Heidegger’s Generative Thesis

A potiori fit denominatio -
“The name derives from the most powerful”

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Abstract

For William Blattner Heidegger’s phenomenology fails to demonstrate how a nonsuccessive temporal manifold can ‘generate’ the appropriate sequence of world-time Nows. Without this he cannot explain the ‘derivative’ status of ordinary time. In this article I show that it is only Blattner’s reconstruction that makes failure inevitable. Specifically, Blattner is wrong in the way he sets out the explanatory burden, arguing that the structure of world-time must meet the traditional requirements of ordinary time logic if the derivation is to succeed. He takes this to mean: mundane ‘tasks’, the contents of world-time nows, must form a transitive series, importing back into world-time the very structure that Heidegger says is derived by its levelling-off. I argue, instead, world-time nows, seen at the level of lived content, can be quite ‘irrational’ but this is perfectly consistent with the generative thesis. Adapting Blattner’s useful suggestion that temporality is sequence building or ‘iterative’ I show that iteration does not manifest itself at the level of tasks but at the ‘existential’ level of my involvement in a task. Depriving that involvement of its expressive content is what accounts for the levelling-off of the world-time now and thus the derivation of the ordinary concept of time.

Nothing is more likely to perplex, bemuse – perhaps, even, ultimately frustrate the hapless Heidegger commentator as much as the second division of Being and Time. One specific controversy exceeds all others in scope, difficulty, and significance, at least for its implications on Heidegger’s basic project: it is provoked by the doctrine of Ecstatic-horizontal temporality. This controversy is cogently expressed by Paul Ricoeur, who, after confessing a significant debt to Heidegger’s analysis of human temporality in the third volume of his magnum opus, Time and Narrative, protests that Being and Time nevertheless fails to live up to its promise. Original temporality cannot account for every form of time, despite its pretension to do so. It fails to account for geological and cosmological timelines which, on Ricoeur’s view, are ‘incommensurable’ with ‘mortal time’. If temporality cannot provide such an account, then it cannot possess the primordial status that Heidegger clearly intends for it. This status is made clear in one of the most explicitly argumentative passages of Being and Time:
If, therefore, we demonstrate that the ‘time’ which is accessible to Dasein’s common sense is not primordial, but arises rather from authentic temporality, then, in accordance with the principle, “a potiori fit denominatio”, we are justified in designating as “primordial time” the temporality which we have now laid bare.  

Ricoeur’s response to this argument is forthright: ‘For someone who is attracted wholly to the polemic that Heidegger has undertaken… by attributing the genesis of this alleged ordinary time to the leveling off of the aspects of phenomenological time, for this sort of reader Being and Time appears to end in failure’. And the reason, he proposes, behind this inevitable disappointment –

It is first of all the “ordinary” concept of time that, from the outset, exerts a sort of attraction-repulsion on the whole existential analysis, forcing it to unfold, to distend itself, to stretch itself out until it corresponds, by an ever-increasing approximation, to its other which it cannot generate.

The thesis that ordinary time has it genesis in originary time fails because, try as he might, Heidegger cannot show how originary time, Ecstatic-horizontal temporality, generates ordinary time.

One reader who sees disappointment in the second division of Being and Time, and for precisely the reasons outlined by Ricoeur, is William Blattner. Blattner has recently argued at great length and in impressive detail exactly why it is that the failure of the thesis of original temporality owes everything to its inability to generate the appropriate world-time sequence from which the ordinary concept of time could then be derived: ‘Heidegger’s achievement was [the insight] that nonsuccessive time [i.e. temporality] would have to be the tenses shorn of their successive content […] The price Heidegger pays, however, is that the return trip to successive time never reaches its goal’. Evidently, then, whatever else may distinguish the philosophical motives of Ricoeur and Blattner, they at least agree on one fundamental point: Being and Time fails to demonstrate the central thesis ‘ordinary time has its genesis in originary time’. The reasons cited for this failure are more or less identical. Blattner asserts temporality fails to make the ‘return trip’ to successive time; while Ricoeur says: ‘If, as I believe, human temporality cannot be constituted on the basis of a concept of time considered as a series of “nows,” is not the opposite path… just as impracticable?’ The reason for the failure of Heidegger’s argument can be stated as follows. The argument cannot meet its own standard
of justification; the phenomenology does not work. With the failure of the phenomenology, and the collapse of the argumentative strategy, we arrive at the inevitable failure of the entire generative thesis – thus: originary time does not generate ordinary time.

Now, my aim in this article is to ask whether we can find the resources in Heidegger to defuse the objection outlined above as a means to clarifying Heidegger’s position on temporality. To concentrate matters, I will focus my efforts on William Blattner’s presentation of the problem in his *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*. It is Blattner’s unquestionable achievement to have made clear water out of what is undeniably one of the most impenetrable areas of Heidegger’s early thought. However, while I think Blattner (and Ricoeur before him) raises important questions, his approach also invites questions. Our response to these will determine whether or not there is enough room to lighten the full weight of the explanatory burden; and if so, whether we might not then discover an appropriate level of phenomenology, sufficient to warrant the disputed generative thesis. In the first section I shall be primarily concerned with some necessary scene-setting: shedding light on Heidegger’s method, his rather difficult and abstruse terminology, and finally specifying as precisely as possible the issue at stake as identified by Blattner: the derivation of successive ‘time’ from nonsuccessive temporality. In the second section, I outline Blattner’s reconstruction of Heidegger’s position, drawing attention to what I shall call the ‘argument from homology’ which Blattner uses as a constraint on Heidegger’s theory of temporal derivation (basically: if one form of time derives from another then they must share some basic feature that makes them ‘structural homologues’). I also detail here Blattner’s proposed solution to the problem of how to identify ‘world-time’ with ordinary transitive time – his interesting notion of ‘iteration’ – as well as his reasons for pronouncing the ultimate failure of this solution and hence of Heidegger’s argument. In section three I attempt to respond to Blattner’s main criticisms by offering an alternative interpretation of ‘iteration’.

