ontological states, and meanings themselves are not only plural but simultaneously so’ (Lavender, 2002: 190). Similarly, Birgit Wiens (2010) explains, The process of performance is no longer limited to the here and now, but rather transgresses local contexts and environments … The space of intermediality, in this regard, is not already there, but can only be understood as a temporal, dynamic and highly complex spatial configuration, which is created within the process of the performance. (Wiens, 2010: 94)

10 Backwards encompasses temporal non-lineal matrixed characteristics and is situated within liminal generating planes of temporal signification and construction. The following sections aim, on the one hand, to explore the proposed aspect of differentiability in relation to production of temporal rhythms and reposition the notion of actuality and immediacy; and, on the other hand, to present intermedial temporality as a non-diachronic unfolding of temporal garlands. The objective is to demonstrate that, in investigating time in its intermedial onto-epistemic and intermedial articulating mode, the nature of time, the “what” of temporality, and its operative construction during the performance event, the “how” of temporality, cannot be separated if a fuller description of the temporal experience is to be conceptualized. In this sense, the differential aspect of the radical dramaturgy shows that each actual occasion as an activation is nomadic and that exists in the both the concrete and differential experience and the construction of space-time.

2.1. 10 Backwards: Differential Temporality and the Production of Multi-temporal Rhythms.
The intermedial debate regards time as a concept and a springboard to both engage with discourses such as aesthetics and draw attention to the produced and contingent nature of time. In this sense, the conception of the temporal present in intermedial performance, Scheer (2010) explains, is seen as ‘functional rather than descriptive’ (Scheer, 2010: 119-120). Similarly, Chiel Kattenbelt (2006) suggests that in recent performance practices time both appears as a theme and as a constitutive element of the performance. Moreover, Kattenbelt aptly states that the use of media technologies in performance practices ‘disrupt[s] the traditional reception of time and space’ by the audience (Kattenbelt in Bay-Cheng, 2010: 87). Within these lines, he also speaks of a ‘temporalization of space and spatialization of time’ in the presentational modes that intermedial dramaturgies enable (Kattenbelt in Bay-Cheng, 2010: 87).

Along the same lines, Bay-Cheng (2010) notes that within recent performance practices notions of temporality are fluid.47 Drawing on Lev Manovich (2001), she calls for a ‘new temporality of the digital media’ (Bay-Cheng, 2010: 86); that is, both Bay-Cheng and Manovich describe a conceptualization of temporality as a dramaturgical ‘temporal montage (a composite of multiple images in a single moment in time)’ (Manovich in Bay-Chang, 2010: 86) where temporal difference mediates continuity in a presentational manner. Moreover, Bay-Cheng writes,

> No longer based on linear progression, external measures and materiality, time in digital contexts evolved into a dynamic, dispersed, yet coherent network of temporal points – a time that could encompass, as noted by Foucault, many different points simultaneously … a further realization of the continuous present … the temporalities of the network similarly draw from this notion of the simultaneous, continuous present. (Bay-Cheng, 2010: 88)

Bay-Cheng also fittingly notes,

---

47 In the context of digital culture and post-modern understandings of time, Bay-Cheng (2010) also points out that the intermedial debate has incorporated philosophical ideas of time simultaneously sharing and engaging with different critical positions such as time as ‘constructed (Lyotard), time as digitally compressed (Dixon and Smith), regressive (Baudrillard), elongated (Virilio), and annihilated (Huyssen)’ (Bay-Cheng, 2010: 86).
the experience of time, the new temporality, is one of many simultaneous experiences and memories capable of being stored and accessed in random order ... random instead of linear; simultaneous instead of sequential ... [a mode of experience] that thus reorders time in digital media and changes our perception of past, present and future. (Bay-Cheng, 2010: 89)

In an article titled *E-escapes: Performance in the Time of Cyberspace*, Alice Rayner (2002) describes how recent digital performance practices move away from notions of ontological space and time as the “here and now” in their dramaturgical manners of staging towards considerations of the performance of time. She describes, ‘the ways in which performance aligns with digital technologies to resist landscape and geometrical space, and to resituate space in the fugitive dimension of time’ (Rayner in Bay-Cheng, 2010: 86). In Rayner’s way of thinking, Bay-Cheng summarizes, ‘performance occupies no place, but rather ontologically exists only in a time’ (Bay-Cheng, 2010: 86); that is, in the perceptual and experiential “now” by an audience. In relation to her proposals, this chapter repositions the perceptual and experiential “now” in intermedial performance as an articulation of intensive and multiple temporalities – not described as presentationally ‘fugitive’, as Rayner designates, but as an interrelated temporal cadence of re-occurring temporalities – as intensities – and as a mutuality of times, therefore, stressing the differential aspect of the radical dramaturgy.

Summarizing the aforementioned main points, Kattenbelt, not without merit, suggests that intermediality explores temporality as a dynamic network of temporal flows that affect the experience of time by a given audience; Rayner aptly proposes that intermedial temporality is a rich cadence of temporal points; Scheer discusses the intensifying aspect as durational frames of intermedial temporality regarding staging modalities; and Bay-Cheng appropriately sees temporality as a fluid network of temporal points that are not reliant on temporal linearity. However, although this thesis draws from these positions, it argues that what is still missing is an efficient way of discussing the temporal complexity enabled by intermediality because all of
their proposals are still reliant on the phenomenon of intermediality as a staging modality and the perceptual manner in which such a modality is experienced by “pre-established” attending subjects to the intermedial transaction. Subsequently, this chapter radically suggests a working definition of intermedial temporal dynamic articulations that stresses the notion of the evental and generative in-between in its intensive manner as a tool for the intelligibility of intermedial temporality; that is, an emphasis on its evental characteristics and the manner in which intermediality constructs a conceptual dimension of a given temporal theatrical and aesthetic experience that, most importantly, cannot be separated from the construction of the experience itself; in other words, the Deleuzian conceptualization of art and aesthetics as life.

In relation to this intensive manner, the following diagrammatic mapping illustrates and visually amplifies the temporal dramaturgical characteristics of 10 Backwards – how 10 Backwards produces temporality as temporal orchestrations through intensities and densities. The diagrammatic maps also help create a visual conceptual picture of multi-linearity and multi-facetedness in relation to its temporal articulation. The examples below show how the elements or ‘notes’ – a term used by Blast Theory’s Matt Adams to describe how the attending variables such as large screen and characters operate to articulate temporal intensities – present different intensities (Adams, 2010: 15-04-2010, interview notes).

The next diagrammatic map images list a series of onto-epistemic attending variables that temporally articulate 10 Backwards. The dotted lines represent the duration, intensity and presence of each of the listed elements throughout the first 26’ of the performance – a dramaturgical blackout occurs at minute 26. For this reason, the first 26 minutes are critically explored and interrogated as a platform to conceptualize the production of intermedial temporality in 10 Backwards.
Figure 4: Diagrammatic map showing temporal intensities on the large screen during the first 26 minutes of the performance.

Figure 5: Diagrammatic map showing the performers’ temporal activity during the first 26 minutes of the performance.
Figure 6: Diagrammatic map showing temporal intensities on the small screen during the first 26 minutes of the performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervening Small Screen variables in relation to temporality (SM):</th>
<th>Performance Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM1: Screen projecting the woman looking and speaking straight to the camera (pre-recorded):</td>
<td>......</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM2: Projection of real time (what's happening on the stage, Live feed):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM3: Projection of other spaces and times (pre-recorded):</td>
<td>......</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Diagrammatic map showing temporal intensities of theatrical attending variables such as costumes and sound effects during the first 26 minutes of the performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervening Theatrical variables in relation to temporality (T):</th>
<th>Performance Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1: Set:</td>
<td>..............................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2: Use of props</td>
<td>..............................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3: Costumes</td>
<td>..............................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T4: Use of lights</td>
<td>..............................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T5: Sound effects</td>
<td>..............................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T6: Screens</td>
<td>..............................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T7: Audience</td>
<td>..............................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T8: Performers (on Stage)</td>
<td>..............................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T9: Performers (virtual)</td>
<td>..............................................................</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

124
As the above graphics illustrate, the presentational intensity of the attending temporal variables presents aspects of interrelation; that is, each variable, in its intensity and occurrence, help us observe an operative pattern in which the matrixed temporal articulation functions to create a temporal environment based on multiplicity, repetition, cross-functionality and co-relation. Interestingly, when combining the graphic dotted lines into a single graphic the constitutive temporal characteristics of 10 Backwards show that all elements/notes intertwine to create a temporal conglomerate. This dotted stratigraphy shows and illustrates how all mapped elements are equal, intertwined, and a fundamental part of the creation of the performance’s temporal construction.

Figure 8: Diagrammatic map showing temporal intensities during the first 26 minutes of the performance. The dotted lines show moments where clusters of temporal attending variables amalgamate.
This type of interconnectivity at the epistemic level shows that the functioning of the variables has a co-dependent and co-constitutive characteristic and, thus, a cross-functional articulation of temporal frames is created.

Intervening dialogic variables (N): N1: Visual Images (i.e. projections of newspapers, projections of old pictures, text); N2: Voice (pre-recorded); N3: Dialogue spoken by character(s) on the screens; N4: Dialogue between 'real' character and virtual character; N5: Dialogue between 'real' characters; N6: Dialogue between 'real' character and the audience; N7: Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or time as experienced) between characters non-screen; N8: Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or time as experienced) on the screen. 'Present Events'; N9: Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or time as experienced) on the screen. 'Past Events'; N10: Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or time as experienced) on the screen. 'Future Events'.

Intervening large screen variables (LM): LM1: Screen projecting the female character (pre-recorded); LM2: Projection of real time (Live feed); LM3: Projection of other spaces/times such as urban landscapes (pre-recorded).

Intervening small screen variables (SM): SM1: Screen projecting the female character (pre-recorded); SM2: Projection of real time (Live feed); SM3: Projection of other spaces/times such as urban landscapes (pre-recorded).

Intervening theatrical variables (T): T1: Set; T2: Props; T3: Costumes; T4: Lights; T5: Sounds; T6: Audience; T7: Performers (actual); T8: Performers (virtual).

Intervening character variables (C): C1: Woman; C2: Man; C3: Man 2

Figure 9: Diagrammatic map showing temporal intensities during the 17-26 minutes of the performance. The graphic shows that all elements are interconnected to produce temporality.
Also in relation to notions of intensity, the diagrammatic map below visually amplifies how the performance presents clusters of occurrences and the intensive interlinking of the attending variables to enable the specificities of this dramaturgical construction.

Intervening dialogic variables (N): N1: Visual Images (i.e. projections of newspapers, projections of old pictures, text); N2: Voice (pre-recorded); N3: Dialogue spoken by character(s) on the screens; N4: Dialogue between ‘real’ character and virtual character; N5: Dialogue between ‘real’ characters; N6: Dialogue between ‘real’ character and audience; N7: Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or time as experienced) between characters non-screen; N8: Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or time as experienced) on the screen. ‘Present Events’; N9: Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or time as experienced) on the screen. ‘Past Events’; N10: Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or time as experienced) on the screen. ‘Future Events’.

Intervening large screen variables (LM): LM1: Screen projecting the female character (pre-recorded); LM2: Projection of real time (Live feed); LM3: Projection of other spaces/times such as urban landscapes (pre-recorded).

Intervening small screen variables (SM): SM1: Screen projecting the female character (pre-recorded); SM2: Projection of real time (Live feed); SM3: Projection of other spaces/times such as urban landscapes (pre-recorded).

Intervening theatrical variables (T): T1: Set; T2: Props; T3: Costumes; T4: Lights; T5: Sounds; T6: Audience; T7: Performers (actual); T8: Performers (virtual).

Intervening character variables (C): C1: Woman; C2: Man; C3: Man 2

Figure 10: Diagrammatic map showing the temporal intensities of the first 26 minutes of the performance. The colours highlight the moments in which the occurrence of the temporal attending variables creates temporal clusters.
Drawing on these visual amplifications, we suggest that the cross-functionality of the attending variables aids the establishment of the evental in-betweeness that this work suggests and aptly highlight the temporalizing aspects of the intervening non-human agencies. It also helps articulate the repositioning of what has been termed ‘hybrid time’ (Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 71) into ‘temporal articulations of mutuality’; and a re-conceptualization of the actual, departing from notions of “liveness” and the “now” as a diachronic vitalism to a categorization of the actual, as the following will show, as a construction of temporal multiplicities and mutualities.

Firstly, 10 Backwards, as noted, in its temporal presentational aesthetics is an interrogation into the nature and construction of time. In this sense, 10 Backwards is characterized by ‘the intention of utilizing the specificity of time as a mode of presentation to turn time as such into an object of the aesthetic experience’ (Lehmann, 2006: 156). In its use and implementation of time, 10 Backwards reveals time as a Deleuzian and Whiteheadian multiplicity, undermining a temporal conceptualization of time as equated by the “now”, “liveness” and notions of presentness. Within these parameters, this thesis argues that 10 Backwards suitably demonstrates that there is no such thing as an essentialist present, but, as John Mullarkey (1999) aptly posits, a ‘multiplicity of presents, each with a correlatively different past and future’ (Mullarkey, 1999: 54). Furthermore, he writes, ‘every moment brings with it something “radically new”’ (Mullarkey, 1999: 9-10), which can be read to imply a constant re-activation of the dramaturgical temporal parameters.

Secondly, Steve Benford and Gabriella Giannachi (2011) validly explain that the temporal structure of technologically informed performance praxis presents ideas of time as a ‘hybrid time’ (Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 71). This hybrid temporal organization, they explain, creates new forms of temporal features, which engage with notions of fluidity and co-existence, and, in this regard, a sense of ‘between time’ (Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 71). In proposing a framework for describing the presentational nature of
hybrid temporal structures, Benford and Giannachi conceptualize the aspects of the hybrid nature of temporal inter-weavings and interstices. They write, the temporal nature is also essentially hybrid, involving multiple time scales that rub up against one another. The hybrid temporal universe created by this kind of experiences not only accommodates embedded and emergent temporal narrative constructions, each with their own varying and occasionally even contrasting tempo-rhythms, but also manages its inhabitants’ relationship to clock time. (Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 95)

Unlike naturalist or “traditional” theatre, 10 Backwards shows a temporal articulation in which elements such as slowing-down, halting and even speeding up involve a different aspect of temporal structure, and, most notably, combine multiple time layers, creating a narrative of mereotopological dimensions. In this sense, this research finds that this notion of hybridity does not fully account for the temporal complexity that 10 Backwards explores for two reasons: first, the notion of hybrid time appears to imply a lack of consistency; that is, one temporal structure, in its merging with another, loses or leaves behind some of its characteristics. Second, hybridity can be also conceptualized as subduable; that is, in the merging of temporal structures, one structure presents more influence, weight, and/or importance than the other.

As a result of this, this chapter repositions notions of temporal hybridity in terms of temporal intensive mutualities. In general, the term mutuality implies notions of reciprocity, interdependence and symbiosis. In this sense, the performative temporal frames that articulate the intermedial event are better understood as a relation of mutual dependence and action – as the Whiteheadian nexuses – and a reciprocal relation of interdependent frames – a relation that can be described as directed and received by each other towards the other and that conveys a sense of temporal equality.

48 In a private conversation with Andy Lavender (2009), he discussed that the term hybridity seems to imply a lack of consistency. He suggested that in media contexts would be more appropriate to speak of interfaces and mutual inter-relationships (Lavender, 2009: 01-12-2009, interview notes).
Within these parameters, Whitehead and Deleuze are relevant to support the argument of this chapter because of their critical engagement with notions of in-betweeness, mutuality, the production of time as processes and the actual as incorporating potentialities and virtualizations. The suggested temporal in-between here involves movement, fluidity and flexibility, and a temporal matrixed whole without a fixed centre.\footnote{Sarah Bay-Cheng (2010) explains that intermedial temporality can be described as a Deleuzian rhizome (Bay-Cheng, 2010: 89). However, we find the term matrix more appropriate to discuss intermedial temporality because, on a close reading of \textit{What is Philosophy?} and \textit{A Thousand Plateaus} where Deleuze and Guattari explain the concept of the rhizome, they point out that the rhizome presents no temporal articulation and, generally, dramaturgy is always temporal.} This is a conceptualization of time that encompasses many different points simultaneously and where the present time becomes continuous time; that is, a temporal understanding that presents no hierarchy – a temporal structure that breaks with the traditional performance concepts of temporal linearity as a vitalist “here and now”.

Claire Colebrook (2009) posits that temporal difference is important in understanding the event as a temporal in-between. In \textit{Difference and Repetition}, Deleuze carefully delineates the process in which repetition and difference coincide: broadly, a differential process always implies repetition and repetition is always differential in a processual manner – in a dynamic interplay, an incorporated difference is repeated, generating a series of independent repetitions, each with a productive and creative potential. In a Whiteheadian ‘becoming of continuity’ (Whitehead, 1928: 35), each temporal repetition, grasped as temporal cadences, creates the following one in manner of constant re-configurations. Clearly, these notions of complex repetition through internal difference and constant re-configurations among others present an apt framework to analyze the temporal aesthetic qualities of \textit{10 Backwards}.

If we understand the idea of time within \textit{10 Backwards} as ceaseless change and becoming, rather than the container of such a change, as in Kant, time becomes an explorative platform for differential movement. In this sense, Deleuze, inspired by Bergson, articulates the idea of the present as
constituted by the co-existence of multiple durations. Broadly, for Deleuze there is no single “here and now”, but several different and self-differing actualities. In relation to duration, Deleuze (1998),

Duration is always the location and the environment of differences in kind; it is even their totality and multiplicity. There are no differences in kind except in duration – while space in nothing other than the location, the environment, the totality of differences in degree. (Deleuze, 1988: 32)

Drawing on this definition, the focus here is to interrogate *10 Backwards* and see how time is conceived within the theorization of differential presents that Deleuzian duration implies, shifting away from the notions of the “now”, presentness and liveness as immediate, essentialist and authentic to the notion of the “now” as differential.50 Furthermore, the focus is also to conceive the “now” appearing as phenomenologically inaccessible outside the notion of the event. This understanding problematizes any notion of experiential time simply grasped as the immediate “here and now” and sees time as a realm beyond experience as such.51

**10 Backwards** is presented as a network of temporalities shaped onstage between the fleshed characters and the pre-recorded characters on screen. The following are samples of the dialogue that Niki establishes with herself through the small screen:

1.18 minute: New Year’s 1999 … so what are you doing for New Year’s eve? I don’t know … Two years in the future. Hopefully, I have the deposit for a home, so you have something to aspire. I am 31 years old now.

3.48 minute: I am 34 years old now. Maybe I’ll have a second home. I don’t care what that is … some kind of chalet or something to escape to. Hopefully, I’ll still have all of my  

50 Deleuzian scholar Todd May (2005) describes how “[Deleuzian] difference in itself is founding for identity, but does not appear as such (as difference itself) within those identities’ (May, 2003: 145). Identity, in this sense, is not equated with presence in an essentialist “here and now” or liveness but in the constitution of differential processes (May, 2003: 140-145).

51 As Laura Cull (2009) aptly points out it comes as no surprise, then, that Deleuzian thought has started to enter the theatrical performance studies field given that performance is always a time-based art, a durational encounter between the materiality and semioticity of the dramaturgy.
family. They will all be around.

16.55 minute: I am now on the 9th year. I am freaked. I am nearly 40. I am thinking back when I was 29 and I feel I’ve done a lot ... 30s. I am thinking back. Where have all the years gone?

21.29 minute: I turn the final year into the future. I am 40 now and it is 2009.

As the dialogues show, the temporal articulation is a network where multiple temporal points interact simultaneously, hence, stressing the mereotopological aspect of the narrative. Within the “live”, in the “now”, the “live” Niki interacts with the pre-recorded Niki who appears to be placed in a different temporal cadence (see figure 2). This, in turn, creates an overall temporal frame in which the “now” requires an understanding that must be grasped as an encounter with temporal difference. In this sense, the “now”, as the dialogue shows, is an interface that occupies a temporal inter-zone of multiple points of entrance – as a “suspended” time that can be accessed from any point – where the experience and construction of temporality is one of many simultaneously orchestrated (see figure 9).

In 10 Backwards, each point of the experiential present accumulates – as a mutuality – from other domains of temporality where time does not always flow according to a chronological line; rather, according to an extraordinarily complex mixture of temporal relations (see Serres, 2008). As in Whitehead, every temporal frame is defined by its temporal relationship to other frames. In other words, the presentness of the event in 10 Backwards is constituted by the multi-temporal and multi-linear relationships formed between each temporal actual entity – each frame. In this sense, the application of analogue

52 Michel Foucault identified the postmodern period as the ‘epoch of simultaneity’ and juxtaposition. There is a clear transition from classical ideas of time as lineal and progressive, to modernist and later postmodernist ideas of time as a constellation, to most recent conceptualizations such as Deleuze's identifications of time as a matrix of interconnections. Further, in The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation (1978), Derrida writes: ‘[in relation to understanding the present, it can be described as] a present outside time, a non-present. The present offers itself as such, appears, presents itself, opens up the stage of time or the time of the stage only by harboring its own intestine difference, and only in the interior fold of its original repetition’ (Derrida, 1978: 57).
and digital technologies in *10 Backwards* not only enables multiple variations and intensities of time, but it also produces the time differentially, or as Deleuze (2000) writes in *The Logic of Sense*,

> Only the past and the future inhere or subsist in time. Instead of a present, which absorbs the past and the future, a future and past divide the present at every instant and subdivide it ad infinitum into past and future, in both directions at once. (Deleuze, 2000, 164)

The use of pre-recorded material and live feed in *10 Backwards* emphasizes the presentation of time through technological mediation, altering the experience of time from a chronological linearity to a differential and multi-temporal experiential manner. The employment of technological devices enables the construction of a temporality that is dramaturgically mediated to provide for the potential of actualizations of both a series of multi-temporal cadences and a state of presentness in which the past and the future are constantly re-presented in the continuous present by making explicit the use of technologies in its dramaturgy; the mediatized encounter, in which the specific rhythms of the pre-recorded, the “live” and the live feed are concerned with making the present of time differential, enables the different mereotopological narrative occasions to form.

From a constructivist point of view, the experience of time in intermedial practices should be simply grasped as the “live” in the immediacy of the ontological epistemic construction as an intra-action. This specific sense of temporality relies on the exploration of the juxtaposition of different temporal dimensionalities and the inter-involvement of the theatrical and the cinematic/pre-recorded dramaturgical environment where the human and the non-human co-activate each other’s agencies. Seen thus, the term “live”, we suggest, can be conceived to incorporate both the human and non-human as life. In doing so, the immediacy of the temporal experience as a successive interrelation of generative frames is presented as a temporal movement whose chronological division in the “live” dimensionality of the execution of the event renders the understanding of ontology as the “now” obsolete and suggests an understanding of temporality that is essentially grasped as
temporal nodes, gates and portals, through which the immediate “now” calls to be repositioned as an immanence of traced temporal differentiations. The difference here in applying a constructivist epistemic framework is that the “live” becomes a temporal node merging the different temporalities together and, thus, needs to be conceptualized as radical because it requires a different reading than those explored on the ontological debates.

In this way, the presentness of the moment produces and displays a double sense of multi-temporality: on the one hand, we are aware of the temporal rhythms, as a medium in a constant making, of each mediatized attending variable; that is, the production of time by the performance calls attention to itself, to how the production of time is being produced by constant processes of re-mediation (see figure 3). For instance, the technological manner of working of the pre-recorded materials shown on the screen, or the manner in which Niki holds the camera as a technical device, focuses the lenses and zooms in the image during the live feed cadences. In this way, the agency of the digital element and Niki’s agency combine – it highlights the emergent and situated activity of the intra-action – in the constructivist temporal creation of the experience, enabling relationships where multiple levels of human and non-human agency exist. As Barker (2012) says, ‘the process of using technological tools to interact with the world reveals itself to be fundamental to our experience of the world’ (Barker, 2012: 134). On the other hand, the presentation of time is also multi-temporal because each mediatized element explores and shows a different temporal orchestration where the past and the future synchronize contemporaneously with the present. As Deleuze writes, ‘the past and the future do not designate instants distinct from a supposed present instant, but rather the dimensions of the present itself as far as it is a contraction of instants (Deleuze, 1994: 71). In this manner, the convergence – as tributary small water streams and creeks flowing into a main river – of all these temporal orchestrations into the presentness of the moment categorizes the presentness of that moment as one composed of differential multiplicities, rendering, yet again, obsolete in the process notions of presentness, as described by Power and Fischer-Lichte, as a “here and now” essentialist ontological category.
Another aspect in *10 Backwards* presents interesting analytical possibilities. Each interaction between Niki and the incorporated technologies can be grasped as a section of the present within a larger event – as a singularity, as Deleuze would say, within the complexity of an event. In this sense, we are presented with a section of the present that has been elongated in such a way that it infiltrates the experiential present with the experienced past and the “yet-to-come” experience of the future: a ‘multiplicity of [temporal] processes, all extending over one another and all shaped by those things to which they connect’ (Barker, 2012: 135). In other words, the present moment expands – as a viscosity – to amalgamate past and future. This is not an understanding of time as hybrid, as Benford and Giannachi posit. Instead, time here becomes mutual, stressing the relation between Chronos and Aeon where the processes of being actualized shift through differential temporal planes. Refusing to experience time as linear, Niki engages with temporal extensions of her past and her future (see figure 2). Her temporal experience – and her trying to make sense of it as a learning process – is an elongation of her presentness in the experiential living present into the realm of an expanded temporality.

In his engagements with Deleuze, Manuel DeLanda (2002) writes, ‘time is scalar, the present may be longer or shorter, temporally, for different oscillations … the length of the present is relative, but these relative presents are nested inside one another’ (DeLanda, 2002: 10). In this way, Niki’s presentness becomes an aggregation of moments that expand into temporal relations of different intensive contemporaneousness. The organizational dramaturgical structuring of the attending variables, the relationships between the “live”, the pre-recorded and live feed, and the mediating – as an intra-actionist vitalist process of constructing mediation – relationships between them elucidate the becoming of her experience of the present moment as a continuous and constant re-conditioning that is in itself the outcome of its own process (see figure 13). *10 Backwards*, distinctly operates with temporal experimentation as scalar, presenting it as multi-temporal, bringing forward the past and the future backwards into a continuous present. Engulfed in
multi-temporality, this continuous present shows scales of time concurrently and intensively experienced as non-linear sequences where, in its constructive aesthetic, the boundaries between the temporal pre-recorded and the “live” become blurry. In fact, they dissolve. Temporality, here, is a system, rhythmically articulated and treated as both suspended and concrete and expanded and contracted intensively.

In the process of using the analogue and digital technologies as objects, not only is Niki sensing the objects, but she is also enacting sensory processes, involving herself – pragmatically and intellectually – in the process and enabling the participant subjects-audiences to be part of her processes of understanding; at times, she even explains how she is activativating the technological objects. In engaging with the technological world, she activates her whole human sensorium, as in Deleuze’s haptic, and learns through that process as a situated activity. Seen thus, ‘technology becomes fundamentally temporal as it intervenes with the processes by which … [the participant subjects] make meaning of the world, attaching itself to and affecting these processes’ (Barker, 2012: 134). Simply put, the agential technologies vitally enhance the haptic in relation to intelligibility. In this way, Niki, as a participating subject, is mutually connected with her multi-temporal and haptic world. Indeed, it is that connection as an intra-action, rather than being reducible to either of the elements connected, that enables the haptic and the knowledge-making characteristics of the constructivist aesthetic.

The mediatization of the intermedial dramaturgy in 10 Backwards through which the network of attending variables and the participant subjects operate juxtaposes linear temporal progress with the radical temporal variations of the mediatized dramaturgical systems. In this respect, temporality in 10 Backwards is investigated via the specificity of intermedial generation of mediality, as a vitalist process, in its constructive temporal aesthetic. Here, 10 Backwards – and Blast Theory in general – in the mediatization of its dramaturgical world presents and re-orders temporal experience, implicitly emphasizing how each temporal plane of composition opens up to virtual and actual modes of temporal experience, hence, emphasizing its radical aspect.
In short, the above-discussed conceptualizations have seen the debate move from static, essentialist and linear ideas of time into a conceptualization of time that is dynamic and responsive; that is, a time that, in presenting, articulating and constructing itself, becomes present and immediate at the very moment of its becoming actuality. *10 Backwards* brings the virtual events of the past and the future into the actuality of the continuous present moment through digitalized dramaturgical processes. By employing strategies such as slowness, freezing-outs, backwards and forwards temporal loops and repetitions, to list a few, the actuality of the present moment of each temporal constructive frame in *10 Backwards* needs to be repositioned as an actuality understood in terms of mutuality and multiplicity and comprehended beyond the scope of unsuitable notions of actuality, as explained by Mock, Phelan and Fischer-Lichte.

### 2.2. *10 Backwards*: Repositioning Actuality.

*10 Backwards* involves a direct presentation of time, highlighting an attention to the nature of time and constitutes a giving of time that explores different possibilities in regards to “clock-time”, “real-time”, “narrative time” and so forth. But, *10 Backwards* is also more than a presentation of time. In its use of repetitions, loops, slowness, waiting, fastness, and stillness, *10 Backwards* also constructs time as difference and as an encounter with multiple temporalities, in which the present moment is constituted as a multiplicity of presents iterating back and forth correlative with different pasts and futures. The mutual interference of these temporal orchestrations, where the present demonstrates interfaces in a process of mutual co-dependence, creates a type of performance praxis that requires a repositioned definition of the term and the debate around notions of actuality. In what follows, the conceptualization of the term actualization in performance debates is rendered inappropriate to theorize the temporal intricacies of *10 Backwards*. 

137
2.2.1. 10 Backwards: Actuality as a Construction of Multiplicities and Mutualities.

The term actualization, as noted in the introduction, has taken centre stage in performance debates regarding the ontology of performance, particularly with the writings of Mock and Schechner. In relation to the particularities of 10 Backwards, however, this thesis argues that an analysis of actuality as differential in terms of its mutual and differential aspects and a repositioning of the term, encompassing the Deleuzian virtual and actual, will offer a full account of the specificities of intermedial temporality as explored in 10 Backwards. Following the philosophical proposals of John Mullarkey (1999), this research suggests that, rather than virtualize other actualities and bring them to the realm of the “maybe possible”, actuality can, instead, be categorized as the differential aspect of time (Mullarkey, 1999: 469-472). Mullarkey writes,

there is [not] one type of actual perception with the virtual existing beyond and around it (as a reservoir of difference) but rather that there are numerous different forms of actualities that virtualize their mutual differences … those differences are consigned to a halo surrounding that single actuality and called ‘the virtual’ or ‘the memory of the past’. (Mullarkey in Cull, 2009a: 211)

In this sense, this multiplicity of actualities occurs: on the one hand, at the moment of the encounter, and, on the other hand, at the level and intensity of temporal experiential changes that intermedial performance enables. This is not a classification that goes beyond the experiential, but one in which actuality is the enactment of multiplicity and mutuality.

Mullarkey explains that, within the Deleuzian definition of duration, the term actualization needs to be reconfigured and adapted. Along the same lines, Keith Robinson (2009) describes actuality within process philosophy as: ‘the product of the process of creative abstraction. Actuality is existence in the fullest sense of this term’ (Robinson, 2009: 220). Similarly, Cull (2009a) describes how the distinctions between space and time, and matter and
memory lead Deleuze to characterize actualization according to the conceptual pairing of the virtual and the actual. She follows that this Deleuzian conceptual characterization of actuality ‘dismantles the binary between the present and the absence of the past, inviting us to think instead of the becoming of the present and the virtual presence of the past’ (Cull, 2009a: 209). Likewise, Deleuzian scholar Constantin Boundas suggests,

The present can no longer be thought of as becoming past after a new present has come to replace it, nor can the past be thought of as being constituted after it has ceased to be present ... we are indeed asked to think that the entire past preserves itself and, therefore co-exists with every present. (Boundas in Cull 2009a: 209)

Within these lines, the constitution of the past and the present coincide. It is a kind of simultaneous articulation of reality as both virtual and actual. Mullarkey appropriately explains that actuality is normally described – as the presentness and liveness debates do – in terms of the essentialist ontological and the phenomenological. In contrast, Mullarkey argues that, within the parameters of the Deleuzian actual and virtual, actualization must be understood as a series of actualities. In describing how actualization has been linked to the actual and how the virtual has been conceived as some kind of hidden potential, Mullarkey crucially acknowledges that this description limits the scope of the perspective. He suggests that actualization should not imply a one type of present everywhere in relation to what is past and what is future, but a multiplicity of presents that can be thought of as an enlarged and differential multiplication. In this way, the actualization of the present moment also includes, according to Mullarkey and Cull, the reality and potentiality that the binary actual and virtual encompasses.

Here is where and how the concept of actualism, as proposed by Mullarkey and Cull, becomes central to the concerns of this chapter: to deconstruct the notion of performance as ontologically ephemeral within an essentialist ontological reading of the “here and now”, and to put forth a conceptualization of temporal intermedial praxis in 10 Backwards not only as an actualism of multiplicities, as Mullarkey and Cull very aptly discuss, but also, we argue, as an evental construction of temporal intensive mutualities – as a viscosity. With
this in mind, temporality categorizes intermedial performance as a plurality of mutually informed presents or, as Cull writes, ‘a multiplicity of inhuman as well as human ways of being in time’ (Cull, 2009a: 213).

Significantly, and drawing on Cull and Mullarkey, this proposed approach to intermedial temporality, within the conceptualizing parameters of actualism – as an evental articulation of mutualities – promotes one that is not reliant on anthropocentric perspectives regarding a phenomenal subject attending to a reality as Fischer-Lichte does. This distinct approach gives support to an enlarged experience of time and to a consideration of intermedial temporality as a viscosity of the present – a viscosity that implies, as the diagrammatic maps have visually amplified (see figures 4, 5, 6 and 7), both, on the one hand, frequency, duration and intensity and, on the other hand, a fundamental encounter with the density of the present moment, or as Cull discusses: ‘as presents, plural’ (Cull, 2009a: 213). Rather than describing intermedial performance, with a simple and generic “here and now”, as ontological authenticity and ephemerality, if we follow Phelan’s postulates, a new definition arises in which the temporal aspect of ontology asserts both the primacy of a process philosophy’s notion of becoming and the possibilities of intermedial temporality understood as a differential and multiple relation of present mutualities.

This proposed understanding of temporal actualism as multiplicities – as Cull and Mullarkey discuss – takes into consideration the epistemic functionality and reality, as combining the Deleuzian virtual and actual, of multiple and mutual actualities; that is, not just a single actual, but a multiplicity of actuals in which the Deleuzian virtual and the actual intertwine in and throughout the evental in-betweeness of its own potentiality. As such, beyond merely describing temporality according to the virtual/actual distinction, we, drawing on Mullarkey, need to clearly consider the temporal intensive presence of multiple actualities – as the moments in which Niki interacts with both screens intensively trying to understand the possibilities of her own life – even when those actualities are invisible, imperceptible and yet-to-come; these actualities ‘are always actual in and for themselves’ (Mullarkey, 2003: 481).
2.2.2. *10 Backwards*: Actuality as a Rhythmic and Differential Construction of Slowness, Waiting, Repetition and Imitation.

The notion of the actuality proposed here falls in line with the epistemic functionality of the constructivist intermedial event. In this context, the exploration of temporality in *10 Backwards* presents a series of operating strategies that reposition actuality in terms of its rhythmic temporal characteristics. Such a recalibration sees the unfolding of temporality during the intermedial event in *10 Backwards* as an in-between process of experiential expectancy; that is, it can be said to enfold – as an intra-action – the participant subjects, in an instantaneously interfacial space in which production and presentation of experiential temporal rhythms move backwards and forwards in a manner of mutuality.  

The first distinctive strategy of the temporal articulation that *10 Backwards* presents is the use of slowness. In the context of re-configuring temporal dimensions, *10 Backwards* explores the use of motion control using non-linear editing. In doing so, the performance engages with and constructs a temporal dramaturgy that goes beyond linear notions of time. This very specific use of editing, slowness of the time frame in both the screens and the “live” action, creates the effect of a stammering and stuttering image – an analogy that Deleuze uses in *Cinema 1* (2005) and *Cinema 2* (2005) – in which the main dramaturgical frame of the image can be seen in-between temporal articulations. The compositional frame is re-ordered at a micro-temporal level and sometimes it is even stopped and frozen – what we can also call a-  

53 This aspect of experiential rhythms is close to Edmund Husserl’s understanding of time in relation to phenomenological experience. David Woodruff-Smith (2007) explains Husserl’s lectures on time consciousness published under the title *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (1893-1917). Husserl describes the experience of time as a double ‘temporally structured’ flow. This double temporal structure receives a detailed analysis in his lectures on time consciousness. Husserl explains that the temporal flow of consciousness plays a fundamental role in our experience of the world around us. In the temporal flow, Husserl describes, we are conscious of the events flowing off in time around us. But in the same flowing experience we are also conscious of events flowing off in time in our own stream of experience. It must be pointed out, though, that Husserlian phenomenology is quite different from the proposals that Whitehead and Deleuze established.
temporality. A-temporality is not understood here to imply any metaphysical temporal categories but as “paused” time, as “something not expected”, as something not related to what has happened before, and as a stop of temporal flow.\textsuperscript{54}

Figure 11: Diagrammatic map showing different presentational temporal aspects of the small screen.

As an illustration of this aspect, the above diagrammatic map shows how at a given specific moment both screens present a split in which the images projected as live feed and the pre-recorded images freeze. Dramaturgically the actress on the stage stops (and/or freezes) to observe how the temporal explorations that the screens create stops. This dramaturgical strategy makes the participant subjects clearly aware of the specificities of the production of

\textsuperscript{54} Yuval Dolev (2007) explains that the metaphysics of time and temporality have emphasized notions of reality in terms of ‘tense’ and ‘tenseless’ temporal paradigms in both continental and analytic philosophical traditions. In general, Dolev explains that the tenseless relations can be defined as ‘relations of succession: we give the tenseless relation between events e1 and e2 when we say that e1 is later than, or earlier than, or simultaneous with e2’ (Dolev, 2007: 5). Broadly, ‘the location of an event with respect to the present is referred to as the tensed relation of the event’ (Dolev, 2007: 5). It can also be said that tensed theorists are also known as presentists and that tenseless theorists are known as eternalists. The now widespread use of presentist and eternalist theories within temporal metaphysics have provided philosophical backgrounds with a plethora of terms such as ‘tenseless relations’, ‘tensed facts’, and ‘tenseless truth conditions’ to name but a few. Dolev explains, ‘Tensed theorists contend, to put it roughly, that there is an ontological difference between the present, on the one hand, and the past and the future, on the other hand. “All and only present things are real” serves as a compressed expression of the view in most of its incarnations. Sometimes the tensed view focuses on time’s passage, on how future events are made “real” by becoming present and then lose their ontological superiority as they move into the past. Tenseless theorists reject this ontological hierarchy, asserting instead that all events are “equally real” and that the distinction between past, present, and future pertains to our experience and to the way we think and speak, but not to the things we experience, think, and speak about’ (Dolev, 2007: 6).
time; that is, the temporal dramaturgy becomes self-referential and calls attention to its own producing, authorizing and staging of time.