1. Interpreting Temporality

Emphatically, for Heidegger, the discussion of temporality deals with time only insofar as it appears as a *phenomenological* problem. As with Husserl before him, Heidegger is not talking about physical space-time, psychology of time, or the metaphysics of time. Suffice it to say that, with the possible exception of certain branches of psychology, none of these purport, as phenomenology does, to attend to our actual *experience* of time and so are excluded by definition from both Heidegger’s and
Husserl’s accounts. What is at stake phenomenologically, in other words, is not the ‘nature’ of time, but rather the nature of those temporal structures underpinning everyday time experience. Ex hypothesi, those phenomenal structures will be precisely what make the experience of time possible. This statement is hardly illuminating, of course, and requires greater specification. We might begin to elaborate on the distinctiveness of a phenomenological approach firstly by situating it within the context of its Brentanian lineage. Franz Brentano’s groundbreaking theory of time was famously summarised and criticised by Husserl in a book partially edited by Heidegger - On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Both Husserl and Heidegger would of course depart from the Brentanian position in crucial matters, but one feature of Brentano’s position persisted: the elaboration of the phenomenological experience of time conceived in terms of two, broadly genetic and genealogical, lines of enquiry. In something approximating Brentano’s terms: What is the original manifestation of time in human experience? And how does that original manifestation of time serve as a sufficient basis for the emergence of the modern or common understanding of time with which we are all familiar?

Heidegger, then, raises several questions, which discernibly echo Brentano’s inaugural enquiry into time genesis, though to be sure, his ontological approach rejects outright Brentanian psychologism. First of all, Heidegger asks: what is the everyday experience of time really like? And, secondly, he asks: what accounts for our ordinary conceptual representation of time – what is the phenomenological origin of this representation? Note, with the latter question we arrive at one of the principal challenges when interpreting early Heidegger – for if he rejects psychological genesis, how are we to then understand his talk of origin/originariness? Let me respond to this methodological issue as a way of further clarifying what is distinctive about Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to time. At this stage it will be useful if we reconnect our debate with Blattner’s interpretation.

As Blattner sees it, Heidegger’s is an explanatory exercise – other commentators take a different view (Taylor Carman, for instance⁶) – but I am inclined to agree with Blattner on this point. Unless we clarify in what way Heidegger’s project is explanatory we will misunderstand his talk of origination and, relatedly, derivation. For Heidegger, talk of origins can only be justified if we understand him to be arguing for the idea that everyday time experience and its vulgar interpretation can be shown to originate in, derive from and thus depend upon a more ‘primordial’ form of time. Blattner is right to point out that this is not a stipulative claim but an argumentative one. Heidegger
does not simply state what those originating conditions must be like; he argues for them. The explanatory strategy which Heidegger adopts is phenomenological-hermeneutic. In Blattner’s words, it aims to explicate the ‘explanandum by showing how it depends upon and makes sense in terms of the explanans’7. ‘Origin’, therefore, is that which makes best interpretive sense of the phenomenon in question. We should also observe that the explanatory strategy in this case just is the phenomenological interpretation itself. The explanatory burden of warranting the designation originary temporality therefore falls to the phenomenological task of demonstrating how these various paths of ‘derivation’ work. That is why for Blattner everything rides on the phenomenology: if it fails then so too does the entire argumentative strategy. It is also why he is right in his assessment that, by definition, the generative thesis could not survive this failure. Still, we need to understand the structure of Heidegger’s argument in greater detail before we can critically assess Blattner’s exegetic objection. To prepare the way for this, we will next need to unpack the following cluster of concepts: Ecstatic-horizontal temporality, world-time, intratemporality, and the ordinary conception of time.

This is Blattner’s lucid description of Ecstatic-horizontal temporality:

Originary temporality is a manifold of nonsuccessive phenomena that explain ordinary time. These elements of the manifold go by the names “future” (Zukunft), “beenness” (Gewesenheit), and “Present” (Gegenwart). They are nonsuccessive in the precise sense that the future does not follow, succeed, or come after the Present, which in turn does not follow, succeed, or come after beenness8.

If original temporality consists of a ‘nonsuccessive manifold’, it is not because Heidegger has a perverse liking for paradox of course. Rather, he wants us to see that our ability to grasp temporal reference must be constituted prior to any actual acquaintance with times. The ‘manifold’ of originary temporality comprises then the primitive coordinates of any possible temporal understanding. Heidegger distinguishes these coordinates of understanding by calling them the ‘ecstases’ of retention, enpresenting, and anticipation. Each ecstasis generates its own horizon: the ecstasis of retention constitutes the horizon of the past; the ecstasis of enpresenting, that of the present; while the ecstasis of anticipation provides the horizonal schema for the originary future. In addition to this, the ecstases are not seen by Heidegger as static structures, but as simultaneous projections in an ongoing ‘process of
temporalisation’ which holds open the horizon of phenomenal time as a unified and coherent structure. However by ecstatic, Heidegger also envisages temporalisation to be an existential and ontological process. It announces, not just the opening up of the horizon of time in general, but the very ‘coming to being’ of Dasein: ‘Not “time is” but “Dasein qua time temporalises its being”’\(^9\). It is precisely for this reason that Heidegger will say temporality ‘makes up the primordial meaning of Dasein’s being’\(^10\).

In the projecting of the ecstases of original time, Dasein is itself projected out of itself and into a world. The term horisonal thus signifies the temporal structure constitutive of the phenomenal world as such, within which Dasein can disclose itself and discover entities alongside itself.

Of course, projecting its being upon a world means that Dasein also understands itself from the world into which, as Heidegger says, it has already been ‘thrown’ as this projection. The facticity of thrown-projection has its own temporal structure, which Heidegger designates ‘world-time’. World-time is distinguished from ordinary conceptual time in the following way. Whereas we ordinarily think of time as the indifferent and mechanical passage or flow of pure nows, running along a continuous axis, albeit in two antithetical directions – one extending behind me into a distant and ever-receding past, and the other into an infinite future which ultimately escapes me – with world-time we are dealing with time as we concretely possess and experience it. To give a simple example: when I use the clock to check the time, I do not find ‘time’ in the clock as though it were a mysterious presence awaiting discovery. Rather, I look to see how much time I still have left – for instance, to complete this or that task. World-time, in short, is a pre-theoretical, pragmatic time of involvement. It is the time we actually use or ‘reckon’ with when we engage in mundane activities. It is the time I use to make appointments, run errands, organise my weekly routine, and thus it is world-time that I implicitly draw upon even as I lose myself in everyday preoccupations.

More succinctly put, the fundamental discriminating feature of world-time, in complete contrast to the traditional conception of time, is this: every world-time Now expresses a worldly content. There are four salient features that structure this ‘content’, according to Heidegger. (1) Every world-time Now is significant, dated, spanned, and public. The world-time Now is significant in the sense that pragmatic connotations determine its meaning such that these Nows are interpreted as either appropriate or inappropriate times to do this or that. For instance, we say: ‘Now it is the right time to eat breakfast, and the wrong time to go to the theatre’. (2) World-time nows are always ‘dated’ in that every expression of the now makes tacit reference to some ‘when’ of involvement. And because world-
time Now's have content, they always possess an extension; they are therefore spans or 'stretches' (3). There is a danger this could be misunderstood, of course, if we take it that spans have magnitudes akin to physical quanta of time. But that is not what Heidegger means. Talk of dimensionality in this context is designed to stress that the world-time Now is itself transitional in character. Notice, again, this differentiates phenomenological time from the traditional concept of time in the precise sense that phenomenological time does not know the now as an instant: ‘[no] now and no time-moment can be punctualised’\textsuperscript{11}. Finally, (4) every world-time Now is inherently ‘public’ – meaning: times are instituted according to the fundamental sociality of our being-in-the-world. World-time is communally organized and therefore necessarily co-ordinated insofar as Dasein constantly interacts with its co-Dasein in a nexus of interrelated world involvements.

We shall return to consider the implications for Heidegger of admitting determinate content into the structure of the Now in a moment; first, two final terms require our attention: intratemporality, and the ordinary conception of time. With these we arrive at the bone of contention, so to speak, between Blattner’s and my own reading of temporality. For that reason it is important that we spell out, as precisely as we can, the way Blattner understands the relation of intratemporality, world time, and what he calls ‘ordinary time’. Blattner interprets intratemporality (\textit{Innerzeitlichkeit}) following a lead suggested by Heidegger to mean: ‘to run its course in time’\textsuperscript{12} – literally, ‘to be in time’. Because of this, Blattner moves quickly to associate intratemporality with successive or sequential time. To be sure, intratemporality means being-in-time-ness. But this ‘requires’, in Blattner’s view, temporal \textit{succession}, conceding without further ado the basic structural characteristic defining the traditional interpretation of ‘ordinary time’: the logical seriality of the now. Regardless of the peculiarity of its ontological constitution, Dasein exists ‘in’ sequential time. What’s more, given that the time in which Dasein exists is world-time then, by extension, world-time is itself intratemporal, that is, successive in structure. To say world-time has a sequential structure is to say it shares an \textit{identity} with ordinary time insofar as the latter is also successive. What is crucial, therefore, in Blattner’s account, is the identification that makes world-time, intratemporality, and ordinary time, insofar as they are all successive, \textit{de facto} homologues\textsuperscript{13}. Note Blattner’s pronouncement: ‘[world-time and ordinary time] belong to the same sequence’\textsuperscript{14} – ‘the “two” Now's are \textit{identical}\textsuperscript{15}. It is precisely this identity which provides the platform from which Blattner launches his attack on the thesis of original temporality.
In fact Blattner’s objection rests entirely on the validity of his understanding of the following assertion: ‘sequentiality lies at the foundation of the distinction between originary temporality and world-time’\(^\text{16}\). Or to state it more precisely, it rests on what distinguishes, as heterogeneous, a nonsuccessive mode of time (temporality) \textit{and} the successive forms (homologues) it putatively generates. Hence, as Blattner persuasively argues, Heidegger must show how temporal succession can be generated at the level of world time – and for the following reasons. First, Heidegger argues for a hierarchical order of derivation which aims to establish an order of priority between the different forms of time he identifies. Thus ecstatic horizontal temporality has priority over world time in that it necessarily comes first – it is ‘a priori’; just as world-time has priority over the ordinary interpretation of time (recall Heidegger argues that the traditional understanding of time conceived as the pure succession of an abstract and empty now is \textit{derivative of} the more complex form of lived world-time.) Consequently, \textit{only} if Heidegger can demonstrate that world-time is \textit{successive} is he \textit{then} entitled to the claim that ‘ordinary time’ \textit{derives from the levelling off of its core ‘expressive’ features – significance, datability, spannedness, and publicness}. If world-time is \textit{not} successive, however, then the ensuing explanatory residuum will expose a gaping hole Heidegger’s account since manifestly he will have failed to provide an \textit{explanation} for the derivation of successive time from non-successive temporality. And plainly, if Heidegger cannot explain succession, as Blattner shrewdly remarks, then he has explained nothing at all. After all, Heidegger’s thesis explicitly states: Ecstatic-horizontal temporality is original ‘time’ because ordinary, everyday time experience ‘arises’ from it (\textit{entspringt aus}). It is original because it is the \textit{origin} of ordinary time. Recall, also, Heidegger’s inclusion of the Latin maxim, which we saw quoted in the earlier citation from \textit{Being and Time}: ‘\textit{a potiori fit denominatio}’ – ‘the name derives from the most powerful’\(^\text{17}\). Original time will deserve the name original \textit{just if} it can be shown that ordinary temporal experience originates from it. It is for this reason that Blattner will insist: no matter how different phenomenological and conceptual time may appear to be, they \textit{must} both share the same axiomatic foundation – which is to say, they must both be determined by the same \textit{logic} of succession: ‘The imposition of sequentiality upon original temporality so as to constitute world-time is absolutely central to the explanation’\(^\text{18}\). In other words, since the axiomatic basis of ordinary sequential time just is the transitivity of the now, it appears that world-time must therefore \textit{also be} determined in the final instance as ‘transitive’. Hence Blattner argues that what needs to be explained is precisely the ‘transitive succession of world-time Nows’\(^\text{19}\).
Let us take note of the immediate significance of this: if Blattner is right to insist that world time and ordinary time must exhibit the same axiomatic foundation, then he has located a powerful constraint which places an enormous burden on the generative thesis. In fact, it is precisely this requirement that allows Blattner to register a fatal error in Heidegger’s calculations. As a direct consequence of this homology, the thesis must face up to a significant complication which arises from Heidegger’s attempt to discriminate world-time from ordinary time – that is, from the introduction of determinate content into the structure of the now. It is time to spell out exactly why this leads, in Blattner’s view, to the failure of the entire explanatory strategy and the collapse of the generative thesis.