The disrupted and fragmented editing is an intrinsic component with variable intensities and frequencies. This is a mediatized re-composition of the presence of the main character, in which micro-durations are both repeated and stopped. In this sense, they are differential. These re-compositions occur in the now-repositioned present moment – as plural presents, following Cull – and encompass a variety of different durations that allow for an experience of the present moment, the “now”, as elongated, stopped, fragmented, and restructured. Here, the present moment ‘is constantly re-presented in the present’ (Barker, 2012: 74).

The live feed projections on the screen position themselves between stillness and motion, at once temporalizing and aestheticizing technology in a passage toward the next constructive aesthetic exploration of temporality (Barker, 2012: 74). In this scenario, 10 Backwards is – using Deleuze’s analogy in relation to the cinematic – a postcard-like orchestration, which freezes the moment, reducing its temporal articulation to mere notations, as Adams would describe, while at once veiling the process by means of a highlighted temporal orchestration. Barker writes,

> The postcard marks a particular moment in time but is uprooted from that particular space and time as it is transported through the mail. This temporal information is not something that is realized within the postcard by the actuality of its image. Rather the temporal information surrounds the postcard as virtuality, as information that exists outside the visual field presented … [this information is] felt as multi-temporality. (Barker, 2012: 73)

This is a temporal orchestration of the experiential present in which – as in Deleuze’s synthesis of time – the memory of the past and the projection of the future get incorporated, becoming real in the interlacing between the actual

---

55 These micro-durations and extensions of the present moment call to mind works such as Douglas Gordon’s 24 Hour Psycho (1993) and Bill Viola’s The Passions (2003) and The Quintet of the Astonished (2001), where slow motions and fragmented moments create machine-like inscriptions of time into the parameters of human experience.
and the virtual. In this sense, even temporal stillness presents motion. The motion allows temporal stillness to be both fragmented and unified, forming context and allowing difference as a whole but multiple entirety.

Figure 12: 10 Backwards still image. Niki sees herself magnified on the screens. This magnification both slows down and speeds up the movement of the image on the screen. Copyright: Blast Theory.

The images are so magnified, at times, that the temporal fragment blurs into ever-shifting patterns of temporality, stressing its differential manner. In short, there is no optimal point from which to comprehend the live feed projections if attempted from a perspective of a linear temporality. The result of this dramaturgical strategy is the estrangement of a chronological time reduced to pieces and pulverized – as in Deleuze’s shattered glass analogy. The temporal articulation explored through the live feed projections requires the participant subject to occupy “real time” in order to experience the technological medium. The production of temporality is magnified and the material production of time is emphasized. In this way, yet again, the analogue and digital technologies in 10 Backwards call attention to themselves as a productive means – technologies as temporalizing – to create the experiential moment.
In these temporal magnifications, temporality occurs and goes by slowly in 10 Backwards. The time-based nature of projections is intrinsically related to the appearance of the technology as a temporalizing factor.

Barker discusses how, in general, in digital practices ‘time is not presented as a linear flow, but rather as recursive. Past events repeat, being re-presented in the present’ (Barker, 2012: 93). Furthermore, the participant subject ‘watches the events in slow time and experiences the affects of these events in everyday time. Two levels of duration are thus presented, the slow time of the work and the time of the viewer; both come together to constitute the event of the viewing experience’ (Barker, 2012: 92). Drawing on these remarks, Blast Theory, we suggest, uses technology as a platform to both atomize and amplify human perception at the moment of the performative construction, dissecting its temporal mechanics in order to construct a temporal metaphor of temporal memory as the traces of the original moment.
that, although both halted and repeated, are preserved, as temporally suspended, faithfully in the cadences of temporality.

Temporality here is both accelerated and slowed, and contracted and extended in its eventfulness. In this sense, temporality can be said to exist in the differential liminal and produce both temporal extendedness and instantaneousness, or as Barker proposes, the present ‘continuously drawing into itself the immediate past … creating multiple scales of time simultaneously’ (Barker, 2012: 96). The consequence of this is the collapse of the present as an ontological essence and a linear unfolding. The flowing intermedial present, in its constant tendency towards newness, becomes both intimate and immediate through the mediated characteristics of technology as a factor in the temporalizing of the aesthetic where presentness becomes a temporal and intensive viscosity. Hence, the disruption of teleological – cause and effect – temporality becomes yet another temporal strategy in Blast Theory's intermedial practice, which replaces teleological temporality with temporal loops, condensing, elongating and expanding time within moments of repetition.

In one of the narrative sequences of 10 Backwards, Niki uses a video camera to record herself eating cereals.56 During this sequence, she constantly tries to perfect the manner in which she eats them by way of recording herself and repeating the actions. At times she is very careful in her repetitions, learning and repeating the patterns she observes on the just-recorded material, creating a staccato of live moments that mutually refer to each other. At other times, she becomes rather obsessive and neurotic, almost uncontrollable and even making fun of herself. Throughout this sequence, a voice-over tells her, while giving her instructions, that this learning process is a part of her trying to understand about herself. She listens attentively. The sequence temporally synchronizes Niki to the pre-recorded material and to the live feed. In doing so, the temporal cadence of the performative frame is sub-divided into several internal micro temporal sequences that mutually infiltrate each other.

56 In his conceptualization of the subject of intermedial performance as a digital double, Steve Dixon (2003) also uses this 10 Backwards' sequence to illustrate his positions.
In this sense, the construction of reality ‘is not constituted by the elements that are captured by … [each] medium. Rather the medium is used in order to translate the emotional effect of this reality’ (Barker, 2012: 86). Conceived thus, the process of mediation in 10 Backwards creates temporal aesthetic temporalizations where time grasped as timing enables the experiential flux of time and it is constitutive of this flux. In this ‘any-instant-whatever’ (Deleuze, 2005: 6), the differential experience of time provokes affective responses to the use and production of temporality. Moreover, the fundamental encounter between the technological and the human in relation to temporal understandings,

is a condition in which material actions and processes can be understood transductively in relation to the specific information technologies with which they interact. This transduction amounts to a temporal transaction whereby the … [non-human] system and the human system work through each other. (Barker, 2012: 139)

As a temporal transaction, this experiential manner brings temporality in 10 Backwards to a realm of temporal modulations of affects through which the participant subjects, both performers and spectators, are triggered emotionally and intellectually within the radically heterogeneous dramaturgical formations.

The second observed strategy in 10 Backwards is the use of waiting as a temporal articulation – waiting as a time of anticipation, a time of anxiety and a time for anticipating the future. In describing temporal anticipation, Deleuze (1988) uses the metaphor of sugar dissolving into a glass of water. Cull explains how Deleuze emphasizes how, when dissolving, the sugar changes in a differential temporal process (in its dissolving the sugar cube presents a rhythmic and intensive process that changes its form, shape and solidity). He writes,

It has a duration, a rhythm of duration, a way of being in time that is at least partially revealed in the process of its dissolving and that shows how sugar differs in its kind not only from other things but first and foremost from itself. (Deleuze in Cull, 2009a: 216)
The example of the melting sugar helps describe how the anticipating aspect in the temporal articulation reveals a relationship between time and logic—an expectation that things may come to the fore early, that things may only last for a specific length of time, and/or that things may potentially never happen (Cull, 2009a: 216-217). Further, the strategy of waiting also puts an emphasis on the dramaturgical aspects of accelerating and decelerating temporal processes. As time unfolds, multiplicity and mutuality occur, even when, apparently, “nothing” seems to be happening. The slowness of the moment produces in itself a sense of difference and repetition: ‘a co-existence of multiple durations in the event of attending to life’s way of being in time’ (Ansell-Pearson in Cull, 2009a: 217). Moreover, this apparent stillness also creates a rhythmic temporal movement through which temporal thresholds are capable of interlinking. It is, we suggest, a temporal process that pays attention to itself during the multiple and mutual processes that take part in the temporal execution of the event. In Cinema 2, Deleuze (2005) explains how the long and slow temporal exposure incorporates duration and presents a temporal articulation where the distinction between the past, present and future are indiscernible,

What we call temporal structure … clearly goes beyond the purely empirical succession of time – past-present-future. It is, for example, a coexistence of distinct durations, or of levels of duration; a single event can belong to several levels: the sheets of past coexist in a non-chronological order. (Deleuze, 2005: xii)

In 10 Backwards, each slowing temporal moment is encapsulated into a single frame where the multiple layers of temporality are condensed in temporal convergence. The layers of instants in the temporal intensity of the slow temporality operate, as Deleuze explains in Cinema 2, simultaneous 'peaks of presents and sheets of time', each with its own operative 'tones' and 'aspects' (Deleuze, 2005: 96). Furthermore, the coexistence of both change and endurance conveys temporal duration: the presentation of ‘that which endures, through the succession of changing states’ (Deleuze, 2005: 16). This long temporal exposure captures an extended duration of successive temporal states and presents these as a temporal unity. It is as if the temporal frames are accumulating to provide a depth of time on a single temporal plane.
of composition. The long exposure can present a continuity of ‘any-instant-whatever’ rather than a selected privileged moment. The long temporal exposure traces a continuity of temporal movement and also extends the temporality of the plane of composition and differentially reveals time in it. In this sense, the long temporal exposure enters into the realm of the mereotopological.

Finally, the third observed strategy in the temporal articulations that *10 Backwards* exposes is the Deleuzian notion of imitation and repetition. Within conceptual Deleuzian parameters, imitation and repetitions do not imply the repetition of sameness. If Deleuze, as Cull explains, rethinks time as becoming, he also posits repetition and apparent mimesis as ‘species of becoming’ (Mullarkey in Cull, 2009a: 222), as part of becoming.

As a visual amplification of this repetitive aspect the following diagrammatic map shows the projections on the small screen execute loops of temporality; that is, both the pre-recorded images and the live feed that is being recorded simultaneously show a one-minute loop intensive orchestration while the dramatic action on the “live” stage continues.

![Diagrammatic map showing temporal loops and fragmentations. The same material is repeated on the small screen every minute.](image)

Figure 14: Diagrammatic map showing temporal loops and fragmentations. The same material is repeated on the small screen every minute.

Additionally, the combination of the attending variables exploring different aspects of intermedial temporality enables a presentation and production of time that can be also considered as interrupted. As the following diagram
illustrates, as an example, between minutes 19’ and 24’ on the small screen there is a sense of interruption and a repetition of interruptions in the use of time as a dramaturgical element.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 15:** Diagrammatic map showing interrupted temporalities on the small screen.

For Deleuze, as Cull and Mullarkey explain, what repetition repeats is difference, not ontological essence, not least because according to Deleuze there could be no identical repetitions but because there is only difference in repetition. Deleuze proposes that ‘everything which happens and everything which appears is correlated with other differences: differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, difference of intensity. (Deleuze, 1994: 222). In this way, the use of repetition, imitation and waiting creates a differential temporal intricacy, engaging with temporal cadences of intensive difference.\(^{57}\) In this sense, every moment is different. Deleuze clearly stresses that repetition is difference as not-sameness, implying that there is no such thing as true repetition. The very repetition of each temporal articulation is in itself a new intensive nuance of a new temporal performative frame since each repetition is different from the original. In short, each repetition is the creation of the new, entering into the realm of the mereotopological since each repetition differentially refers to the overall temporal cadence.

---

\(^{57}\) In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze (1994) also defines difference in relation to the Kantian binary of the ‘phenomenon’ and the ‘noumenon’ explored in the first Critique. Deleuze writes, ‘difference is not the phenomenon but the noumenon closest to the phenomenon … every phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is conditioned’ (Deleuze, 1994: 222).
Although not as obvious as temporal repetition, the use of imitation in the temporal cadences that *10 Backwards* creates is also crucial in conceptualizing the first onto-epistemic condition. Again, the use of repetition is closer to Deleuze’s becoming rather than mere copying insofar as each imitation, according to Deleuze, transforms the imitated into a different temporal articulation. Imitation is not a representation of the same; it is an encounter with difference and, therefore, the creation of the new. Deleuze and Parnet (1987) explain:

To become is never to imitate, not to ‘do like’, nor to conform to a model. There is no terminus from which you set out, none which you arrive at or which you ought to arrive at ... The question ‘what are you becoming?’ is particularly stupid ... as someone becomes changes as much as he does himself ... becomings are not phenomena of imitation or assimilation. (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987: 2)

With this in mind, each repetition, Deleuze explains, questions aspects of difference and sameness. In doing so, each repetition shatters notions of any essentialist notion of representational assurance. None of the repetitions is highlighted over the other, yet all infiltrate the present and are part of a complex temporal reality – as convergent paths where the virtual and the actual reconfigure in each registered repetition. Each temporal repetition is in a constant stream of difference – a new actual-virtual possibility and therefore a newly positioned temporal reality; it constitutes a whole differentiating becoming that dismantles traditional notions of mimesis and representation. This is not the repetition of the same, but rather the repetition of difference and the creation of new dramaturgical intensities mereotopologically.

Through repetition, copying and augmentation strategies, the present moment in *10 Backwards* is also a fragmented present that portrays variable durations – it expands and contracts as a viscosity. It is a fragmented moment that in its elongation allows for the past and the future to be included in it. This characteristic encodes an experience of temporality that is extended and multiple. Here, the participant subject breaks away from an experience of time that is a sequence of essentialist instants. Instead, the “now” becomes an
enormous matrix where temporal loops, for instance, enable the production of intermedial temporality.

In relation to the experiential temporalities that video and digital worlds create, in *The Temporalities of Video: Extendedness Revisited*, Christine Ross (2006) discusses how the temporal loop both ‘inscribes itself in and substantially changes … [the temporal] exploration of extendedness and repetition’ (Ross, 2006: 98). It extends the temporal orchestration and becomes an exploration of the actual and the potentially virtual. In its repetitive manner, the temporal loop reconstitutes the past with the possibilities it had – its potentiality – and ‘makes these possibilities available again to renewed perception’ (Ross, 2006: 98). In this way, each temporal repetition becomes a Deleuzian temporal synthesis. The temporal loop,

lengthen[s] the duration experience precisely because the observer is solicited to attend to the passage of time and to allocate more attentional resources to process time-related information. In other words, the loop, the potentially endless repetition of a short scene, may lead to an extension of time, at least at the level of judgment, perception and experience. (Ross, 2006: 98-99)

The temporal loops, we suggest, allow for a temporal processing that reclaims the instantaneity of the moment, while introducing its intensity and mutability. The temporal loop does not produce a hybrid time, as Benford and Giannachi discuss; rather, it contributes to the reigning of instantaneity, whilst acknowledging ‘temporal permutations in producing temporal extendedness from within its realm’ (Ross, 2006: 99).

In *10 Backwards*, the projected video relays allow a screen to show action that has just happened “live” flowing backwards and forward at different speeds, the performer imitating actions shown on the screen that she herself has just executed. In this sense, the temporal articulation of the piece does not obey the fixed linearity normally associated with the passage of time (only it does because the performance starts and ends). Here, temporality is flexible and malleable – as a viscosity – which not only problematizes the temporal stability of cause and effect, but also questions the central temporal and
ontological elements of performance such as the materiality of time and the liveness debate.

The multiplicity of temporal perspectives is present and made explicit. Furthermore, temporal articulations are presented to reaffirm the centrality of the actuality of performance, now understood as a mutuality, and the immediacy of the temporal experience as non-reducible to a simple “here and now”. As the following diagram illustrates,

Figure 16: Diagrammatic map showing the C1 in the experiential present as a continuous present.

The performative temporal composition becomes a space of potentiality, of several simultaneous temporal viewpoints that offer simultaneous articulating possibilities – or as Deleuze (1984) writes in *Difference and Repetition*: ‘multiplicity must not designate a combination of the many and the one, but
rather an organization belonging to the many as such’ (Deleuze, 1984: 182). A dynamic intertwining of temporal phenomena that allows for the interpretation of the event from several angles and in several sections at one and the same time; that is, a temporal articulation arranged into montages of temporal poly-perspectives. Drawing on this above visual amplification, the temporal differential montage is simultaneously presented as a construction that allows for several foci of temporal configurations. All parts, all temporal articulations, are mutually susceptible, forming the springboard and framework of each other’s development and becoming. *10 Backwards* draws attention to the “now” of performance as a point of experience, knowledge-making and temporal construction that is defined as a temporal flow invested in what belongs to the past and the future. Its realization, composed of an actuality of multiplicities, is formed in a layering – malleable as a viscosity – of temporal orchestrations, operating in or as the present.

In this context, Jonathan Kramer (1988) explains how the performative time-structure in performance is defined by ‘at least two temporal continua determined by the order of succession … the past-present-future qualities of events are determined by … [the articulation of their qualitative] shape as well as their placement within absolute-time succession of a performance’ (Kramer, 1988: 161). Interestingly, the performative event produces time, but this is time as differential that cannot simply be understood as the occupation of an essentialist reading of the “now”. Instead, *10 Backwards* – scarlarly and mereotopologically – engages in constructing and synthesizing differential and multiple convergences of time, layering interconnected temporal experiences and the articulation of temporal rhythms that shape the experience with dramaturgical strategies such as temporal repetition and elongation. The “now”, here, is always in a process of being constructed by the operational mechanisms through which temporality is enabled.

2.3. *10 Backwards*: Becoming, Final Thoughts and Problematics.
In this section, this thesis adds some final remarks on how, in articulating the temporal and performative frames that construct the intermedial temporality *10 Backwards* enables, becoming is fundamental in as much as the becoming and self-generative nature of the frames construct the performative event. Instead of understanding the event as one of linear constitution, here the event, following Cull (2009a), is conceived as one of multiplicity rather than homogeneity. The dramaturgy of *10 Backwards* is not simply concerned with multiplicity, imitation, slowness and repetition as manners of staging and presenting. Instead, the creation of a dramaturgical construction engages with presence and absence, temporal density and intensity, mutuality and temporal cadences through processes that fully generate novel modes of constructing mediality. Adams (2010) discusses how *10 Backwards* is not interested in ‘presenting linear dramaturgical beginnings, endings, and middles’ (Adams, 2010: 15-04-2010, interview notes). Instead, the piece, on the one hand, asserts the predominance of onto-epistemic becoming, not only emphasizing the dramaturgical distinction between temporal structures, but ‘the distinction between one discrete moment and another, between being (this) and not being (this)’ (Cull, 2009a: 232) – when one onto-epistemic creative frame apparently ceases to exist and opens up to the next one; and, on the other hand, captures the dynamics that are established through the activation of the performative intra-actions.

The temporal dimension of the onto-epistemic construction in *10 Backwards* that this chapter has addressed brings to light the full scale of the constructive connection between attending variable and participant subject. In doing so, this temporal construction reminds us that it includes topological connectivity between the different modalities of the actuality that the executing temporal frames enable. This respect for the differential actuality of the present moment in intermedial praxis embraces multiplicity as an evental in-betweeness. In this sense, *10 Backwards* creates a ‘temporal experience of time as a multiplicity of presents, an opportunity to attend to the plurality of ways in which life moves, and so also the multiples of even seemingly simple [temporal moments]’ (Cull, 2009a: 235).
In their becoming, the performative and generative nature of the temporal frames in the triadic execution of the event constructs 10 Backwards. Becoming, thus, functions as a performative creative articulation of analysis and operation. The emphasis on becoming and the event of becoming transforms the understanding of the triadic execution into a radical dramaturgy. Put in Whiteheadian terms, becoming is formalized in ‘the principles of process’ (Whitehead, 1978: 5) at the heart of a constructivist dramaturgical aesthetic. The being of 10 Backwards is constituted by the becoming of the execution of the event; its being is never a substrate – a pre-given – that underlines the process, but it is always the consequence of the process of becoming.

From this constructivist perspective, nothing is pre-given to the very moment of the triadic execution. The execution of the event is the expression of the process in which the attending variables come together in a becoming and generative manner that sees those attending variables not as pre-given or initial conditions, but as being formed, interpreted, made sense of and engaged with as creative processes and being in becoming themselves – as the being and becoming duality of each Whiteheadian actual entity. The ont-epistemic nature of the triadic execution, understood with the help of Whitehead and Deleuze as processes of creativity, indicates the non-substantial – and non-representational – activity of becoming itself which is only actual in and through its becoming.

The attending variables that enable the execution of the event are not to be understood as a static and pre-fixed ‘sedimentation’ for something to become (Faber and Stephenson, 2011: 5). Instead, at the moment of the performative triadic execution, this ‘sedimentation … is nothing in itself, [no pre-given,] no substrate; it is only with new becoming in which it functions as its condition’ (Faber and Stephenson, 2011: 5). In this sense, becoming is both functionality and conditioning. Furthermore, the ‘structures of becoming [the attending variables of the execution are therefore] always in becoming, but are also the conditions of becoming in the sense that there is a paradoxical mutual rhythm between becoming and being’ (Faber and Stephenson, 2011: 5). With these
categorizing parameters, *10 Backwards becomes 10 Backwards* at the very moment of execution.

The temporal articulation of the performative frames is not one that highlights the ephemeral characteristics of the pre-given, as in Phelan and Fischer-Lichte, but one that repositions the pre-given as immediately given at the moment of activation. Furthermore, it sees this given as becoming and generating. A given that, in its becoming, differentially constructs the actuality of the present as something that is becoming, has become, and will become combined together. In becoming, everything is in the temporal co-existence of its own constructivist flux in a liminal intersection of multiplicities. Deleuze's notion of the event of becoming – once more – helps categorize these proposals. He writes,

> In every event of becoming there are many heterogeneous, always simultaneous components, since each of them is a meanwhile, all within the meanwhile that makes them communicate through zones of indiscernibility, of undecidability; they are variations, modulations, intermezzi, singularities of a new infinite order. Each component of the event is actualized or effectuated in an instant, and the event in the time that passes between these instants, but nothing happens within the virtuality that has only meanwhiles as components and an event as composite becoming. Nothing happens here, but everything becomes, so that the event has the privilege of beginning again when time is past. Nothing happens and yet everything changes because becoming continues to pass through its components again and to restore the event that actualized elsewhere, at a different moment. (Deleuze in Faber and Stephenson, 2011: 6)

In this regard, Roland Faber and Andrea M. Stephenson (2011) explain, 'being is effectuated in becoming and per se is only a multiplicity of components in becoming, permanently reconstructed in ever-new instants of becoming' (Faber and Stephenson, 2011: 6). In this sense, the generative structure that is becoming captures this 'becoming-anew' (Faber and Stephenson, 2011: 6) – the creation of the new as creativity. The dramaturgical structure dissolves into fluent components that re-structure in their becoming. Hence, no pre-given dramaturgical substrate underpins the process of becoming and the re-construction of dramaturgical structures of
becoming. For both Deleuze and Whitehead, these structures are the conditions of becoming. But, for Whitehead, the structures, as Faber and Stephenson explain, are ‘not causes (or principles or grounds) that activate becoming, but sediments that are activated and are effected by the very process of becoming they condition’ (Faber and Stephenson, 2011: 6).

Now, this theoretical point of view where there is nothing pre-given at the very moment of becoming opens up some problematics in relation to performance. If we faithfully follow Deleuze’s and Whitehead’s proposals regarding notions of becoming; that is, there is nothing pre-given at the very moment of the execution, then, put bluntly, it can be implied that there is no author of performance, which opens questions such as: When does the first frame start? Who sets up the first frame or plane of composition? Is it possible to think of performance outside a predefined dramaturgy? Are there any limitations to the notion of becoming in a performance paradigm?

Firstly, in relation to the first question, a literal application of Whitehead’s notions of creativity and the actual occasions and Deleuze’s proposals regarding the plane of composition as not differentiating between aesthetics and everyday life would make no difference between a performance event and the act of, for instance, walking down a city street. Both would be considered, according to their constructivist postulates, as acts of ontological construction as life. However, we suggest here that a performance, as a worldly structure, presents a more restricted manner of engaging with such a structure because of the pre-set dramaturgical parameters such as the duration of the performance and the particular environment in which the performance takes place. From this perspective, it can be argued that the choices that the participant subject can take are more, we may say, limited. Put slightly differently, the subject is less free in the way in which he can decide how to activate the worldly structures. In this sense, the performance debate destabilizes some of the intrinsic notions of a constructivist reading of epistemology because, according to such a reading, for instance, creativity occurs at interstice between actual occasions as a process. This interstice, as Shaviro points out, is freedom: ‘life is “a bid for freedom”’ (Shaviro, 2009: 92-
What performance does to such a bid, we suggest, is that it limits its articulating and executing possibilities.

Secondly, it is rather obvious to state that a given dramaturgical structure has been created to, more or less, a certain degree by an author – a director, a designer, or an artist – in order to drive the experience along one or more pre-scripted parameters. Even in the most unplanned and non-scripted performance texts – whether incorporating analogue and digital technologies or not – some dramaturgical paths have been thought out. Dramaturgy, in general, invariably involves imposing a sense of ordering, a schedule and deadline on events.

It is true that the majority of narrative clues in 10 Backwards are provided by Blast Theory, but what the intra-actions activate is only determined at the very moment of the triadic execution. This perspective, we suggest, can be applied to all Blast Theory’s work independently of the presentational modality of the work. From the combination of virtual computer-generated worlds and urban settings of Uncle Roy Around You (2003) and I Like Frank (2004); to the pervasive games of Can You See Me Now? (2001) and Riders Have Spoken (2011); to the installation-performance environments of Atomic Installation (1998); to the site-specific work in art galleries such as Flypad (2009); to Ulrike and Eamon Compliant (2009) that moves, during the Venice Art Biennale, from art pavilions and across the city of Venice; to the virtual games of Desert Rain (1999); and to interactive dance pieces such as Chemical Wedding (1992); in all these intermedial instances, the participant subject activates – while activating himself – the fluidity of the engagement with the dramaturgical structures during the execution of the event. Moreover, this perspective of the evental activation during the execution can be also applied, we argue, to all intermedial performance.

However, independently of the complexity of the structures, as preliminary dramaturgical parameters, these have been put in place for the activation to start – to become. In their proposals, both Deleuze and Whitehead appear to have left an open door through which notions of authorship can be claimed
back. On the one hand, if we take into consideration Whitehead’s understanding of the ‘sediment’, as Faber and Stephenson point out, then an authorial figure can be regarded as a sediment – an author has planted seeds for the performance event to germinate. From this perspective, the notion of an author may not need to be rendered inappropriate: the author sets up the sediments/parameters of the performance/structure system, which will later operate autonomously during the becoming of the execution of the event. On the other hand, Deleuze’s notion of the pre-subjective – where materiality is waiting to be actualized – can be also read as implying a sense of authorship; that is, very simply, there is a subtract as a stratum not-yet deterritorialized. From this point of view, the stratum could be considered as the author’s work.\textsuperscript{58}

What has concerned us here, as a final note, is how intermedial praxis leads to a process in which the articulation of the present is transformed by the onto-epistemic variations of the intervening media, which change the experiential temporal effects and their interpretation in the temporal performance’s specificity. Correspondingly, the effects of intermediality in relation to a given performance’s articulation of temporality stage a performative act where the perspectival specificity of the Deleuzian actual and virtual are framed and blurred through intra-active processes of mediation. The network-like structure – the convergence and interlinking as a mereotopology – of the present moment that this chapter has proposed, drawing on Barker, Cull and Mullarkey, creates a progression that constitutes the unyieldingness of the performance’s becoming. The present moment in \textit{10 Backwards}, the engagement with its experiential immediacy, is constructed at

\textsuperscript{58} Without entering into the complex technicalities of Deleuze and Guattari analysis of literature and cinema, it can be suggested that they do not “fully” deny the notion of authorship, but they conceive it, very broadly explained, as a signature and as an authorial self-inscription in the pre-subjective aspect of the event – as a virtuality, rather than actuality. In \textit{Cinema 1}, Deleuze (1986) even writes, ‘certain great movements are like a director’s signature’ (Deleuze, 1986: 21). In Deleuze’s and Guattari’s writings about what a signature is, they conceive it as a constant process of signifying de-territorializations, continuously shifting from the individual to the collective as ‘something only by being something else’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 87), on the one hand, blurring the lines between an author’s identity and the authorial collective identity of the activators of the work once it is produced and, on the other hand, stressing that the notion of the author is simply a signifying reference that bears little impact in the processes of becoming.
the very same instant in which the ontological differences between past, present and future onto-epistemically blur onstage when forging an interfacial convergence between temporal moments. This convergence positions the participating subjects in the event in a present moment of experiencing – the immediacy of the activating execution and the immediacy of the intra-action – that belongs to a world of differential temporalities. Most importantly, the experience of time in *10 Backwards* is shaped in the in-between of the intermedial performance present – a present that can be only understood as the negotiation of temporal flows and a repositioning of the liveness of the theatrical performance; that is, an articulation of the “now” not as lineal, but as a matrix of temporal flows, and a repositioning of the liveness debate and presentness positions as not reduced to an essentialist “here and now” ontological category, and therefore, claiming the differential aspect of the radical dramaturgical aesthetic.
Chapter 3

Execution: Blast Theory’s *Something American* (1996)

This chapter concerns the way in which the proposed radical aesthetic of intermedial work explores the relational aspect of the mereotopological narrative. In the previous chapter we highlighted the differential characteristic of such an aesthetic, the following moves the argument of this thesis forward by particularly focusing on how such a radical dramaturgy needs to be grasped in terms of its relational attributes, paying particular attention to, on the one hand, the topological aspect of the mereotopological defining combination; and, on the other hand, concentrating on how these relational dimensions impact on the construction of spatiality within the presented reading of epistemology. From this perspective, the chapter highlights how intermedial practices enable and experience the spatial aspect of the “here” and space in performance. Put slightly differently, the exploration of media technologies in performance practices creates spaces that can be also grasped as liminal, differential and relational. In this sense, the agential and operative quality of the media, we suggest, also acts as spatializing, enabling the construction of intermedial orchestrations that are topologically relational.

What follows sees the “here” as interrogating the articulation of a given intermedial construction, in this instance, Blast Theory’s *Something American* (1996). Specifically, this chapter questions intermedial spatiality as a phenomenon that is intrinsic to the way the present moment differentially stretches between temporal articulations, therefore, stressing the link between spatiality and temporality.59 As Matt Adams (2005) explains, the work of Blast

---

59 In *For Space*, Doreen Massey (2005) points out that the inclusion of time within space changes the way in which space is understood within critical debates such as human geography. She suggests space moves from being a fixed entity to a performative conception. In this manner, the inclusion of time within space highlights the performative act of making space and experiencing the practice of making space.
Theory ‘invite[s its participant subjects] to inhabit these spaces and then to be implicated much more directly in the relationships that emerge and the way that technology is mediating’ (Adams in Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 41). From this emerging perspective, the experiential, compositional, agential and knowledge-making aspects of spatiality within intermedial works such as *Something American* open up the possibility of discussing intermedial spatiality as always being in process and subject to time.

In this context, the creation of spatial orchestrations, along with temporal structures, explicitly defers the sense of spatiality as a fixed entity and/or as a container, as Kant describes, towards a processual, performative and relational act of onto-epistemic construction. The performative triad of the execution of the event, in its generative nature, enables the creation of polyphonies of spatial orchestrations – what we call here spatiality – through which the collisions and boundaries between dramaturgical narrative spaces are blurred in their relational activation and medial creation, hence, we argue, pointing to their mereotopological aspect as a radical understanding of intermedial dramaturgy.

With this in mind, the notion of intermedial spatiality proposed in this chapter not only includes the physical space, as striated space, in which the performance takes place but also accounts for the attending variables that make the onto-epistemic production and functionality of intermedial performance possible. In other words, the analysis of the production of intermedial spatiality, here, also includes the scenographic elements that enable – and condition while conditioning themselves in their becoming – such a production and functionality.\(^6^0\) In the work of Blast Theory, intermedial

---

\(^6^0\) Scenographic practices and scholarship have also investigated the notion of the frame as a compositional and presentational devise. However, this presentational and compositional understanding must not be confused with the notions of the generative frames, as a constructivist aesthetic, followed here. Ana Sanchez-Colberg (2002), for instance, uses the analogy of the frame in relation to how the concept of the frame helps discuss enquiries of performance and spatial practices. Sanchez-Colberg is interested in the presentational and dramaturgical aspect of the frame and the framing of performance as a set of elements in movement. Although Sanchez-Colberg’s proposals offer valid insights in the use of frames as a dramaturgical device that connects the spatial with the dramaturgical, her conceptualization
scenography operates beyond notions of stage design and static conceptualizations of mise-en-scene. Instead, the scenographic perspective followed here takes into consideration both the compositional and the constructivist aesthetic of the intermedial evental encounter. As a crucial platform to construct intermedial spatiality, the scenographic is defined here, following Rachel Hann (2013), as ‘the quality of an object, situation or event to impart scenographic qualities’ without being considered a pre-established structure (Hann, 2013: 05-09-2013, conference notes). In this sense, we move away from conceiving the scenographic as a platform to ‘create mood [and images], convey [semiotic] information and enhance thematic concerns’ to an understanding of the scenographic as intrinsic to enabling intermedial spatiality, stressing both the material and the ‘immaterial image and immanent space’ (Aronson, 2010: 87). Furthermore, we keenly highlight the scenographic as a sensorial and intellectual experience that generates the haptic.

This chapter categorizes spatiality in Blast Theory’s intermedial praxis as a transitional space – a categorization that requires a repositioning of pre-existing notions of intermedial space such as those found, for instance, in the writings of Birgit Wiens (2010). Argued as topological and relational, and mainly supported by Deleuze’s notions of the fold and Whitehead’s proposals of the nexuses, the discussion of intermedial spatiality can be thus conceptualized as being both synchronic and diachronic, pulverizing notions of space as a linear progression – as the ontological debates emphasize – and entering into the space of the interval – as an architecture of relations.

Arnold Aronson (2008), a key figure in scenographic scholarship, traces the words space and spatiality to the Latin word spatium. He writes,

[The Latin spatium] was used primarily as a term in racing to denote a course, distance or an interval … Thus, while we may define physical space as a distance between two points, or also as that area which is contained within an enveloping boundary or demarcation such as a circle or a sphere, it is

of a frame, as noted, differs from this research’s conceptualization because of the constructive onto-epistemic aspect proposed here.
also a measurement of time. The two may be interchangeable. (Aronson, 2008: 9)

Interestingly, he places spatiality in relation to temporality and discusses both around the notion of the interval. The interval, Erin Manning (2009b) describes, allows us to see spatiality as a relational space. She explains the notion as an active space ‘with the tendencies of interaction but … not limited to them. Relation folds experience into it such that what emerges is always more than the sum of its parts’ (Manning, 2009b: 34). In this sense, it is, drawing on Manning, the spatial and temporal movement happening between the interval that enables us to categorize intermedial spatiality as a relational dynamism – as in-between two points, opening up to a relational landscape of potential and topological configurations. The temporal movement of the interval is understood as intensively and extensively horizontal (as extension) and vertical (as layers of depth), highlighting the intricate entanglement between the extensive and the punctually located and the intensive and the superficial (Manning, 2009b: 34-35). In other words, the interval can be considered as a time of transformation, a time of waiting in preparation for something else, but also, and most importantly, a spatial and temporal structure that is not static but somehow suspended in temporality, yet continuing its function. The interval is not a time of abrupt and harsh change but a time in which change happens both fast and slowly at different spaces and times. It is a liminal transformation – a gradual movement that tends towards the creation of the dramaturgically new.

From the relational perspective of the interval, the correspondence and correlation between the parts of the emergent narrative configurations, as mereotopological, construct a structure between temporal and spatial planes of composition – neither here, nor there; neither now, nor the past or future. Conceived thus, the application of a constructivist aesthetic will help discuss how intermedial spatiality can be also understood using notions of landscape. A landscape is, broadly defined, a stratigraphic amalgamation of spatial structures that present no hierarchy in which series of compositional strata – as in Deleuze’s fold – are equally important to the overall configuration of the
structure. In this sense, landscape can be also understood as a mereotopological configuration.

In relation to the topological, in *Something American*, we suggest, the activating of relationality is at its most intensive because, on the one hand, the dramaturgical articulations also include digitally-designed graphics, virtual theatre worlds and a myriad of pre-recorded material such as movie clips and cartoons; and, on the other hand, the speed of the movement at which spatial and temporal orchestrations unfold narrative changes constantly, varying from moments of complete slowness to rapid constant changes between the pre-recorded material and the “live”; the pre-recorded material itself – the speed (or the lack of it) of the moving images; and the “live” intertwines between the performance’s choreographic phrases and the dialogue segments taking place, and changing constantly and differentially, in different areas of the stage. In this sense, the moments between the “live” and the pre-recorded also highlight the ‘both-and’ approach (Nelson, 2010: 15) to understanding intermediality as a complex system of dramaturgical interfaces between space and time that are connected to a dramaturgical structure, using media technologies.

The argument here does not ask what intermedial spatiality is – its ontological manner of being as an essence or complete entity – or who intends to it but, rather, how intermedial spatiality, as an architecture of potential relationality, becomes the onto-epistemic condition for relational spatial continuities to appear. Subsequently, in discussing intermedial spatiality as topological, it can be also grasped as a spatial event of intensities and densities; that is, clusters of spatial formations that intertwine concurrently, produced along convergences of differential temporalities, hence, expanding on the proposals explored in the previous chapter. Most importantly, intermedial spatiality, as a topology, renders obsolete the essentialist ontological positions of the “here” as discussed by Phelan and Fischer-Lichte and, thus, can be considered as radical.
Looked at from the point of view of topological relations and the non-linearity of the interval, intermedial spatiality occupies, this thesis argues, the territory of the transversal. Felix Guattari (1972) defines transversality as: ‘a dimension that strives to overcome two impasses … [and] tends to be realized when maximum communication is brought about between different levels and different directions’ (Guattari, 1972: 80, my translation). In this regard, the intermedial, as transversal, emerges by the activation of temporal and spatial planes of composition from the transitional space in-between and the interval. This is to say a transversal spatial configuration arises, enabling the potential of different configurations in a number of differential spatial directions and temporalities. In its transversal manner, intermedial spatiality does not follow a sequential line. Rather, it cuts through spatial planes of composition, constantly connecting with the spatial “has-been” and the “yet-to-come” and a myriad of possible modulations between these.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first presents Something American as a case study. The second section is divided into four internal sections. These discuss intermedial spatiality in relation to topological notions, including the interval and Deleuze’s fold within the suggested radical aspect of the dramaturgical structure. The sections also use conceptualizations of the concept of landscape to describe intermedial spatiality and explore the generative aspects of the intermedial scenographic as a fundamental element of the suggested radical aesthetic. The fourth, and final one, discusses the Deleuzian and Whiteheadian concept of becoming in the dramaturgical context of Something American and opens up some problematics in relation to the theorized relational aspect.

1. *Something American: Description of Practice.*

Blast Theory’s *Something American* (1996) won the Barclays New Stages Award in 1996 and toured the UK and Germany. The production was one of the Blast Theory’s earliest instances of intermedial praxis. As such, it demonstrates an embryonic articulation of the type of praxis that Blast Theory
will develop in future work. In opposition to traditional theatrical performance, *Something American* actively explores the intersection between the physical space for the stage, the scenographic strategies and the inclusion of media technologies, including virtual spaces and graphically designed environments. These derive from the creation of communicating narrative thresholds within the dramaturgically complex system, which in this case can be described as tightly configured. In other words, in the history of the company *Something American* is one of Blast Theory’s dramaturgically complex systems – a defining characteristic, as noted, in the work of Blast Theory – that is at its most limited in its structuring openness. Nonetheless, the mereotopological characteristic of the radical dramaturgy proposed here can be observed.