2. Structural Homology and the Failure of the Generative Thesis

If Heidegger’s generative thesis works, he will be able to demonstrate how originary temporality generates, in Blattner’s words, ‘the sequence of qualitative or contentful moments or spans of time that Dasein encounters in its everyday going about business’\(^\text{20}\). This sequence must be, according to the argument from homology, necessarily successive – that is, world-time must be transitively successive if ordinary successive time is to be derived from it. Two questions need to be answered, then, in what follows: first, how is original temporality able to account for the transitive succession of the world-time now? In other words, what does it mean to say that temporality ‘generates’ world-time as succession and what exactly is meant by generativity in this context? Second – given the phenomenological evidence – does world-time really display any such feature? Let me answer these questions seriatim.

Now, earlier, we said that world-time is the principal form of ‘time’ that gets generated by ecstatic-horizontal temporality. It is ‘first’ because world-time is the form of time that is closest to Dasein insofar as it is the time it directly uses or ‘reckons’ with in performing everyday practical tasks. The deeper significance of time-reckoning, however, lies in the related claim that through its practical involvements, Dasein’s own being is ‘stretched’ – Dasein itself is in transition in the world-time now. As a consequence world-time can be said to express not only Dasein’s practical concerns, but the very movement of factual life\(^\text{21}\). This movement is not just ontical, then; it is ontological. (Remember: Dasein qua time temporalises its being). World-time therefore expresses the self-generating movement of Dasein’s being. If this is correct then it follows that world or ‘expressive time’ must be connected to
the rather more formal and existential structures characterising the activity of human Dasein as such. There are two related claims Heidegger makes that will help elucidate this connection. First, Dasein exists, says Heidegger, for-the-sake-of itself – meaning: Dasein projects itself onto some determinate way of being that expresses its ‘ability-to-be’. Second, and as a consequence: Dasein’s being is essentially projective or future-oriented: ‘In the projection of the for-the-sake-of as such, Dasein gives itself the primordial commitment [Bindung]’. In projecting, Dasein constantly anticipates itself, and thus is constantly ‘ahead’ of itself. Notice, however, because projection is ultimately an ontological and formal structure, Dasein is thereby essentially attainment-directed yet without ever being in any strict sense identifiable with what it attains. Heidegger’s way of putting this is to say that Dasein’s existence lies not so much in what it currently is, but just in its being-possible. We can think this in the following way: being-possible is an ‘existential’ condition determining Dasein’s being as purposive as such; yet what it projects on as this being-possible are actual possibilities. The latter, says Heidegger, are existentiell. Actual possibilities are made available to Dasein as it projects itself upon a factically given world. So, projecting involves Dasein pressing into determinate or worldly ways of being. On the one hand, we can say: projection determines Dasein’s being as being-possible as such – it is being-for-its-own-sake. Thus the signification of the term ‘Dasein’ just is: being-towards-oneself, or more precisely stated: acting-for-the-sake-of-self-disclosure. On the other hand, because self-disclosure is always concretely situated in a world context, being-for-ones-own-sake is only given via possible ways of being, via possible worldly involvements – that is, by one for-the-sake-of-which or another. My for-the-sake-of-which determines how I understand myself, as a self-interpreting mode of being. To take Blattner’s example: I am a teacher just if being a teacher makes sense of my practical identity: teaching is currently that for-the-sake-of-which I am.

More concretely, we might think of a for-the-sake-of-which as operating somewhat like a Wittgensteinian rule under which various tasks may be described as customary. Heidegger calls these tasks ‘in-order-tos’. We find such tasks intelligible only if they contribute to our self-understanding, as determined by how we self-interpret. So, for example: I do task x in order to press into being y. If being y precluded doing x I would, as a matter of course, rule x out of my current range of activities. And since y is how I understand myself, it is, in Heidegger’s terms, my for-the-sake-of-which. If I self-interpret as a teacher, I intrinsically understand myself as obligated to perform various tasks appropriate to furthering the ends of teaching. Note here that this establishes a reflexive-existential
connection between myself and my self-interpretation, since to be y, I must perform the pertinent tasks required to enact this self-interpretation. We might also observe the implicit temporal reference involved in this: being-y is not a state-of-being but a way-of-being that requires further practice. If being a teacher determines how I envisage my future life, it is only because I continue to project into this way of being as a current possibility of myself.

Construed in these terms, we can now, I think, begin to see how Blattner is able to read transitivity into a world-time sequence. As Dasein presses into a way of being (by pursuing a for-the-sake-of-which) it implicitly understands that way of being to involve pragmatic ends. Being a teacher implies acting ‘for-the-sake-of-learning’, and that means performing tasks appropriate to that attainment-directed end. Pressing into a self-interpretation, which is basically pragmatic and futural, Dasein then understands each world-time now as a period of significant time it uses ‘in order to’ further advance its chosen end (for-the-sake-of-which.) Since every world-time now derives its significance from the way it stands under a general rule of pragmatic import, Dasein’s present is thus defined by what Blattner calls the ‘pragmatic Now’24. In this way, Blattner, who wants to explain how world-time nows line up to form a sequence of (pragmatic) times, interprets world-temporality via the transitive rule: \( x \) is in order to \( y \), which is in order to \( z \). The rule being the telos under which this chain of tasks makes sense (and the telos being the for-the-sake-of-which.)

Thus a world-time sequence is explained on the basis of an original non-successive manifold which generates world-time according to a transitive logic immanent to itself. In fact Blattner’s novel interpretation of the process of temporalisation, which accounts for the transitive structure of the world-time sequence, is more accurately described as a logic of iteration. In other words: each world-time now is generated transitively precisely because original temporality ‘iterates’ itself by imposing a telos on each pragmatic involvement. To show exactly how a transitive sequence can be derived in this way, through the iteration of original temporality at the level of actual world-times, Blattner presses the argument to its conclusion:

To explain sequentiality in terms of the iteration of the originary present, Heidegger thus must present some reason why the originary Present would iterate. […] How can we understand why that purposive direction to the task should iterate? [We] must have some reason to think the originary future would impose a further pragmatically futural reference onto the terminus ad quem [of the pragmatic now] so that it would itself have a task to which it is purposively
directed. [...] The reason for which we are looking may well be this: the originary future imposes a structured, chainlike teleology on tasks. In short, one task motivates the next according to the (transitive) rule that governs the means-end intelligibility according to which world-time Nows are ordered sequentially under a for-the-sake-of-which. The latter acquires its teleological character from the originary future, which interprets itself through it. The for-the-sake-of-which then determines the kinds of tasks that are required in order to make sense of this way of being, and thus the order in which they should unfold. So as Blattner sees it, ‘sequentiality is to be explained by the for the sake of which generating a sequence of tasks’. Blattner reasons, because of this, unless Heidegger can show that the for-the-sake-of-which imposes a futural reference onto the ‘terminus ad quem’ of tasks, we cannot explain world-time as sequential. This is not because one world-time would not follow the next; rather, it is because that sequence would not be transitive in the appropriate way. Heidegger must show that temporality iterates transitively, at the level of Dasein’s factual involvements. He is entitled to the generative thesis, therefore, only if the phenomenology holds up. And that means, in Blattner’s words, if a ‘reason’ – that is, a transitive rule – can be found within world-time which might demonstrate the necessity behind the sequential arrangement of mundane tasks.