![Figure 1: Something American. Production poster. Copyright: Blast Theory.](image)

*Something American* is an interdisciplinary performance work. It uses technology to present an amalgamation between dance, performance and
film. It challenges pre-conceived conceptions of the separation between the “live” and the mediatised through the mediating processes of its dramaturgy. Blast Theory describes the piece as: ‘Something American (1996) treated the USA as the Wild West, quoting freely from Hollywood films on a billboard sized projection screen’ (www.blasttheory.co.uk. Accessed on 12-05-2013). Matt Adams (2010) discusses how in creating Something American, Blast Theory aimed to ‘examine the disparities between the American media and the mythology that it helps to maintain. We observed America from a distance and presented our point of view’ (Adams, 2010: 15-04-2010, interview notes).

At the opening of Something American, a voiceover announces: ‘This is our interpretation of America’. This very statement establishes, as one of the main interrogating themes of the piece, an investigation into the nature of American identity and space. On a bare stage (12 meters wide and 2 meters deep) the performance starts with a man dressed up as a New York policeman. He speaks of his desires, fantasies, fears and erotic thrills. He also discusses how the American geographical landscape has influenced his life.

Figure 2: Something American. Still image. Copyright: Blast Theory.
Behind him a cinematic and panoramic screen comes to life. The screen is used to explore the geographical, symbolic and cultural landscape of America. This is a landscape that is both personal to the policeman and to internationally recognized standard notions of American culture. On the screen is shown a vast geographical American landscape – an interpretation that also includes elements of the American cultural landscape with images of cowboys and even presidents such as George Bush Senior.

The screen also portrays layers of icons, footnotes and speech bubbles, as a continuous and ever-changing electronic billboard that operates at different speeds. Sometimes, the screen shows the thoughts of the cop; at other times, it presents the dialogue of the characters; or the written thoughts and feelings of an all-knowing director/dramaturg explaining some of the performance aspects e.g. ‘he is a performer in a cop’s uniform’.

Figure 3: Something American. Still image. Copyright: Blast Theory.
The background images in *Something American* oscillate between vast geographical landscapes like the Mississippi's river delta filmed from above, and miniscule vistas, such as the window of a house in the Midwest of America. In general, the shown articulations vary from urban to rural landscapes; from cartoons to historical footage; and from computer designed backdrops to lines of text. Interestingly, at times only the pre-recorded screen contents are shown. At other times, the film stops and the performers dance and act whilst the screen goes blank – although it never disappears from view. Sometimes the performers engage with text and react to the images shown on the screen, and, in other sections, both performers and film stand still and/or the interactions between them become rhythmic as they work in intervals.

![Figure 4: Something American. Still image. Copyright: Blast Theory.](image)

One of the dramaturgical strategies employed in *Something American* is the use of cinematic fading.\(^6^1\) The fade, it could be said, has been traditionally

\(^{61}\) In *Black to White: The Fading Process of Intermediality in the Gallery Space*, Karen Savage (2008) proposes that, in the creation of dramaturgical intermedial environments, some
used as a tool in film to articulate narrative transitions typically dictating how the material is viewed as a focalizing devise. Here, however, the fade emphasizes the differential movement between the “live”, the pre-recorded and the interdisciplinary aspects of *Something American*. Through the use of fades the participant subjects are placed in a world that is in a state of continual haptic metamorphosis in which the film fragments, the dance choreographic phrases, and the dialogue performance segments unfold in one another through cross-fading cinematic frames. These fades, we suggest, are not to be understood here simply as blackouts, but as transitional dramaturgical explorations. They highlight, in their variational speed, the intensity and the transversality of the narrative intersections.

In relation to these transitional features, the participant subjects are made aware of the functional aspects of the fading by way of dramaturgical dynamics such as slowness; narrative focalization; interactions between performers and the screen; the showing of filmic fragments; and the acting and dance phrases, hence, emphasizing aspects of differential temporality as discussed in *10 Backwards*. In this sense, *Something American* draws attention to itself and the cross-functionality of the dramaturgical variables. This fading can be also said to constitute a strategy through which each compositional segment morphs into the next, crossing thresholds of temporal and spatial narrative orchestrations. In other words, the fade acts as a literal crossing between different medial contents and forms of the structuring narrative frames in relation to temporal dramaturgical change. In this regard, the fading enables and affords from within the intervallic characteristic of the mereotopological.

Although the use of film is integral to the piece, *Something American* aligns itself more with “live” dance performance than with film and art installation practices. The explored combination between the “live” performance and the pre-recorded clips in *Something American* calls into question conventional uses of technology in performance – just as embedding digital technologies
within dramaturgies – and takes into full consideration the materials and technologies that scenography has at its disposal, acknowledging its agency. In this manner, technology acts as a spatializing factor. Simply put, its agency is intrinsic to the production of spatiality. Seen this way, *Something American* explores spatial complexity as a multi-layering where simultaneously engaged spatial configurations propel the participant subjects into the realms of multiple narrative experiences happening contemporaneously. In doing so, the configurations of the temporal and spatial aspects of intermedial dramaturgy can be described here as being constantly superseding from any fixed point and entering into the realm of the relational where disjunction and multi-framing constitute the mechanisms by which intermedial performance can be produced, made sense of and experienced. Crossing over symbolic, geographical, filmic and digitally designed spaces, *Something American* with the use of performance, dance and film, creates an interdisciplinary and interfacial dramaturgical space, capturing the nomadic complexities of the geographical close and far; the spatially present and absent; and the “here” and “there”.


*Something American*, in its exploration of new spatial frontiers and the blurring of boundaries, moves across actual and virtual theatrical spaces. Equally, the performance, structured as such a complex montage of layered temporal and spatial orchestrations, redefines a narrative environment that is in a constant process of spatial displacement, constantly shifting, in doing so, between the smooth and the striated space.\(^6^2\) In this way, *Something American* explores a

\(^6^2\) In *Mapping Intermediality in Performance*, Liesbeth Groot Nibbelink (2010) discusses the term ‘displacement’. She writes, ‘in physics, displacement refers to the difference between the initial position and the final position of an object … [in engineering, it] measure[s] the process by which an object immersed in a fluid pushes some of the fluid out of the way … [in relation to intermediality, she explains how a displacement] removes [an object, a text, an image or a word] from their original context, thus drawing new attention to the object … Digital technologies that reconfigure the ontologies of space and time add a sense of displacement that increasingly characterizes intersections of media and theatre’ (Groot Nibbelink, 2010: 97).
multiplicity of spatial presentations, both actual and virtual, that reposition the spatial boundaries of the performance event from a simplistic reading of the “here” to an understanding of the “here” as relational. The physical space of the theatre, as striated space, and the articulations of the virtual and actual spaces, as smooth space, creates topological constitutions in which the mediatized and non-mediatised scenographic strategies move and re-configure. In this sense, the artwork enables a zone of generative interplay as creative intervals of spaces of potentiality interrogate the conditioned and conditioning material aspects of the attending variables and their ability to dramaturgically coordinate a multiplicity of spatial and temporal narrative viewpoints.


The radical nature of the aesthetic frames proposed here highlights the intertwined relationship between temporality and spatiality. The intermedial performance debate has rightly discussed the presentational aspect of both temporality and spatiality. The so-called temporalization of space and spatialization of time has heavily informed intermedial performance positions such as Birgit Wiens (2010), exploring the problematics of space and highlighting notions of spatial disruption in intermedial praxis, particularly in relation to notions of intermediality as a mode of staging. Naturally, this thesis agrees on the disruption of traditional dramaturgical presentations of time and space by the application of media technologies in theatrical performance. Aptly, Chiel Kattenbelt (2006) writes, ‘the expansion of the principles of the theatrical imagination through the use of live video and recorded sound can be characterized most concisely as a temporalization of space and a spatialization of time’ (Kattenbelt in Bay-Cheng, 2010: 87). According to Kattenbelt, a sense of presentational simultaneity and succession occurs in intermedial dramaturgical praxis that enables such processes.
For Kattenbelt, the presentational simultaneity of the occurrences, the attending variables, allows for a concretization of the “side-by-side” and “one-after-the-other”, producing this spatialization of time. On the one hand, simultaneity also impacts on spatial design in and through which multiple perspectives and locations can be articulated and presented concurrently, producing a sense of spatial multi-vocality; spatial simultaneity in intermedial practices also organizes, according to him, presentational heterogeneity; different times presentationally develop “side-by-side”; multiple dramaturgical spaces are orchestrated and articulated simultaneously. On the other hand, a sense of succession also occurs as a counterpart to the “side-by-side” sense of the simultaneous. This successive aspect – the “one-after-the-other” – through which the attending variables organize the line of spatial presentational developments, affirms the temporalization of space; that is, the spatial re-configurations.

Drawing on these remarks, Wiens (2010) highlights how, 

digitization and the possibilities of interactivity allow media-spaces to become dynamically inter-engaged in ways that modify understanding of the liveness criteria of real-time event … the intermedial stage can be understood as an adjustable platform, or interface, in which real, imagined and

---

63 From this point of view, intermedial spatiality participates in the post-dramatic. Lehmann explores the dynamics of post-dramatic space in opposition to what he terms a ‘medium’ space (Lehmann, 2006: 150). For him, this notion of ‘medium’ encompasses the forms of space that set apart the dramatic from the post-dramatic. If dramatic theatre uses the ‘medium’ as a space for representation, mimesis and metaphorical dramaturgies, the post-dramatic, according to him, repositions the ‘medium’ in three distinctive aspects. These are: first, the replacement of the metaphorical and symbolic space for a metonymic space; that is, as with the literary figure, a sense of continuity in which a part stands in for the whole is established. He writes, ‘[the theatre space] is not primarily defined as a symbolic standing in for another fictive world but is instead highlighted as a part and continuation of the real theatre space’ (Lehmann, 2006: 151). Second, the post-dramatic ‘medium’ is articulated as a tableau in which the stage action is framed as a tableau vivant. Third, the medium as a tableau-like montage in and through which the participant dramaturgical elements are ‘connected, isolated and assembled’ creating a sense of ‘spatio-temporal continuum’ (Lehmann, 2006: 151). Within these lines, Lehmann explains that the traditional hierarchies of dramatic theatre in relation to spatial configurations become obsolete because the continuity of the dramatic action does not rely on a linear exploration of spatial relationships in regards to dramaturgical composition. The use of this montage-like space develops an organizational structure as a ‘cinematic montage’ (Lehmann, 2006: 151); that is, a sense of spatial environment in which the gaze of the spectator is not led exclusively by the dramatic action. Within the ‘cinematic collage’, he describes the ‘medium’ establishes specific relations between spectator and performer and dominates the perception of the performance event.
virtual spaces can performatively reconfigure one another and create enlightening tensions. (Wiens, 2010: 94)

Both Kattenbelt and Wiens offer relevant remarks in terms of the multiplicity and adaptability of spatial presentational configurations within intermedial practices. However, some aspects can be discussed from their definitions. Firstly, they both see intermedial spatiality as a manner and modality of staging. Secondly, in emphasizing the possibilities of interactivity within digital practices, Wiens implies that intermediality maximizes the phenomenal possibilities of human perception, which, for her, are still reliant on an attending subject to the intermedial transaction.

Additionally, Wiens, drawing on Adolphe Appia, writes, ‘the music and the actions of the performers and the changing of lights turn the stage and its material elements into a temporal “rhythmic space”’ (Wiens, 2010: 92). She also observes that the temporality of staged spaces in intermedial praxis starts as an effect of the digital media – a position, we note, in line with Boenisch’s postulates regarding intermediality as an effect of mediality. In this way, for Wiens, spatial design and the dramaturgical staging of spatiality cease being a static phenomenon and become a movement one articulated by the materiality of the scenographic design and the spatial materiality and configuration of the performative space – be it a theatre building or an urban landscape (Wiens, 2010: 93-94). Drawing on Auslander (1999) and Dixon (2007), Wiens also fittingly points out that the introduction of media technologies in performance praxis enables media spaces to encompass a myriad of presentational inter-relations (Wiens, 2010: 94).

Furthermore, Wiens, agreeing with Gay McAuley (1999), suggests that in intermedial practices ‘space is now seen to function as an “active agent” and co-player in theatre events (McAuley, 1999: 41)’ (Wiens, 2010: 91). Within these remarks, she defines spatiality in terms of the interplay of the following four characteristics,

(1) theatrical space (architectural conditions of theatre); (2) stage and scenic space (set design, scenography); (3) place of performance (the local, sociocultural context); and (4)
dramatic space (spatial designs as evoked by the dramatic or post-dramatic text, libretto, choreography etc. (Wiens, 2010: 91)

The notion of spatiality in intermedial praxis, Wiens points out, moves away from considering ‘space as a fixed container’ (Wiens, 2010: 91) towards a spatial consideration that conceives theatrical spatiality as a transformational space of interconnections and dynamic interplays. Moreover, she rightly posits intermedial space as no longer ‘something not given, but rather as an occurrence … experienced as a perforation of a stable here and now’ (Wiens, 2010: 92). Additionally, she suggests the spatial complexity of the intermedial stage: ‘spaces – in their complex relevance as material, corporeal as well as communicating modes – turn out to be complex and dynamic components … they are always preconditioned and products at the same time’ (Wiens, 2010: 93). Interestingly, she discusses the construction of intermedial spatiality in relation to communicating modes – the portals and nodes highlighted by the IFTR Intermediality group’s second book – through dynamic dramaturgical components and highlights intermedial spatiality as ‘no longer given’. However, on the one hand, she does not conceive dynamism in terms of a generative characteristic. Instead, she seems to imply the fluid movement, as in Kattenbelt’s succession, of a linear spatial articulation; and, on the other hand, although she speaks of the ‘perforation of the stable here’, she implies: first, this perforation as a presentational modality simply means that several spaces as presented at the same time, as in Kattenbelt’s simultaneity; and second, she stresses the occurrence of spaces of transformation are imbued on a essentialist ontological reading of the “here” because she still reads temporality as linear.

The understanding of intermedial space, Wiens suitably explains, requires a ‘both-and’ (Nelson, 2010: 15) approach to fully account for an understanding of the spatial configurations that intermedial praxis enables. In relation to the

---

64 Wiens discusses and supports her positions in relation to the manner in which Michel Foucault (1986) described the 20th Century as the ‘epoch of space’, and as ‘the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed’ (Foucault in Wiens 2010: 93). Along these lines, she writes, ‘spatialization in the post-modern debate becomes a model of philosophical thinking, and the rejection of diachronic in favour of synchronic concepts of space and time become a prominent concern’ (Wiens, 2010: 93).
‘both-and’ approach, she offers a solid conceptualization of the intermedial stage. She writes,

the intermedial stage affords the explorations of performative configurations between here and other spaces and experiments with simultaneous actions at different (locally or geographically separated) locations. These complex scenographies not only go beyond the boundaries of the theatre space … but also include what George Christoph Tholen calls “the playing space of media” (Schede and Tholen, 1999: 17). In other words: the processes of performance is no longer limited to the here and now, but rather transgresses local contexts and environments and playfully connects to telematic and other remote spaces … The space of intermediality, in this regard, is not already there, but can only be understood as a temporal, dynamic and highly complex spatial configuration, which is created within the processes of performance … The live phenomena of the media spaces (virtual spaces, telespaces, networks) that emerge on the stage are no longer constrained simply to the radius of the here and now. (Wiens, 2010: 94)

This ‘both-and’ approach, she proposes, helps see the presentational specificities of the theatrical space as “here” but also as “there” – “here” and “there”, and both “here and there”, because, as proposed above, intermedial spatiality is both synchronic and diachronic. In short, this chapter agrees with Wiens that the “here” of the performative event also includes the “there” as explored through media technologies. However, it argues against her in claiming that the amalgamation of the “here” and “there” is not only structured via the presentational actual and the virtual, as in virtual theatre, but also in terms of: on the one hand, the Deleuzian understanding of the relationship between the virtual and the actual and the concept of the fold, which does not presupposes a spatial interiority and exteriority, nor does it imply a sense of “side-by-side” – instead, the fold is an intertwining of worlding relations; and, on the other hand, the Whiteheadian nexuses, which fuse the synchronic and the diachronic in their relational activation. Seen this way, the understanding of the synchronic and the diachronic, as Deleuze and Whitehead explain, is multiple and differential – it inhabits the synchronic and the diachronic space of the topological and relational interval.
Wiens makes another pertinent remark. She discusses the complexity and heterogeneity of intermedial explorations regarding spatiality. She writes,

media spaces have to be examined not only in terms of the semiotic and phenomenological characteristics, but also in terms of their technological ramifications ... and new performance modalities ... the performativity of the intermedial theatron, in this respect, has to be analysed as a complex, heterogeneous and relational phenomenon. (Wiens, 2010: 96)

Significantly, she highlights how the performative and technological aspects of the intermedial transaction imply a repositioning of classical semiotic and phenomenological readings of the artwork as a fixed entity. In this sense, Wiens – in common with Fischer-Lichte – fittingly acknowledges the performance transaction as a performative event that is heterogeneous and complex. Yet, her call for new understandings of the semioticty and phenomenology of the event is articulated, once more, from the point of view of how the performance’s experience and the meaning enabled by a given performance transaction is perceived and understood by an aprioristic attending subject. Interestingly, Wiens also stresses the theatrical phenomenon as relational. However, her understanding of the term can be simply read to imply how the different elements in a given performance refer to each other in a presentational manner; instead the radical understanding of the term used here sees the relational as encompassing the differential and implying the constructive.

In relation to compositional aspects in digital theatrical environments, Steve Dixon (2007) also writes,

in multimedia theatre, projection screens or video monitors frame additional spaces this time in two dimensions ... Yet, despite the flatness of the screen frame, projected media can in one important sense offer far more spatial possibilities than three-dimensional theatre space. (Dixon, 2007: 335)

Similarly, Greg Giesekam (2007) emphasizes, ‘onstage action may be reframed through live relay, multiplying or magnifying performers onscreen, showing them in microscopic close-up, fragmented or shot from different angles’ (Giesekam, 2007: 11). Additionally, Carol Brown (2006) highlights the
topology of performative space as being framed by the physical space and the
digital strategies within the overall composition of the performance event.
Clearly drawing on Deleuze, she explains that the use of digital technologies
creates presentational modes of intermedial staging that can be discussed as
‘frames within frames within frames’ (Brown in Scchio, 2011: 27). Moreover,
Brown, as suggested by Dixon and Giesekam, also highlights the
morphogenesis between virtual and physical spaces and the relational aspect
digital spatiality as a specific mode of staging. In other words, for her, the
media elements in mediatized performance add layers of spatial complexity,
creating a sense of presentational spatial multiplicity. According to her, spatial
frames both physical and virtual merge and converge. In this context, Peter
Boenisch (2006b) notably highlights that ‘no single point in the space is in any
way privileged and thus would guide the observers’ vision and perception –
not even the framed stage as such … Spatial intermediality no longer projects
one clearly focused space’ (Boenisch, 2006b: 157).

However, intermedial spatiality here, contra Brown and Giesekam, is to be
understood as a space in-between – as a modality of location – that carries
the intensive and relational potential of the radical nature of the frames. First,
regarding the proposed intensive aspect, the following diagrammatic map
illustrates how the attending variables are executed as a series of intensities.

![Diagram](image)

A: “Live” stage dramatic action using a small section of the “actual” stage; B: “Live” stage
dramatic action using the whole “actual” stage; C: Screen used continuously; D: “Live” stage
action; E: Screen used intermittently; F: No dramatic action on the “actual” stage but dramatic
filmic fragments shown on the screen.

Figure 5: Diagrammatic map showing intensities in relation to the use of the screen
and the “actual” stage.
Intermedial spatiality is explored in a differential articulation of processes that incorporate various uses of the “actual stage” as sections; the whole “actual” stage; and the screen in order to show the peculiarities that transform “traditional” assumptions about space and time in intermedial praxis. As the map showed, at moment 2’, E, D, C and B are at play. Second, in relation to the suggested radical relational aspect, the following diagrammatic map visually amplifies how *Something American*’s dramaturgy presents a configuration of spatiality as more than simply a punctual location of striated space. Rather, it enables a spatial and temporal configuration that shifts from the geographical to the symbolic and back again, creating articulations of smooth space.

The following diagrammatic map visualizes how the spatial configuration of the execution of the event can be also categorized as a textual landscape and a world of graphic designs that range from cartoons to geometric patterns. In short, the diagram showcases a spatial configuration that goes beyond the
mere geographical location and enters into areas of graphic design as virtual environments.

Figure 7: Diagrammatic map showing the different articulations on the screen between minutes 7-19, highlighting the use of graphic design elements.

In this way, intermedial spatiality here becomes a space of relational contributions and convergences – adding another defining aspect to the described differential viscosity as discussed in the previous chapter – between different configurations such as physical and media worlds; that is, spatiality dramaturgy moves through the ever-shifting intermedial environment. From this perspective, the postulates discussed by the ontological and liveness debates and notions of presentness as an essentialist “here” only offer, yet again, a minuscule account of the intricacies of such a dramaturgical configuration that occupies a space in-between.

In relation to this space in-between, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari (1988) describe it as follows,

> Between things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a particular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other way, a stream without beginning or end that
undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle.  
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 25)

Within this conceptualization, a fluid and heterogeneous spatial articulation emerges. One in which spaces do not conflict, but, rather, one where the knitting of distinct spaces opens up the spaces in-between: the constant unfolding of the processes of deterritorialization. As the above diagram has illustrated, this is not a presentational amalgamation or juxtaposition of different dramaturgical elements that are fused into an amorphous one, nor a simple collection, as a spatial collage/ montage understood as a “side-by-side” where parts are set against parts simply collecting them as aggregates. Instead, the radical process of relating parts, as a mereotopology, is stressed within a single field of creative composition and emphasizes the functional and differential collective of constructively joining planes of composition together. Deterritorialization activates the perceptual and intelligible experiences that the unfolding of the dramaturgy affords through the temporal emergence of mediality, interconnecting the enabled modifications in the manner the medial experience is generated: this manner is the constant progressing of the topological interval.65

In Dance to Life, Rick Dolphjin (2010) expresses how ‘the topological rather than geometrical space … opens up a spatiotemporal way of spatial experience [and] refuse[s] the anthropocentric perspective’ (Dolphjin, 2010: 167). From this perspective, we can again highlight that in the work of Blast Theory the creative aspects of the execution renders agency to both the participating subjects and the performative transaction – an agency that, as an intra-action, is capable of opening up a threshold of perception, intelligibility and experience, and creates the generative morphogenesis of the

65 This is the space where disparate elements intricately deliver the possibility of understanding intermedial spatiality as the Deleuzian notion of the line. For Deleuze, a line is not made of successive and linear points, between different spaces that do not move in a single specific direction but it is a continuous oscillating movement, in an arboreal manner, an endless differential, traced back and forth between two or more spatial configurations. In doing so, the line creates tension and intensity. The performative composition contains a structure that is a self-forming and always-renewing structure, which is achieved by the unfolding, as in Deleuze, of the generative frames in and throughout the onto-epistemic execution of the event.
event’s dramaturgy. Regarding the threshold, Erin Manning (2013b) points out,

the threshold makes the opportunity for discontinuous potentialities to mix. As they come together … they collide in an emergent discontinuity. This emergent discontinuity becomes a continuity only to the extent that a third is introduced: relational movement. (Manning, 2013b: 345)

In this sense, the threshold emerges as set of relations that, 

produce nodes of intensity that carry emergence across iterations. Emergence, understood as a quality of infinite potential with a margin of indetermination at its core, is sustained by the very elasticity of the nodes of intensity, an elasticity that bends … to make space for points of inflexion that, in turn, create differential of relation. (Manning, 2013b: 345)

This perspective of the emergence of the threshold shift away from the already constituted – from the pre-established “side-by-side” – to the plurality of an emergent relational multiplicity ‘in the relational movement of the shift in levels of process … it operates across and through … [and it is] immanent to it’ (Manning, 2013b: 348). The relational threshold taps into the ‘cresting where the continuous and the discontinuous meet … [and where] novelty is invented’ (Manning, 2013b: 350).

Drawing on Manning’s philosophical positions, we suggest that intermedial dramaturgy is always on the threshold. Emphasized by the fading strategy in *Something American*, the spatial plurality of dramaturgical modes enters into a dynamic form. Each spatial actual occasion combines, creating a relational architecture of emergence and becoming as its constructive mode of existence (see figure 5). With this in mind, intermedial spatiality inhabits the space of the middle. It is activated in transversal creative fields. Considered in this way, intermedial spatiality in *Something American* builds relations across the fields that it enables, whilst enabling and conditioning itself. It generates onto-epistemic experience. Moreover, this proposition of transversality enables the participant subject to draw a potential futurity into the actual experience. Such a potentiality happens at any spatial instance – at any plane of composition – in which each intra-action, renews the potential of the radical
aesthetic, transversalizing its movement and filling it with affective and knowledge-making potentiality, activated through a nomadic interfacing and unfolding haptic spaces.

In this sense, Guattari’s notions regarding transversality as never given, but conquered through processual and constructivist aspects, become relevant. From this point of view, intermedial dramaturgy always moves – and becomes – from the middle as a mereotopological configuration; that is, it expands in a continuous and relational flow between each creative plane of composition and draws connections between them. From this radical relational middle, *Something American*’s spatial and temporal intermedial planes of narrative both converge and diverge across narrative transversal fields, generating modulations of intensities and multiplicities. Extrapolating from Manning’s (2013b) conceptualization of the threshold, we can categorize it as the fertile middle of the interval where narrative boundaries become populated by differential iterations of each other – as Boenisch points out, there is no single point of entrance or observing position. In this way, it is important to stress that transversality has little to do with a reductive presentational and communicational reading of intermedial dramaturgies. Rather, it radically addresses the differential existential territories of the constructivist aesthetic. As such, it emphasizes the transversality of the radical aesthetic understood here as a Deleuzian vitalist reading of mediation processes that construct an architecture of relations.

In *Sensing the Virtual, Building the Sensible*, Brian Massumi (1998) discusses an original interpretation of topology concretely in relation to architecture as a spatial construction within an understanding of the Deleuzian virtual. In this way, topology could also be described as becoming in its renegotiating of how spatial topologies move from virtuality to actuality and back again. Massumi writes,

> Topology deals with continuity of transformation. It engulfs forms in their own variation. The variation is bounded by static forms that stand at its beginning and its end, and it can be stopped at any point to yield other still-standing forms. But it is what happens in-between that is the special province of
topology. The variation of seamlessly interlinking forms take precedence over their separation … when the focus shifts to continuity of variation, still-standing form appears as residue of a process of change, from which it stands out (in its stoppage). … The variation, as enveloped past and future in ceasing form, is the virtuality of that form’s appearance (and of others with which it is deformationally interlinked.) (Massumi, 1988: 16)

Crucial for Massumi, and relevant to this thesis, is the construction of novel combinations of spatial articulations as an active engagement with indeterminacy and emergence. In fact, spatiality – as with temporality – in relation to the applications of media technologies in the work of Blast Theory, necessarily needs to be conceived of ontogenetically in terms of spatial variations. In this sense, intermedial spatiality works at the level of ont-epistemic functionality and Being – as with Whitehead’s understanding of the nexuses between actual occasions – in its constructive aesthetic, thus producing the new which is happening but “not-yet-finalized”, shattering simple and specific locations and linking the local and the non-local in a multiplicity of layers and un-stratified and intensive spatial orchestrations (see figures 6 and 7).

One of the most interesting dramaturgical segments, this thesis suggests, in *Something American* happens between minutes 15-22. In this sequence, the screen flickers constantly, showing different speeds in the manner in which the pre-recorded material is presented. At the same time, on the “live” section of the stage we also see three of the performers executing a myriad of choreographic explorations. At times they dance together, moving across the whole stage. Sometimes they move extremely quickly. At others times, their choreographic movement – in a Pina Bausch manner, we may suggest – comes to a still point. Within the same sequence, we only see one performer. At other moments, we see two. At one point, they all vanish and the performer playing the policeman appears. While all this is happening, the overall speed of the dramaturgical fragment – highly emphasized by music tracks, lights and soundscapes in what could be described as a turmoil of intervening variables – constantly changes and the fading strategy intensifies. Here, a haptic space
of intensities is articulated. The participant subjects are thrown into a spatial environment where the human sensorium is highly activated because it needs to respond to the barrage of dramaturgical stimuli and to a frenetic transition of images – enabling an intensive intra-active composition of affects and cognitive processes. In this sense, the operating of the employed media technologies as spatializing agencies intensifies the architectural structure, both striated and smooth, of the dramaturgical experience in the constant processes of deterritorializing.

The activation of the dramaturgical material in the above-described segment inhabits the nomad interval. It maps the topological elasticity of the dramaturgical planes of composition, stressing its multiplicity, the relational movement of the radical aesthetic and activating the intensive dramaturgical turmoil that the relational movement creates across the nexuses of the dramaturgical planes of composition. As in Deleuze’s fold, this is an intermedial dramaturgy that continuously blurs whilst the temporal and spatial layers within unfolding narrative strata generate at the level of interface. Throughout his writings, Deleuze introduces the concept of ‘strata’. At one point, he explains that among strata there is no fixed order, and that one stratum serves directly as a substratum for another: as the given for the becoming. To quote Deleuze and Guattari (1988),

This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous point on it, find potential movements of deterritorialisation … experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensity segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 161)

Grasped as strata, each plane of composition is both stable and topologically opens up to the next one. Simply, they are relational. In this manner, each stratum differentiates itself from the other and from itself and is both synchronic and diachronic. Both, as Deleuze (2003) explains in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, different and ‘at one and the same level’
(Deleuze, 2003: 36). They compose the always-modulating attending elements of a relational spatial surface.

In relation to Something American, this always-modulating architecture is articulated as a place of exchange where transitive and fleeting layers of dramaturgical articulations interact – where the pre-recorded filmic material, the graphics and the “live” sequences unfold as interwoven strata of many modes of interdisciplinary practice (see figure 6). Moreover, in conceptualizing Something American as an architecture, the proposed theorization of intermedial dramaturgy becomes a manner of executing, already in the act, highlighting a thinking of intermedial dramaturgy in its varied manners of affording itself, construed as a mode of making and composing creatively in the act. Conceived thus, intermedial dramaturgy in Something American can be also described as a temporal and spatial landscape because the amalgamation of elements and the complexity of the practice’s practicing activate a coherent dramaturgical unit while still presenting internal and differential aspects.

2.2. Something American: Intermedial Spatiality as Landscape.

Something American executes, as a Deleuzian fold, a spatial architecture of correlated spaces characterized by multiplicity, discontinuity and continuity, flows and heterogeneity. The performance travels through interconnected spatial orchestrations that combine physical environments, symbolic spaces and pre-recorded spatial contexts that are enfolded, setting, in doing so, its own evental self-positing by capturing multiplicities into a functional and unified collective.66 Characteristically, the type of functionality we analyze here contains spatial aspects that amalgamate as strata; that is, the physical and the mediatized blurring the boundaries in the continuous smooth and

---

66 Notions of landscape and ecology have been also interrogated in performance studies. In the majority of cases, these notions, when applied to theatrical performance, have been interrogated from the point of view of presentational aesthetics and cultural studies (see Kershaw, 2012 and Arons and May, 2012).
striated re-negotiation of the constructivist aesthetic. From this point of view, this perspective shares defining elements with notions of landscape conceived as a mode of stratification.

As stratification, these intermedial spaces are constructed in order to communicate and express the movement of temporality and narrativity. In *Something American*, the ‘cutting edges of deterritorialisation become operative … forming strange new becomings, new polyvocalities’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 190–1). Because of this, intermedial spatiality in *Something American* responds to a communicative environment as an architectural topology where temporality and narrativity turn into experience as the experience is creating itself, as it is taking form. In this sense, the overall spatial configuration forms internal orchestrations or intra-events while shaping potentialities – as in Whitehead’s actual occasions within the relational characteristic of the event.

Human geographers Christopher Perkins and Richard Huggett (2004) present the possibility of applying the notion of landscape, grasped as a dynamic construction, as an interpretative concept that can bring important insights into different critical perspectives. Along the same lines, geographers Janet Abrams and Peter Hall (2006) also stress the dynamism of landscapes. They interpret the notion of landscape as spatial points and elements ‘intertwined in singular and evolving relations to others’ (Abrams and Hall, 2006: 3). Moreover, they state, ‘from the interplay of such relations, functional patterns … [a landscape] emerge[s]’ (Abrams and Hall, 2006: 3). Most importantly here, physical geographers Robert Kitchin and Martin Dodge (2007) put forward an understanding of landscape as a set of relational entities, engaging constantly in processes of becoming. Conceived thus, their proposals regarding the concept of landscape move away from ontological readings of the “here” as an absolute location in time to the “here” as relational ontogenesis. They write, ‘the shift from ontology (how things are) to ontogenesis (how things become)’ must be observed to fully comprehend the notion of landscape (Kitchin and Dodge 2007: 4). This ontogenetic understanding of landscape allows Kitchin and Dodge to claim that
landscapes emerge in process through a diverse and relational set of experiential practices. In this context, landscapes are always in a state of becoming. They are ontogenetic (emergent) in nature. Kitchin and Dodge also write, ‘[landscapes] have no ontological security. They are … transitory … relational. They are never fully formed [but open to new formations]’ (Kitchin and Dodge 2007: 5).

Furthermore, in *Mapping Cyberspace*, Kitchin and Dodge (2001) discuss how the concept of landscape can be also used to fuse the differences between physical and virtual spaces. Their central thesis is that these spaces cannot be thought as separate entities. Instead, they propose they ‘are interwoven’ in a series of experiential relations (Kitchin and Dodge, 2001: 24). Kitchin and Dodge suggest that digital and geographical spaces exist in an interfacial dominium. Both types of space, according to them, should not be grasped as two separate realms because ‘spill over is inevitable as both join to form a single experiential reality’ (Kitchin and Dodge, 2001: 54). Such ‘spill over’ suggests fluid yet orchestrated connections between geographical space and digital space in a dialectical interweaving.

With these definitions in mind, the differential unfolding of the intermedial spatial articulations interrogated here responds to the dynamic re-activation of narrative configurations. As with the notion of landscape, where spatial structures and circulations are said to be in a constant process of re-configuration and amalgamate all different ‘spilling over’ constituent elements, intermedial spatiality can be also said, as a dynamic intertwining, to engage in a process of landscaping articulations. Adding to Kitchin and Dodge’s descriptions, we argue that the modulation between the different parts and sections that articulate a landscape can be said to be mereotopological since the active correlation between the parts and the whole conditions the spatio-temporal dynamism on the thresholds of morphogenetic modalities, topologically interlocked in different organizing centres.

Broadly, if we consider a landscape as a relation of intervening elements, configured as a working system that incorporates its own dynamic process,
the spatial configurations of *Something American* can be also categorized as such. As the diagrammatic maps have helped visualize, the dynamic movement of the attending variables presents interfaces that systematically amalgamate their elements. From the computer generated graphics, pre-recorded film and cartoons to the choreographic phrases and the splitting of the screen into a myriad of cinematic presentational frames, the modulations of the shown spatial structures can be grasped as unfolding strata within an overall spatial landscape. Seen thus, intermedial spatiality, as a landscape, can be said to be in constant processes of modulation within the overall dramaturgical landscape. As Deleuze and Guattari (2004) write in *A Thousand Plateaus*, ‘what holds heterogeneities together without their ceasing to be heterogeneous … are elements of a discrete aggregate, but they become consolidated, take on consistency’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 363). In this sense, a landscape is constantly made and remade; that is, it is relationally transitory.

### 2.3 *Something American*: the Generative Aspect of the Intermedial Scenographic.

The purpose of this section is to offer some conceptualizing remarks regarding notions of scenography as a fundamental element in the articulation of intermedial spatiality and an overall dramaturgical structure, particularly emphasizing its generative nature in *Something American*. It is, however, beyond the scope of this section to fully engage with scenographic research and scholarship. Having said this, it is important to note how recent scenographic scholarship fittingly agrees that scenography is increasingly conceived of as an event, rather than a set of static physical elements (see Aronson, 2005, 2010; Nellhaus, 2006; Grondahl, 2010; Pavis, 2012 and Block, 2007). Nonetheless, critical debates regarding scenography still

---

67 Paul Allain and Jen Harvie (2006) discuss that ‘even though the practice [of scenography] has existed for hundreds of years in various forms, as a term ‘scenography’ is relatively new and still unfamiliar. It has superseded the phrase ‘theatre design’, for ‘scenography’ denotes the integrated work on all the elements of production, from costumes through soundscapes to masks, a breath which the expression ‘stage design’, ‘scenic design’ and ‘theatre design’ cannot encompass’ (Allain and Harvie, 2006: 203).
discuss the conceptualizing differences between scenography and mise-en-scene. For instance, Patrice Pavis (2012) in *Contemporary Mise en Scene: Staging Theatre Today*, defines mise-en-scene as ‘beyond the setting-up of the scenery, the passage from page to page, then the opposition of the visual and textual, and ultimately the semiotic system of meaning that the show implicitly carries’ (Pavis, 2012: 35) and scenography as ‘the visible and material part of the mise-en-scene. It is only one component among others’ (Pavis, 2012: 63). Then, he recognizes that, on the one hand, ‘there is an underground struggle between scenography and mise-en-scene’ (Pavis, 2012: 63); and on the other hand, ‘scenography has grown so close to mise-en-scene that they can no longer always be distinguished’ (Pavis, 2012: 78). Because of this, this research suggests that intermedial scenography is better understood, following Hann (2013), as the scenographic since the term presents the possibilities of including both. In this sense, we stress the networking process of the scenographic as an agential force of emergent aesthetic relations.

Intermedial practices, this research proposes, emphasize the use of media to explore staging modalities, which, in turn, generate novel (semiotic and material) scenographic orchestrations. These orchestrations disrupt traditional existing critical positions such as Lavender (2004). This thesis suggests an understanding of the scenographic that moves towards a maximization of the theatrical space and a layering of both the physical and virtual space – one that, in the constant unfolding between the striated and the smooth, enables the haptic. It is this potential for creating transformative spatial processes that sees the making and constructing of dramaturgy through the scenographic as a process that cannot be assigned a single meaning, a single aspect and/or a single form. Rather, it radically conceives the intermedial scenographic as an unfolding and performative threshold with its own agency. In this context, this fluctuating, becoming and always-modulating scenographic space appears as a dynamic potential through which dramaturgy is constructed within a relational landscape of activity.
In *Scenography or Making Space*, scenographer and scholar Thea Brejzek (2012) discusses the dynamic aspect of scenography. She writes, ‘we have learned, and maybe always felt, that space is not one, but many … We are, however, always part of a spatial configuration. Space is a dynamic network of temporalities. (Brejzek, 2012: 16)

Furthermore, in relation to the performative, she writes,

>[With t]he performative qualities of space-making in the here and now, it becomes apparent that “making” and “re-making” as constant and non-finite processes correspond closely with the notion of the heightened presence of the performative act of making space, of enacting and experiencing the practice of making space. (Brejzek, 2012: 22-23)

Drawing on her definitions, we agree that the arrangements of the intermedial performance space can be no longer seen as a ‘container with fixed boundaries … to be filled with things and objects, furnished with a purpose and thus be given functionality and meaning’ (Brejzek, 2012: 16) for the dramaturgical development, in which the material design of the space – the scenographic set and the nature of the performance venue – functions as the structuring devices for the intermedial event. Rather, the place, the artwork and the participating subjects engage in a creative process, as intra-actions, that blurs established conceptualizing lines in relation to scenography such as those described by Fischer-Lichte and enables the onto-epistemic construction of the spatiality of the intermedial event.

Scenography and mise-en-scene, in general, are obviously important in the construction of the spatial features without which no performance event would ever take place. With this in mind, in *What is Scenography?*, Pamela Howard (2002) describes the term scenography as a ‘seamless synthesis of space … that contributes to an original creation’ (Howard, 2002: 130). She continues, ‘it is a synthetic system of options and organizing principles’ (Howard, 2002: 130). We suggest, in concurrency with Howard, that the consideration of space and time as a synthetic unit becomes central to intermedial scenographic practices. In doing so, the intermedial space becomes an active
agent in dramaturgical creation since it conditions the network of relations between the performance attending variables and the participating subject.

It is hard to argue against the statement that intermedial work contributes to dramaturgical staging or mise-en-scene in straightforward and fluid ways in its challenge of traditional presentational strategies. As Wiens correctly describes, intermedial scenography opens up a potential territory in relation to scenographic positions. In this context, Greg Giesekam (2007) writes, ‘the use of recorded media and live relay multiplies the scope of possible incidents, source materials, interactions, intertexts and issues, and the ways of presenting and perceiving them’ (Giesekam, 2007: 10). According to him, intermedial work presents the possibility of playing with space and time, backstage and stage, and the interaction of spectators and performers. He describes,

"multiplicity of materials, view-points and styles is often also accompanied by a greater degree of simultaneity, more focused on visual imagery, and an increased self-reflexivity than is generally the case in theatre driven more by text, character or narrative. (Giesekam, 2007: 12)"

Regarding the above-mentioned multiplicity of presentational viewpoints, Giesekam also argues that performances become more presentational than representational. In this way, it can be argued that the different ways of executing the event in relation to the construction of spatiality become polyvalent and multiplied since the proposed generative characteristic affords a myriad of performative dramaturgical combinations.

Within the context of the agency of intermedial spatial configurations, the introduction of the technological elements, as we find in *Something American*, provides new ways of presenting scenographic conventions – technology as spatializing. In this context, Giesekam aptly suggests that the inclusion of screens and visual imagery in theatrical productions ‘achieves the dynamic effect of cinematic dissolves’, creating a heterogeneity of temporal and spatial orchestrations (Giesekam, 2007: 10). This, in turn, re-negotiates the architectural aspect of performance where scenography shapes new modes
of theatrical expression and innovative relationships between the event’s participant subjects and the attending variables. In other words, Giesekam suitably points out that the collage-montage of intermedial temporal and spatial locations distributed across the stage space disrupts the usual expectations of space and time in a linear presentational manner. However, here it is argued that, although, following Giesekam, the presentational disruption of traditional scenographic linearity is acknowledged, *Something American*, and the work of Blast Theory in general, cannot be fully explained by only considering the presentational aspects of intermedial scenography. Rather, the intermedial scenographic elements in Blast Theory’s praxis are imperative to the formation of intermedial spatiality and overall dramaturgy. In other words, rather than using an intermedial presentational aesthetic to discuss Blast Theory’s performance, a constructivist aesthetic is needed to fully account for the specific kind of scenographic practice in the work of Blast Theory.

The discussed characteristics of the onto-epistemic execution of the event radically conceive, we argue, the scenographic as a dynamic and transformable system of unfolding narrative potentialities. Instead of focusing on the static materiality of the set, the scenenographic in *Something American* is conceived as a becoming platform to create and facilitate the dynamics of the onto-epistemic fundamental encounter. Through the theoretical lenses of Deleuze and Whitehead in relation to potentiality, spatial agency and becoming, *Something American*’s scenography can be discussed as an enfolding platform that presents the becoming narrative structuring. Conceived thus, the scenographic articulations of the triadic execution of the event proposed here problematize some of the critical positions such as semiotic, materialist, formalist and phenomenological in relation to intermedial scenographic articulations. It is to these that we now turn.

First, Erika Fischer-Lichte (2008) positions the functionality of the autopoietic feedback loop as the performative transaction and the emergence of materiality and meaning. In relation to materiality and semioticy, Fischer-Lichte establishes mise-en-scene and the autopoietic aesthetic experience as
the constitutive conditions of a given performance’s materiality and
semioticity. The specific performativity of the aesthetic event, she claims,
disrupts classical aesthetic debates of the artwork, production and reception.
She proposes,

The concept of the work of art is accompanied by the terms
production and reception, the notion of the event is
complemented by mise-en-scene and aesthetic experience.
This terminological triad constitutes the conceptual backbone
of the aesthetics of the performative. (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 182)

However, Fischer-Lichte’s interpretation of both constitutive elements, mise-
en-scene and aesthetic experience, becomes blurry and problematic
throughout her writings, because of what appears to be an unclear correlation
between concepts such as event, theatricality and mise-en-scene. On the one
hand, for her, mise-en-scene articulates a given performance in a temporal
and spatial sequence – as with Phelan’s ontological claims also grasped
within an essentialist reading of ontological vitalism. This articulation, she
claims, is accomplished by staging strategies. In her understanding, the
staging, bluntly put, decides what appears or disappears from the
performance, and, ultimately, informs the processes of the autopoietic
feedback loop, but ‘is nonetheless unable to determine or control [the final
outcome of] the autopoietic process’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 188). She explains
that the staging process of a given mise-en-scene determines the
performative strategies for enabling semioticity and materiality.68
Consequently, she posits, the staging process influences the effect of the
autopoietic feedback loop. She describes how ‘the mise-en-scene provides a
strong framework for the performance and the feedback loop’s autopoiesis,
but is nonetheless unable to determine or control the autopoietic process’.
(Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 188). On the other hand, Fischer-Lichte links the
concept of mise-en-scene to the idea of the autopoietic event, but fails, this
thesis argues, to establish an apt differentiation between either. Later in her

68 Drawing from Edward Gordon Craig (1911), Fischer-Lichte (2008) also sees mise-en-
scene as the platform to artistically compose a given performance. However, she aptly
acknowledges that most definitions of mise-en-scene within semiotic backgrounds, for
instance, fail to clearly distinguish between mise-en-scene and performance.
argument, she even links notions of theatricality with mise-en-scene. The lack of a clear distinction between mise-en-scene, theatricality, and event throughout her writing makes it rather difficult to classify mise-en-scene as a clear constitutive element of performance as she wishes to do. Having said this, one aspect becomes clear. That is, she rightly places materiality, form and semioticity in the performative liminality of the autopoietic feedback loop. In placing the constitution of scenography regarding materiality, semioticity and form within the feedback loop, she offers a more developed interpretation of semiotic and formalist approaches; that is, she does not rely, for instance, on fixed semiotic taxonomies or essentialist readings of form; she sees form, semiotics and materiality as process; and places the phenomeno-experiential encounter at the epicentre of scenographic constitution. However, as valid as these remarks are, Fischer-Lichte’s proposal does not fully capture the particularities of the scenographic intermedial execution in *Something American* because her phenomeno-experiential explanations of the autopoietic feedback loop place mise-en-scene, scenography, materiality, form and semiotics in the constant process of constitution occurring in the liminal and evental space between the attending spectators and performance, which still explicitly emphasizes the binary world/subject.69

With Deleuze’s fold, the autopoietics of Fischer-Lichte’s feedback loop become reductive because, although the feedback loop does not predetermine an outcome, her reading is still steeped in a conventionality that attempts – in its performative sequencing – spatial dramaturgical resolution and stability. In the fold, contrary to this, we see intermedial spatiality as reaching across – transversally – and as intersecting several spatial

69 In relation to materiality, the autopoiesis, following Varela and Maturana, of a given being and entity can be understood as a mode of constant transformation whereby the material world can never be absorbed entirely by the subject because its ever-mutating and re-adjusting manner requires a certain structure to be in a constant process of reconfiguration and search for stability. Autopoiesis places the emphasis on a materiality that can never be stable, and, as such, implicates the embodied dimension of subjectivity appropriately; that is, in a constant struggle and fight of adaptation between world and subject. By identifying the constant interactive crisis between subject and environment, Maturana and Varela state that autopoiesis is a system of temporal reconfigurations always tending towards (and struggling to achieve) stability. In opposition to this reading of autopoietic materiality, this research argues that intermediality cannot be conceptualized using Fischer-Lichte’s autopoietic perspective because, due to the intensive potentialities of the triadic execution, the event never tends towards the stability of materiality.
orchestrations. The activation of the fold is the creation of the new. Seen thus, the fold sets up the relational spatial intermedial environment, no longer creating linear separation and sequencing. Rather, it sets intermedial spatiality in the realm of variable intensities of movement – in the threshold of the interval where notions of spatial connection and separation collapse.

Second, Andy Lavender (2004), in relation to intermediality, and, particularly, within the context of hypermediality addresses the specificities of mise-en-scene, which he defines as ‘the arrangements of the stage and its spaces of performance’ (Lavender, 2004: 56). He argues that, undoubtedly, the hypermediacy of the intermedial staging ‘gives both structure and texture to the event … the same space as both flatly pictorial and fully scenic, two dimensional and three-dimensional’ (Lavender, 2004: 62). In the context of understanding mise-en-scene as, broadly, “everything” allocated on the stage, Lavender posits, the relationship and duration of this “everything” creates a theatricalized space (bodies, sets, costumes, lights and screens). Furthermore, the use of the screens, he explains, is coded in relation to mise-en-scene and is contingent upon the use of the elements that make up the staging, the hypermedial mise-en-scene (Lavender, 2004: 56-58).

From this perspective, Lavender notes that mise-en-scene not only organizes the theatrical event configured by both actors and spectators, but also explores meaning and effect, hence, generating a mode of experiencing and meaning-making. Additionally, in Mise en Scene, Hypermediacy and the Sensorium, he (2006) describes how mise-en-scene ‘organises space for spectatorship and thereby redistributes meaning and effect’ (Lavender, 2006: 63). Crucially, Lavander locates the materiality and semioticity of scenography within the complex network of hypermediality. He follows, ‘in hypermedial performance, mise-en-scene is a network of mediations that are also re-mediations, persistently playing to its spectators [and actors] both the modes of the piece and the culture’s modes of aesthetic affinity’ (Lavender, 2004: 63). This is a type of mise-en-scene, according to him, that allows for spectators and actors to be fully aware of the remediation process that is taking place – a rather similar perspective to Bolter and Grusin’s. Interestingly,
Lavender’s proposition, in regards to mise-en-scene, can be categorized as one of presentational simultaneities where all the functional elements intertwine and where the virtual and the actual emphasize each other. However, on a close reading of his proposals, Lavender, as with Fischer-Lichte, still privileges the phenomeno-experiential dimension in order to explore the evental nature of semioticity and materiality; and, in doing so, yet again places the emphasis in the subject-world duality.

Third, the intermedial debate highlights the creation of hybrid spaces (and hybrid works) and draws attention to the impact of technologies and the “how” of creation rather than the “what” (see Benford and Giannachi, 2011; Davis and Harrison, 1996; Steuter, 1992; and Dixon, 2007). This focus on the “how”, Johannes Birringer (2010) proposes, has highlighted the process of creating a given performance’s phenomenal experience while engaging with dramaturgical aspects such as interactivity. Significantly, Birringer also points out that notions of agency have moved centre stage in the conceptualizing of standard scenographic parameters. As with Wiens, he also highlights how intermedial practices have been described as blurring the distinctions between the “here” and other spaces through their use of virtual presentational environments and the engagement with different levels of spatial representation. In this context, Birringer offers a basic but precise definition of digital scenography. He writes,

> the live performance architecture incorporates analogue, digital and networked dimensions; performers and audiences are inside and outside the digital worlds simultaneously; and the screen canvasses co-animate the localized movement narratives. Such hybrid spaces can evoke forceful and beautiful combinatorics [and] fusions. (Birringer, 2010: 99)

Furthermore, Birringer notes that intermedial practice creates a ‘moveable world’ (Birringer, 2010: 91) through which three primary dimensions interplay. According to him, these are: ‘(1) movement environment (spatial design); (2) movement images (projections of digital objects and virtual spaces; and (3) movement of sound (from macro to micro levels)’ (Birringer, 2010: 91). Interestingly, he sees spatial configurations as movement and process, yet, once again, with a clear focus on the “how”.
As noted, this thesis sees no difference between the “what” and the “how” of, in this instance, spatiality in relation to the onto-epistemological. In the context of digital performance, this research highlights, following Boenisch, the continuous and evolving relations between the physical and the virtual worlds in space never stand still and have no dominant perspective. The use of mediatized scenography extends the performative space into the physical, the virtual (combining both pre-recorded geographical locations and computer designed virtual and graphic spaces), and even the symbolic. This, in turn, creates haptic and diegetic narrative spaces that enhance the spatial orchestration of the performance transaction as a whole. We observe here a non-separation of the “what” and the “how” and the mediation process that enables the scenographic to become, in which the layering of simultaneous spatial perspectives see the functionality and operativity of the creation of the generative spatial frame, the “how”, as equal to the qualitative and knowledge/concept-making aspect, the “what”, of the frame.

At the heart of this argument lies the plasticity of the mediatized scenographic. *Something American* presents a heterogeneous spatial orchestration in which the agential scenographic, incorporating the media elements and the physical space, enables the complex wholeness of the haptic experiential and the intelligible. In relation to the above-mentioned plasticity, Birringer’s notion of the ‘moveable’ presents useful characteristics in relation to intermedial spatiality. First, it sees the process of spatiality linked to the temporal process. Second, it articulates the unfolding and rhythmic movements that see the physical and virtual spaces in a polyphonic manner. Third, and last, it emphasizes the non-static aspects of the scenographic execution.

From these defining parameters, this thesis proposes that unfolding in *Something American* is ‘mise-en-abyme’, broadly defined here as a space within a space, an interior within an interior and a complex multiplicity of the
inside and the outside (Deleuze, 2005: 79). In this sense, intermedial scenography can be also positioned as an architectural mise-en-abyme that brings together an intensive, expressive, affective and effective relationship between agential interactions of the human and non-human. Drawing on Deleuze reading of mise-en-abyme, intermedial scenography operates between cross-functional relations of multiplicity. In Cinema 2, Deleuze (2005) discusses mise-en-abyme as an imbrication of multiplicities that contain many heterogeneous ends, and establishes relationships of different kinds, putting an emphasis on instances of spatial connectivity. Seen thus, the only thing holding the imbricated structures together is co-relation, or, in other words, symbiosis and mutual relations. In this sense, we are in the realm of ‘any-space-whatever’ which gives rise to and expresses affect as centres of determination in the making.

Something American, in its use of mediatized scenography, extends and restructures compositional elements. It is in a state of transformational becoming, creating scenographic compositions with a feel of a fluctuating and mutable state. Media technology in performance effortless creates, we suggest, multiple spatial iterations of images displaying similarity, differentiation and complex dimensionality. In Something American, the scenographic composition itself moves, becomes and unfolds as drapery interpenetrating different spaces while engulfing the striated and the smooth. As with the Deleuzian and Whiteheadian event, the fluctuating and enfolding spaces inhabit a model of constant, relational and intensive multiplicity of spatial units. As with Deleuze’s ideas of the fold, in particular, intermedial scenography’s virtuality never stops creating itself during the performance in a series of becomings where potential difference creates scenographic harmony – the univocity of the execution of the event. Intermedial scenographic, like a drapery space, creates a folding of becoming where the movement and variation of scenographic compositions becomes indiscernible. The generative compositional aspect of the intermedial scenographic throws its spatial compositions into a synchronic and diachronic landscape of smooth

70 Derrida and Foucault also use the term in their conceptualizations of postmodern notions of space. The notion was originally used by Derrida.
and striated space that, as mise-en-abyme, formally create a synthetically, both fractalized and united, scenographic space of intra-active potentials.

With this in mind, the intermedial scenographic presents a variety of self-organizing processes and an intense power of morphogenesis. The formation of materiality, semioticity and form metamorphoses through the generative entanglement of the scenographic planes of compositions. Here, we observe the processes of creating the scenographically new through the dynamics of the topological. In this way,

the intra-active topological dynamics reconfigure the spacetime manifold ... [including] an analysis of the connectivity of the phenomena at different scales ... The topological dynamics of space, time and matter are agential matter and as such require ... knowing and being: Intra-actions ... the dynamics of the spacetime manifold is produced by agential interventions made possible in its very re(con)figuration. (Barad in Dolphijn et al. 2012: 112-113)

Here, the generated scenographic structures cease to be the primary reality. Rather, the process of self-positing – and the transversality of scenographic morphogenesis – becomes the defining element. In Something American and within the proposed radical aesthetic, the scenographic incorporation of technological elements draws attention to the scenographic staging as a process in the making, constantly re-activating through vitalist mediation while exposing a mode of scenographic existence as plural both in relation to their coming into being and the manner in which their modality affords cross-functionality in its relational complexity.

In opposition to reductive readings of intermedial scenography as a modality of staging, in the work of Blast Theory in general, the media technologies scenographic structures, as noted, are fundamental to the forming of the piece’s dramaturgy; they are not simply presentational. From Viewfinder (2001) where a fixed view of a flat was shown constantly over twenty four hours in an art gallery, thus enabling the visitors to the gallery to do close-ups and zooms in/out and linking the everyday with, at times, even the pornographic; to Jog Shuttler (2013) where old VHS tapes containing
recordings of past Blast Theory performances were selected by participant subjects to be projected onto a series of screens on a big wall in mixes of up to nine simultaneous loops to visually, sensorially and intellectually re-purpose the archives in manners that were never intended originally; and to the handheld GPS systems of _Rider Spoke_ (2007), where the participants subjects cycle through the streets of a city in search of the others, and the media technologies as part of the scenographic agentially activate the performances’ events from within, enabling reciprocal transformations between the narrative variables and the participant subjects through processes of generating dramaturgical mediality. In this instance, the screen’s agency of _Something American_, as a crucial dramaturgical element, needs to be fully accounted for because it enables and enhances the possibilities for perception and intelligibility afforded in this intermedial environment. As a tangible material interface between its own qualities as a physical element and the perceptual experience it generates, the screen becomes a mediatary element. It helps afford the experiential dynamics of narrative change. As part of the topological, the screen appears as continuously layering the stratigraphic modulations of the medial narrative interfaces and it is predicated on the prominence of the interval – in constant transformational movement, exploring the thresholds of intensity and capturing the potentialities that emerge between the amalgamations of different incorporated narrative forms such as the dance phrases and the theatrical monologues. Seen thus, the screen is both compositional and constructive at the same time. The use of the screen as a technological element in this piece can be extrapolated, we suggest, to the manner in which all Blast Theory’s work employs technology. Simply put, in the work of the company technology as scenographic elements becomes a mediatory constituent in the event-generating activation of medialities.

The scenographic in _Something American_ and Blast Theory, in general, needs to be repositioned as radical – it purely requires a novel manner of critically accounting for. In this sense, we ardently highlight the processes of mattering, forming and semiotizing; the thinking of the intensive and differential, instead of the chronologically linear; the functioning as the blurring
layering of the strata and nexusing through the transversality of the scenographic intertwining; and the search for the newly configured imbued with relationality, landscaping itself into unfolding scenographic forms. The intermedial scenographic in the work of Blast Theory escapes from essentialist and foundational readings of ontological form and matter, traditional readings of representation and classical aesthetic notions regarding static and completed works of art. Rather, it enters into the unfolding territory of the re-activating and the constantly created and re-presented, and in turn, to creates new scenographic territories and landscapes in the performative act of making, constituting co-experience and co-construction of material and semiotic environments through the creation of affective and intelligible narrative atmospheres. In this sense, the scenographic as a fundamental and agential component of the dramaturgical is always in processes of becoming.

2.4. Something American: Becoming, Final Thoughts and Problematics.

In this final and short section, the becoming of spatial complexities is explored. The dynamic spatial combinations in Something American present an ongoing re-activation in which the link between spatial surfaces and temporalities points directly to relational sub-divisions and emphasizes the relativity of coming into being. Here, the creative and forward movement of the intermedial transaction, generated in synchronic and diachronic concurrent narrative orchestrations, enables the production of the structure emergence as the becoming of a plane of immanence.

In their becoming, the agential inter-engagements of material design, embodied performance, 3D graphics, virtual world design and filmic geographical landscapes create the adequate conditions to explore spatiality as relational. In other words, the relationship between the “live” and the recorded projections stretches the correlation between the spatial and the

71 In this sense, intermedial scenography in the work of Blast Theory can be also discussed from critical backgrounds such as new materialisms and anti-representational positions (see Dolphijn and van der Tuin, 2012, DeLanda, 2006 and Braidotti, 2000).
temporal. These correlations are not understood here to be oppositional. Instead, they communicate, inter-relate and co-exist concurrently in the space of the narrative interval. There is continuity of becoming, as Whitehead says, between the far and the close, osmosis between the intimate and familiar and the determined and undetermined space while actively enabling the intelligible and the affective. Enfolded within these liminal intensities are the spatio-temporalities of narrative relation, the topological, the interval, the transversal and becoming. To understand these, we have focused on *Something American* as an example of how the work of Blast Theory particularly stresses the dramaturgic intervening variables as a system of differential relations between the variables and the variables-to-come, as a landscape, creating forms of intensive succession and extension; pulverizing any essentialist reading of the “here”; and conceiving the synchronic and the diachronic as engaged with equally. These characteristics can be extrapolated from the historical arc of the company’s production. From *Gunmen Kill Three* (1991) where the “live” performance simply incorporated a video projector to *The Thing I’ll Be Doing for the Rest of my Life* (2013), where every member of the audience was encouraged to record, take pictures and document the performance as a crowd of volunteers dragged a trawler out of the water in Nagoya, Japan. The dramaturgical characteristics that this chapter has interrogated highlight the specificity of Blast Theory’s work and its original manner of enquiring about the very nature of intermedial performance.

Now, the notion of emergent relationality, as noted, is central to the philosophical principles of a constructivist reading of epistemology, mainly because it implies a network of connections that shapes the flexibility of the emerging patterns whose structures multiply increasingly and are distributed extensively. Deleuze and Whitehead ask us to faithfully distinguish the progressive unfolding of a multiplicity through a relational continuum where everything happens at the boundary between positions that could move in any direction. Their reading of the relational constantly moves away from a clear specification of the continuous space formed by multiplicities as it enables a world of an all-encompassing, all-extending and all-reaching spatial structures. Deleuze and Whitehead require us to imagine a continuum of
multiplicities, which differentiates itself from our understanding of space as structured contents. From this perspective, relational emergence may be considered not to have a beginning and an end. Both philosophers, within a relational perspective, oblige us to think of time as an extensive continuum that expands in the relation between actual occasions as an intensive magnitude.

However, when the notion of emergent relationality is applied directly to performance conceptualizations it becomes somehow problematic. In this sense, performance also informs a reading of a constructivist epistemology. First, performance is obviously a durational aesthetic – it has a starting and a final point. From this perspective the relational continuum can be rendered as being temporally bound – the dynamic system that emerges out of each performative intra-action is contained by the durational and dramaturgical aspects of the performance. Hence, the potentialities of the relational, while remaining open during the execution of each performative intra-action, still present, we suggest, a sense of limitation. Seen thus, theatrical performance, even in the most structurally open dramaturgy, may appear to reduce the possibilities of this ever-expanding relational continuum that both Deleuze and Whitehead devotedly highlight. Second, the processual interactions between the conceptualizations of the striated and smooth space may also need to be reconsidered in relation to dramaturgical parameters. Although Deleuze and Guattari clearly state the dynamics between these two types of space, it can be argued that, particularly in the final sections of *A Thousand Plateaus*, they appear to emphasize the smooth over the striated when considering processes of becoming and potentiality since they link the smooth to the virtual. Nevertheless, we suggest that in theatrical performance the striated needs to be given full consideration because the specificities of the physical space where a performance takes place cannot be disregarded during processes of actualization. The location is crucial in the construction of the dramaturgical structures. Simply put, theatrical performance cannot be disassociated from the physical space in which it takes place – the striated is a vital conditioning element and cannot be underestimated in relation to the smooth. What we suggest is a reading of the striated as being constantly
transversed into the smooth and the smooth as being immediately returned to
the striated, creating a world that both homogenizes and differentiates in its
relational concatenations.

As a final thought in relation to the notion of becoming, intermedial
orchestrations, as seen in *Something American*, act beyond the pure
empirical succession of time and space and explore the co-existence of the
generative presentational operatives of how they come about – their
becoming. In their becoming, a constant deterritorization of all the
attending variables occurs in all their actual and virtual relations, not as pre-
given to the event’s constitution, but as a given to the immanent processes
during the triadic execution. The continuous reframing of the spatial inter-
relations is capable of creating a metamorphosis of the performative frame
and, with it, the generative metamorphosis of the evental onto-epistemic
relations.
Chapter 4

Execution: Blast Theory’s *Day of the Figurines* (2006)

This chapter interrogates the way in which the suggested constructivist aesthetic of intermedial work explores the structural complexity of the mereotopological aspect of the radical dramaturgy. In the previous chapters we highlighted the differential and relational characteristics of such an aesthetic. This chapter moves this research’s argument forward by particularly focusing on how such a radical dramaturgy needs to be grasped in terms of its activating attributes, paying specific attention to, on the one hand, the generating multi-linear narrative patterns as a complexity occurring between each narrative occasion, which retains, we suggest, its own singularity and how such singularities are connected to other narrative occasions within the relativity of their own existence; and, on the other hand, concentrating on how this mereotopological dimension impacts on the construction of dramaturgical mediality through the constant interplay between the Deleuzian actual and virtual within the argued reading of epistemology, thus, enabling a fielding of narrative potentialities.

From this perspective, the chapter highlights how intermedial practices enable the generation of narrative landscapes in which the inter-layering of narrative strata rejects, on the one hand, any ontological reading, as foundational, of narrative, and, on the other hand, dramaturgical understandings of fabulation as linearity and notions of focalization as the specific relationship between the viewpoint and the explored mode of perception of a given narrative structure by the viewer/reader of such a structure. Instead, on the one hand, processes of fabulation, we argue, do not aim to correlate with any essentialist reading of a narrative “here and now”; rather, they bring to light how each dramaturgical
occasion is always associated through the creation of new relations – through such relations fabulation produces itself; and, on the other hand, focalization, this research emphasizes, is constructed at the very moment of the execution as internal to the construction of the diegetic frame, not synthesizing focal point relations into a final outcome, but as emerging in the process from within and opening up to a landscape of relationality. Put slightly differently, the exploration of media technologies in performance practices creates narrative environments that can be also grasped as liminal, differential and relational. In this sense, the agential and operative quality of the media, we suggest, also acts as narrativizing, enabling the construction of intermedial orchestrations that are mereotopologically mediated. Put in Deleuzian and Whiteheadian terms, as a set of constituted actualities that are activated through their immanent capacity of creating the new. Crucial to this view is the notion of the relational, self-positing and differential character of Being. In this sense, the constant execution of dramaturgical occasions has to do with the radical manner of being of the narrative next that, although clearly emerging within the contingency of how the dramaturgy is being activated through a series of parameters, as in Hendriks-Jansen’s proposals of emergent and situated activity, presents narrative openings immanent to the interplay between the conditioned, the conditioning and the about-to-be-conditioned fabulating and focalizing capacity. Conceived thus, this understanding needs to be categorized as radical because it calls for a repositioning of ontological debates around notions of narrative essence and rejects the ontological narrative primacy of the constituted. This is a repositioning that stresses the modes of being, manners of thinking and formation principles, emerging as a system of relations predicated on processes of narrative-in-practice and dramaturgical mediality in the making.

Here, Blast Theory’s *Day of the Figurines* (2006) (hereafter DOF), in the Barcelona execution, is used to inquire into the proposed mereotopological aspect. The argument will show that some established positions such as those by Gabriella Giannachi and Steve Benford (2011) regarding notions of intermedial narrative need to be repositioned. The following paragraphs will demonstrate that although intermedial narrative participates in classical
narrative structures, it also radically challenges the idea of classical narrativity in unique ways. Drawing on Whitehead and Deleuze, this chapter proposes a network of notions such as ‘assemblages’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2003: 504) and Perrella’s ‘hypersurface’ used as instruments for narrative analysis when specifying the onto-epistemic functionality of the narrative event within Blast Theory’s intermedial praxis.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first introduces Blast Theory’s *Day of the Figurines* as a case study. The second one is divided into four internal sections. These incorporate and interrogate critical debates around narrative and digital contexts, particularly regarding notions of, for instance, intertextuality. The fourth and final section interrogates intermedial narrativity within the context of process philosophy and engages with the concept of becoming while presenting some problematics in relation to a literal application of a constructivist reading of epistemology.

1. *Day of the Figurines: Description of Practice.*

*Day of the Figurines* is a performance that blurs the parameters between theatrical performance and games. In discussing the performance, the company highlights the role-playing game aspect of the piece, where the players/participant subjects create a character within a fictional world imposed over a real setting – a city, Barcelona in this instance. As such, the creation of the dramaturgical structure unfolds in the format of a multiplayer board game for a high number of participants who interact via SMS messages using their mobiles.72 Blast Theory describes it as an,

---

72 The writings of Gabriella Giannachi and Steve Benford (2004, 2008, and 2011) in relation to the collaboration between Blast Theory and The Mixed Reality Lab, and particularly their analysis, descriptions and discussions of this performance practice, have been highly influential. In relation to *Day of the Figurines*, they describe the piece as an interactive performance in their extensive writing regarding the collaboration between Blast Theory and The Mixed Reality Lab at the University of Nottingham. There is a wide diversity of practices and forms that could be included under the category ‘interactive theatre’. Here, we explore the term in relation to theatrical events that bring together a combination and/or a certain degree of dramaturgy, narrative, and interactivity or participation. By this, we mean events where the guests/audiences present are simultaneously *spectators* and *co-creators* of a fictional theatrical world. According to Gary Izzo (1997), in ‘participatory theatre […] there is a fixed outcome to the story […] arrived at through a finite number of scenes that must be
enquiry into the nature of public participation within artworks and within electronic spaces (here, through SMS). It uses emergent behavior and social dynamics as a means of structuring a live event. It invites players to establish their own codes of behavior and morality within a parallel world. It plays on the tension between the intimacy and anonymity of text messages. (www.blasttheory.com. Accessed 25-08-2914)

Figure 1: Day of the Figurines. Production poster. Copyright: Blast Theory.

The performance takes place over a period of 24 days in a virtual setting based on an imaginary town within which players can reach a number of destinations that are the equivalent to 24 hours of the game. The players are given missions as tasks while interacting “live” with the other players. In this presented in a certain order, one after the other’ and the ‘audience participant responds or reacts to the production but does not alter it’ (Izzo, 1997: 22). In interactive theatre, on the other hand, ‘the participant co-creates the scene with the actor, but on the actor’s terms, and within the general goals of the performance’ (Izzo, 1997: 26). While it is true that the word ‘participation’ can imply a more localised and circumscribed role, in which audience members are invited to take part in something that has already been prepared or fixed and does not belong to them, the continuum is clearly quite fluid. Further, in DOF, the relationships between participant subjects, actors and spectators, change continuously in the making of the narrative structure and the configuring dynamic between interaction and participation blur.
sense, the performance was designed to interrogate the specificities of embedding a dramaturgy into the worldly structures that emerge in daily life.

The piece was developed by Blast Theory in collaboration with the University of Nottingham’s The Mixed Reality Laboratory as part of a research project (IPerG) to investigate the possibilities of interactivity and participation in intermedial performance within the context of pervasive games – ‘games that are no longer to be confined to the virtual domain of the computer, but integrate the physical and social aspects of the real world’ (Magerkurth at al., 2005: 2). After its first showing, it was commissioned by a large number of European institutions such as Sony NetServices and the Fraunhofer Institute and presented in various countries, including Japan and Spain.

The work can be considered as a clear example of the type of practices that Blast Theory engaged with after the collaboration with The Mixed Reality Lab started and that, we suggest, continue informing Blast Theory’s mode of creation to the present day. These practices explore theatrical performance via the creation of complex systems whose patterns maximise dramaturgical openness in their executions. In doing so, Blast Theory investigates how a set of pre-given dramaturgical parameters can evolve into unexpected forms within the contingency of the constantly emergent dramaturgical conditioning, stressing, for example, multi-linearity and fragmentation in their compositions. In other words, DOF can be categorized as an unmistakable exponent of the dramaturgical openness that is relevant in the manner in which the work of Blast Theory enquires about the nature of intermedial performance. In this sense, the piece shares fundamental similarities with Can You See Me Now? (2001), a chase game played online and on the streets; with Uncle Roy All Around You (2003) in which participants engaged in a search for Uncle Roy using handheld computers and roaming through a virtual city; with Rider Spoke (2007) conceived as a participatory work in which participants cycled around a city; and with I Like Frank (2004), described as the world’s first mixed reality game that incorporated the use of 3G phones. Also in relation to the creation of complex and open dramaturgical structures through the collaboration with the University of Nottingham, Blast Theory has explored
notions of augmented reality by combining the use of digital broadcasting and theatrical performance, for instance, in *Kidnap* (1998), in which two members of the public were kidnapped as part of a lottery and the resulting event was streamed online and in *Desert Rain* (1999), designed as an installation, performance and game using virtual reality to explore the ramifications and boundaries between art, performance, everyday life and digital paradigms.

*DOF* actively focuses on the use of mobile phones as a mediatory platform that weaves together the participants’ experience of the performance and the worldly structures in which the performance occurs. In doing so, the performance highlights the manner in which time, space and narrative present relational and differential characteristics. It is through the use of text messaging (SMS) that the participants are given tasks as multiple-choice problems and missions, creating a network of activities that expand throughout the city in which the performance takes place. Events are communicated by text, for instance, pubs open, or players twist an ankle and have to go to the hospital.

In this performance, Blast Theory explores areas of spatial extension and temporal differentiations by including Global Position Systems (GPS) to create a model of performance that maps the locations of its participants. In this sense, the hosting city itself as a spatial structure becomes a part of and an active agent in configuring the game. Without entering into the socio-political and ethical aspects of the piece regarding pervasive games, what is crucial to *DOF* is its social extension, understood here as the exploration of the interlinking of a fictional narrative world set up through a game and the physical reality of the city where it takes place. In other words, the performance frames the dramaturgical narrative with both scripted-fictional and factual information about the context in which the piece is performed, creating a liminal narrative space that intensively and relationally blends both narrative worlds; that is, the world that the game creates is extended and superimposed upon the social world in which it operates.
**DOF** executes a dramaturgical articulation that interlaces a trinity of operative spaces. First, we have the streets of the city. Second, there is an operating room where the participant subjects/operators navigate through the development of the performance and constantly respond to how the dramaturgical parameters evolve. Third, the incorporation of another room where a board has been placed, showing how the figurines that represent the players move throughout the city. From this perspective, the dramaturgy of the piece activates a myriad of medial constructions between the three spaces; that is, the generation of dramaturgical mediality is not confined here to a “here and now”. Instead, mediality comes into being by the constant inter-relation between the three activating areas, creating a relational and differential landscape of narrative structural orientations.

One of the key aspects of the performance is its treatment of and balance between the pre-scripted narrative materials and the emergence of a narrative structure when the tasks are being executed. The combination between the scripted and the non-scripted allows for the creation of narrative patterns that highlight the connectivity between the participant subjects activating the tasks throughout the city’s streets who have been chosen randomly after submitting an application to enter the game – the number of selections varies depending on the specific city where each version of the game occurs (in the Tokyo version there were more than 1000 participants); the operators of the performance who set and create new missions in response to how the tasks have been explored; the participant subjects/audiences who interact (knowingly or unknowingly) with performers on the actual streets – what in traditional readings of dramaturgy is discussed as a diegetic agent; and the participant subjects/audience who attend the performance to watch the movement of the figurines on the game board and/or see the development of the operating room – this type of spectatorship would be the equivalent of a traditional audience in an auditorium (or, as in classical dramaturgy, an extra-diegetic agent). Conceived thus, the emergence of the performance responds to the mutual communicative interface between them, creating location-based experiences and enabling an architecture of temporal orchestrations and spatial extensions that combine different forms of narrative communication.
Put slightly differently, the relationship between the scripted and the non-scripted mereotopologically superimposes the fictional narrative that is being created through the information and tasks that the SMS provide within the “real” narrative that emerges through the everyday city life. Simply, the fictional and non-fictional blur in the development of the narrative.

Figure 2: *Day of the Figurines*. Still image showing the operating panel. Photo taken at SONAR, Barcelona. Copyright: Blast Theory.

At the very start of the performance each participant selects a plastic figurine that will represent him throughout the duration of the performance. The figurines are meant to portray the physical characteristics of the human player typically found in the town where the game takes place. For example, some of the figurines for a version of the game that took place in Barcelona had dark hair, an obvious tan, and wore beach outfits. When the players are introduced
to the figurines, the game operator asks the participant subjects to name the figurine and give them certain attributes such as personal and characteristic traits; that is, the players endow the figurine with their personal characteristics, yet again mixing the fictional with the non-fictional.

Figure 3: Day of the Figurines. Still image showing the figurines. Copyright: Blast Theory.

When the game starts, the figurines are placed on the edge of the board by the player, who is able to stay there (next to the board) as long as they want, leave and return to the board if they want to see how the figurine has been moved, go and observe the operating panels in the other room, or never come back to the board and see the figurine again. In doing so, the relationship and correlation between the participating subjects, operators and game players, and the figurines enables the construction of the dramaturgical experience to emerge differentially both temporally and spatially.

In relation to the narrative of the fictional town that is superimposed within the real town’s everyday narrative, the players use a large metal model of an imaginary town. On this metal board, the players find destinations that could be familiar to any contemporary modern city such as El Palau de la Musica, a
city landmark in Barcelona, but it also includes fictitious locations. On the board, there are cut out silhouettes of the physical locations that are used throughout the game. Also, there are two video projectors under the board that present information regarding the development of the performance, creating a sense of augmentation in the manner in which the information is shown on the board; that is, the combination between the live projection and the punctual location of the figurines on the board’s surface. At times, these projectors are turned off so the operators can update the information and manually move the figurines to capture the narrative movement of each participant/figurine. In this sense, there is a clear sense of narrative correlation between the three operating and activating spaces.