Here, however, the explanatory burden places on the phenomenology a level of commitment it simply cannot sustain. To be sure, some tasks appear to follow neatly one-upon-the-other; but Blattner finds obvious inconsistencies in the phenomenological evidence, quickly demonstrating its flaws. To use Blattner’s example: I pick up the chalk in-order-to draw a diagram on the blackboard, in-order-to bring the lecture to a succinct conclusion. After the lecture is over, I wait for a moment before leaving class in-order-to field questions from students. All of these tasks (lecturing-writing-waiting-talking) are ordered by the purpose I self-assign in being-a-teacher. But what if instead of waiting after class, I immediately dash off to the cinema? Going to the movies is not imposed by any for-the-sake-of-which, so the apparent transitive sequence collapses. I do what I do merely as ‘a result of having to fit several tasks into a given time sequence’, not because I generate a necessary sequence imposed upon the world by the iterativity involved in the original temporalisation of world-time:

[The] need to place tasks into different times does not itself explain why these tasks form up into a sequence. The only way to derive the requirement that the times make up a sequence is
to rely upon the teleological sequentiality of the tasks themselves. And as we have seen, that sequentiality does not generate the proper world-time sequence\textsuperscript{28}.

The argument accordingly collapses because original time demonstrates neither transitivity at the phenomenological level of an actual world-time sequence, nor therefore any homology with ordinary successive time. The generative thesis is vitiated.

3. The Generative Characterisation of World-Time

How sound, though, is Blattner’s conclusion that the generative thesis fails because the argument from homology fails? The answer to this question depends on whether an alternative explanation for world-time can be found that does not insist on ‘homology’, but which nevertheless satisfies the following constraint: it must show how stripping out the content of world-time opens up a plausible path for the derivation of ordinary transitive time. It must also, of course, do several other things: it must be able to make sense of the full complexity of the phenomenon of world-time; account for the apparent irrationality of its contents – the seeming ad hoc arrangement of the sequence of tasks that Blattner identifies as so detrimental to the generative thesis; and be able to explain why, despite its seeming irrationality, world-time does not simply disintegrate into a state of incoherence – why it remains an articulated and stable structure. Let me attempt to address these issues by way of answering the first question in some detail.

To begin the task of reconstructing the argument, I want to examine two ideas, fundamental to the generative thesis: (1) that in ‘generating’ world time, original temporality ‘iterates’ itself; (2) that to distinguish world-time as a ‘generative’ form of time is to contrast it with ‘secondary’ or ‘non-generative’ modes of time. The basic thought – if you recall – is this: in the process of iterating itself, temporality generates world-time; which means, for Heidegger, world-time is the medium in which temporality directly expresses itself: ‘The Dasein, which always exists so that it takes time for itself, expresses itself. Taking time for itself, it utters itself in such a way that it is always saying time’\textsuperscript{29}. World-time is expressive time because it is expressive of Dasein’s temporal mode of existence. Contrast this with the two ‘secondary’ modes of time that Heidegger identifies: first, the form of time that Blattner distinguishes as disengaged or inauthentic temporality, which has a merely presentative function: Specifically, as ‘presentative’ disengaged temporality applies itself – in enpresenting-
awaiting-retaining – to some entity or other which it renders in an *occurrent* form. Thus, disengaged temporality is the mode of presentation constituting the understanding of the occurrent. And (second) the pure or theoretical *conception* of time, which is strictly representational - what Heidegger at one point calls the ‘discursive articulation of time’ 30. It is called ‘discursive’ time precisely because it allows us to think (represent) time by means of some mathematical measure 31. Notice, neither disengaged nor discursive time is expressive of Dasein’s existence. Moreover, as conceptual, the discursive Now of the ordinary understanding of time does not express existence precisely because it cannot express the *movement* of existence 32. In fact, it is only because the ordinary conception of time is *not* expressive that it can be said to have any apparent autonomy from Dasein: its autonomy derives from its conceptuality 33.

A fortiori, only world-time is generative, since only world-time refers to the existential and temporal *movement* of Dasein’s being – as Heidegger explains in *Basic Problems*: ‘I am in motion in the understanding of the now and, in a strict sense, I am really with that *where to* the time is and *wherefore* I determine the time’ 34. This movement occurs because, in pressing into an involvement, Dasein necessarily develops a possibility of its being in the concreteness of a task that matters to it (and to which it assigns *itself* in assigning itself ‘time’ to perform it.)

What we need to do now in order to fully answer the constraint of derivation is to show: (a) how this mode of being generates world-time times by iterating the structure of the transitional Now in the form of involvements (thereby yielding a *sequence* of Nows) – without: (b) imposing the rule of simple transitivity upon world-time contents (albeit allowing that such a conception of time could nonetheless be derived from its levelling off.) To do this, we must reengage critically with Blattner. This is what he has to say regarding iteration.

To get to the understanding of a sequence, Dasein must interpret the structural unity that ranges from the awaiting to the retaining as *iterated*. It must understand the object of awaiting, for instance, as a time whence a future Now departs; it must understand the object of retaining as a time whither a past Now ends. That is, it must apply the very same structure of awaiting-retaining enpresentation to what is awaited and retained; it must understand the horizons of realization and retention as themselves Nows 35.
For Blattner, iteration is the mechanism that will explain how world-time can be generated as sequential. Iteration yields a sequence of involved times by ‘[reapplying] the framework of the Now to the object of its futural orientation’\textsuperscript{36}. The idea can be stated simply enough as follows: Dasein’s existence (stretching or temporal movement) is expressed via its existentiell interests (the involvements which span tasks in the form of the pragmatic Now). These in turn express some for-the-sake-of-which, and thus some ability-to-be, so that whenever Dasein involves itself in a current task, it iterates (in a factical setting) the deep temporal structures constitutive of Dasein’s existence, fallenness and facticity (that is, its future, present and past). The result: Dasein understands world-time as a sequence of involved times, such that when one involvement is over, another will then take its place. Now since each involvement expresses a for-the-sake-of-which, it would be natural to assume that the structure of world-time could be ordered, as Blattner suggests, by the for-sake-of-which generating a sequence of tasks. Recall, furthermore, Blattner thinks, as a consequence of the requirement for homology, that the contents of world-time involvements need to demonstrate what I have called ‘simple’ or logical transitive relations. My variation, however, will say they do not. It is now time to show why Blattner’s iterative-transitivity need not be ‘simple’.

Iteration, as I see it, explains the possibility of how temporality can generate a non-transitive sequence at the level of world-time contents (tasks). Allow me to explain: the arrangement of tasks need not follow Blattner’s simple ‘transitive’ logic of \(x\) is in order to \(y\), which is in order to \(z\). On the contrary, \(x\), \(y\), and \(z\) need not demonstrate any unity of content at all; they need merely be sutured together. Here, ‘suturing’ implies that nows \(x\), \(y\), and \(z\) are indeed ‘connected’ but at a ‘higher’ level than that of their contents. In other words, what are sutured are not the contents of tasks – as though one task literally acts as a springboard to the next, that is, through the imposition of a transitive rule (upon the \textit{terminus ad quem} of every task). Instead, by ‘suturing’ I mean a reflexive process (call it ‘dating’) whereby tasks are arranged as Now of involvement within the nexus of a broader ‘pragmatic’ world understanding (significance). So what get sutured are tasks insofar as they express my involvements. In this view, it is reflexivity that imposes a sense of stability on the otherwise irrational character of world-time contents. To schematize this interpretation: the world-time sequence of tasks now looks like this: ‘… (\textit{T}1) ’\(g\) is in order to \(r\)’ ; (\textit{T}2) ’\(m\) is in order to \(q\)’ ; (\textit{T}3) ’\(p\) is in order to \(n\)’ ; …’ and so on, with the semi-colon representing a suture. In being sutured – tasks \(g\), \(m\), \(p\) have become Now of \(x\), \(y\), \(z\), regardless of the fact that they are not connected transitively at the internal level of
contents. Tasks $g$, $m$, $p$ can appear as such to be quite unrelated. Or to put it in more basic, even quotidian terms: I do not brush my teeth in order to get in the car, and while I may very well get into the car in order to drive to work, I certainly do not drive in order to work (unless I am a cab driver, etc). The tasks of brushing, driving, and working do indeed have a temporal arrangement, but not because they are transitively connected – not because of the content of the tasks.

Nor, conversely, is it simply a matter of having to fit a number of tasks into an already given sequence of times, as Blattner contends. After all, that kind of explanation begs the very question it is meant to defuse, namely, of how tasks can be arranged (understood) as temporal. The question therefore remains: what accounts for the temporality of tasks? To answer this, we can return to our schematic example above: tasks $g$, $m$, $p$ become the Nows $x$, $y$, $z$ insofar as I select them from the pool of possible involvements made available to me by my being thrown into the world. What is important with the idea of the selection of tasks is not the character of the task per se but that they are seen as expressing an involvement. In becoming the involvements $x$, $y$, $z$, the tasks $g$, $m$, $p$ come to concretely mediate and thereby embody the sequence-building process of original iteration. So, $g$, $m$, $p$ are subsumed under the pattern of iterations ‘$i^1 \rightarrow i^2 \rightarrow i^3 \rightarrow$’, and in this way they are ‘sutured’ as my involvements into a ‘sequence’. While the iterative sequence is constituted at the higher level of an existential understanding, it is nevertheless expressed at an existentiell level through Dasein’s involvement in tasks. Because of this, every task and thus every world-time Now acquires its intrinsic coherence for Dasein, regardless of the apparent diffuseness of its content; and it does so just in virtue of its belonging to the nexus of Dasein’s self-understanding to which, as an involvement, it is reflexively related. What makes the pattern of world-time involvements sequential, therefore, is not the transitive logic that can be derived from the ordering of tasks, but the deeper existentiality that transforms tasks into involvements such that they can be appropriated as iterative Nows. The temporal suturing of tasks bypasses, in other words, Blattner’s requirement for a logically rigid ‘iterative-transitive’ mechanism, and points instead to a looser existential-iterative process of self-temporalisation or generation.

We are now in a position to provide an alternative answer to the question of the derivation of the ordinary conception of time. In my view, transitivity is not, pace Blattner, the expression of a logic of iteration, imposing itself at the level of mundane tasks (in-order-tos). But it is derivative, in Heidegger’s sense, of the existentiiality of iteration through which temporalisation is expressed. In
speaking, then, of the derivation of ordinary transitive time – the principal constraint identified above – I envisage Heidegger to be arguing for something quite distinct from structural homology: Transitivity is what remains of iteration once world-time has been deprived of all existentiality (significance, datability, spannedness and publicness). This process of deprivation, as we know, occurs in two steps. Firstly, it entails the narrowing down of phenomenal time from an engaged generative temporality to a disengaged presentative temporality – an act of levelling-off which prepares the ground for the second step: the transformation of the Now into its concept. Step two involves the discursive rendering of the disengaged Now in a dimensionless and ideative form. Since the Now is thereby conceived in isolation from any phenomenal content, it is understood as a pure unit, or better, a pure quantum of time. And since each Now thus construed is formally indistinguishable, as a consequence, the discursive Now can only be individuated logically, that is, via determining its location on the timeline. However, because the Now has a purely formal identity, ‘location’ and ‘timeline’ must also be conceived in equally abstract terms: those of the relations established by a logic of succession. In short, transitive logic derives from this way of conceiving the Now. So – to return to my initial suggestion – transitivity indeed makes sense of the concept of succession but only once the Now is conceived in abstraction from all expressive content; that is, it represents the rule governing the succession of a logically reduced Now (a Now without any content).

Accordingly, Heidegger need not advocate transitivity, one of the defining features of the traditional concept of time, as determinative of world-time contents. On the contrary, his argument is precisely that we could not conceive of such a logical sequence from world-time because world-time is not strictly transitive. To read transitivity back into world-time contents is Blattner’s mistake. It is a mistake because Heidegger never argues that world-time should be successive in the manner thus imputed to him. Indeed, I think he would agree with Blattner’s assessment that the succession of world-time times is not deductible in this way.