![Figure 4: Day of the Figurines. Still image showing the metal cut out surfaces of the locations. Copyright: Blast Theory.](image)

The board presents another specific characteristic; that is, the augmentation system also projects a line, presenting the narrative trajectory of each figurine from their current location on the board to its new location, hence, establishing an intrinsic correlation between the different layers of the narrative.
In a sense, these lines also show the incremental and intensive aspect of the narrative that is being played out physically on the city’s actual streets by its players.
The board also presents what may be called traditional theatrical elements. It can be considered as a theatre-in-the-round piece since the audience watching the developments on the board – how the figurines are moved – can circumnavigate it to get different views and perspectives, but they can never alter it. However, the theatrical articulations of the “outside” event can be entered and altered – an audience member who has been watching the board developments may decide to meet one of the participants and interact with him. This creates a generating dramaturgy through the interaction of the “real” time of the players/viewers and a narrative time of the game, thus, capturing different layers of relational connectivity between the elements and enabling inter-composing modalities.
It must also be clarified that there is no winner in this game, nor is there a clear conflict-resolution outcome, which generally occurs in games. The construction of the narrative in *DOF* within game parameters is an exploration of how the participants experience a situation that requires co-ordination and collaboration between the players in the execution of the tasks. In fact, when participants enter the game, they are informed that the game is about creating a narrative through technology that encompasses interactive elements, but that has no definable outcome. From this perspective, the game as a narrative structure could be durationally infinite. What limits the game — and makes it a finite structure — is that this interaction lasts for exactly 24 days — if the game started at 7pm, it will finish at 7pm, 24 days later. During these 24 hours the players/performers are free to participate as many times and for as long as they wish. When the game finishes, participants are not even required to return to the board.
The game adopts different temporal conventions in its execution; that is, 24 days of the game equate to 24 hours on the board. In this sense, the temporal articulation of the board is expanded because what happens outside does not get inputted immediately on the board. Seen thus, the temporal and spatial nature of the narrative reinforces a sense of narrative doubling; that is, this double structuring functions in a plane of “dislocated” spatio-temporalities. In other words, each 24-hour day (“real” time) of the game corresponds to one hour of the 24-hour day of the game. In this sense, DOF participates in traditional narrative notions since the narrative time condenses “real” time. Moreover, it executes different narrative temporalities because of the intertwining between game engagement and non-engagement within the 24-day game structure.

In this context of the different engagement between the participant subjects and the correlations between the intricate layers of narrative development, DOF disrupts classical narrative conceptualizations because this is neither a narrative where cause and effect are in place; nor is it a narrative where traditional teleological notions apply; nor does it reflect a set and static lineal sequence of narrative events by which its story is unfolded. Rather, we radically find here a narrative that creates a fabula that is always context-specific (in the case of DOF, each performance takes place in a different city), presents an open structure, and accommodates a diverse range of interests. Further, DOF presents a narrative that can be also categorized as aleatoric: it employs chance and is open to the unplanned event because of the multiple possibilities through which the narrative can develop. In this way, DOF disrupts the causal normative logic of lineal narrative by multiplying narrative spaces and temporal orchestrations. To borrow from Nelson, here we inhabit the narrative space of the ‘both-and’ (Nelson, 2010: 15), as opposed to the ‘either-or’, in which the ‘experiencer’ takes decisions in order to make the story and, in complying with the logic of the nature of the game, produces a narrative. This narrative aspect enables a fluidity of narrative between performers, audience, and passers-by, and, in this sense, DOF as a performance event encompasses a series of intra-events, as in Deleuze and Whitehead, that interrelate, expand and contract, creating a non-linear fabric.
of narrative experience and construction. The fundamental composition of DOF is the functional mechanism that blends life and game, art and technology, and “real” and representation. The players constantly move from different narrative realities, and, in doing so, create a multi-compositional structure in the constant generating of the intra-active dramaturgical mediality.


The articulation and creation of intermedial narratives can be described as an emergent complex system of interrelated and interactional elements. In relation to these complex narrative systems within the context of interactivity, Benford and Giannachi (2011) discuss how these systems operate through ‘trajectories’ in which the narrative construction is created by ‘a complex mixture of space, time, interfaces and performance roles that are connected to a sophisticated structure’ (Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 14). This is a narrative machinery of diverse agents that lay open its functionality and structuring, and explores itself in constant self-positing of narrative flows as a field of narrative relations. As such, the discussion of narrative in DOF focuses on how a narrative environment arranges a series of narrative ‘tangible interfaces’ (Crabtree et al., 2010: 1). These tangible interfaces explore communication modalities,

The artwork reveals that the tangible … interface is designed to frame interaction and define distinct interactional trajectories that extend beyond the interface itself to foster engagement, [and] support performance … [the tangible interface] create[s] a powerful sense of direct … interaction amongst the distributed participants in an artistic narrative set. (Crabtree et al., 2010: 1-2)

The following demonstrates the ways in which such interfaces create a narrative in which the interfacial and in-between structure of the narrative presents generative characteristics. As described previously, DOF presents several kinds of interfaces between the triad of operating spaces and the different modalities in which the participant subjects activate the intermedial
event as diegetic agents, hence, stressing the differential and the relational. In doing so, the different modes of narrative mediality disrupt classical narratological positions such as the relationship between the intra-diegetic and extra-diegetic specifically regarding the compositional narrative frame.

In relation to the participant subjects in the creation of the narrative in the urban setting, we see:

1. Participant subjects as performers. These are the participants who receive texts and engage with the assigned tasks (intra-diegetic to the compositional narrative frame).

2. Participant subjects as knowing-spectators. These are the participant subjects who are aware that a performance is taking place and are able to interact with the participant subject as performer (both extra-diegetic and intra-diegetic to the compositional narrative frame).

3. Participant subjects as not-knowing-spectators. These are the participant subjects who are not aware that a performance is taking place, but whose, at times accidental, not-knowing interaction also participates in the creation of the narrative (both extra-diegetic and intra-diegetic to the compositional narrative frame).

In relation to the participant subjects in the creation of the narrative on the board and operating panel, we see:

1. Participant subjects as operators. These are the participant subjects who send the SMS texts and move the figurines on the board. They are the link between the two narrative orchestrations: the urban and the board (intra-diegetic to the compositional narrative frame).

2. Participant subjects as knowing-spectators. These are the participant subjects who know that a performance is taking place, but they are not allowed to interact with the development of the board narrative – as in traditional audiences (extra-diegetic to the compositional narrative frame).

73 The not-knowing spectator further problematizes Fischer-Lichte’s co-bodily presence of actors and spectators as the principal and intrinsic constituent element of the autopoietic feedback loop.
In relation to these different modalities, this thesis radically proposes that a constructivist reading of intermedial narrative would make no difference between the intra- and the extra-diegetic. The synthesising and capturing nature of the frames proposed here intrinsically highlights the manner, through which immanent processes catalyze the human and non-human developing intra-active entanglements. The very nature of these entanglements pulverizes any differentiation within the narrative process of the frame coming into being. Put simply, the mediated constructivist frame amalgamates the intra- and extra-diegetic into onto-epistemic concatenations and, hence, disrupts traditional understandings of narratology.

In this context, Giannachi’s notion of the tangible interface needs to be repositioned because it is still reliant on the exploration of communicative modalities between an artwork and the participant in such a work in its participatory mode of engagement. Simply put, we suggest that, instead of considering the compositional mode in which the interactive narrative develops as Giannachi does, the tangible interface needs to be conceived as activating the work from within. Seen thus, the notion of the intra-action offers a more substantial defining perspective because it fully accounts for the mode in which the narrative comes into being. In this sense, the now repositioned notion sees the narrative interfaces of DOF as the constitution of tangible interfaces both in terms of the different types of engagement between the participant subjects and the twofold narrative configuration. In this manner, the nature of this tangibility establishes from within the constructive intra-active sequences such as the physical form of the board, the physical and manipulative interaction with the phones, the figurines, the operators’ panels and the participant subjects, all of whom determine the development of the narrative interface.

One aspect that Benford and Giannachi highlight regarding the tangible interface is the concept of ‘affordance’ as a ‘kind of interaction that communicates to its users’ (Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 122). They also write,
Originally developed by J. Gibson (1979), the concept of affordance implies the object potentiality for action (1979) and constitutes what has been described as a “three-way relationship between the environment, the organism, and the activity” (Dourish 2001: 118). Creating in William Gaver’s words “a direct link between perception and action” (1991: 79) and connecting technologies to people who use them (80), affordances are useful in drawing out possible trajectories of interaction, but also, if organized in sequences, creating situations in which acting on and affordance may reveal information leading to new affordances (82). (Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 122)

Furthermore, they write,

The interlocking of data, objects and environments implies the possibility of not only designing paths that interconnect physical and digital data, but also designing physical environments, which prompt specific sequences of affordances that establish trajectories through a collection of interfaces. (Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 125)

The tangibility of the narrative interface creates and forms the narrative experience: ‘the experience is framed in fine detail through careful attention to the built details’ of each interrelated narrative interface. (Crabtree et al., 2010: 4). In shaping the narrative experience, the tangible interface also designs the emergent functionality of the narrative construction ‘articulating a distinct interactional trajectory’ for the participant subjects. (Crabtree et al., 2010: 6). Furthermore, ‘the design of the interactional trajectory extends beyond’ any specific physical space and amalgamates a series of different temporal and spatial narrative elements (Crabtree et al., 2010: 6). From this perspective, narrative construction as a tangible interface is ‘explicitly designed as artefacts-in-collaborative-space and as artefacts-visibly-affording-embodied-interaction’ (Crabtree et al., 2010: 6).

From these conceptualizing parameters, we can discuss how the intermedial narrative in DOF works as a differential amalgamation of tangible interfaces that combines and interlinks the participating human and non-human elements, forming mereotopological engagements; fostering collaboration; and supporting the functioning of interactional narrative trajectories. However, although we agree on this reading of the tangible interface as a manner of
enabling narrative communication through trajectories, we suggest, in opposition to Crabtree, Benford and Giannachi’s proposals, that the affordance of such trajectories activates the field itself from which the trajectory happens; that is, it is activated as it happens, changing the configuration of the narrative experience and entering into complex relational patterns from within; these are affordances that emerge from the agential impact of both the human and non-human, integrally co-composing themselves. Such a now-repositioned understanding of affordances enables us to conceptualize a mode of existence that pays attention to the emergence of the affording fielding – it is a generating that modulates narrative construction in its integral relationality, activating platforms for new affordances that may potentially develop. In this sense, the re-interpretation of the notion of affordance that we follow here sees the Deleuzian actual and virtual in a constant executing interplay and opening up to the newness of new medial interactions. Shifting away from seeing affordances as a communicative and compositional strategy as the three of them imply, we observe them now as holding the potential for recombination, as nexuses, with a tendency to narrative movement created as it is creating itself. Each affordance here inhabits the territory of agential activation, positing itself in the actual-virtual realization that each deterritorialization brings forth. From this radical perspective of affording from within, the manner in which the different inter-relations between the three activating spaces can be conceptualized in a much stronger manner because it fully accounts for the manner in which the emergence of the structural composition of the narrative happens.

From this perspective the relational activation of the affordances from within operates as a hypersurface, as places of differential exchange between strata in which the unfolding of the attending elements is overlaid – hence, highlighting the proposed mereotopological characteristic. As with Deleuze’s fold, our reading of the tangible interfaces, as hypersurfaces, also bridges the spatial and temporal elements of any given narrative composition as an entity where the complexity of the many become one in the always-in-transition aspect of the emergent dramaturgical structure. This is evident in the case of DOF through the inclusion of the board, the operating panel, the
communication channels and the attending variables of the urban narrative. As a hypersurface, the processes of medial construction that are suggested in DOF are in a continuous connecting structural form. DOF as a narrative entanglement encompasses the spatio-temporal inter-penetration that the narrative articulates: the configuration of the material objects that affect the narrative interfaces; the multilayered urban and non-urban systems in which the narrative develops, creating mereotological narrative relations; the materiality of the inter-layering environment, as striated space, that supports the narrative; the different relationships and engagements between the participant subjects; the different shapes, durations and scopes of the narrative actions; and the created temporal narrative sequences and affordances.

This is the narrative world of DOF as an intermedial instance. A world of mediating narrative intra-actions, in which the operative connections and narrative conditions see the onto-epistemic nature of the execution of the event presented as generative immanence of spatio-temporal narrative configurations that highlight (and heighten) notions of the immediacy of the active narrative engagement.74 The generative becoming of each attending narrative variable creates a matrix of orchestrations between different narrative realms in constant becoming, whose onto-epistemic creative functionality, its being and functioning, is executed in a myriad of polyphonic narrative occasions. In this manner, the third onto-epistemic condition,

---

74 Birgit Wiens (2010) discusses that immediacy is heightened in intermedial theatre because the intermedial phenomenon, in its performative manner, asks its participants to fully focus their attention on specific moments that need to be made sense of in the altered perspectives of space and time. Robin Nelson (2010) links the concept of immediacy to mediation and the ‘increasingly hybrid’ (Nelson, 2010: 123) environment that the intermedial phenomenon achieves. He also posits immediacy in relation to areas of transparency (Nelson, 2010: 141), that is, the manner in which the intermedial event draws attention to itself – as a self-referential aesthetic construction of elements. Andy Lavender (2010) presents the concept in relation to notions of speed, movement and the interactive manner of the communication processes occurring during the intermedial event. In the context of a Deleuzian vitalist reading of dramaturgical mediality, immediacy is intrinsic to the constitution of the narrative medium as a vital process. One could argue that the performative and creative engagement of the participant subjects in the onto-epistemic constructive dramaturgical aesthetic enables a sense of immediacy that is at its most heightened in the radical aspect of dramaturgy proposed here.
narrativity, amalgamates and includes, in its becoming, the other two onto-
epistemic conditions, spatiality and temporality, proposed here.

2.1 *Day of the Figurines*: Intermedial Dramaturgy as Spatial
and Temporal Inter-engagements of Narrative Occasions and
Dramaturgical Assemblages.

The notions of emergence and complexity in intermedial narrative have been
linked to chaos and complex systems theory, particularly by Andy Crabtree
and Steven Benford among others (2004, 2007 and 2010), in relation to
network activity and aesthetic experience. It is well beyond the scope of this
chapter to deeply enter into a fully engaged discussion of such backgrounds.
However, *DOF*, and the work of Blast Theory with The Mixed Reality Lab,
shares some of the characteristics of both theoretical paradigms due to the
articulating openness of the dramaturgical structure and how they highlight
notions of emergence and process.

Zachary Dunbar (2007) describes how chaos theory, very broadly defined,
explores notions of behaviour and patterns that appear in deterministic and
non-linear systems, specifically focusing on the dynamics of such systems.
Chaotic behaviour is not completely defined as random, but the theory
highlights the non-predictable aspect of the system’s dynamism. Complex
type theory stresses how the independent elements that interact within a system
constantly reorganize, developing more elaborate structures as the system
advances. The self-organizing complexity of the system continuously adapts
to new situations and inputs. It also pays attention to the control parameters
that affect the system throughout its adaptiveness (Dunbar, 2007: 235-236).

Dunbar also explains that in chaos-complex systems the organization of the
internal elements constantly develops new complex structures from previous
ones. He writes,

[T]he newly evolved structures may not prove successful in
the end and eventually disintegrate, or they may continue
towards new forms of organization, reaching other critical points at indeterminate moments of time ... emergence and self-organization are the common terms in complexity for understanding the way ordered systems move far away from equilibrium. (Dunbar, 2007: 236).

Seen thus, as with chaos-complex theory, the participating elements within a system present a sense of emergence, self-organizing and self-referential characteristics. This process of constant re-formation can be extrapolated to the structures that we observe in the intermedial event. From this perspective, the overlapping and interrelatedness of the attending elements create narrative and dramaturgical architectures. As an architecture, it activates a narrative space-time relational and differential continuum where the present elements maintain an independent status while only being able to be explained as part of a system. Within these parameters, the intermedial performance event constructs a performative organization with emergent spatio-temporal narrative characteristics.

Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (2010) point out some other characteristics of such chaos-complex systems. They explain,

While for chaos theory apparently random effects have an extremely complex, non-linear provenance, for complexity theory the emphasis is on unpredictable events that can catapult systems into novel configurations. For both, the physical world is a mercurial stabilization of dynamic processes. Rather than tending towards inertia or a state of equilibrium, matter is recognized here as exhibiting immanently self-organizing properties subtended by an intricate filigree of relationships. (Coole and Frost, 2010: 13)

Furthermore,

Such phenomena are now understood as emergent systems that move with a superficially chaotic randomness that is underlain by patterns of complex organization, which in turn function as foci for further organization and development. Such systems are marked by considerable instability and volatility ... there is a continuous redefining and reassembling of key elements that in systems’ capacities to evolve into new and unexpected forms ... there is no longer a quantitative relationship between cause and effect. (Coole and Frost, 2010: 14)
John Urry (2005) also discusses how in such systems,
the sum is greater than the parts – but that there are systems
effects that are different from their parts … [The] components
of a system through their interaction spontaneously develop
collective properties or patterns … These are non-linear
consequences that are non-reducible to the very many
individual components that comprise such activities. (Urry,
2005: 5)

Now, although some aspects of these definitions clearly describe the
suggested narrative parameters of DOF such as the constant development of
the narrative as a complex system of inter-related variables, particularly the
relation between the three activating spaces and the surperimposing of the
double articulating narrative, there are, however, some facets of these
definitions that present some problematics regarding a full account of the
narrative specificities we have emphasized.

First, we have drawn attention to the interactions between the attending
elements to the system and how these elements develop constantly, making
rather difficult to predict an outcome in advance. Nonetheless, we argue that
in relation to intermedial dramaturgy it is important to stress the manner in
which the initial conditions of the dramaturgy were set out and how the
physical sites and the relation between the activators – operators, performers
and spectators – give re-configuring shape to the development of these initial
conditions as well as the effect they have in what the performance does in
relation to the possibilities of knowledge creation and structural unfolding.

Second, Coole and Frost highlight the continuous volatility and instability of
the system; nevertheless, we suggest that the constant self-positing of the
dramaturgical parameters, for instance the cues that the operators in DOF
provide for the activation of the tasks limit the scope of such a volatility. For
chaos theory, the non-predictability of the system means that the system
cannot be controlled. Yet, to some extent, the narrative system becomes
predictable because of the constant influence of the dramaturgical control
parameters. In the work of Blast Theory, these control parameters present
different degrees of openness and rigidity. For instance, in Something
American and 10 Backwards these parameters are much more tightly controlled by the initial conditions that the dramaturgical structures provide than in DOF.75 In this sense, a literal application of chaos and complex theory would only offer a very partial account of the specificities that Something American and 10 Backwards present. These control parameters give the emergence of the system a sense of consistency. Eugene Holland (2013) explains how, using the analogy of a jazz improvisation musical composition, Deleuze and Guattari, in A Thousand Plateaus, note that even in the most non-predictable of the sequences a sense of organization can be observed.76 In this sense, without imposing a sense of rigidity and static unification and uniformity, they, Holland describes, using some complex theory terminology, state that some “attractors” hold the improvisational system together. The challenge of such systems, they argue, is to maximize the degrees of intensity, relationality and difference in relation to activating processes of deterritorialization and the experience of variation. From this point of view, the emergence of the structures within complex systems can be given a Deleuzian reading. Deleuzian scholar John Protevi (2006) defines the concept of emergence within Deleuzian backgrounds as ‘the (diachronic) construction of functional structures in complex systems that achieve a (synchronous) focus of systematic behavior as they constrain the behavior of individual components’ (Protevi, 2006: 19). In relation to complex theory and Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, we can aptly say that Deleuze establishes the ontology of a given world within a complex theory framework. Protevi writes,

complex theory models material systems using techniques of non-linear dynamics, which, by means of showing the topological features of manifolds (the distribution of singularities) affecting a series of trajectories in a phase

75 In the 1960s, meteorologist Edward Lorenz established some mathematical equations regarding the manner in which some weather patterns can develop, in order to investigate the conditions of the weather changes over time. His proposals had a great impact on the theoretical development of chaos systems. One of his key papers, Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow (1963), put forward a position explaining that even in the most chaotic of the systems, an acknowledgment of the initial conditions and how these initial conditions vary must be considered if any patterning is to be deciphered.

76 Eugene W. Holland (2013) provides a comprehensive and extended discussion on the complex notion of consistency in relation to differential variation in A Thousand Plateaus.
space, reveals thresholds and the necessary intensity triggers (events that move systems to a threshold activating a patterns) of these systems. (Protevi, 2006: 20)

In this manner, the functional aspect of the system activates the spontaneous and becoming model of being and behaving of such complex systems. As such, Protevi explains, complex theory enables us to think of material systems in terms of their power of immanent self-organization. *Difference and Repetition*, Protevi discusses, allows us to think of ‘synchronous emergence (order) and diachronic emergence (novelty)’ (Protevi, 2006: 20), but it is, we stress, the onto-epistemic constructive work of the emergent unity that enables us to speak of an emergence that situates the subject as one emergent unity in a field of such entities. With all this in mind, the proposed aspect of the radical dramaturgy here does not deny the configuration of emergent multiple and non-linear structures as chaos-complex theory bring to light. Rather, we claim that, on the one hand, these structural complexities are more appropriately conceptualized using the parameters of the mereotopological, particularly emphasizing its synchronic and diachronic emergence instead of the chaos-complex positions; and, on the other hand, these complex structures in relation to intermedial practice are better understood as an emergent activity that can expand into a complex system of possibilities within the positionality of each narrative emergence. This perspective will provide, we argue, a stronger conceptualization of, for instance, the relation between the execution of each task in a specific area of Barcelona and the texts sent from the operating pannel.

Third, and final, Urry highlights that the sum is greater than the parts of the system in relation to its dynamics. However, we argue that to fully capture the particularities of intermedial narrative and dramaturgy the relationships between the parts and the whole need to be grasped as non-hierarchical. In this sense, a mereotopological reading of intermedial dramaturgy and narrative provides, we claim, a more competent reading of such dramaturgical systems in relation to generation of narrative inter-layering between the pannel, the board and the streets of Barcelona within the overall creation of the dramaturgy. In this context, Whitehead’s philosophical vocabulary
becomes useful in understanding the potentials of each single actual occasion as a collaborative creation of nexuses that combines different elements in a “togetherness” of occasions. In this sense, in DOF every dramaturgical actual occasion, in its spatio-temporal articulation, encapsulates the many, diverging and connecting mereotopological potentials.

Regarding this connectivity, we suggest that the many narrative units become one in the interlocking of the elements and the co-working of conjuncted and disjuncted parts allows for the formation of multiple and potential narrative perspectives. As such, the creation of the narrative in DOF is also the creation of the in-between in the relational and generative characteristic of the dramaturgical unfolding. Starting from the composing elements and arriving at the composed whole, and all the possible narrative modulations in-between, the generativity of the narrative liminal takes into account every single attending and structural aspect of the narrative construction including both the relation and the relating parts, such that the parts, as a mereotopological structure, cannot be concretely given beyond their relations and manner of functionality. Simply, the “what” that defines a part’s identity and the “how” the part becomes what it is, constitutes an equal binary in the evolving and complex narrative mereotopological dynamic.

Drawing on the theoretical mereotopological notions by Stamina Portanova and Luciana Parisi as discussed in chapter one, we can extrapolate that the creative collaboration of the mereotopological better highlights the significance of the narrative relation, which organizes the parts as co-constituent elements: the narrative parts as always emerging from the mereotopological relations between themselves, which, in turn, dismantles any notion of narrative linearity and any essentialist and formalist readings of narrative. In this context, as narrative singularities with their own potential, and as distinguishable elements of a given relation, a narrative schema of co-existing spatio-temporal narrative multiplicities emerges, creating a space of narrative trajectorial relationality. In this sense, the mereotopological continuity forms an immanent spatio-temporal narrative system. The virtuality of a concrete narrative collaboration between the parts, therefore,
corresponds to a narrative reality exceeding its own actualization – the potential of connectability, as Whitehead would say.

Collaborative relationality is implicit in both Deleuze’s fold and Whitehead’s actual occasions. From this theoretical position, we can argue that each narrative actual occasion can be seen as revealing itself as already composed of many narrative occasions, converging into a collaborative nexus of narrative actual occasions and allowing the creative emergence and connectivity of the narrative new. Following Deleuze and Guattari, here no central narrative point is established. It is, however, primordial to see in the construction of a given narrative a weaving of relations and series of potential connections between the narrative elements that are internally constituted within each narrative occasion. This is a narrative opening as a system of polytonalities – narrative as a ‘polyphony of polyphonies’ (Deleuze, 2006: 93). Potentialities are actualized in the creative experience, understood in a Whiteheadian manner, as a process of conjunctive synthesis. This, in turn, creates a sense of narrative “togetherness” within singularities and individualities. As such, a process of composition, a continuity of becoming, as Whitehead discusses, through articulating nexus into an increasingly complex form creates the becoming conditions through which each narrative

77 Intermediality, Nelson discusses, can be defined as demonstrating syntheses of co-existence of the “live” performers and the co-present audience with the media (Nelson, 2013: 16-02-2013, interview notes). At the heart of this precise definition is a co-existence of elements, both digital and human, that creates a “live” event. In Intermediality in Theatre and Performance (2006), Freda Chapple and Chiel Kattenbelt, describe “liveness” as hybridity. They write, ‘media objects have a different ontology from non-media objects on the stage, so there is an empirical and qualitative difference between the digital and non-digital objects operating on the stage. Thus, digitization plays a part in conceptualizing the changing space of theatre performance. It creates junction points where the different media meet and it is there – at the point of their meeting – that locates intermediality in theatre and performance’ (Chapple and Kattenbelt, 2006: 18). The use of the words ‘trigger’ and ‘junction’ presents useful possibilities. It can be extrapolated that, on the one hand, triggering can be equated to activation and execution; and, on the other hand, the word junction can imply a sense of transit, an operational move, process, and a re-positing of elements. Further, these two words can be also articulated from the point of view of syntheses and performative re-configurations. Peter Boenisch (2006a) also suggests that theatre can perform media: ‘Compared to other media that transmit objects to another space and/or another time, or store them to make worlds out of them there and then, theatre processes these objects into worlds here and now, while simultaneously leaving them as they are … Any theatrical performance, thus, negotiates a multiple range of potential perspectives’ (Boenisch, 2006a: 114). As Boenisch points out, theatre becomes an art of synthesis, whose essential nature is flexibility and mutability that imply changeability and flux.
actual occasion is capable of articulating intensive forms of onto-epistemic experience.

In the context of the above-mentioned relational “togetherness”, Whitehead discusses that each becoming is situated within and emerges from a wider complex of becoming. This complex, according to Whitehead, is an ‘extensive continuum’, defined as ‘one relational complex [system]’ (Whitehead, 1978: 66). For Whitehead, this continuum determines the becoming of all actual occasions. In this respect, the extensive continuum operates as a field of potentialities for the becoming of actual entities, which informs the process and creativity of the narrative landscape. In this sense, each task in DOF as an actual occasion and as a singularity is actualized in a becoming world of potentialities; that is, the activation of each text-sent task has the actualizing potential to impact on how the other tasks may be actualized and how the communication between the different spaces can virtually develop. Seen thus, the task is relationally extensive in its potentiality because, although it is executed in a very specific location such a street in Barcelona, in this instance, it is also extensively connected to board and the operating panel. Whitehead sees this continuum as an infinite extension, however, we argue, that the set parameters of the dramaturgy limit the possible scope of this extension.

This complex inter-relation of immanent actualizations of narrative singularities is the process by which narratological materiality, semioticity and eventfulness is attained. We can claim that narratological materiality and semioticity are something that is attained through processes of actualization of given narrative singularities and in relation to the real conditions within and from which actualization arises – a radical narrative universe of potential and generative creation afforded from within. In other words, narratological materiality and semioticity are not something pre-established waiting to be actualized. Rather, there are emergent at the same time – conditioned while conditioning – that the narrative patterns become. In the context of DOF, each task creates its own material and semiotic emergence. Yet, we can also add that semioticity and materiality are extensively relational in relation to the
above-discussed perspectives; that is, the activation of a narrative task, for instance, can happen in a specific street in Barcelona involving one or more participant subjects; yet, the semioticity and materiality of that task also relationally involves the operating panel and operators because the execution of the task can be said to start at the very moment in which the text is sent. In this sense, semioticity and materiality are also differential and mereotopological.

Regarding the mereotopological, we can describe how the heterogeneous narrative universe of elements informs the compositional aspects of the narrative and becomes ‘assemblages’ (Deleuze, 1987: 7-10) when each constructive frame transforms both attending variables and subjects into a becoming of multiplicity through processes of narrative formation – the creation of a singular narrative occasion during the process of becoming. Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari explain that, although multiple and heterogeneous in their composition, these assemblages maintain a univocity in their becoming: ‘An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 8). Extrapolating from this definition, we can infer that each narrative assemblage is in a constant process of becoming-multiplicity. In this sense, a multiplicity such as the board, the operating panel and the extended narrative throughout the city designates the set of narrative relations, which produce the mechanism that informs the radical dramaturgy of the execution of the event, including the production of affects and knowledge in its activation. Conceived thus, the assemblage can be also seen as a platform for knowledge making, presenting mereotopological characteristics. In the dramaturgical world of DOF, heterogeneous narrative elements such as the interaction of the pre-scripted narrative and the everyday life narrative or multiplicities such as the ecology of tasks articulations can be considered to become assemblages in the relation between the attending variables to the becoming system and the participating subject when they take up a relation to life. In this sense, a narrative assemblage, as seen in DOF, is a mereotopological system of knowledge and affect creation. From this perspective, epistemic processes of
intelligibility become relational and differential. Also in the context of DOF, a narrative task, as a narrative assemblage, can incorporate other tasks and a varying number of participants within it and develop in different manners. The assemblage, in this sense, is the narratological enabling of semioticity – and materiality – as always being constructed and emergent at the executing moment of practice. In this way, hermeneutic processes of interpretation and semioticity result in multiple signifying sequences and concatenations since the narrative content of each intra-action is being created at each emergent moment – a moment that can present a complexity, as an assemblage, in terms of, for instance, how many participants engage in the activation of a single task; how the tasks enter into processes of narrative inter-layering when they combine; and how many participants execute through collaborations more than one task at the same time.

With all this in mind, we can radically claim that DOF cannot be categorized as narratological linearity. Here, we can no longer speak of a single narrative assemblage but of a myriad of relational assemblages being constituted at the same time as narratological multiplicity – as a hypersurface. In this sense, DOF cannot be explained by the “here and now” vitalist ontological frameworks as described by Phelan. Nor can it be theorized by “simplistic” interpretations of autopoietic feedback loops, as theorized by Fischer-Lichte. Nor can it be conceptualized by expressions of ephemeral actualism and “here and now” presentness as in Power. Nor it can be described as ‘trading in nowness’ as in Lavender. Instead, these narratological constructions must be considered as ‘any-instant-whatever’ and ‘any-space-whatever’. This is narrative-en-abyme. Blast Theory’s radical praxis requires a different explanation because the company engages with narratives that are the result of spatio-temporal narratological heterogeneities, whose development re-activates mereotopologically. Moreover, the spatio-temporal, the semiotic, the hermeneutic, and the material aspects of the narrative are the syntheses of the multiplicity of elements that enter into immanent equations within a given narrative assemblage. In the work of Blast Theory, intermedial narrativity knows nothing of notions of pre-established form, content, ontological essence, fixed semiotic taxonomies, and/or pre-given materialities. These
aspects are always affected by continuous modulation in a multi-temporal flow that places the attending variables into continuity, which realizes, in itself, the immanent nature of each assemblage. In this context, not only does the mereotopological characteristic of intermedial narrative activate a myriad of spatio-temporal narrative modulations, but it also presents a sense of narrative intensities within structural complexity.

As discussed in chapter one, Deleuze (1994) explains the idea of intensity as comprising a structure that is both vertical and horizontal (Deleuze, 1994: 230). In understanding the intermedial narrative, the introduction of intensities provides us with another qualitative aspect by which to understand the navigational process at play in intermedial narrative and the complex fabric of narrative experiences it creates. DOF presents a narrative that needs to be categorized in terms of entanglements and engagements. This is a narrative that can be also presented in the shape of a network of interactions, which in most cases show a matrix aspect because it can be entered at any time, from any point, has no centre. As the following diagrammatic maps illustrate,78

![Diagrammatic Maps](image)

Figure 9: *Day of the Figurines*. Diagrammatic map showing patterns of narrative orchestrations.

---

78 These diagrammatic maps have been inspired by the work of Paul Baran (1964) for the RAND Corporation in relation to how distributed communication and Internet strategies are affected by the functionality of networks. Baran also observes these centralized, decentralized and distributed morphological aspects.
In the context of seeing how some of these networks were articulated, we have observed three major patterns in relation to DOF as a spatio-temporal dramaturgy: (i) the centralized pattern, where all participants engage in activities determined by a central point (the main hub could be an example); (ii) a decentralized pattern, where we observe patterns of different tasks being engaged by different groups of participants, independent to any hub; and (iii) a distributed pattern, where most of the participants engage with the same task throughout the city. This is a myriad of possible inter-layered connections as a narrative with no-centre and dramaturgical mediality as inter-layering. Through the execution of the event, these identified patterns combine, as an assemblage, presenting other possibilities such as distributed and centralized and/or distributed and decentralized. In this way, the construction of the narrative creates a series of narrative multiple dimensions defined by its changing nature. Beyond the distributed, centralized and decentralized patterns governing participant behaviour, an intrinsic characteristic of DOF is that it gives rise to a physical and spatio-temporal and an intensive expansion of the narrative that could re-configure these patterns into different structurings and re-modellations.

Here, against the backdrop of the city of Barcelona’s performance, the maps visualize how the execution of the event expands throughout the city. The grey area of the map below presents an outline of Barcelona’s metropolitan area; inside this grey area, the black section – the city centre – represents the location of the interrogated fragment of DOF.

Figure 10: Day of the Figurines. Diagrammatic map showing the metropolitan area of Barcelona. The city centre is highlighted.
The following expands the selected fragment, outlining the configuration of the streets in Barcelona’s city centre. It shows one of the districts of the city in which the game was played. However, the execution expanded throughout the whole of Barcelona. Here, we only focus on the centre of the city because: (i) the majority of the tasks related to the city landmarks, and (ii) it was the only district engaged with throughout the whole duration of the performance (some outer districts such as Poble Sec were only used a couple of times).

![Diagrammatic map showing the configuration of the streets in Barcelona’s city centre.](image1)

Figure 11: *Day of the Figurines*. Diagrammatic map showing the configuration of the streets in Barcelona’s city centre.

The following four diagrammatic maps show the daily occurrences of the performance – a performance execution over three days – as executed in the central district. This first diagrammatic map represents day one, 15th June 2006, at 3pm.

![Diagrammatic map showing the development of DOF narrative in relation to Barcelona’s landmarks. The lines represent the narrative development and expansion – 15th June 2006.](image2)

Figure 12: *Day of the Figurines*. Diagrammatic map showing the development of DOF narrative in relation to Barcelona’s landmarks. The lines represent the narrative development and expansion – 15th June 2006.
The stars on the map mark some of the city’s landmarks such as the gothic cathedral and El Liceu, the music palace and opera house. As it can be already seen, the nascent narrative has started to be articulated in relation to the city centre, Plaza Catalunya.

The following diagrammatic map represents day two, 16th June 2006, also at 3 pm, and shows an already developed narrative in its spatio-temporal expansion: a bigger area of the city centre has been covered. This diagrammatic map builds on the prior one and shows how this particular type of performance transaction stages performance as an expanding architecture of multiple experiential complexities.

![Diagrammatic Map of Barcelona Landmarks](image)

Figure 13: *Day of the Figurines*. Diagrammatic map showing the development of DOF narrative in relation to Barcelona’s landmarks. The lines represent the narrative development and expansion – 16th June 2006.

It is interesting to note how this distributed network of game and performance creates an immediate environment by a series of trajectories that position its participants on different points of the performance.
The following diagrammatic map is day three, 17th June 2006 at 3 pm. It can be clearly observed that the orchestration of the narrative continues to develop the ubiquity of the network immersing its participants in a wider section of the city and clearly portraying the temporally extended performance.

Figure 14: *Day of the Figurines*. Diagrammatic map showing the development of *DOF* narrative in relation to Barcelona’s landmarks. The lines represent the narrative development and expansion – 17th June 2006.

Within the same city backdrop used to create the prior three maps, this one (17th June 2006 at 3 pm) shows how some areas presented a richer intensity of encounters. The map is made showing four different tones of black: the lighter tone specifies the less used areas of the city where less than 10 participants executed the event during the three case study days that this research is interrogating; whereas the darker tone implies a higher usage, density and intensity of interaction.
Figure 15: Day of the Figurines. Diagrammatic map showing the development of DOF narrative in relation to Barcelona’s landmarks. The lines represent the narrative development and expansion – 17th June 2006. The different tones in the colours represent the different intensities in narrative execution.

The following, and last diagrammatic map, 17th June 2006 at around 3.30 pm between Plaza Catalunya, Via Laietana and Passeig de Gracia, presents an articulation of narrative as a web of actual, virtual and potential narratives. The diagrammatic map shows the black point as the execution of the actual narratives, in which the participants were given different possibilities and/or different tasks to execute. The grey points show the potentialities – the alternative narrative possibilities: the Deleuzian virtual. Interestingly, and as a defining characteristic of DOF, some of the virtual potentialities for a participant become the actual narrative for another participant creating a temporal and narratological articulation of actualities and virtualities. It also shows how some participant subject's narratives combine with other narratives, hence, highlighting the mereotopological aspect.
These diagrammatic maps have visually amplified the most defining and radical traits of DOF as an intermedial emergent narrative: the use of media technologies as a narrativizing element; the blend of everyday life and performance; the creating of a performance that is temporally, spatially and socially expanded; and the creation of a narrative of virtualities and actualities that is emergent at the moment of execution.\textsuperscript{79} In short, the structural reality of the dramaturgy in activating the three onto-epistemic conditions depends on generating a constellation of dramaturgical occasions that activates the singular modality of each encounter as it conditions the emergence of the

\textsuperscript{79} These diagrammatic maps have been designed using the information provided by Blast Theory regarding the number of participants and interactions in the Barcelona performance. Blast Theory has an archive showing the records of how the operating panel processed the information. Although the diagrammatic maps present an accurate picture of the performance development, these are only an approximate quantitative estimation.
overall structure through the interlacing of spatio-temporal narrative strata immanent in the shaping of the experience of dramaturgy across all its material, semiotic and formal aspects.


In relation to intermedial narrative discussions within the context of interactivity, Benford and Giannachi (2008b) coined the term ‘temporal trajectory’. They define it as ‘the complex mappings between story time and clock time that are to be found in shared interactive narratives such as computer games and interactive performances’ (Benford and Giannachi, 2008b: 73). In relation to this notion, Benford and Giannachi discuss that the interaction between narrative and time is intrinsic in ‘synchronizing different participants and enabling encounters … [creating the narrative’s] pace and interaction, revealing and communicating delays and visualizing, browsing and synchronizing convergent and divergent histories of interaction’ (Benford and Giannachi, 2008b: 73). Furthermore, they explain that his temporal framework identifies the different kinds of narrative transitions in relation to a network of narrative ‘mobile experiences’ that may occur along a narrative trajectory (Benford and Giannachi, 2008b: 73). In this sense, time and narrative interaction, they explain, also shows how inter-linking trajectories describe important aspects of multi-participant experiences (Benford and Giannachi, 2008b: 73-74).