My solution – schematically presented here – no doubt overlooks many important details. Regrettable as that may be, I think, my principal point has at least been made: to show that iteration need not impose simple transitivity on world-time contents as Blattner believes. Still, there are residual worries. For instance, while I have presented an alternative picture of iteration that stresses its formal and ontological distinctness from the actual contents that come to embody the factical progress of Dasein through its world, I have not yet given an explanation as to why temporality should iterate.
Furthermore, have I not undermined the very coherence and sense of iteration by insisting on the mere suturing of world-time contents? Doesn’t suturing threaten to render iteration too independent of world-time, such that it is no longer able to explain even the loosest of associations between world-time times? Iteration, recall, was designed to establish the coherence of world-time times through the ordering of a sequence (which is precisely why Blattner can charge it with overestimating the facts). However, on my construal, it is hard to see precisely how iteration can impose any coherence on what I above called the irrationality of world-time contents.

Let me attempt to allay these worries, and in so doing, suggest a final amendment to Blattner’s reading of Heidegger.

I accept Blattner’s point that for Heidegger, the world-time Now is internally defined by the purposefulness that directs it toward the moment of its completion, that is, I accept Blattner’s reading of the originary present as the pragmatic Now. My disagreement with Blattner, rather, has to do with Blattner’s tendency to conflate tasks with involvements. Recall, on my alternative reading, this identity is by no means a strict one. Temporality does not iterate tasks; it iterates my involvement in a task. This yields a quite different result to Blattner, because the determinate content of the involvement – the task itself – is on my construal less relevant than its status as an involvement. Consequently, we need not expect tasks to disclose a ‘reason’ to iterate; or to state it with greater precision: we need not locate in the telos of a task the terminus a quo of the immediately ensu ing task. All that is required in order to generate an iterative or sequential understanding is that we take the idea of imposing a ‘further pragmatic futural reference’ onto the terminus ad quem of the Now to be referred to the ontological structure of involvements and not to the ontical contents of tasks. Iteration indeed imposes a pragmatically futural reference, although not necessarily further to the task – not onto the terminus ad quem of tasks, but onto the terminus ad quem of involvements. The seriality of involvements certainly does not require the necessary sequencing of tasks. Tasks need not therefore imply further tasks38.

This brings me to a second worry concerning the way Blattner interprets iteration. By insisting on the logical sequentiality of the contents of involvements, Blattner is forced to read the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, mechanistically, as a transitive rule; it is the for-the-sake-of-which that imposes on the understanding of world-time a simple, diachronic logic of presentation: ‘sequentiality is to be explained by the for-the-sake-of-which generating a sequence of tasks’39. On my view, such an interpretation threatens to blur the ontic-ontological distinction Heidegger carves out between original
teleology and the teleology of involvements. That is, Blattner is in danger of collapsing the distinction we earlier made between the ontological claim ‘Dasein is for-the-sake-of-self-disclosure’ (it is for its own sake) and the for-the-sakes-of-which that structure the various ontic possibilities into which Dasein can move when disclosing itself. The latter, however, do not provide ‘reasons’ which temporality imposes so as to iterate itself. On the contrary, they present the means by which it can do so. But here, the direction of the imposition is surely the reverse of that suggested by Blattner. After all, Heidegger says Dasein is essentially ‘thrown’ into a world as a facticity; so while it is true to say that temporality generates the ontological condition for the possibility of any world involvement, it is de facto the world that imposes its structure onto factual Dasein. But, why, we might ask does Blattner insist on according such a singular role to the for-the-sake-of-which?

In fact, the reason has to do with how he interprets the meaning of projection as specifically bound up with the ‘upon which’ of Dasein’s self-projection, to be precise its sense of self-identity. This is the deeper significance of the for-the-sake-of-which. I agree with Blattner, of course, that when Heidegger says Dasein is its possibility, he does not mean that it can thereby press into every factual possibility made available to it. Dasein is determined in its thrownness by the specific choices it is compelled to make, according to the range of possibilities opened up to it as thrown being-in-the-world. Projection is thereby already ‘selective’, and selection inevitably involves the exclusion of alternative possibilities. The claim ‘projection is always projection upon a chosen possibility’ announces the finitude of projection, which circumscribes and places determinate limits upon Dasein’s who. Still, we might wonder whether this means that a chosen possibility – a specifically selected for-the-sake-of-which – must personify, wholly and exclusively, everything that Dasein can be? Blattner insists that it must because otherwise he could not use it to generate a sequence of transitively-related tasks. For that reason, projection-upon-a-possibility becomes in Blattner’s reading a means to fix Dasein’s factual identity in an all encompassing commitment to a singular ability-to-be. One might miss the significance of this claim, however, because of the subtlety with which Blattner expresses it: ‘projection refers only to… determining oneself as someone by pressing into a possible way to be’40. Still, the corollary of this claim, which insists on the strength of the identity of Dasein’s ability-to-be with its for-the-sake-of-which, is that the indefinite article is here made to shoulder an enormous load. Indeed, the entire plausibility of the ‘a posteriori fit denominatio’ – the justification for the generative thesis – comes to rest on it.
After all, if my entire identity as a ‘someone’, a person, depends upon my continually pressing into a possible way of interpreting myself, then that is because everything I do is organised around the singular goal of my aiming to be that someone. It is my need to be someone that relentlessly organises my world according to the pursuit of a way of being insofar as it serves as an identity for me. Thereby, the for-the-sake-of-which not only performs the function of a transitive rule governing the order of tasks (generating the world-time sequence), it also quite literally operates as a transitive rule determining the diachronic persistence conditions of my personal identity over time. Because every involvement tacitly reiterates the for-the-sake-of-which that identifies me as a someone, each involvement recursively iterates my sense of self via the assignment of tasks.

To be sure, the issue of whether Dasein should or should not be understood as a person is a controversial one within the literature. But that is not the issue here. The fact that Blattner comes down on the side of an individualistic interpretation of Dasein is less relevant to us than the way he determines identity conditions so singularly: ‘Dasein is its possibilities’ but note, only by ‘pressing ahead into one of them’. Of course, it is trivially true that I can only be what I am currently pressing into at any given time. Obviously, I cannot be a taxi driver and a keen amateur golfer simultaneously (even though I may share my enthusiasm for golf with my passengers). But, Blattner’s interpretation is not trivial; recall, it is ampliative and explanatory. Specifically, it aims to explain how a world-time sequence can be generated as transitive via the for-the-sake-of-which. Consider also, however, that Blattner reads projection as the projection of my selected identity, which is singular in its first-person specificity: ‘If projection were the opening up of possibilities as possibilities, simply as such,’ he muses, ‘then Dasein would not have to give up one possibility in virtue of projecting a different one’. And yet, why should this choice get cast so starkly? Why couldn’t Dasein’s factual understanding have more than one single possibility through which it could interpret itself? Why must Dasein define itself only according to the unicity of an ability-to-be, rather than through a multiplicity of abilities? Why should these alternatives be excluded?