Viewed in this way, *DOF* can be categorized as a multi-dimensional narrative configuration of converging and differential spatio-temporal orchestrations, synchronizing the modes of interaction. This narrative presents aspects of multi-linear narratological intervening elements.\(^80\) This multi-linearity is

---

\(^80\) As noted in the introduction to this thesis, the work of Blast Theory presents social, political and ethical implications that this dissertation decides not to engage with. In the context of *DOF*, the execution of each interactive narrative task can be also grasped as an ethico-political act within discourses of power and knowledge. Drawing from Foucault (1982), Deleuze also engages with ethics within the processes of individuation. In relation to interactive narrative, John Winslade (2009) describes that Foucault discusses notions of
created as an amalgamation of narrative experiences that is being informed by the decisions that the participant subjects take; that is, the multi-modal manner through which each activation may take place in the inter-relating of the game and personal lives of the participants as co-informing each other.\textsuperscript{81} Interestingly, in activating the tasks, the participants, when they meet, learn about each other’s experiences such as what a past experience may have entailed through collaboration. In this sense, past narrative experiences can be brought back and may inform how a present experience/task is executed. In this sense, the activation of a given task enters into the realm of memory, learnt knowledge and the temporally differential through the synthesizing of time as seen in \textit{10 Backwards}; that is, this is a synthesizing narrative that refers back to the past, is situated in the present, and is projected into the future as a result of the decision-making and self-reflexivity of the participants.

Consequently, the creation of \textit{DOF}’s intermedial narrative plot presents a sense of ‘transcoding’ (Boenisch, 2010a: 189); that is, each participant subject transfers the informational and cultural codes\textsuperscript{82} of a different – everyday life and narrative aesthetic construction – environment as both a strategic dramaturgical tool and a constant self-reflexive dialogue to account for the ‘structural principles of data organization and processing … [w]here established conventions and concepts (aesthetic as well as everyday) are thus reconfigured along the logic of transcoding’ (Boenisch, 2010a: 189). In power-knowledge regarding to the political implications of ‘actions upon other actions’ (Foucault in Winslade, 2009: 336); actions that are executed from the specific ethico-political point of view of the subject. Instead, for Deleuze, ‘the subject, the person who comes to know something, does not have a point of view (which would necessarily imply both a pre-existing subject and that truth is relative), but it is a point of view and this point of view is a condition of variation rather than universality’ (Winslade, 2009: 334).

\textsuperscript{81} John Winslade (2009), following Deleuzian scholar Todd May (2005), explains that in interactive narrative practice, the subject asks himself the question How might one live? – as opposed to How do I live? This question has also political, social and ethical implications because what is implicit is the presentation of the subject’s concerns about his own life. In asking the afore-mentioned question, and in activating the narrative’s trajectories, the subject will play each task according to the ethical, political and social parameters of his own life and, therefore, integrating the interactive narrative into his own understanding of power-knowledge strategies and ethical discourses.

\textsuperscript{82} Peter Boenisch (2010a) explains that ‘in computing, to “transcode” refers to the conversion of data from one (digital) format to the other. Facilitated by shared structural principles of data organization and processing … it allows digital media to copy, convert, blend, store and reproduce any kind of contents and information’ (Boenisch, 2010a: 189).
this way, the participants create a narrative that can be described as a polyphony of affects and temporal convergences. In other words, the creation of the narrative expands the presentness of time into a network of differential narrative temporalities: the temporalities of the game life and personal life overlap. Seen thus, the temporal articulation of temporality enters into the mereotopological space of the dramaturgically multiple, the interval and the differential.

Moreover, in relation to the treatment of time, *DOF* presents another characteristic: the duality between the 24 hours of the game and the 24 days of the performance. In this sense, the linearity of the 24 hours of the game is expanded into the multi-temporality of the 24 days. These 24 days of the performance can be discussed as multi-temporal because the participants decide when (and if) to take part in the executing dramaturgical process, therefore, unfolding layers of multi-temporality. Contra traditional readings of narrative theory, here the time of the game is expanded and transverses differentially, affecting the time and the manner is which the audience can access the work. The execution of the narrative here requires the participants to constantly transverse between different scales of time, hence, yielding non-linear temporalities produced by the encounter between game and everyday life executed in the multiple registers of the temporal. As we saw in *10 backwards*, here the multi-modal temporality of the complex emergent processes affords the constant reconditioning of temporal layers in a scalar manner and calls attention to its own manner of functioning.

Also in relation to the suggested scalar treatment of temporality as discussed in chapter two, in *DOF* we observe the layering between the “programmed” time of the tasks by the operators and the “activating” time of the tasks by the participants. In this sense, the process of fabulation also enters into the realm of the scalar because of the convergence of both types into the creation of the narrative structure. Seen thus, we suggest that a conceptual approach from a scalar perspective offers a more accurate description and critical position than Giannachi’s ‘temporal trajectory’ because it fully accounts for the radicality of the functional and compositional conditioning from within of the narrative. The
relationship between the modes in which the plot is made available to the participants and the manner in which the plot may be executed enables a constant correlation between the processes of fabulation and focalization and the spatial and temporal expansion of the narrative. Such correlation processes place the creation of narrative in DOF in a scalar landscape of co-interacting planes, which, as a hypersurface, demands constant consideration of the responses to the narrative engagement; that is, the temporality in which the operators function and the temporality of the participants in the game is co-informed in the nested complexity of the intensity of the phenomenon.

2.3. Day of the Figurines: Intermedial Narratives as Multiple Intertextual Worlds.

In Ontological Plotting: Narrative as a Multiplicity of Temporal Dimensions, Hilary Dannenberg (2004) explores narrativity as a multiplicity of spatio-temporal dimensions and establishes an account of the possibilities of the ‘multiple worlds’ approach to ontological plotting (Dannenberg, 2004: 159). Widely used in critical literary studies, the concept of ontological plotting can be used to review some of the constitutive narratological elements of DOF. Dannenberg defines ontological plotting as ‘the analysis of narrative fiction’s coordination of the alternate possible worlds which give it depth and interest’ (Dannenberg, 2004: 159). Conceived thus, the use of ontological plotting creates a structure that cannot be traced to causal-lineal sequences of events through fictional time. Ontological plotting creates an orchestration of spatio-temporalities. In this sense, DOF could be considered an ‘ontologically multidimensional fabric of alternate possible worlds’ since each participant decides and acts upon the ‘tellability’ of his individual narrative (Dannenber, 2004: 160). The participant, Dannenber discusses, takes an active role in the proliferations of spatio-temporal multiple-world structures. In this way, DOF’s plot is a dynamic interaction of differential possible worlds always in ‘a state of ontological flux’ (Dannenberg, 2004: 161). Each single world created by the participants of DOF forms part of a ‘plurality of worlds’ (Dannenberg, 2004: 162) that push the reader/participant ‘into a new system of actuality and
possibility’ (Dannenberg, 2004: 161). Drawing on these remarks, the narrative that *DOF* creates is an activity of interlacing narrative constructions in which the participant is invested, immersed and deals, as an intra-action, with the multi-layered narrative that *DOF* creates through the narrative of his engagement with both the game narrative and the narrative of everyday life events through feedback loops that rely on a series of constant mereotopological narrative re-orchestrations.\(^{83}\) In short, drawing on Dannenberg, *DOF* can be described as an intermedial performance where communication between the different colliding, multiple and temporally differential narratives occurs through a multitude of channels that constantly redefine the intervening narrative frameworks. As Boenisch (2006a) explains, ‘intermediality manages to stimulate exceptional, disturbing and potentially radical observations, rather than merely communicating or transporting them as messages, as media would traditionally do’ (Boenisch, 2006a: 115). From this parameter, each communication and interaction channel is a narrative medium that does not function in isolation, but in a chorality of level-crossing medial frameworks.

Now, although we have suggested that Dannenberg’s positions can help discuss the textual specificities of *DOF*, some remarks need to be considered. Admitting that Dannenberg’s proposals suitably describe, on the one hand,\(^{83}\) Gareth White (2012) explains that the term ‘immersive’ relates to the configuration of dramaturgical spaces and the re-configuration of audience-performer duality. He also points out that ‘Immersive theatre has become a widely adopted term to designate a trend for performances which use installations and expansive environments, which have mobile audiences, and which invite audience participation’ (White, 2012: 1). For him, ‘Immersion implies access to the inside of the performance in some way’ (White, 2012: 221). Drawing on performances by two London-based theatre companies, Shunt and Punchdrunk, he describes how the use of architectural interiors, extensive and large environments at times, ‘in which audiences explore in order to find the performance, and sometimes to give performances themselves’ (White, 2012: 221), inform the conceptualization of the work. He posits that the use of these physical interiors and the audience member’s movement through them becomes part of the dramaturgy of the work. This thesis proposes that the term ‘immersive’ refers to two aspects: on the one hand, it transforms the performer and the individual audience member’s experience of theatre; on the other hand, the term ‘immersive’ can be also described as being part of, dwelling within, a distinct and constructive environment; that is, the mediated performance phenomenon re-orders the relationships and experiences that the performance event explores, in such a way that the participant subject and the mediated attending variables’ agency in participatory and immersive performance is significant; it shapes, moderates, and configures the event. The kind of technological mediation and the use of everyday spaces in the manner of Blast Theory’s *Uncle Roy All Around You* (2003) and *DOF* are examples.
the complexity of multi-linear narrative perspectives and highlight the inadequacy of the traditional readings of narratological tellability and causally-linear sequences that can be clearly applied to \textit{DOF} and, we suggest, to intermediality in general as a new digital medium; and, on the other hand, the active engagement of the participant in developing the narrative. Nonetheless, one aspect that she discusses becomes problematic. She explains that a multiple-worlds approach views narrative fiction in its ontologically unresolved state before (at least in the single world ontological hierarchy of realist texts) the finality of closure imposes a single story version on the discourse’ (Dannenberg, 2004: 161). Contra this position, we can claim the radicality of \textit{DOF} because at the end of the performance/game, there is no winner; that is, there is not a final position arrived at. Further, when the performance finishes, a large number of tasks and missions may be still unresolved and, therefore, narrative threads are left incomplete. Moreover, in the above-quoted definition, Dannenberg seems to imply that at the very end, due to the fact that a single story version is imposed to enable closure, all the participant subjects are able to grasp the narrative articulation in its totality. However, one aspect that becomes obvious in \textit{DOF}, and points to its radical aspect, is that because of the positionality of the subject within the overall dramaturgical structure, the participant is rendered incapable of reaching an overall and conclusive perspective on the totality of the performance event – we will return this positional aspect on the following section regarding some suggested problematics.

Conceived as an interrelation of narrative texts, \textit{DOF} presents an intermedial narrative that is a constant flow of performative textual potentialities, which are always interconnecting frames and strategies and fluctuating and constructing signifiers. In this way, this is also a narrative that can be explained within the framework of the notion of ‘hypertextuality’. In \textit{Virtual Theatres}, Giannachi (2004) defines hypertextualities as,

\noindent forms of textualities that are rendered through HTML, an abbreviation of hypertext mark-up language. Whether textual or hypermedial, hypertextualities are fluid and open forms that allow the reader or viewer to move beyond the world of the
interface and penetrate the realm of the work. (Giannachi, 2004: 13)

The viewer, Giannachi explains, becomes an active constitutive element of the textual process and, therefore, activates the work of art, allowing the participant to live in both the virtual and the actual world, which multiplies the participant’s narrative position (Giannachi, 2004: 14). She further explains,

to read a hypertext entails reading the text as well as the space within which the hypertext is encoded. In this sense, hypertext is each text forming the hypertextual structure, but also the path of interrelatedness connecting each segment to other segments. (Giannachi, 2004: 14)

Also, Giannachi adds,

reading a hypertext not only implies actively moving through space to find content and to explore the space containing the content, but also to observe the structural and formal patterns characterizing each fractal section and to study the potential interrelatedness to the fleeting whole. (Giannachi, 2004: 14)

In relation to these hypertextual actions, DOF creates a multitude of possible texts as an encoded web.84 Drawing on her definitions, we also conceive the reading of the text and the meaning and knowledge that comes forth from that reading as a process of encounters and highlight the formation of patterns that come about between a given text and the potential textual references that may spring from a text. As she suggests, the reading of a text also implies a variety of performative context-dependent activities. From this perspective, we

84 From this point of view, DOF participates in the post-dramatic. In his description of post-dramatic space, Lehmann argues that this space should be understood as a chora, that is, as a multiplicity of spatial and textual articulations. In relation to post-dramatic text and narrative, he uses the term chora and positions narrativity in a manner reminiscent of Derrida – as ‘chora-graphy’ (Lehmann, 2006: 145). From this perspective, post-dramatic narrative operates, according to him, from the principle that narrativity can be considered as a mode of critical and practical discourse. Placing an emphasis on processes and practices over narratological products, Lehmann seeks to engender dynamic relationships between the articulation of narrative as postmodern literary text and the presentational and compositional theatrical configurations of such particular texts according to their principles of staging. For him, the narrative chora can be described as ‘a space and speech-discourse without telos, hierarchy and causality, without fixable meaning and unity’ (Lehmann, 2006: 145-46). Further, he says, ‘in this sense, we can say that theatre is turned into chora-graphy: the deconstruction of a discourse oriented towards meaning and the invention of a space that eludes the laws of telos and unity’ (Lehmann, 2006: 145).
can extrapolate from her ideas that each of DOF’s sent-text topics is written and spatially and temporally realized. In this web of messages where each SMS text is a path to another entry, and each entry is a door to another spatially and temporally realized text, the structuring of the text can be constituted by the functioning of narrative portals. Conceived thus, DOF is set as a series of portals of interconnecting structures of an invisible architecture of spatially and temporally realized links.

From this point of view of interconnecting structures, the hypertext can be considered as a rhizome. Taking from biological backgrounds that define a rhizome as a root with no clear structure and no main channel/filament as in a tulip or a mushroom, Deleuze and Guattari (2001) in *A Thousand Plateaus* discuss how the rhizome ‘has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (*milieu*) from which it grows and which it overspills’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2001: 1605). For them, the rhizome is a ‘self-vibrating region of intensities whose development avoids any orientation toward a culmination point or external end … [it] brings into play very different regimes of signs’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2001: 1605-1606). Drawing on these remarks, the hypertextuality of DOF creates a complex system of textualities in which the text enters a world of narrative action, pragmatics and functionality. The hypertext enters, in this manner, into processes of variation and intensity, establishing patterns between its own singularity and the connecting variety of its own existence. Seen thus, the hypertext is also relational and differential because the manner in which it is engaged with enables constant relations between each section and/or pattern of the hypertext and the overall structure. In other words, the hypertext is mereotopological.

Now, some of the proposals put forward by Giannachi in relation to hypertextuality need to be repositioned in relation to the argument that this thesis follows. First, the constructivist perspective argued for here sees no difference between a text and the subject engaging with such a text. Rather, the entanglement of agencies conceives the moment of intra-action as the very moment of hypertextuality. Radically put, the human subject is also hypertext. So when she writes that ‘in hypertext, the reader controls these
links’ (Giannachi, 2004: 14), she is also implying an anthropocentric perspective in conceptualizing it and seems to overlook the agential qualities that the hypertext itself possess. Second, she sees that hypertext as a temporal *infinitum* of textual possibilities. However, we suggest that the processes of hypertextuality come to life with the emergence of the situated activity that the dramaturgy as a scaffolding of inter-related elements enables. Seen thus, hypertextuality is imbued in processes of temporality. Following this argument, we can understand how *DOF* radically presents the participant with an ability to negotiate the text from the point of view of form, content, medium, and message from within. In this manner, the participant actively and hermeneutically interprets the constant development of the narrative as a kind of hermeneutics of active creation as learning-in-action – here the hermeneutic operation actively creates the text at the same time as disrupting traditional hermeneutic binaries such as the intra- and extra-diegetic relation between text and reader (see Bryon, 2006). In the context of *DOF*, the participant subject decides their own manner of participation and experiences the hypertext as an interrelated zone of narrative structures, as an assemblage. In this sense, the participant in *DOF* not only is inside a meta-architecture, inside the work of art, an architecture that is being created at the moment of performance, but onto-epistemically creates the narrative structure and is aware that it is being created. It is in the participant’s engagements –

85 In the context of classical hermeneutics, broadly defined as the art of interpretation, meaning was attached to a text, bound up to a text – independently of the nature of the text – and awaited the interpreter to extract meaning out of it via proper exegetical method. Departing from this, David Allen and Jerry Vines (1987) explain that: ‘modern hermeneutic theory is characterized by a two fold transition: the shift from a spatial/regional hermeneutical approach to that of general hermeneutics, and the shift from a primarily epistemological outcome to an ontological one’ (Allen and Vines, 1987: 310).

86 The complexities of *DOF*'s narrative construction can be viewed from the framework of a metanarrative; that is, broadly defined, a narrative that refers to its own manner of making, paying attention to the operative manner in which the technological elements enhance the agential elements of the dramaturgy and the temporalizing, spatializing and narrativizing elements of the technology. Intermediality, as Chiel Kattenbelt (2010) fittingly states, always engages in process of self-interrogation and self-referentiality (Kattenbelt, 2010: 32). Robert Alter (1972) has shown that metanarrative always includes reflexive elements. In this sense, it is a self-conscious narrative in the context of its structure, meaning and purpose. The term metanarrative appears often in narratological studies. In *Narrative Discourse* (1980), Genette uses the term in two different senses: on the one hand, it refers to narratives inside narratives which can imply a sense of hierarchy; and on the other hand, he also uses the word to specify the internal organization of the text, in the sense of a self-reflexive narration. Seen thus, the self-reflexive and self-referent elements of *DOF* as a metanarrative allow for the participants
as intra-actions – with the text that both the text and the participant manifest and emerge themselves. In other words, the hypertextual narrative creation suggested here radically resides in the interface between the “just created” text and the action that created it. Seen thus, the hypertext can be defined as a process of creating different medial articulations. The intra-action captures the contingencies of the emergent hypertextual activity. Simply put, it is the intra-action that creates the interface through which the narrative text and the dramaturgy is created: the work of art and its narrative reside in the interface between the participant and the “participated in” through processes of onto-epistemic mediality that as a hypersurface operates in the inter-layering of different planes of composition.

2.4. Day of the Figurines: Becoming, Final Thoughts and Problematics.

DOF is a trajectory that presents a multiplicity of elements, which create a narrative structure with generative characteristics. Areas of narratological structuring have fittingly put an emphasis on aspects of the performative event and the spatio-temporal structuring of narrative as a process. These are narrative events that interpenetrate and influence each other, where materiality and semioticity are not pre-given, but are also facets of a nascent event; that is, each event is the embryonic point that generates the next one, exploring mereotopological relations of structural complexity. The Whiteheadian and Deleuzian theory of the event helps, once more, understand the elusive complexity of DOF as a narrative architecture of complexity. Whitehead and Deleuze help articulate the inter-connectedness of the narratological structure that DOF constructs – a radical structure of ever-changing patterns of narrative events and an affirmation of operativity and process.

to be engaged in a process of constructivist creativity; that is, the participant subject is intrinsic and internal to the functioning and development of the diegetic frame.
This theory of the event, provided by Deleuze and Whitehead, enables us to encompass the more conventional narrative definition of the event as a complete and defined happening, but also it extends this narrative definition to incorporate a structured sequence (not necessarily chronological) that includes a spatio-temporal framework and provides the individual event with a larger evental environment. Deleuzian scholar Constantin Boundas fittingly explains this non-linear characteristic. He says,

Becoming, instead of being a linear process from one actual to another, should rather be conceived as the movement from one actual state of affairs, through a dynamic field of virtual/actual tendencies, to the actualization of this field in a new state of affairs. This scheme safeguards the relations of reversibility between the virtual and the actual. (Boundas, 2006: 5)

From this perspective, DOF can be said to embrace this narrative non-linear structure of space and time. DOF exists as a narratological event and as a structure of internal events, which emphasizes the creative, the generative, and the complexity of medial narrative intra-actions. This definition also entails the constantly changing condition of the event as intensity and the coalescing of connections between the agents, the world, the objects and the formation of a narrative. DOF produces a plural range of events on all levels, which, as operating patterns, construct the narrative structure. Given the emphasis on becoming, the evental interconnection of space and time provides a useful platform for describing the complexities of DOF. Further, DOF creates a web of structural interconnectivity where events generate and become more events; that is, a creative and compositional aspect of the structure of the event linking the generative aspect of the event with those who experience it.

Throughout his writings, Deleuze, particularly in Difference and Repetition, emphasizes the relationship between the actual and the virtual in the processes of actualization. The focus on the virtual allows Deleuze to highlight the activations of new potentialities and, thus, the creation of new singularizations. From this perspective, the relation between the created and the vital creating is in a constant renewal – the unlimited virtual creatings in their differential being. Deleuze stresses a field of potentialities that are all-
reaching and encompass all possibilities as a totality of potentialities. Simply put, Deleuze sees no limits in the manner the virtual can affect the actual in its realization. However, we suggest that a literal application of this theoretical position to the intermedial performance backgrounds becomes problematic. In this sense, intermedial performance also informs a constructivist reading of epistemology, particularly in relation to how the structures and scaffoldings that a dramaturgy establishes limit the scope of such possible virtualizations. We have seen in *DOF* that the coming into being of the complex dramaturgical system presents an open structure. However, even in the most open structures, there are initial set parameters and these parameters evolve throughout the development of the dramaturgy. In this sense, the range and scope of the processes of virtualizations are always contingent to how the situated activity of each intra-action may emerge. The emergent dynamics of the dramaturgical system enable processes of actual-virtual realization, but the context-dependency of such an emergent dynamic actively informs their modality of emergence. Deleuze conceives each actualization as a “captivity” that is immediately deterritorialized by its virtual counterpart. In this sense, the dynamics of creation instantly escape from the mediation of the created. In fact, for Deleuze, creativity takes place in the virtual dimension. Although Deleuze clearly rejects any notions of hierarchy, we may even suggest that in conceptualizing the processes of creativity, he places the emphasis on the virtual rather than the actual, particularly in terms of the immanence of creation. Yet, what intermedial performance suggests to us is that it is impossible to deny the mediality of the created and its spatio-temporal dynamics of morphogenesis. The movement between actualization and virtualization, for Deleuze specifically in the final chapters of *Difference and Repetition*, has no intermediaries. However, we argue that the dramaturgical scaffolding acts as an intermediary because it constantly repositions the created as mediated and, hence, it evidently determines the processes of virtualizations.

Another element that becomes problematic in relation to intermedial performance is the notion of the rhizome regarding hypertextualities. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari discuss that the rhizome presents
no temporal aspects. It is even described as “suspended” in temporality, only engaging with genealogies of knowledge and differentially expanding in a web with no centre. This research has simply presented a miniscule discussion of the concept of the rhizome. Nonetheless, in the context of intermedial performance it is impossible to overlook the contextual aspect in which a given performance may take place and its durational aspect. From this point of view, although the rhizome becomes a helpful concept to examine and capture the specificities of hypertextuality, the temporal specificity of the situated activity must be acknowledged in the constant exchange that enables the emergence of hypertextual relations.

One aspect, we suggest, that cannot be ignored is the positionality of the subject in a given context. Readings of Deleuze such as Stuart Elden (2006) and Ronald Bogue (1997, 2005), particularly emphasizing notions of nomadism, territorialization and deterriotiarialization, have highlighted critical accounts of globalization, specifically within philosophical and political notions of space, nationality and territory while stressing a complex and abstract view of political territories, the overlapping of political, social and economical regimes as nomadic distribution, and their ontological shift as their manner of being from the purely localized to the flow of the global. In general, these readings and applications of Deleuzian philosophy have entailed a subordination of notions of positionality to what we can consider as a “secondary” plane of importance. It is completely beyond the scope of this research to engage with such readings. However, we would like to argue that when applied to intermedial performance – and theatrical performance in general, we would suggest – the positionality of the subject cannot be put on the “back burner” because the situated emergence of the aesthetic event always implies a position to be taken and a positioning within it. We stress that the intermedial narrative ‘plane of composition’ can be understood as a constructed event of internal frames that render the dramaturgical whole as an unreachable totality – particularly stressed, as noted, in more open dramaturgical structures such as DOF – and forces the participant to become aware of his own positionality within the execution of the dramaturgical event. Simply put, the participant, in his positionality within the dramaturgical system,
can only grasp a part of the overall structural unfolding and is, therefore, unable to synthesize the entirety of the dramaturgical construction as a whole.

As a final thought, if DOF can be articulated in terms of a web of structural interconnectivity, then DOF can be also categorized as a collective creation. This is a creation that is enabled at the moment of practice within several planes of articulation and composition. Within this perspective, the work of art is thought of as a differential construction constituted by specifically immanent rather than transcendent relations between a given creator and the created. Following Deleuze, DOF can be discussed as being generated as an overall narrative plane of composition made of internal and generative planes of composition. A plane in which subject and object co-constitute each other, and where the relationship, between subject and work of art, dissolves in the construction and becoming of the collective narrative event.
Chapter 5

The Execution of the Intermedial Performance Subject in the Construction of the Event

The aim of this chapter is to conceptualize the intermedial subject in relation to the notion of the constructivist intermedial event where the onto-epistemic constructive aesthetic comes into being by the creative realization of each spatio-temporal narrative frame due to its always becoming-other – becoming the new and tending towards dramaturgical novelty in the constant synthesizing and generative processes of activation occurring through the triadic execution of the event. Here, it is argued that there is no “epistemology of the subject”, but, rather, there is an onto-epistemology of the event, which explains the mode of appearance of the intermedial production of subjectivity; that is, the activation of the event constitutes the subject in a process of continual renewal. If for Kant the world finds its foundation within the subject, as a transcendental structure, in agreement with Deleuze and Whitehead, this thesis claims that the intermedial subject is not transcendentally constituted as Kant proposes in the First Critique, but emerges transcendently within the intermedial transaction. In other words, this thesis proposes a notion of the intermedial subject as transcendentally possible, albeit not in a substantive sense, as Kant implies, but viewed as a model of subjectivity that can be analyzed by the transcendental conditions that determine the possibility of such intermedial performance subjectivations. Simply put, they both emerge from within.

In opposition to what Mock, Phelan, Fischer-Lichte, Nelson, Lapage, Causey and Schechner have proposed, this research seeks to produce a radical understanding of constructive aesthetic co-dependence as one that is non-anthropocentric. As noted in the introduction, Phelan, Schechner, Mock and
Fischer-Lichte have articulated their understanding of the type of subjectivity enabled in performance in relation to their postulates around the ontological and liveness debates, particularly emphasizing the subject's ephemerality, ontological actuality, self-erasure, constant re-presentation and aspects of being determined by but also determining the performance transaction – the subject as co-dependent within Fischer-Lichte’s autopoietic feedback loop. Furthermore, recent intermedial performance scholarship such as Lapage (2008), adopting a terminology inspired by “simplistic” readings of Deleuze and a post-humanist philosophical framework, calls the intermedial performance subject a ‘schizzo subject’ (Lapage, 2008: 143), actively negating the possibility of a transcendental subject in intermedial work. In relation to subjectivity and digital performance, Matthew Causey (2002) writes,

The question that needs pursuing is the construction of subjectivity … live performance that incorporates digital and interactive media is uniquely situated to represent the conflicts and convergences of the human and technology … the dramatic struggle between the material body within virtual and televisual space can create a dialectic that reveals the … changing positions of the subject in mediatized culture. (Causey, 2002: 180-182)

Interestingly, he acknowledges the need for a clear conceptual position of notions of subjectivity within digital performance backgrounds and the relation between human and technology. However, in identifying that the position of the subject needs to be addressed when encountering the digital transaction, he still refers to an aprioristic subject that is “placed” in a technological performance environment.

Not without merit, all these ways of conceiving the subject connect the subject to theatrical performance and establish some valid points such as the linking of subjectivity in relation to the specificities of a given performance transaction. However, they are all anthropocentric conceptualizations and all rely on the primacy of the subject as an experiential entity that tends towards the phenomenon, implying a model of subjectivity that posits the subject as distinct from the performance transaction, although it is influenced by it.
Whereas Nelson – in what is a closer understanding of the intermedial subject to the one proposed here – uses the term ‘experiencer’ aptly encompassing both the spectator and the performer. The term ‘experiencer’ describes the subject as performative and phenomenal. In doing so, Nelson endows the subject with performative creative aspects in relation to the performance event, but, once more, this is a conceptualization that is still reliant on a notion of a subject as pre-existing the performance encounter.

Contra these above-mentioned positions, this chapter argues for a radical conceptualization of the intermedial subject. The following develops a critical position against these, we may say, post-modern models of subject fragmentation, co-dependence and erasure. The proposed intermedial subject is not the fractured subject of post-modernity, but on the contrary possesses an onto-epistemic unity; it is a subject that is immanent and instantiated, in a Deleuzian sense, at the moment of the execution of the event; and one that is, as Whitehead would say, always in a process of subjectivations – a process that pays attention to emergent processes and to how subjects are actualized and individuated through a set of diverse practical relations and interconnections. Interconnections, this thesis argues, that enable a constant process of knowledge making and learning.

The suggested radicality will show that the intermedial subject is a subject with constructivist characteristics, emerging coterminously with the event and whose identity is constantly performed in processes of onto-epistemic construction. The following sections will demonstrate that: (i) the intermedial subject is self-conscious (in performatively activating and executing the event); (ii) presents autonomy, univocity, and unity; (iii) is heuristic-hermeneutic (in its self-reflexive, concept-making and learning aspects); (iv) can be understood as intersubjective; and (v) is transcendentally constituted (through syntheses, not understood here in the categorical imperative of the Kantian framework, but in the empirico-transcendental emergent sense, as
The notion of the onto-epistemic intermedial subject that this research proposes borrows from Nelson’s ‘experiencer’, but puts forward a new and distinct conceptualization by focusing on the constant process of performative identity formation and the situatedness of the qualities of the production of subjectivity (its consciousness, perception and experiential interpretation) in constructive dramaturgical assemblages of spatio-temporal narratological structures and evental experience.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first puts forward this research’s proposal of the onto-epistemic intermedial subject in relation to the findings observed throughout the case studies in chapters two, three and four, and claims the unity and univocity of the intermedial subject’s Being. The second one describes the subject as a learner within a dramaturgical world of affects and intensities. The third section explores the intersubjective manner in which the subject activates the event. The fourth and final section offers some final thoughts and opens up some problematics regarding the notion of intermedial subjectivity and intermedial dramaturgy.

1. The Intermedial Subject: The univocity of Being.

This section engages with the philosophical positions that enable this thesis to radically claim the transcendentality, unity and univocity of the intermedial subject. The Deluzian and Whiteheadian scholar Keith Robinson (2008) explains that for both Deleuze and Whitehead the dynamisms of becoming, Being and the production of subjectivity are clearly articulated through the compositional movement enabled by creativity. Put simply, Being, thinking and creativity are one. Processes of creativity enable subject and world formation within dramaturgical orchestrations. In this context, the production

---

87 Whitehead would term this the empirico-ideal aspect. Similar to Deleuze’s notions, for Whitehead, experience is the constructive base of ideas and thought.

88 Relative to Deleuze’s understanding of the term creativity, two aspects also need to be considered. First, philosophy, for Deleuze, can be broadly defined as the novel creation of concepts. Philosophy, for him, is functionally creative and pragmatic. That is, broadly, truths are constructively made, not found. And, second, Deleuze and Guattari differentiate between three domains in which creativity occurs: (i) philosophy regarding the creation of concepts,
of subjectivity, for Deleuze, constitutes a move to create a plane of consciousness within the plane of composition. In his understanding, the subject is the unfolding process of creativity. The subject participates in an ongoing creative process on the basis of its creativity, the created and the process of creating. In this way, the subject, for him, is the functioning of relations – or forces – that articulate the process of creativity. This functioning, according to Robinson, comes into existence by subtracting the multiple aspects of a given experience in a counting-as-one; that is, the multiple amalgamates as one. Through this counting-as-one, Being can be grasped in a single and univocal sense; the one is made of internal multiplicities that co-emerge out of multiplicities. As Paul Bains (2002) describes, the Deleuzian understanding of the subject places its production within a world of multiplicities. He writes,

The multiplicity of heterogenous components can emerge as a process of subjective self-reference through a kind of ... existential grasping ... whereby a fragmentary whole emerges, a unitas multiplex, a unity in multiplicity ... a plane of consistency ... a whole in all its parts ... an endo-consistency in which the components are distinct but inseparable. A composite unit. (Bains, 2002: 103-104)

Put slightly differently, the individual's identity is to be understood as the synthesizing aspect of creativity, emerging as becoming. In this sense, we can infer, each of the counting-as-one can be read as a temporal state of equilibrium about to be deterritorialized; that is, a comprising moment of linearity that encompasses the non-linear and a unique moment of complexity when the potentialities for a new singularity co-exist with what happens to be actualized.

The Whiteheadian scholar Isabelle Stengers (2011) argues that the production of subjectivity must be understood as part of a milieu (see defined as abstract systems of actual and virtual worlds; (ii) art in so far as creativity is involved in the creation of affects, defined for now, as sensory embodiments of actual and virtual worlds; and (iii) science in so far as creativity is involved in the creation of percepts, defined as the embodiment of functional worlds. In What is Philosophy? (1991), they write, ‘the three modes of thought intersect and intertwine ... [articulating] a rich tissue of correspondences [that] can be established between the planes’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991: 198-99).
Manning, 2013a). She proposes that subjectivity can never be understood for itself – independently of its milieu; rather, for Deleuze and Whitehead, it is always part of an assemblage in which it is enabled. As Whitehead (1968) writes in Modes of Thought,

> The notion of existence involves the notion of an environment of existences and of types of existences. Any one instance of existence involves other existences, connected with it and yet beyond it. This notion of the environment introduces the notion of the “more or less” and of multiplicity. (Whitehead, 1968: 7)

Drawing on this, the identity of the subject, in terms of creativity, is the production of novelty, which is the effect of multiplicity and repetition whereby an event is produced out of the chaotic multiplicity available within the pre-individual field and becomes an individual singularity within an environment of other individuals.

Extrapolating from these philosophical positions, here, contra the above-mentioned subject-of-performance positions, the radical conceptualization of the identity of the intermedial subject is understood as the evental production of subjectivations – as the subject’s own evental self-production. As such, rather than an identity per se, as an essentialist entity, we consider identity as a performative strategy between and within practices; that is, it is through constant creative practice that the notion of identity, as highlighted in this thesis, comes into being. Looked at in this way, the processes of ephemerality, highlighted by Phelan and Fischer-Lichte, are rendered inadequate to discuss the particularities of the type of subject’s production that the triadic execution of the event actualizes. Each instantiation is not seen as an erasure and ephemeral disappearance; rather, each one is conceived as a moment of temporal synthesis that, simply put, differentially amalgamates the previous processes of actualization. Furthermore, the focus on singularities and assemblages offers possibilities to reconsider the conceptualization of the notion of the intermedial subject. Following Deleuze and Guattari, we can then suggest that the identity of the intermedial subject is de-centred from any essentialist ontological notions framed as the “here and now” and showing unity, and is part of an assemblage of dramaturgical
multiplicities, as seen, for example, in DOF or the interactions between Niki and the two screens in 10 Backwards, an emergent conjunction and an evolving inter-twining of self-ordering aesthetic forces. In this sense, the radical identity of the intermedial subject and all the attributes that enable processes of subjectivity to emerge such as consciousness, perception, experience and interpretation are activated at the very moment of the emergent situated activity as life in the making.

As Simone Brott (2011) writes, ‘subjectivity is, for Deleuze, not a person, but a power given to immanent forces to act and to produce effects in the world’ (Brott, 2011: 1). As such, rethinking the subject-object binary as belonging to one creative composition in the contingency of a given situated activity. In addition, in understanding subjectivity as constructed and realized in the intermedial event, intermedial subjectivity is always active.89

For Deleuze, consciousness, activity and actuality cannot be disconnected.90 They are always connected at the point of intersection of actualizing responses at each present moment. Applying Deleuzian thought, the intermedial subject, in activating the intermedial event, is open, dynamic and productive – an open whole defined by relations between materiality and temporality, experiential perception, action and response and influenced anew by each new dramaturgic stimulus within the mereotopological aesthetic complexity. This is a subject that is open to a dramaturgical totality, a conscious being that exists, experiences and perceives in order to change – where change is understood in terms of its specific temporal dramaturgical actualizations occurring through the generative activation of the intermedial event.


90 Deleuze’s understanding of consciousness is highly influenced by his readings of Bergson’s notions of time and memory and Hume’s notions of experience.
In their proposals, Fischer-Lichte and Lapage have negated the possibility of conceptualizing the subject of performance as a transcendental entity. Here, instead, we radically propose that the intermedial subject can be considered as transcendental. This conceptualization of subjectivity can be understood in relation to Deleuze’s postulates regarding ‘transcendental empiricism’. Deleuzian scholar Marc Roberts (2006) explains that within Deleuze’s theoretical framework the subject transcends the empirical sequences of instantiation, it remains immanent to the series of such instantiations and, therefore, shows a sense of transcendental continuity. For Deleuze, the subject, in transcending the given, is constituted empirico-transcendentally in the given (Roberts, 2006: 191-194). The subject is rather like the emergence or immanence of a melody; that is, as it emerges it transcends the single and logically independent moments/musical notes where both the virtual and actual are immanent. The sense of continuity and of our enduring self transcends the empirical series of the ‘lived states’ – as a musical note – creating a sense of self that remains immanent to that series. Roberts also points out,

Rather than existing in some transcendental realm … our sense of self emerges from the manner in which the lived states that have passed are continually contracted and synthesized, and therefore virtually contemporaneous, with the actual present lived state, creating the passive expectation of future lived states, and the ongoing continuity of our subjectivity. (Roberts, 2006: 197)

Extrapolating this transcendental characteristic to this research’s discussion of the intermedial subject, we can argue then that the intermedial subject can be radically categorized as transcendental because the subject transcends the dramaturgical series – for instance, the constant executions of the tasks in DOF and/or the dynamism of the dramaturgical structures of Something American highlighted by the seriality of the fading strategy – experienced through performative intra-actions; that is, in his constantly transcending the intra-actions, the intermedial subject can be described as transcendental. In other words, the onwards production of subjectivity in the execution of the event consistently transcends the pre-given.
In relation to the above-mentioned series of empirical instantiations, Deleuze presents the lived experience of subjectivity as a continuity that emerges as part of an organized system: the intermedial event in this instance. Defining a system as an autopoietic self-organization with interaction between the elements, Deleuze also speaks of the self as an emergent system, hence, equating the self with the generating qualities of an organism, or of a system. He suggests, ‘the given is no longer given to a subject, rather the subject constitutes itself in the given [as part of a system]’ (Deleuze, 1991: 87). So, if the given is organized as an emergent autopoietic system, the production of subjectivity has to be also accounted for as an autopoietic and self-referential creation in itself, which, in turn, pulverizes Fischer-Lichte’s notion of co-dependence.

In relation to this autopoietic understanding of subjectivity as a system, Bains explains that the subject is internal to a world of immanence – as noted in chapter one, the plane of immanence is a complex system that incorporates both the subject as a system and the worldly structures as a system. Bains writes, ‘a self-referential, autopoietic immanence that is not immanent to something (as to a purely ideal transcendent ego-onto-theological plane or Subject/Eye) but rather an autopoietic or self-producing/positing immanence of subjectivity’ (Bains, 2002: 102). This is a process of the realization of the subject’s autonomy that can be grasped as ‘an event that is in-itself and for-itself, and not as for its aspects in the essence of another such occasion’ (Whitehead in Bains, 2002: 102). For Bains, the subject can be only understood as part of ‘an autopoietic event [that] has an endo-consistency that is lacking in a vortex or dissipative structure defined only by its relational flows within the surrounding medium’ (Bains, 2002: 102).

Also, regarding the intrinsic relationship between autopoiesis and the production of subjectivity, Alberto Toscano (2006) explains that there is no individuation happening apart from an environment. In this way, both environment and individual are co-individuated as a constant “double” self-positing. In Toscano’s sense, the internal relation between the pre-individual – the given – and the individual is constantly renewed by its ongoing self-
positing individuation (Toscano, 2006: 140). Seen thus, Toscano’s reading of autopoiesis specifically regarding the production of subjectivity becomes more useful than Fischer-Lichte’s discussions of subjectivity within the co-dependence of the feedback loop to explain the proposed radical intricacies of the intermedial dramaturgy. From this perspective, the individual’s identity is a complexity that amalgamates both the human and non-human through the dynamics of autopoiesis.

Furthermore, the individual, for Toscano, must be thought of as an event – rather than as a fixed entity – of ongoing processes within the system as a complex network of relations. As Toscano puts it,

> [if] we consider individuals themselves as … relational nodes, as opposed to discrete atomized entities, we can see how their potentiality, while constrained by relation, can never be delimited. In other words, potentiality cannot be removed from the becoming of relations. (Toscano, 2006: 128)

In short, individuals, for Toscano, are not to be thought of in isolation, but as developing in a vast field of inter-relations, from which they emerge as a local point within the relational continuum. In this sense, the process of individuation is emergent to the becoming of the situated activity, as in Hendriks-Jansen. Most importantly, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that our subjectivity is a ‘product, produced as nothing more than a part alongside other parts which it neither unifies nor totalizes’ (Deleuze and Guattari in Roberts, 2006: 197). The self is a whole that unifies and emerges, differentiating itself from parts, becoming a plurality that experiences itself as a unity, a differential continuous multiplicity that fuses the collection of parts into one – from this perspective, for instance, the self can be conceived as the synthesizing of all the experiences that the tasks in DOF bring forth.91

91 In *Deleuze and Sex*, Frida Beckman (2011) explains that, in equating the given with the subject, Deleuze uses the metaphor of the orchid and the wasp. Deleuze explains that in the relationship between the wasp and orchid, their interaction and interconnectivity, each is involved in a systematic network of becoming. The wasp becomes the orchid as the orchid becomes the wasp. In interacting with each other, a fundamental encounter and exchange takes place, but this is also an encounter in which each other’s codes become entangled. The connectivity of the eco-biological codes blurs and a multiplicity of connections appears. As with the orchid and the wasp, the performance subject and the performance itself are co-dependent and generated at the moment of the execution of the event.
Moreover, the self as a system can be thought of as the one encompassing differential multiplicities, where the organization and combination of the many form the unity of the system. Viewed in this way, the process of producing subjectivity radically engages in mereotopological relations, imbued in the complex flow experience that, in this instance, the dramaturgies of Blast Theory enable.

The organization of the many is what Deleuze and Parnet (2002) refer to as ‘the state of things’, understood as ‘neither totalities nor singularities but multiplicities’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: vii). As multiplicities, the state of things is relational rather than a sum of substantial entities. In this context, Brott writes, ‘for Deleuze, the world is composed of so many singularities [forming multiplicities], which together resonate silently towards a mystery of something always already yet to come’ (Brott, 2011: 1). The analysis of multiple relations leads to the creation of the new, experimentation and the construction of novel concepts – the new as a dynamic field of forces that combine to create immanent planes of composition. In this sense, it is through these dynamic creative and compositional forces that multiple spatio-temporal narrative boundaries are crossed always at the limit of the experience, hence, creating the new – an aspect that, as discussed throughout the case studies, the work of Blast Theory radically stresses.

Such a limit-experience is equivalent, for Deleuze, to becoming-other in the process of individuation – ‘the other in me’ (Deleuze, 1988: 98). Applying Deleuzian thought to the intermedial subject, the other is not meant to be grasped here as an othered “other”, as deconstruction backgrounds suggest, nor is it a Lacanian mirror, as Dixon (2003) discusses in his proposals regarding intermedial subjectivity. Instead, it is a moving horizon within intermedial narrative exchanges and becoming towards a new creative dramaturgical exchange (see Braidotti, 2000). From this perspective, this constantly moving intermedial subject – as a nomad – is neither about fixed representation, nor recognition of pre-established dramaturgical structures, but rather is about affects, expressions and knowledge-making choices activated throughout the narrative actualizations of praxical intermedial
dramaturgies. In this sense, the work of Blast Theory aptly optimizes the speed and intensity of engagement at which the intermedial subject moves because the artwork is in a constant manner of performative nomadic transformation, as seen, for example, in the discussed fragment of *Something American*. In dealing with the newness of each intermedial plane of composition, the nomad intermedial subject radically activates his own producing processes of subjectivity because he needs to create new concepts and new knowledge, interpret the given and self-reflect on the aesthetic experiences, whilst responding to and executing the dramaturgical attending intermedial variables; that is, his identity is being autopoietically created at the same time as the response is performatively activated – a life in constant processes of execution.

Here, following Deleuze, we do not presuppose a static identity, but one that is produced in the process of individuation, which is always already collective; that is, made of multiplicities. As a multiplicity, the identity of the intermedial subject can be also considered as relational. Unfolding through these relational processes of subjectivity formation, the intermedial subject draws from a multiplicity of connecting and conflicting given dramaturgical experiences, such as the narrative tasks in *DOF* and the temporal multiplicity in *10 Backwards*, constituting immanent consistency within an immanent plane of composition. In this sense, the intermedial subject is pragmatic and always in a process of movement, as a nomad, to become-other.92 The intermedial subject, in a process of becoming-other, is open to a myriad of dynamic, intellectual, affective and intensive forces that manifest in dramaturgically mediated encounters and diverse dramaturgical assemblages such as the moment in which Niki in *10 Backwards* is engulfed in a world of

---

92 In the context of process philosophy, Brian Massumi (2011) discusses how the term pragmatic ‘doesn’t mean practical as opposed to speculative or theoretical. It is a synonym for composition: “how” processual differentials eventfully play out as co-composing formative forces. This pragmatic playing out is always speculative in the sense of what will come out of the process is to some degree an open question until its “final characterization” of itself at its point of culmination. En route, it is speculatively anticipating what it will have been. That speculation is entirely active. It is the “how” of the experience getting where it’s ultimately going with itself. The co-composing of formative forces constitutes in each exercise of experience a novel power of existence: a power to become’ (Massumi, 2011: 12).
temporal loops and repetitions while engaging with both screens at the same time. The thinking the intermedial subject produces over a background of affects is both experimental and experiential.

Deleuzian subjectivity is always collective; that is, multi-vocal. Nonetheless, at the ontological level it indicates the univocity of Being. Individuation, for Deleuze, ‘has little to do with any [pre-given and fixed] subject. Rather, it is to do with an electric and magnetic field, an individuation taking place through intensities … it’s to do with individuated fields, not [pre-established] identities’ (Deleuze, 1995: 98). In this sense, subjectivity manifests itself by one’s becoming capable of expressing oneself so as ‘to bring something to life, to free life from where it’s trapped … for doing so [is] something unstable, [and] always heterogeneous’ (Deleuze, 1995: 141). Drawing on this, we can propose that in the fundamental intra-active encounter between the outside and the inside, individuation is produced. The process of individuation may be described by a transfer function, the outcome of which is the emergence of the new. This transfer takes place at the moment of the experiential limit and its mode is the in-between such as, for instance, the activation of the tasks in DOF.

The process of subject-formation, or individuation, depends on the dynamics of unfolding. ‘Being as fold’ (Deleuze, 1998: 110) is to be understood as the process that unites the outside (the-pre-individual) and the inside (the individual) as a ‘feedback loop’ (of processes of individuation as an event) (Deleuze, 1995: 139). In other words, this conceptualization of the feedback loop does not see the outside and the inside as different, but as a constructive process of world-subject unfolding making, where the given (the pre-individual) and thought (the individual) are constructed in a process that tends towards novelty in a constant process of self-positing. The constant folding and unfolding in the process of individuation brings forth novelty and presents ‘life as a work of art’ (Deleuze, 1995: 94).

Here, there is no return to the “already-constituted” Kantian transcendental subject that attends to a given experience and makes sense of it. Instead, the
radical invention and creation of new possibilities of life are intra-actively mediated by means of going beyond from the “already-established” to the “about-to-be-established” to the potential “will-have-been-established”, hence, stressing his relational differentiality. For Deleuze, the world is folded and as such,

There is no subject, but a production of subjectivity: subjectivity has to be produced, when its time arrives … The time comes once we’ve worked through knowledge … [to work towards new knowledge] is that work that forces us to frame a new question … [that] couldn’t have been framed before. (Deleuze, 1995: 112-114)

What is implicated in the fold is the process of becoming-other. As in the dramaturgical assemblages of Blast Theory's work, this is a process that involves complication; that is, a new level of organization in a complex system where the actual and the virtual give position for a new possibility of becoming. In this sense, the dynamics of individuation describe a process of complex synthesis, which is always happening in the middle and 'tending-towards’ (Manning, 2013a: 2) of the next process. Deleuze highlights that this process of becoming-other is bound to collective assemblages as multiplicity, difference and repetition.

From this becoming-other perspective, we can suggest that the intermedial subject is a transitive process of self-realization as an activating process in which each occasion performatively feeds into the next occasion in a process of continuity of becoming. In Process and Reality, Whitehead (1929) makes clear that an actual entity is an act of experience as conscious transitions in univocity. It is this univocity, he explains, that bridges the conscious experience of an actual occasion and the full variety of events that compose the universe; univocity brings the actual occasions into enduring forms of order. Here, there is no ephemeral erasure; rather, there is univocity in the making. Through this act the subject becomes itself through the conjunctive synthesis of many things that are other than itself. This is a constant process of production of subjectivity with a clear temporal connotation of being
instantaneous through processes of experimentation. In this sense, each task in *DOF*; Niki, trying to understand her identity in *10 Backwards*; an all the different modes of articulations in the monologues and dance sequences in *Something American* place the participant subject in a process of affective, knowledge-making and performative experimentation that enable the process of his own production of subjectivity.

In relation to the above-mentioned experimentation through creativity, this thesis argues that the onto-epistemic intermedial subject incorporates aspects of learning; corporeal literacies as multiple literacies; heuristic self-reflection as a constitutive part of the execution of the event; and a sense of collective identity. The intermedial subject also explores active hermeneutic interpretations, not understood here in the classical sense as exegesis but as active hermeneutics afforded from within. In this manner, the onto-epistemic intermedial subject becomes transcendental and shows unity. In what follows, we will explain why.

### 2. The Intermedial Subject as a Learner: Hermeneutics, Multiple Literacies, Learning, and Affect.

This section interrogates the self-reflexive and heuristic-hermeneutic aspect of the proposed notion of intermedial subjectivity. If Chiel Kattenbelt (2010) explains that self-reference and self-reflexivity ‘are not only characteristics of the [intermedial] performance itself, however, but also of the perceiver who assumes the position of the spectator, of the audience … which is made perceivable through engagement with the aesthetic object’ (Kattenbelt, 2010: 93).

Keith Robinson (2010) suggests, ‘Deleuze theorizes an evanescing subject that disappears behind the vanishing point of human experience; Whitehead constructs an expanded or extended subject that enlarges the human experience beyond itself. Deleuze seeks the non-human becomings in the human whereas Whitehead looks for humanlike becomings in the non-human … Deleuze finds the non-organic in the organic and Whitehead looks for traces of the organic in the inorganic’ (Robinson, 2010: 123). In this context, Robinson explains that in a process of self-formation and individualization, the subject is the actualized product of an individuating genesis – a genesis that is the complete expression ‘of the two functions of the subject: both to universalize and to individuate’ (Robinson, 2010: 123). In this manner, ‘the individual for Deleuze becomes contemporaneous with its individualization’ (Robinson, 2010: 123).
32-33); and if, as he goes on, ‘I ultimately consider intermediality mainly in terms of staging the arts for the sake of self-reference and self-reflexivity’ (Kattenbelt, 2010: 37), the description of intermedial subjectivity in relation to self-reflexivity as a manner of staging the performance transaction and as an attending subject to an aesthetic object that hermeneutically reflects on both the staging and on himself does only offer a partial account of the way in which the intermedial subject, particularly stressed in Blast Theory’s dramaturgies, engages with self-reflexive processes.

In relation to self-reflexivity, this research proposes that when the intermedial discourse speaks of self-reflexivity and hermeneutic interpretation, notions of interpretative reading should be understood in relation to an active engagement with multiple literacies. In this sense, the active hermeneutics implied here during the execution of the event may not mean ‘exegesis’ in the classical sense of the hermeneutical interpretation of texts, but in relation to the affective and knowledge-making dimensions of the generative frames. In this sense, hermeneutical processes are radically afforded from within.

Described as an evental dialogue, the intermedial text and the participating subject co-constitute each other as a process of constructive aesthetic actualizations. Each actualization raises a new question, unfolds a new horizon, takes a new shape, and assumes a new position. In this way, the intermedial subject is opened to a process of deterritorialization in which learning; active hermeneutic processes; and heuristic self-reflexivity take place through creativity. Because the subject is immersed in a haptic dramaturgical environment of affective dimensions, particularly emphasized in the work of Blast Theory, the fluidity of the performative engagement, in its generative aspect, is highlighted.

---

94 From this point of view, the conceptualization of the intermedial subject can be also described within the parameters explored by the critical background of new materialism (see Dolphijn and van der Tuin, 2012).

274
2.1. The Intermedial Subject: Learning as Engaging with Multiple Literacies.

Creatively and constructively invested in a dramaturgical world that functions as an origami, the intermedial subject, in its continuous passage from fold to fold is engaged in, within and through dramaturgical orchestrations. In doing so, intelligibility and knowledge-making arise out of each intra-active fundamental encounter, out of each creative and performative aesthetic composition where ‘the forces of thought’\(^\text{95}\) (Portanova, 2008a: 2) activate, overcoming ‘the dichotomy between concrete production and abstract thinking … that thought (as a generative matrix of creation) is not conceived by, but is in and of the [participating subject]’ (Portanova, 2008a: 2). In relation to Deleuzian critical backgrounds, Stamina Portanova (2008a) explains that Deleuze’s understanding of the thinking subject is,

\[\text{intended not as the phenomenological subject manipulating, rationalizing and dominating an external world, but as a \text{``processual entity that transforms and is transformed by the relational sensing matrices it instantiates through its movements''} [Manning, 2008]. In other words, thought can only be generated in the \text{``creating and being created elastically, folding and being folded by its environment.} (Portanova, 2008a: 2)\]

Drawing on this theoretical position, we can describe thought and thought-making as movement in and through creative and becoming changes. Thought as becoming-other thought; ideas as generated at the moment of creative practice – at the creative moment of violent disruption, in Deleuze’s terms, which calls for a new creative engagement; for a new idea to be formed; for a new concept to be applied; for a new solution; and for a new

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{95} For Deleuze, the engagement with the experiential process is that which makes us think – that which \text{``forces thought’} (Deleuze, 1994: 135-139). For Deleuze, thought is the product of what he calls a \text{``fundamental encounter’} (Deleuze, 1994: 139) – not a product of language. He posits that something in the experiential encounter: \text{``forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition’} (Deleuze, 1994: 139). In this regard, the fundamental encounter is the creation of the new \text{-- as opposed to recognition.} }\]
position within the point of view the subject is. Here, we highlight the creation of thought as thinking-in-practice emerging from within in the heterogeneity of germinal forms of thinking and attuning of the mutually composed activities that capture the learning and knowledge-making processes that are being applied, as seen in DOF, for instance. The emerging of new learning and thought cannot be separated, we argue, from the evolving dynamics of the dramaturgical scaffolding. To quote Hendriks-Jansen in relation to the emergence of thought,

The notion that thought is given a structure before it is actually executed, that it must exist in some predefined form prior to actually being thought ... we feel that structure cannot simply emerge, that it has to be specified before it actually happens. But intricate structures cannot simply emerge in nature without the need for an explicit plan, and it emerges also in our thoughts. (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996: 338)

In this sense, the creation of thought, its application and learning develops, builds up and structures itself as the edifying of a scaffolding. The learner's lived experience and acquired knowledge recognizes the context-dependent features, tasks and objectives and is able to modify knowledge and performatively activate the increasing complexity of the emergent context, developing the practicality and pragmatics of each experience into knowledge.

In this sense, thought, we claim, is haptic thinking; that is, the thinking-in-process activates the whole human sensorium producing affectual reactions that help model the yet-to-come structures of potential learning. Thinking finds itself in the fold of the experience relationally activating the potential for new thinking and affording itself a variety of executing modalities, folded backwards and forwards in the spatial and temporal experiences of its own creating – as Brian Massumi (2002) says: 'anything that varies in some way carries the continuities of its variation' (Massumi, 2002: 201).

---

96 For Deleuze, the subject does not have a point of view to observe and make sense of in an outside world, but is a point of view in, through and across an emergent subject-world territory – or cartography, as he sometimes puts it.
The creation of concepts is itself experimentation with thinking within each new dramaturgical occasion, constructing topological modulations of space, multiple orchestrations of time, and mereotopological narrative structures. Consequently, in conceptualizing the intermedial production of subjectivity from a constructivist aesthetic, grasped within a Deleuzian reading of vitalism, the intermedial subject’s thinking can be categorized as both grounded and flowing and, thus, transcends the very dramaturgical intermedial variables which structure it (whilst structuring themselves). As with the attending dramaturgical variables in intermediality, the thinking process of the intermedial subject is multi-functional and complex – as seen throughout the case studies and highlighted in the work of Blast Theory – and must be understood in terms of flows and intensities between affect and concept-making.

This thinking-in-practice is, as pedagogical theory describes, active learning in process. Active learning process, roughly defined, challenges conventional thinking regarding learning as imparted by a master to a learner. Instead, it places the processes of learning in the midst of experiential processes. In this context of purposeful experiencing, David George (1996) discusses how,

> The term experience is crucial ... the traditional task of making sense is then replaced by unique experiences, which are both cognitive operations and forms of emotions. The word experience derives etymologically from the French "to put to test". Experience is an experiment. (George in Nelson, 2006: 111)

Most importantly, it places learners as reflective practitioners/executers. As Gillie Bolton describes, ‘reflective practice is positioned firmly as a dynamic developmental process ... it clearly delineates processes of critical reflection upon the forms, values and ethics of ... structures ... [it] result[s] in radical movements for change’ (Bolton, 2005, 1). Furthermore,

reflective practice is learning and developing through the examining of what we think happened on any occasion, and how we think others perceived the event and us, opening our practice to scrutiny by others ... reflexivity is finding strategies for looking at our own thought processes, values, prejudices and habitual actions, as if we were onlookers. (Bolton, 2005: 7)
In short, learners are involved in action learning processes. The pedagogys Chris Argyris and Donald Schon (1974) describe these types of learning as,

Action learning is a continuous process of learning and reflection that happens with the support of the group or 'set' of colleagues, working on real issues with the intention of getting things done. The voluntary participants in the group or 'set' learn with and from each other and take forward an important issue with the support of the other members of the set. The collaborative process, which recognizes set member’s social context, helps people to take an active stance towards life, helps overcome the tendency to be passive towards the pressures of life and work, and aims to benefit both the organization and the individual. (Argyris and Schon in McGill and Brockbank, 2004: 185)

The learner is invested in a process of reflection in action, a process wherein the participant is never sure of what it is that one thinks until those thoughts are transported into a mode of creation and execution. As Ian McGill and Anne Brockbank (2004) describe, ‘action learning builds on the relationship between reflection and action. Learning by experience involves reflection. i.e. reconsidering past events, making sense of our actions and possibly finding new ways of behaving at future events’ (McGill and Brockbank, 2004: 12). In doing so, the learners ‘confront the challenge to think about how they make judgments; choose criteria which are of relevance to them, when judging the quality of their own work; [and] think about the strengths and weaknesses of their work in relation to these criteria’ (Cowan, 2006: 25).

Learning as active-self-reflection can be also understood as both processes of heuristic-epistemic learning and processes of self-development and learning. Moreover, the learner, in activating reflexivity through active practice,

97 Heuristic epistemology appears as a distinct approach to epistemology in order to interrogate an epistemic process of enquiry. Malcolm Armstrong (2008) explains heuristic epistemology as a methodology to describe and interpret what we think about a phenomenon and how we think about it. Heuristic epistemology can be explained as more than an epistemological rational approach to a given enquiry. Armstrong fittingly explains that knowledge is not simply arrived at via ratiocination. Plainly, knowledge and knowing are equal parts of the equation. Armstrong writes, 'heuristic epistemology appears as an approach to epistemology that is independent of any worldview, a priori category or concept. It acts, rather, as a handmaiden for epistemology ... [heuristic epistemology] functions as an aid in
involves [himself] not only [in] a focus of the validation of data and outcomes, but also the positioning of oneself in relation to other fields in order to reveal the character and source of one's interest … As a result of this reflexive process, [practice and knowledge] are necessarily emergent … rather than remaining fixed throughout the process of enquiry … The juxtaposing of disparate objects and ideas has, after all, often been viewed as an intrinsic aspect of creativity … [which, in turn,] creates conditions for the emergence of new analogies, metaphors and models for understanding objects of enquiry. (Barret and Bolt, 2010: 6-7)

Drawing on all these pedagogical positions, we suggest that navigating across and within Blast Theory’s intermedial environments, the intermedial subject actively learns as thought is being created and concepts are being applied in intellectual, pragmatic, and affective manners. Involved in the radical dramaturgies of Blast Theory, the intermedial subject is thought in movement, where, drawing on Deleuze, practicality, intelligibility, expressivity, vivacity and imagination are always at the limit of new critical and intellectual compositional possibilities (see Manning, 2008). Whether deciphering the spatio-temporal orchestrations of Something American and 10 Backwards, or making sense of the activation of the tasks in the narrative processes of DOF, the intermedial subject thinks thought and makes concepts generatively during the execution of the event, engaging in a constructive aesthetic as ‘the art of forming, inventing and fabricating concepts’, encompassing affects and connectivity where each new activation is a field of affect and thought

the quest to know by installing a desire for authenticity, empathy and appropriation’ (Armstrong, 2008: 6). In this sense, it can be inferred that heuristic epistemology adds knowledge appropriation (and the process of appropriation) to ratiocination: the process of doing the knowing – the known (the “what”) and the process of knowing (the “how”) as equivalent and concurrent.

98 In Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Deleuze (1984) offers a detailed account of the role of the imagination in relation to concept-making processes. For Deleuze, imagination is a synthesis of time within life’s immanent creative powers. This position contradicts Kant’s primacy of the understanding in the categorical imperative of the First Critique and the application of the faculties of reason of the Second Critique. Moreover, Deleuze’s understanding of the role of the imagination problematizes Kant’s positioning of aesthetic judgment and the aesthetic sublime of the Third Critique. In Kant, Deleuze and Architectonics, Edward Willat (2010) offers a thorough and comprehensive discussion of Kant and Deleuze’s understanding of the role of the imagination in relation to the Deleuzian virtual-actual and the Kantian categorical imperative.
(Deleuze and Guattari in Portanova, 2008a: 4). From this perspective, the making of thought is active and interested aesthetic practice. The dramaturgical orchestrations that we have examined here help us see how one activated and learnt thought is the seed for future thinking through the constant performative transitions between the phases of the event and the affective intensities of the dramaturgical scaffolding where ‘the elucidating of the immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought; and the starting point for thought is the analytic observation of the components of the experience’, giving way to new situational demands for new learning (Whitehead, 1979: 4). Viewed in this way, we can discuss, following Hendriks-Jansen, that the emergence of human behaviour and knowledge is intrinsic to the realization of process of constructive scaffolding between the worldly structures and the human subject as effective and operating co-composing. As he states,

> Human behaviour is affected by the emergent concepts that result from our typically human patterns of interaction … It is shaped, deflected and integrated by such concepts in the sense that a person who has acquired a particular concept will be capable of acting in ways that she could not have acted before. (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996: 316)

Taking from this definition, we suggest that the intermedial subject’s behaviour develops through the activation of learning processes in the performative and transitional mechanisms of vitalism, catalysing relational variations that are executed as life in motion. Seen thus, his learning, thinking and behaviour adhere to a direct set of aims and principles within the complexity and the prevalence of the thinking-feeling occurring across the making and activating, and capture the co-existing realities of the emotionally complex and the intellectually intriguing, as seen, for instance, in the analyzed section of *Something American* when the dramaturgical changes move very rapidly. In this context of constant creative and dynamic dramaturgical variations, the intermedial subject can be also understood as being open to

---

99 Stamina Portanova (2008a) fittingly describes, ‘Having lost its primacy as a pre-determined source of thought, subjectivity becomes a comprehensive force which can recognize and define (or conceptualize itself) as a thinking subject (a sufficient reason for thought to develop itself) only after including an event as its predicate in this case, an event of an idea crossing the body, the event of forces thinking in it’ (Portanova, 2008a: 5).
development. In its creative characteristic, the intermedial subject overcomes the spatio-temporal narrative “difficulties” of each performative activation – as seen in *DOF*, for instance – by applying knowledge, learnt habits and explored skills; applications that are always in motion and open to new creations. Bluntly, learning is the changing process of producing subjectivity – the movement happening between, at the interstice of consolidation and development.

In *Mapping Intermediality in Performance*, Nelson (2010) applies notions of corporeal literacy to the ‘experiencer’. In the same book, Maaike Bleeker, describes how ‘corporeal literacy points to the bodily character of these perceptual, cognitive practices and draws attention to the relationship between bodily practices and modes of thinking commonly associated with the mind’ (Bleeker, 2010: 40). Although this thesis fully agrees with their proposals, we find that the notion of corporeal literacy offers only a partial view when applied to the problem of accounting for the way in which the intermedial subject engages in learning through intermedial praxis, particularly, in the intermedial work of the kind found in Blast Theory. The ‘experiencer’, or creative exegete, engages, we suggest, in a process of multiple literacies, as each performance unfolds.

The notion of corporeal literacy can be also given a Deleuzian spin. The concept of literacy has been much debated and has come to broadly mean reading, writing, speaking and listening – as Bleeker fittingly points out. As such, this term has been extensively explored in pedagogical and educational backgrounds. This is not the way in which literacy should be understood in this research. A Deleuzian perspective is more in line with notions explored in multiple literacies theory. For instance, multiple literacies theory posits multiplicity and the relation between the different elements that enter into the learning process as a performative “doing” at the very heart of its conceptualizations. Seen thus, multiple literacies theory can be also grasped from a mereotopological perspective.
In the context of Deleuzian philosophy, Diana Masny and David Cole (2009) explain that ‘the critical notion of his thinking through multiplicity comes when he expands the notion of quantitative multiplicities to include qualitative multiplicities … [in order to] establish differences in nature’ (Masny and Cole, 2009: 2). They define multiple literacy theory as,

> a framework and lens for understanding empirical evidence that consists of words, gestures, attitudes, speaking, writing and valuing … and ultimately examines the processes and manners in which these literate behaviours come together through becoming with the world. (Masny and Cole, 2009: 6)

Moreover, they note that it is important to differentiate between multiliteracies and multiple literacies theory. In relation to multiliteracies, Masny and Cole write,

> at the heart of the multiliteracies framework is a concern for design, and a specific focus on designing social features … This central conception of design in multiliteracies may be built upon and makes up the multimodality of textual use – that includes gestural, spatial, audio, visual and linguistic meaning. (Masny and Cole, 2009: 4)

In articulating these modalities, a sense of social experience is substantially important – this would include aspects such as the use of SMS messaging and social media and Internet sites. Masny and Cole argue that multiliteracies are philosophically based in phenomenology, whereas multiple literacies theory is based in transcendental empiricism. Masny and Cole further explain,

> the multiliteracies framework argues that the social agenda for literacy should be in experience. Multiple literacies theory would counter that the social agenda of literacy is in the many aspects of life that flow through the subject and that constitute memories, desire and mind. As such, experience is extremely difficult to render a stable category when examining exactly what aspects of life determine literacy. (Masny and Cole, 2009: 4)

If multiliteracies encourage communities of learners through design and experience, multiple literacies theory, they explain, promotes learning as action and creativity emphasizing the performative and creative flows that include non-lineal modes of learning. Masny and Cole explain that multiple literacies theory shifts the focus from organized learning to random collisions
of affects that work through local and pre-existing knowledge to produce, paraphrasing Deleuze (1995), moments of inspiration, experimentation, critique and art – a definition perfectly in line with the narrative articulations of DOF because of the discussed creative aspects of narrative construction (Masny and Cole, 2009: 4-6).

Given this context, difference and multiplicity become vital in the learning process occurring within the radical dramaturgies of Blast Theory. Further, multiple literacies theory performatively constitutes text – text understood within this critical position in its broadest sense and including performance – as a dynamic and differential process: learning and text are immanent to the learning process. For example, in DOF, the execution of each task is not pre-planned; the narrative task and the learning that accompanies it emerge at the moment of the execution. As such, the engaged and invested intermedial subject learns and creates concepts at the same time that learning “the problem” is encountered and engaged with and the possible “solution” activated. In this sense, learning is the creation of the new. The intermedial subject, in this sense, explores an ontogenetic learning manner; heuristic-epistemically reflects on the process and on himself through the active compositional activations; and moves the learning forward. In short, the learning epistemic subject is always at the threshold of becoming more literate, constantly aggregating learnt skills and praxical habits and open to other learning influences.  

100 Most importantly here, from the perspective of multiple literacies, the intermedial subject is immersed in mereotopological learning processes; that is, learning is not considered as a linear process. Instead, learning unfolds through fields of multiplicities and potentialities in which each learnt fragment correlates with a pool of learnt resources and skills. Such a correlation highlights learning as an operative system, in which

---

100 The concept of ‘habit’ presents a myriad of describing possibilities in both Deleuze and Whitehead. In general, the concept incorporates notions of temporality and memory (Deleuze being influenced by Bergson), practical skills, and acquired practical and critical knowledge. Also, both Deleuze and Whitehead see habits in relation to ethics and politics. Habits, for Deleuze, are also processes of bodily desire and sexuality. For Deleuze and Guattari, habits are formed at the heart of social milieus. Whitehead discusses the term in relation to processes of repetition, intentionality and prehensions. Finally, for Deleuze, habits are also affects and expressions in-themselves and for-themselves.
the systematic constituent elements such as the dramaturgical parameters and the different levels of collaboration between the participating subjects are integrated. The operational manner of this system can be discussed as a constructive alignment; that is, a functional and operative scaffolding, intertwining thinking-as-doing and learning-as-reflecting.

Within the context of multiple literacies as performative interactions self-reflectively executed in flows, the possibilities of categorizing these flows as learning become viable. Anna Cutler and Iain MacKenzie (2011) describe how a section of Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* considers what is involved in learning to swim. For Deleuze, they explain, learning to swim is not a passive process in which knowledge is received from an expert. Rather, learning to swim is a process that requires the full engagement of the learning subject with the body of water. If we have seen that the Deleuzian subject is made out of a series of differential relations, the body of water shares the same characteristics. Both are composed of particular variations within a system of relations encompassing subject and water. Deleuze develops this further. He explains that in learning the body of the subject-learner, the body of water and the body of knowledge of how to swim are indistinguishable; they form a trinity (Cutler and MacKenzie, 2011: 53-54). Simply, knowledge is not superior to learning. Learning to swim is the formation of bodily habits and in the activity of learning we form knowledge of our bodies, our capacities and ourselves, Cutler and MacKenzie explain. This self-reflexive and practical knowledge, subsequently, becomes conscious to us as a body of learning language that can be reapplied if needed.\(^\text{101}\) In this learning sense, the intermedial subject is pragmatic, self-reflective and engages in constant processes of heuristic-epistemic learning and personal development. Each aesthetic activation is a

\(^{101}\) The Deleuzian perspective moves away from Kantian conceptualizations of the knowing subject, whose synthesizing activity makes him knowing and transcending the world. Cutler and MacKenzie (2011) explain how Deleuze argues that ‘we must not conceptualize human learning as the activity of a subject but the subject as the result of a process of learning that is in itself characterized by passivity: the passive synthesis of the sensible’ (Cutler and MacKenzie, 2011: 57). The relationship of these three bodies is one of co-emergence, not one of hierarchy. Co-emergence is what Deleuze terms, in relation to learning ‘forms of thought or creation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 208). As such, learning becomes an active engagement, but one that does not reinstate the primacy of the knowing subject; it links the emergence of the learning experience and the learning subject as co-emergent.
learned experience; a new concept activated. Each one is a self-reflexive moment. Each activation is a lesson learnt about life.

2.2. The Intermedial Subject: The Affective Dimension.

Engaged in the constructive characteristic of the generative frames, the creative intermedial subject utilizes affectivity to connect with the analogue and digital processes of spatio-temporal narrative creation, which serve as a catalyst – as an affective medium – for processes of individuation as a response to the performative choices in constructing and structuring a narrative solution to the problematic posed by each plane of composition. In the work of Blast Theory, the intermedial subject confronts the experiential given and has to find creative solutions for it. For instance, an SMS narrative-making task in DOF, or a multiplicity of relational configurations in Something American, in its intensifying moments of dramaturgical unfolding affectively maximize the triadic execution’s forces of relation and the mediated fielding of affective thresholds. Such works intensify the affective attending force as a vehicle for the construction of intra-active mediality, enabling affective reaction, and, in turn, generating new hermeneutic interpretations and concept-making, and, therefore, showing the radical potential of Blast Theory’s intermedial dramaturgies.

The dynamic intermedial subject suggested in this thesis is enabled by dramaturgical complexity in its formation, which is defined by the capacity of the subject ‘to affect and be affected’ (Deleuze, 1987: xvi). In this sense, the production of intermedial subjectivity is based on the autonomy of affect and processes of being affected by the multiplicity of a creative and constructive experience (see Massumi, 1996). As Rosi Braidotti (2000) explains in relation to the philosophical link between being affected and subjectivity, the subject is,

rather an in-between: it is a folding-in of external influences and a simultaneously unfolding outwards of affects. A mobile entity … [that is] capable of lasting through sets of discontinuous variations, while remaining faithful to itself. (Braidotti, 2000: 159)
Also, as Simon O’Sullivan (2010) discusses in relation to Deleuze’s positions regarding affects, ‘[a]ffect names the intensive quality of life. The risings and fallings, the movement from one state of being to another, the becomings’ (O’Sullivan, 2010: 198). In the same context, Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth (2010) explain, ‘affect is born in in-between-ness and resides as accumulative beside-ness ... a supple incrementalism of ever-modulating force-relations’ (Gregg and Seigworth, 2010: 2). From these positions, we can extrapolate that affectivity must be grasped within the intermedial conceptualization proposed here as the “capacity of” creating, modifying and experiencing a dramaturgical radical aesthetic as an active and multidimensional creation.

In *The Affective Turn*, Patricia Ticeneto Clough and Jean Halley (2007) also highlight how the concept of affect is central to the philosophy of Deleuze. Broadly, they explain how, for him, affect can be defined as a passage that only exists between the states it creates. In considering affect as an interface, a form of space and time is implied in the writings of Deleuze and Whitehead. For both, affect is treated as a ‘substrate of potential bodily responses, often autonomic responses, in excess of consciousness’ (Ticeneto Clough and Halley, 2007: 2). Having said this, affection is an effect that is not strictly limited to emotion or perception. Rather, as Ticeneto Clough and Halley explain, affects also imply a capacity for action, agency and engagement with any given experiential phenomena. In this context, Whitehead explains that through affectivity the human subject in its creative interaction with the world is in a constant flow of variation that combines the intellectual with the emotional. With this in mind, there is, this thesis argues, a clear sense between ideas and intelligibility and emotional reactions. Also, Ticeneto Clough and Halley explain that affect ‘constitutes a nonlinear complexity out of which the narration of conscious states such as emotions are subtracted’ (Ticeneto Clough and Halley, 2007: 2). In this understanding, affect is not only considered in terms of the human subject, but also in regards to the technologies that allow the affective capabilities of the subject – the intra-active constructions. In this sense, affect ‘transverses the opposition of the
organic and the non-organic; it also inserts the technical into felt vitality’ (Ticeneto Clough and Halley, 2007: 2). The affective turn, they discuss, ‘express[es] a new configuration of bodies, technology and matter’ in the constant engaging with the complexity of each given encounter (Ticeneto Clough and Halley, 2007: 2). Furthermore, affect, according to them, makes ‘an intensification of self-reflexivity (processes turning back on themselves to act on themselves) in information/communication systems including the human body’ (Ticeneto Clough and Halley, 2007: 3). As such, affect, as self-reflexivity, becomes intrinsic to and,

internal to these systems, an ongoing and readily available feature of their functioning, it is increasingly realized in feedback loops, which shoot off with varying speed, in multiple directions, and in multiple temporalities, emerging by chance out of control … [it] is at this time the condition of possibility. (Ticeneto Clough and Halley, 2007: 3)

In this context, Blast Theory’s artworks enhance the potential modalities – texts, images, sounds, analogue and digital forms and even tactile qualities – in and through which each dramaturgical singular engagement – each generative frame – can be affectively realized, as a hypersurface, in a myriad of possible ways from the in-betweenness of the dramaturgical encounters to the movement of the planes of composition always in process rather than in punctual positions.

From this perspective, affect, we argue, is radically mereotopological when activated in intermedial work. It expands in the openings of fields of potentiality as the virtual, enabling affective responses in the not-yet of the knowledge-making process. Affectivity is not understood here as linearity; rather it inhabits the landscape of the multiple and the differential where the capacities to affect and be affected constantly deterritorialize in the nomad space of the interval. Affect here is the topology of the always more-than-human in the undulations shaped in the transitory forms of relation. Affectability is at the core of the conceptualization of dramaturgy we argue for here; it intersects and transverses the different planes of experiential composition through the entanglement of agential impacts. Affects call for responses, expressions and emotions. They emerge in the performative
interactions of dramaturgical investment and afford from within the manifold processes of learning. Affectivity, as Mark Hansen (2006) proposes, becomes a vehicle: ‘affectivity as a potentially fruitful medium of the interface … [w]hat this means is that affectivity actualizes the potential’ (Hansen, 2006: 130). In this sense, affectivity apprehends the very entanglement of the intra-actions, their agential multi-modalities that bring about the capacities to become the medium of experience. Insofar as these affective forces emerge from the mediatized aspect of the intermedial event, the processes of creativity are imbued with affective correlations in the proprioceptive space of the mediated and mediatized interval.

In the context of affectivity, Whitehead explains that ‘the basis of experience is emotional’ (Whitehead, 1933: 176). It is, for him, through emotions and questions regarding what is affecting us, that we can base an account of human experience. From this perspective, we can infer that Whitehead, in highlighting personal self-reflection and its affective capacity is also implying, although he never mentions it, a sense of learning and personal development. For Whitehead, Shaviro explains, affective reactions are both cognitive and immanent. Interestingly, he observes that on each prehension there is always some indeterminacy, which allows for a feeling-thinking to emerge; this is, broadly explained, how the thinking subject feels about experience, as a datum, that each actual occasion brings forth.

Remarkably, this undefined margin for creation can be also read to imply a novel manner of creating thought and affectivity. Put slightly differently, novelty is a manner of affection-learning. In perceiving the datum, the subject executes novelty and renews himself. We have seen through the explorations and findings of the case studies that the datum in intermedial performance is one of multiplicity, expansion, and interfaces. From the temporal orchestrations of 10 Backwards, to the spatial intricacies of Something American, and the narrative web of DOF, the intermedial datum presents

Steven Shaviro (2009) explains that the Whiteheadian emphasis of feeling and affect leads Whitehead to a new account of subjectivity as ‘affect-laden’ (Shaviro, 2009: 47). This new account of subjectivity departs from the Kantian postulates of the First Critique.
clear spatio-temporal complexities bound into an unfolding unity through the


dramaturgical radical structure. Complexities are articulated by the being-

affected, grasped as a process of becoming and connectivity, which

articulates the human subjective experience as an influx of sense data in

space and time, which for Whitehead, as Shaviro explains, are in themselves

forms of affectivity. Drawing on this, the intermedial event as a systematic

environment of interconnections produces an affective and learning subject in

multiple and inter-connected ways, as ramifications of differential affects that

are united by the perceiving and learning subject at the moment of each intra-

active encounter. In this sense, the triadic encounter of the intermedial

execution is an act of feeling and affection, contingent to the emergence of

the situated scaffolding activity, rather than a predetermined relationship. The

multiplicity of the intermedial datum is subjectively synthesized as a process

of being affected, expanding within a topological complexity of multiple “heres

and nows”; that is, an affect creates, alters and conditions other affects in

relation to all of its temporal actualizations as an affective multidimensionality.

Engaged in the mereotopological dramaturgy of Blast Theory, the intermedial

subject is involved and invested in a world of affects that are intrinsic to his

learning process. In this environment, the result of the affective forces enables

the dramaturgical constructive making. This making includes the

dramaturgical form and content of what will come to be as well as the

functioning of its being and the functions to come through affective virtuality.

In this compositional world, the span of the subject’s dramaturgical being is

broader than any actualized moment it transverses through. In this context,

the intermedial subject is always becoming-subject by means of establishing

actual and virtual affective relations that are embodied in the situational

emergence of each intra-action.

Erin Manning (2013a) explains, in relation to choreographic practices, that the

participant is always in a ‘tending-towards’ world of pre-individual

potentialities. She describes that the participant’s self ‘expresses itself, but

never towards a totalizing self – always towards continued individuation …

always on the way towards new foldings … these foldings bring into

appearance not a fully constituted human, already-contained, but constitutive
strata of matter, content, form, substance and expression’ (Manning, 2013a: 2-3). In this way, the participant, according to her, is ‘a fold of immanent expression’ (Manning, 2013a: 3). For Manning, affect is central to subject formation. Drawing on Daniel Stern (1985), she develops the idea of a ‘vitalist affect’ as the modality in which forces of expression, intelligibility, and feeling come into being, incorporating a full activation of the human sensory-motor schema (Manning, 2013a: 5). For Manning, affect is experience in motion. She writes, ‘affect moves, constituting the event that [becomes subject]’ (Manning, 2013a: 5). A vitalist affect reading, as a modality, can be also grasped as a medium – the channel of the coming-together, of ‘the immanent becoming-present [and immediate] of the [constructive] experience in experience’ (Manning, 2013a: 6). Manning describes how, in the experience of ontogenetic worlding, we have not yet succumbed to the promise of linear time, living instead in the active topology of spacetimes of experience … species of affects, an affective tuning that operates as … an event across myriad actualizations … a fielding of relations. (Manning, 2013a: 6).

Vitality affects, for her, are a ‘co-constitutive qualitative infrastratum that provides a tending-towards immanent feeling in the constitution of the event’ (Manning, 2013a: 6). The participant, according to Manning, ‘is fed by vitality affects … a living of feeling [which] creates a taking-form of expression. This taking-form of expression is the dynamic of becoming-selves’ (Manning, 2013a: 7).

Drawing on her understanding of vitalist affects, we can then describe the intermedial subject as a complex organization that is always experiential and affective across scaffolding modalities that enhance the affective intensity of thinking-in-action. Nonetheless, we add to Manning’s vitalist proposals by offering that this constant being affected by the radical aspect of the intermedial dramaturgy implies an endless process of decision-making as a learning practice through exploration and experimentation as the creating of the new in the course of active learning action. Learning, we suggest, occurs in the embodied and installed emergence of affective cognition, thinking in terms of the ontogenetic production of knowledge within the complex interplay.
of the conditions of intelligibility that the dramaturgy affords from within. Here, emotion and cognition must be thought as co-emergent in the dynamic system. Put in Deleuzian terms, the actualization of any learning as the realization of a state of affairs sees feeling and thinking as correlated in the immanent processes of virtualizing learning. These learning processes, however, do not happen in isolation; rather the subject is learning as part of a community of learners – the other participants in the execution of the event. In doing so, the intermedial subject must be also grasped as intersubjective.

3. The Intermedial Subject as Intersubjective.

Intersubjectivity is broadly understood here as a mutual co-engagement of independent subjects, which creates their respective experiences. Chiel Kattenbelt (2010) describes intersubjectivity in intermedial backgrounds as ‘an orientation towards one’s own subjectivity, particularly towards oneself as an experiencing subject and subject of experience, [and] creates the possibility of perceiving and experiencing oneself both within the aesthetic framework and in relation to the lifeworld’ (Kattenbelt, 2010: 31-32). Although this reading of intersubjectivity aptly places the experiencing subject in relation to himself and the others who share the same experience, presupposing a communality of experience, it is clearly imbued in a reading of intermediality as a staging modality and a subject attending to a phenomenal world. This section will demonstrate that, in the context of intermedial performance and within this research’s argument the notion of a pre-established consciousness as intending to a lifeworld/wordly structure and other consciousness, also considered as pre-given to the experience, needs to be drastically reconsidered. In fact, the notion of intersubjectivity is intrinsic to the understanding of the proposed empirico-transcendental onto-epistemic intermedial subject.103

103 Daniel Smith (2007) explains that Deleuze, by giving an account of the subject itself, simultaneously provides an account of the constitution of the other as arising at the same time as the subject. Deleuze shows that, in contra phenomenology, there is in fact no separation between subject and other. Deleuze proposes that the problem of intersubjectivity as posed by phenomenology is false. His philosophy shows the subject to be the product of an underlying network of relations – relations that also include other subjects.
In relation to the conceptualization of intersubjectivity in theatrical performance, Fischer-Lichte defines the performance subject as co-dependent and intersubjective, which can be understood as implying an idea of collective consciousness in the performance event. She aptly argues against the Cartesian model of subjectivity, as an irreducibly private model, and establishes the performance subject as not “blocked” by a thick and impenetrable wall, but as perceptive co-creator, and aware of others’ experiences. Her argument is not against the possibility of a single act of consciousness; but, rather, that the act of consciousness can be interpreted as a sense of collective individuality within the framework of the performance’s autopoietic feedback loop, grasped as a shared experience. As with Fischer-Lichte, the model of intermedial subjectivity proposed here also sees the Cartesian model as inadequate, but this thesis finds her intersubjective understanding partial in explaining the specificities of the intermedial event’s shared experience because (i) her model of intersubjectivity (as well as her performance subject model) relies on an aprioristic conceptualization of the subject; and (ii) regarding the questions of shared experience, her postulates seem to imply that all participating individuals who shared the same performance experience, experience it in the same manner and, as we have seen in DOF, for instance, this is not the case.

So far, we have described the non-separation and co-dependency between subject and transaction where consciousness is not a purely individual, nor a pre-individual phenomenon. What we propose here is a reading of intersubjectivity as one in which the sharing of a given experience has an impact on how that experience is lived by the group that takes part in that experience. In this sense, the individuality of each experience also presents a plural aspect. In other words, how one may experience a given phenomenon is informed by the interaction with the group and the being aware that there is other participating subject in such an experience. Simply put, the term intersubjectivity refers to what happens between subjects at the moment of evental activation as a collectivity.
The philosopher David Midgley (2006) explains that in relation to philosophical accounts of intersubjectivity as a collective experience, a collectivity is not a mere chance aggregation of individuals, but one that is bound together by a common purpose – the performative activation of the event, in this instance – and a collective identity in the sense of many individuals participating in a common emergent experience with a sense of identity and empathy.

In relation to the empathetic aspect, Midgley writes,

> an empathetic awareness of someone else’s experience is a matter of my having an experience which is not only (in certain respects, not in all) qualitatively identical with that of the other, but which is identified as that very experience which they are having. (Midgley, 2006: 104)

In this sense, each participating subject establishes empathetic relations with other participating subjects since they stand equally in the relation to the subject of the experience as a collectivity: ‘the empathetic relationship … consists in my standing in some sense in the relation of subject to the very same experience that they [the other subjects] are having’ (Midgley, 2006: 104). Although we find these definitions appropriate to discuss intersubjectivity in intermedial performance backgrounds, some aspects need to be reconsidered. First, in the work of Blast Theory as seen in DOF, for instance, these empathetic relations vary in terms of mode, intensity and duration in relation to the spatial and temporal orchestration of the dramaturgy; from this point of view, and second, the notion of collectivity presents varying degrees in relation to the number of participants; that is, the concept becomes pliable in relation to how each collectivity is modelled.

Intersubjectivity can be also considered as a communal identity. This communal aspect, articulated by empathetic processes, creates, we argue, “an aligned arrangement of consciousness” as a sense of purpose.104 This

---

104 Bruce Barton (2010) explains that, through the performative aspect of the intermedial event, the phenomenon creates a new sense of intimacy between the participants, whose aim could be said, as a collective, to intimately engage with the event. Barton states, ‘Intermedial intimacy is, thus, not generated through the portrayal of shared cultural attitudes and beliefs (a relationship that reinforces ‘timeless’ and ‘universal’ values), but rather through the
conscious alignment is not understood here in terms of flows of circulating energies; ‘intensifications of energy’ by the actors (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 59); spectators ‘absorbing energy’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 58-59); ‘energy flows as a tool to create a communal experience’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 59); energy as superseding ‘mere corporeality’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 97); exchanges of desire and/or any other esoteric claims, as Fischer-Lichte does (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 99). But, rather, the suggested alignment is radically grasped as a sense of purpose through which each individual collectively constitutes this conscious community of intermedial subjects, and participates in its acts of consciousness that are dependent on the conditions of the given previous learned experiences and shared expectations that emerge at the moment of the interaction, as described in DOF when the activating participants discuss the tasks they are and have been involved in. In this sense, this “aligned arrangement” can be conceived as a group learning process; that is, a collective of learners and/or a community of practice, moving from individual cognitive processes to processes of learning in which the community of practice functions as an integrative activation for both the individual in a learning context and the idea of groupwork as a learning system.\textsuperscript{105}

In this context, the work of Blast Theory, in their radical dramaturgical articulations, enables the intersubjective experience occurring during the intermedial event in a myriad of manners. Firstly, as with all intermedial practice, we may argue, the participant subjects are placed and immersed in performative environments\textsuperscript{106} responding to the same set of attending performance of shared perceptual frames and dynamics (interaction that posits ambiguity and dis/reorienation as the constant of contemporary existence)’ (Barton, 2010: 46).

\textsuperscript{105} On his pedagogical writings, particularly in A Sociology of Teaching, Paul Trowler (2005) discusses how a community of learners and the learning that takes place in a given community must be considered in relation to the social background in which the community is located. For him, learning is always socially informed. He also refers to communities of practice in relation to how learning is institutionalized.

\textsuperscript{106} Chiel Kattenbelt (2010) terms this aspect the ‘performative and aesthetic orientation’ (Kattenbelt, 2010: 30-31) of intermedial praxis. Within the specificities of intermedial modes of experience, Nelson’s ‘experiencer’ explores new modes of interaction in digital performance. It is through these modes that the ‘experiencer’ develops a sense of self-reference and self-reflexivity. In performatively executing the event the ‘experiencer’ in intermedial performance refers to and reflects on himself, and the occurring intermedial dramaturgy and himself.
variables. As Kattenbelt explains, the ‘communicating participants meet each other in duality, as both ‘I’ and ‘you’. These two perspectives are geared for one another in balance, as it were – with respect to their attempts to achieve a mutual understanding of a situation’ (Kattenbelt, 2010: 31). This is the case in *Something American, 10 Backwards* and *DOF*. Secondly, as noted at the start of this section in relation to Kattenbelt’s understandings, each participant experiences himself as ‘experiencing subject and subject of the experience’. In doing so, each participant, as ‘subject of the experience’, is also experienced by the other as part of the experience and experiencer. This is also the case in *Something American, 10 Backwards* and *DOF*. However, and thirdly, as distinct from Kattenbelt’s valid remarks, Blast Theory’s creation of radical dramaturgies sees narrative as being created incorporating mereotopological characteristics. In this manner, the shared subjective experience presents in itself a series of possible intersubjective engagements because, as seen in *DOF*, for instance, in its orchestration of a more open dramaturgical structure, (i) there are participant subjects who do not know they are part of a performance; (ii) the performance does not present a linear temporality or continuity of dramaturgical engagements; (iii) the number of participating subjects changes continuously during the execution of the event; and (iv) the activation of each narrative articulation is presented in different physical environments – the hub where the board is and the streets of the city where the performance takes place. In this way, what Blast Theory maximizes in its dramaturgical structures is the possible number of modalities in which intermedial dramaturgy experiences intersubjectivity. This is because of the ‘the operational and qualifying aspect of media’ (Elleström, 2010: 25) and the different types of dramaturgical modalities in and through which the participant subject experiences the intra-active constructions of dramaturgy.107

Kattenbelt writes, ‘the performative orientation and, even more so, the aesthetic orientation are very much self-referential and self-reflexive’ (Kattenbelt, 2010: 32). In the engagement with the aesthetic intermedial transaction, according to Kattenbelt, the ‘experiencer’ confronts his own personal experience with the background of performance experience.

107 In *How We Think: Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis*, within the critical context of post-humanism, Katherine Hayles (2012) explains how, when engaged in digital processes, the subject engages in thinking processes – yet again emphasizing the epistemological – that can be categorized as technogenesis; that is, the subject thinks through, with and inside the mediated environment. This position places the agency of the
As a final remark, and in Deleuzian terms, intersubjectivity as collectivity can work as a machine, where the making of multiple relations interlaces with the possible virtual arrangements that such a collectivity may take, and where the creative composition is that such a machine could remain indeterminately and relationally open in the performative activation of the frames. The collective as a whole also remains as an individual. Collectivity is not outside the logic of the individual, but in the realm of how the development of each enables the conditions for the development of all as in a group learning experience.

In relation to group learning and the creation of a collectivity, the pedagogys David Jaques and Gilly Salmon (2008) explain that group cohesiveness ‘is a measure of the attraction of the group to its members … the sense of team spirit, and the willingness of its members to coordinate their efforts’ (Jaques and Salmon, 2008: 28). They also observe how the normative formation and the development of learning group dynamics evolve at the same time that the procedures change: the ‘explicit rules and conventions for ensuring that what a group wants to happen, does in fact happen’ (Jaques and Salmon, 2008: 30). In this sense, the different modalities of group formation vary according to the situated emergence of the particularities of the learning structures. From this perspective, the thresholds of intensity, determining transactions between engagements, mark processes of intersubjectivity. Seen thus, intersubjectivity can be grasped as mereotopological because of the constant conditioning of the relationships that enable such intersubjective entanglements.

4. The Intermedial Subject: Final Thoughts and Problematics.

Dramaturgical complexity is the key term for the understanding of the multiple affective layers, the complex spatio-temporal variables, which frame the intermedial subject’s mediated and embodied existence and how the media and the agency of the subject at the same level of “intersubjective” agency. Similarly, Rosalind Krauss (2000) describes that the notion of intersubjectivity should include the agential mode of interactions that the digital media brings.
production of subjectivity emerges out of the differential inter-layering of the conditions that enable such intelligible and affective ecologies. The dramaturgical frame, particularly maximized in the work of Blast Theory, becomes mereotopological by its interaction with other frames. In this way, the intermedial subject, as nomadic, is a threshold identity between frames of transformations in an intricate web of dramaturgical affairs. Each producing process of subjectivization, each performative layer of this accumulative identity is an emergent attunement that depends on the re-establishing of the condition from which it emerged in the first place – a performative journey with no specific point of arrival – while leaving room for any stops during the ride as a single moment between different occasions. This is a performative journey of territory construction. As with any journey, the identity of the subject is temporal, transcendentally persistent throughout the expedition, affectively responding and learning about the specificities of each station, each stop, and each encounter with his fellow travellers.

With these parameters, it is the evental experience which enables the intermedial subject’s consciousness to loom through the moment of praxical engagement with the performance work; this praxicality provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness to emerge and be the outcome of these praxical encounters. In other words, the performative activities of the triadic execution involve a constructive relationship between the human and the non-human, therefore generating thought (consciousness) and an onto-epistemic manner of articulating experience, learning and creativity.

In this sense, the epistemic intermedial subject is, as the diagrammatic map below visualizes, the outcome of the performative actions that activate the dramaturgical complexity of the intermedial event.108

---

108 This image is this thesis’s author own re-creation of one of many drawings by the artist Marc Ngui, particularly his work titled *Diagrams for Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus*. 
Figure 1: The onto-epistemic intermedial subject: a visual conceptualization.

The subject is immanently realized in a world of virtuality (dotted arrows) and actuality (arrows), where new concepts (circles) and knowledge are activated, incorporated and put into practice through each constructive and generative plane of composition, and where the multiplicity of the dramaturgical orchestrations, as a web, enables processes of differential intra-active relations.

In the previous chapter we highlighted the positionality of the subject within the narrative as only affording him a “restricted view” within the overall narrative orchestration. Here, within the same parameters, we also suggest that this positionality, particularly in more open dramaturgical structures enables the subject to only understand and learn about a punctual section of the overall epistemic knowledge that the dramaturgy generates in its entirety. In this sense, the scope of the processes of learning and knowledge making is clearly context-dependent and specifically situated. Even if we acknowledge
the virtualizing processes of learning, which potentially unfold in expanding bifurcations and pluralities of possible learning activations, what the structuring development of a given dramaturgy and the position of the subject within it entail is that the potential learning engagements are only feasible within the realm of the situated activity emerging from each intra-action. The dramaturgical structures, then, act as a catalyzing mechanism that dictate the possible learning experiences that the subject may be involved in within the constructed punctuality of his own positionality. Simply put, even when considering the nomadic aspect of learning, what intermedial performance tells us about epistemic constructivism is that the temporal punctuations of such a nomadic learning trajectory and the knowledge that emerges from them need to be fully acknowledged.

As a final note, the notion of the event is, yet again, primordial. The onto-epistemic characteristics of the intermedial event are the enabling characteristics of intermedial subjectivity. If, for Whitehead, these onto-epistemic characteristics imply and provide the unity of the subject, for Deleuze, these characteristics – which he sees as repetition and seriality, difference, structuring, and series – imply the temporal dissolution and fragmentation of the subject as a unity, which should not be read as the disappearance of the subject, but as a subject that is mereotopologically multi-layered and stratigraphic, yet still united; a process of subject creation that becomes-one to become-other. This stratigraphic unity means that the subject is conceptualized as a non-hierarchical complexity of intensities, and it is through the synthesis of these temporal and spatial orchestrations that the immanent subject shows univocity. The intermedial subject is a self-referential territory in-itself and for-itself within a dramaturgical world composed of generative spatio-temporal narratives, presenting a sense of mereotopological multiplicity. This is not a subject enabled by linear processes of teleological cause and effect, as in Kant. Instead, the subject is generated out of creative, affective and intelligible dramaturgical engagements – a self-feeling and self-understanding multiplicity/unicity. The world of Blast Theory fittingly highlights how the intermedial subject is creativity at the experiential and learning threshold.
Conclusion

The work of Blast Theory explores the interdisciplinary intersections between theatrical performance and media technologies as a functional structuring that orchestrates complex dramaturgies. The company’s practice interrogates novel explorations of spatio-temporal narrative configurations, the dramaturgical potentialities of the very nature of intermedial praxis and the creation of communities of experiential participant subjects who explore the impact of mediatized dramaturgical systems across a variety of performative situations and theatrical landscapes such as games as performance, virtual environments, dance-theatre pieces in “traditional” proscenium settings and immersive parameters in urban structures. More than simply embedding media technologies in performance practices as a mode of staging, the work of Blast Theory exemplifies the potentiality of such mediatized performance encounters, actively highlighting the agential impacts of the human and non-human entanglements, and the productive interaction between theatrical performance and other artistic fields of practice such as video art within the realm of analogue and digital aesthetics. These defining considerations, we have claimed, make the work of Blast Theory unique in relation to other examples of intermedial performance.

This research has argued that Blast Theory’s type of intermedial dramaturgy can be described as a radical departure from traditional understandings of dramaturgy, generally grasped as a linear and pre-established structure waiting to be activated by an attending subject, because it requires a different manner of conceptualizing it; that is, the work presents a generative characteristic that enables a multi-linear and multi-faceted in its execution. This is a dramaturgy that introduces multiple performative variations, self-positings and re-configurations of each dramaturgical frame, which, in turn, generate other frames at the moment at which the encounter between the
dramaturgical attending variables and the participant subjects activates from within, as intra-actions, the intermedial event: ‘the execution of the event’.

Departing from Nelson’s idea of the triadic performative encounter between media, audiences and performers as the constitutive and defining element of intermedial practice, this thesis has suggested that the way to fully understand the argued generative characteristic of such a triadic encounter in the work of Blast Theory is through the introduction of a constructivist reading of epistemology. Drawing on the process philosophy positions of Deleuze and Whitehead, this epistemic constructivist aesthetic understands, first, epistemology and ontology as non-separated fields of enquiry; second, the aesthetic position assumes no difference between the notions of subject and object. Rather, a combination of subject and object is perceived as an individualized singularity, as an intra-action, that incorporates differential, relational and mereotopological processes with a sense of unity through processes of creativity; and third, this critical position entails no difference between an aesthetic art event and an everyday event; that is, both are seen as the evental execution of processes of life.

The proposed constructivist aesthetic fully explains the particularities of the dramaturgical worlds created by Blast Theory’s praxis via the intrinsic relationship between ontology and epistemology as an onto-epistemic construction. Moreover, it also accounts for the effects of the technological media in dramaturgies, experiences of spatiality and temporality, technologically informed narrative structures, and knowledge-making aesthetic processes. Furthermore, the constructivist aesthetic highlights the shift from the questions of knowledge production, representation and the subject’s identity raised within classical epistemological perspectives such as Kant to the onto-epistemic questions about human and non-human agencies and organic and non-organic life.

The performative encounter between the mediatized performance phenomenon and the participating subjects most radically highlights the potentialities of such a constructive experience of the aesthetic phenomenon.
Consequently, this radical aspect problematizes and, therefore, calls for a repositioning of the much-debated ontological liveness and presentness of performance. In this sense, this thesis has argued that theatrical performance debates such as the ontological analytical framework articulated by Phelan and Fischer-Lichte and the liveness and presentness debates discussed by Power and Mock can offer only a reduced explanation of the specificities of Blast Theory’s work and the generative activation of its radical dramaturgies because they fail to fully account for the myriad of dramaturgical intricacies that Blast Theory’s praxis enables. Specifically, because such an ontological debate neglects the ‘onto-epistemic conditions’ – the spatial, temporal and narratological conditions that construct the execution of the event.

The application of an onto-epistemic constructivist aesthetic has provided an alternative discourse from conceptualizations of the intermedial performance event as a chronological linearity and as an essentialist ontological reading discussed around the primacy and authenticity of an ephemeral “here and now” as the platform to articulate the performance event. Instead, it has proposed a radical theorization of the intermedial performance event as one of multiple temporalities (i) where the “here and now” is grasped as differential; (ii) where presentness notions include temporal synthesis that incorporates the past, the present and the future in each present moment; and (iii) where the intensive, virtual and potential aspects of such an event are also acknowledged. This onto-epistemic constructivist aesthetic also abandons a conceptualization of intermedial performance within the confines of an essentialist reading of ontological vitalism which is imbued in phenomenological connotations of co-dependence between a performance and an attending subject to that performance – as in Fischer-Lichte’s notion of the autopoietic feedback loop. Subsequently, this constructivist framework implements an onto-epistemic vitalist approach, as described by Deleuze, Colebrook and Barad, in which the notion of co-dependence is radically repositioned as an intra-active onto-epistemic construction. In this way, this research’s framework is a shift away from a categorizing ontological vitalist context as a means of understanding the processes of actualization of the performance event. Drawing on the philosophical proposals of Shaviro,
Stengers, Protevi, Hendriks-Jansen and Toscano among others, this thesis has argued that Fischer-Lichte’s framework only offers a simplistic understanding: although it favours the idea of performative emergence over one of static being, it heavily relies on the attending subject as the enabling platform for the actualizing of performance processes. Simply put, her reading of the notion of co-dependence is looked at through an anthropomorphic lens. Here, we have not denied that performance can be thought out as an autopoietic system where the interaction of the attending elements constantly re-configure and enables the development of such a system; instead, we have argued against Fischer-Lichte’s understanding of autopoiesis within her phenomenal and ontological reading of theatrical performance.

Contrary to her reading, this thesis has offered an onto-epistemic constructivist vitalism that places a clear emphasis on encountering the realities of entities that are constituted through (i) non-human agency and perception; (ii) the immanent characteristic of human cognition, interpretation, experience and consciousness; and (iii) the mediating processes occurring between them both. From this point of view, the radical dramaturgy is mediation in the making. In this sense, there is a clear recognition of the givenness of entities – the attending variables – whose measuring and making sense of can never be complete without accounting for the self-measuring processes of the entities themselves. In other words, the onto-epistemic vitalism framework proposed here also presents an autopoietic characteristic. However, this one fully accounts for the autonomous and immanent movement of becoming whereby the performance phenomenon and the subject self-posit or realize themselves concurrently and co-terminously both understood as a system within the system of a plane of immanence. Simply put, the object and the subject are both emergent in the situated aesthetic activity that brings them both forth. Thus, it is the creative connection – as intra-actions – of these elements, the individual and the pre-individual, that is continuously produced in an ongoing re-activation that always shows a creative dimension tending towards the exploration of the creatively new as life.
Drawing on the philosophical writings of Barker, Toscano and Bains, the suggested radical dramaturgy of the execution of the triadic encounter as a constructivist aesthetic sees the classical aesthetic notion of representation reconceived as a constant process of re-presentation and re-activation in generative immanence; traditional hermeneutics repositioned as activated hermeneutics; and the traditional binary of pre-established narrative form and content as colliding, since the constructive characteristic conceives the activating process as creating dramaturgical form and content in a constant and mutual mediated re-shaping.

The focus of this thesis has been twofold. First, through the interrogation of three of Blast Theory’s performances, it has looked at the way in which the company’s intermedial praxis uniquely investigates, questions, and experiences the onto-epistemic conditions of a given intermedial event here identified with temporality, spatiality and narrativity. Second, once these spatial, temporal and narrative complexities and structures have been identified, this thesis has contributed to the intermedial debate and created new knowledge by providing an account of the type of subjectivity that Blast Theory’s intermedial practice enables: ‘the onto-epistemic intermedial subject’.

Following Kattenbelt, Nelson and Boenisch among others, we have defined intermediality as a mode of performance and a performative practice in which the interaction of the media results in a constant interplay of mediation processes. These processes, we have suggested, entail fundamental reconfigurations of spatio-temporal relationships and narratological articulations. As such, on the one hand, through the three case studies we have addressed different modalities of experiential constructiveness, looking at dramaturgical points of connectivity; and, on the other hand, we have argued against a reductive understanding of the intermedial praxis – although aptly conceptualized as a performative transaction by critical intermedial positions such as Nelson and Kattenbelt – as a praxical entity to be experienced by an “already-established” perceiving subject and as a modality of staging.
Chapter one has been used as a platform to introduce the theoretical positions that underline a constructivist reading of epistemology. Through these readings, we have highlighted its pivotal notions such as creativity, event, the Deleuzian distinction between the actual and the virtual and Whitehead’s concept of actual occasions among others. The chapter has also presented a theoretical reading of the three proposed onto-epistemic conditions in relation to process philosophy, stressing notions such as differential temporality, relationality, the hypersurface, the fold and mereotopology, to list a few.

Chapter two has discussed, using Blast Theory’s 10 Backwards, the first suggested specificity of the proposed radical reading of intermedial dramaturgy; that is, its differential characteristic in relation to mereotopology, particularly interrogating areas of intermedial temporality. Contra to ontological debates that conceive time within an essentialist reading of ontology as the “here and now” and highlight the ephemerality of the performance event, here, time has been discussed, with the help of a process philosophy background and the philosophical positions of Deleuze and Whitehead, as a temporal event composed of internal multiplicities and differential articulations. The chapter has suggested that temporality in the work of Blast Theory is best understood as the production of multi-temporal rhythms that present intensive and liminal characteristics. Following Cull and Mullarkey, it has also repositioned notions of actuality as a construction of temporal multiplicities and mutualities, where the Deleuzian virtual and actual amalgamate. In this way, the chapter has rendered obsolete notions of presentness as occupying a chronological and essentialist “now”. Furthermore, it has emphasized the production of time and the dramaturgical strategies such as slowness and repetitive loops that enable such a temporal construction. The Deleuzian notion of becoming has been employed to highlight the generative nature of the dramaturgical event in which the attending dramaturgical parameters occur in all their actual and virtual relations, not as pre-given to the event’s constitution, but as a given to the immanent processes during the triadic execution.
Chapter three has discussed notions of relationality, the second emphasized aspect of the mereotopological dramaturgy suggested here, particularly regarding critical positions of intermedial spatiality in relation to Blast Theory’s *Something American*. The chapter has explored intermedial spatiality in relation to the notions of topology, the interval and transversality, and has linked spatiality with temporality. Supported by the writings of Deleuze and Whitehead, intermedial spatiality has been addressed as combining both synchronic and diachronic aspects. It has also stressed that intermedial spatiality is to be understood as amalgamating the physical space of the theatre venue and the scenographic attending variables. Drawing on Deleuze’s smooth and striated space and Whitehead’s nexuses, intermedial spatiality has been said to occupy any-space-whatever at any-instant-whatever. Furthermore, as with the concept of landscape, intermedial spatiality unfolds, creating agential, affective and knowledge-making territories that are relational in their configuration. Intermedial spatiality, as an always changing and nomad territory, has been discussed as a relational field of heterogeneous elements where the transitional aspect of the interval enables from within the capacities of the relational. Seen thus, intermedial spatiality opens to constant processes of deterritorialization where spatial topological relations activate the intermedial event. In this context, it has been argued that the intermedial scenographic plays an intrinsic part in enabling spatial orchestrations. Here, the proposed notion of the scenographic moves away from static readings of mise-en-scene. Instead, it also occupies the topological territory of being in the making and becoming.

Chapter four has seen the final suggested aspect of the radical dramaturgy – the interrogation of the mereotopological as a complexity of dramaturgical intensities and an ecology of multifaceted assemblages, principally engaging with narrativity, and as integrating the other two proposed onto-epistemic conditions, temporality and spatiality, in its functionality and constructive emergence. Blast Theory’s *Day of the Figurines* has been used as a case study to exemplify such as a proposal. In discussing intermedial narrativity, the chapter has stressed its becoming where the differential and relational
aspects function as a hypersurface. We have seen that intermedial narrative cannot be conceptualized as a linear structure. Instead, it radically disrupts traditional understandings of narrative composition, focalization and fabulation, and blurs the distinction between the intra-diegetic and the extra-diegetic. Intermedial narrativity has been described as trajectories of spatio-temporal narrative expansions, in which the becoming narrative structure mereotopologically and ontogenetically morphs into emergent compositions that re-configure in a multiplicity of varying degrees and where the constant process of virtualization expand the narrative into a myriad of configuring relationships. In this way, intermedial narrative in the work of Blast Theory explores a world of intertextualities that, also as a hypersurface, enfold in their becoming from within. With all this in mind, intermedial narrativity pulverizes any notion of narrative chronological linearity, essentialist readings of the “here and now”, and transient autopoietic feedback loops. Instead, it occupies the territory of the multiple and the differential narrative. Furthermore, as a mereotopological relation, it expands in becoming narrative processes of composition and experiential interfaces.

With the help of the three case studies, this thesis has highlighted how the arrangements of the dramaturgical attending variables impact on the subject’s experience as a self-bounded entity within the dramaturgical artwork where active thinking is essentially creation. The creative spatio-temporal narrative occasions arise from the intra-actions of both the participant subject and the intermedial transaction in a constant process of onto-epistemic vitalist mediation. In this regard, this research’s onto-epistemic constructivist aesthetic has stressed the becoming process of the re-activating materiality; semioticity; hermeneutical interpretation; and narrative form and content that generate the existence of multi-modal and radical dramaturgical interfaces, which, in turn, inform the intermedial subject’s construction through the enabled processes of mediation. Furthermore, drawing on Colebrook and Toscano, the proposed constructivist aesthetic has emphasized the conditions for mediatized vitalist dramaturgical instantiations to emerge, comprising cognition, affect and the production of subjectivity. This is because the identity of the experiential and creative thinking subject is re-made – as becoming-
other — at every instant of the evental process. Thus, the constructivist aesthetic proposed has not restrictively accounted for the specificities of media objects and their staging modalities, the “pre-given” to the phenomenon participant subjects or the outcomes of subject-object interaction. Instead, the onto-epistemic aesthetic has radically privileged the process that constructively constitutes the analogue and digital attending variables and the participant subjects as an intra-active unified aesthetic of life.

In this sense, the epistemic knowledge that emerges from the aesthetic fundamental encounter can be only grasped as a process of conditioning and autopoietic self-positing between both the transaction and the subject and as nomadic thinking-in-action, stressing the idea of the dynamic and self-structuring articulations of thought processes, framed by affects and concepts. Hence, the focus is not in the manner of staging an intermedial artwork through which semiotictiy, materiality, experiential reception and hermeneutical interpretation by “pre-given” attending subjects form. Rather, the focus is the radical process of the mediatized encounter through which these aspects emerge. In its radical dramaturgical aspect, the intermedial event constantly creates the conditions of the new — of the generative — and sees the processes that enable these conditions unfold where the subject’s identity is formed as an extension of them. Here, the intermedial subject is the product of the experience — the phenomenology of the event as opposed to the phenomenology of a subject intending to a given phenomenon.

With all this in mind, this thesis, in chapter five, has created new knowledge and discussed the specificities of the onto-epistemic intermedial subject as a transcendental subject. This subject, engaged in processes of dramaturgical construction, is part of a world of mereotopological affects and effects and is in a constant need to create new praxic knowledge to respond to generative performative activations. In this sense, the radical conceptualization of intermedial subjectivity proposed here understands the intermedial subject as a creative learner, thinking-in-action and reflecting-in-practice, whose concepts are created and thought is applied at the very moment of activation. The creative engagement with the ongoing development of dramaturgy allows
the intermedial subject to actively become self-reflexive and observe processes of self-development. This is a subject that is heuristic-epistemic because each of the dramaturgic activations incorporates processes of creativity and self-reflexivity, while being aware of the other participant subjects. In this way, the intermedial subject is intersubjective since it is part of a community of other activating subjects whose overall aim is to activate the radical dramaturgy.

Through the writing of this thesis, a dialogue between intermedial performance and constructivist epistemology has emerged. The dialogue has pointed out a mutual crossing between both critical backgrounds. In the course of the application of the argument it has been observed that a literal application of the theoretical proposals of Deleuze and Whitehead to intermedial performance praxis became at times problematic. Intermedial performance as a critical field has indeed informed the reading of epistemology proposed here. In fact, some positions required re-assessment and a middle position needed to be found. Throughout the chapters, we have highlighted how some positions such as notions of authorship; the relation between the Deleuzian actual and virtual; the positionality of the subject regarding a dramaturgical context; the binary striated-smooth space; and the relational aspect of mereotopology needed critical recalibration. The responsive relationships between both backgrounds have happened from the middle, from within, as thinking-in-practice and exchange-as-attunement, creating the conditions for the becoming of future thinking.

Further questions remain open. We have claimed that the proposed reading of epistemology and its application as an interrogating methodology has fittingly explained the particularities of Blast Theory’s work, its originality and distinctiveness, what sets them apart from other intermedial practices, in a manner other critical proposals such as the liveness debate and ontological readings of performance could have never done. Now, can this constructivist position be also successfully applied to other intermedial practices? Can it even be transferred in order to conceptualize theatrical performance in general? The potential answers may yet again come from the middle. We may
only suggest for now that the majority of the positions discussed in this thesis might be fittingly extrapolated to intermedial praxis in general, even though further dialogue between intermediality and epistemic constructivism may be needed. As for theatrical performance in general, a reading of performance in terms of its epistemology will necessarily reveal a stronger conceptualizing position regarding an interrogation of what and who enables and conditions the “live” performance event; that is, fully taking into account the epistemic conditions of the experience, the moment in which the subject encounters the experience, and the generation of mediality through the encounter. However, the recalibration between both critical landscapes may need to be even more intensive and some of the constructivist positions such as the complexity of the mereotopological might become rather challenging when applied to a “traditional” reading of theatrical performance, particularly regarding aspects such as narrative linearity. The hope in finding these answers lies in the thinking that this research is simply a middle; a position that is setting the potentiality for future deterritorializations.

In this analytical context, the writer of this thesis sees this research project expanding the analysis of other artistic fields. As an artist, his practice has been developing into areas of installation art that include mediatized elements and performance aspects. His practical work explores what he calls ‘installative performance’. He envisions, in the near future, his proposed constructivist epistemological methodology will critically engage with, for instance, notions of relational aesthetics as described by Nicholas Bourriaud, Rosalind Krauss and Claire Bishop, particularly interrogating his own work and that of Japanese artist Tadashi Kawamata and installation and mixed media American artist Jamie Davies, among others.

The radical dramaturgy of intermediality proposed here – taken to the experiential-limit by the work of Blast Theory – cannot be categorized as a pre-established dramaturgy of embedded technologies, but as a radical structure that folds in, and through, a multiplicity of spatio-temporal orchestrations of experience. In the work of Blast Theory, what emerges is a dynamic dramaturgy of complexity. What emerges is the radical characteristic
of a generative environment of human and non-human agential relations. What emerges is the onto-epistemic generation of mediality as ‘a life’. What emerges is the radicality of life as a work of art.
Bibliography


Blast Theory. www.blasttheory.co.uk.


Sicchio, K. (2011). ‘Frames within Frames within Frames: Compositional Space in Choreography with Real-time Video’ in *Crossing Conceptual*