There are, I think, two reasons to exclude them. The first depends on our accepting the argument from homology. After all, if Dasein were, say, a ‘bundle’ of for-the-sakes-of-which, then it would be hard to see how it could generate the simple transitive sequence which that argument requires. Because we have already rejected the need for that, we can at least entertain the thought of what I will call, for the sake of convenience, a ‘bundle-solution’ to the problem of identity. Secondly,
we might think because ‘possibilities as possibilities’ is too open a formulation for a finite entity such as Dasein, then that entails the imposition, via a factual delimitation at the level of existential choice, of a rigorous limitation on identity-conditions. Even so, one might be recognizant of the need for such limitations, and yet query why this should necessarily exclude all multiplicity from (personal) identity. Again, the reason, I think, Blattner insists on such an imposition has everything to do with his reading of the derivation of ordinary (transitive) time. Consequently, we may entertain the possibility that, here too, finite choice is multiple in character.

Let us, in conclusion, draw out the consequences of these amendments to Blattner’s reading by examining three hypotheses which can be made on their basis. The first articulates the ‘bundle’ solution: Dasein – as factual and thrown – is a multiple-identity, that is, it consists in multiple for-the-sakes-of-which running concurrently. Note, here, that the idea of a multiplicity of concurrent for-the-sakes-of-which need not prevent one possible way of being from becoming ‘superordinate’ to the others. After all, nothing is to say Dasein cannot interpret itself as a teacher and as a cinephile, to use Blattner’s example, even though, in the main, it prioritizes ‘being a teacher’ over any number of subordinate for-the-sakes-of-which, amongst which being a cinephile is one of them. It may be that sometimes one for-the-sake-of-which becomes superordinate to the others, while at other times it recedes into the background as subordinate.

How does this help?

Well, one might imagine something like a series of gestalt switches operating between concurrent self-interpretations, enabling Dasein to adapt to the rather itinerant pattern of an average day. In this way we can begin to make sense of the irrationality of tasks, observed earlier. For instance, before I go to work, my principal concern is to get my daughter Beatrice ready for school; at this stage, other possibilities of my being are subordinate to the superordinate ‘for-the-sake-of-good-parenting’. Once those duties are discharged, once the tasks assigned to parenting are accomplished, an entirely distinct interpretative possibility of my being then takes precedence: I ‘switch’ my for-the-sake-of-which. Now, it might be objected that my amendment operates at the wrong level of analysis, since the need to reckon with times, as Blattner points out, does not in itself explain the possibility of generating a time sequence. While it is true the adjustment just outlined presupposes a definite temporal sequence, we should not be intimidated by this fact: the consequence is not that the entire generative thesis is thereby made redundant or inexplicable.
To see this we need to consider a second hypothesis. World-time is transmitted as average and public. Dasein does not literally produce world ‘time’, *ex nihilo*. To speak of a thrown-facticity is to say Dasein is first and foremost embedded in a with-world. Consequently, the actual character or range of possibilities that are available to it – these possible ways of being and thus the tasks that Dasein involves itself with day-to-day – are always already inherited. Dasein’s factual possibilities reflect concretely the historical world, whether it knows it or not: world-time is inherently public; the times it reckons with acquire their intelligibility in conformity with Dasein’s situated being-with-others. *Therefore, the tasks that constitute the content of world-time Nows are already standardised.* If this is right, there is little sense in trying to explain the sequentiality of world-time times via the content of tasks because tasks, as we have seen, are only contingently related to world-time Nows. Instead, tasks need to be interpreted as involvements. From this perspective, we can see that the sequentiality of the Now is established by the iteration of involvements, not tasks: that is, not at the level of world-time contents, as Blattner suggests, but through their suturing as *my* involvements. On the other hand, to speak of an irrational facticity is just to say that while one task may literally follow ‘one-upon-the-other’, the reason why it does so need not display any necessity at all; the sequence of world-time times could, on my construal, be explained as *quasi*-successive, that is, without any reason being offered for their seriality other than that it is customary to do things in that order. Tasks and their arrangement are contingent on the thrown-character of the world (itself a contingent and historically conditioned structure). However, that this contingent and irrational structure is grasped by Dasein as a sequence – and indeed necessarily so – is precisely due to the ontologico-temporal process at work in the synthesizing of times as ‘involvements’.

A third and final hypothesis has to do with the nature of choice. As a thrown-facticity, Dasein has a multiplicity of choices available to it at any given time. Not only does Dasein have multiple abilities through which it can press into its ability-to-be, it also has, as a consequence, a diverseness of options open to it, and only for this reason can it have choices. Note, however, this by no means underestimates the implacability of the existential circumscription of choice – quite the contrary, in fact: only because Dasein has choices is it forced to exclude possibilities – something it does continually. As to the character of those choices, whether compliant or transgressive, authentic or inauthentic, these are ‘always already’ determined through the connivances of an understanding which assimilates Dasein to its world.
One final question remains outstanding: why *should* temporality iterate?

The answer to this question is easier to state negatively. Against Blattner, we can say: temporality indeed iterates, but not because for-the-sakes-of-which provide ‘reasons’ to do so other than the merely existentiell. A positive answer is rather more difficult to apprehend, not least because it involves that essential negativity which circulates in the deepest recesses of Dasein’s being. In other words, if temporality iterates – and as we have said *generatively* – it is because Dasein *is* substantively unattainable ‘in itself’. It is Dasein’s nullity which compels it to press ahead into its facticity, without respite, one way or the other, under the imperative of ecstatic existence.

4. Conclusion

Blattner’s reading of temporality, in my view, is more important for its unintended successes than the evident failing of its ambition to controvert the generative thesis. In particular, the concept of iterativity, understood as generation, makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the otherwise murky process of temporalisation. In contrast to Blattner, however, I would recommend the following: iterativity renders the concept of transitivity otiose with regard to the determination of the sequentiality of world-time contents. The alternative to this has two relevant aspects. Firstly, it accepts that ‘time reckoning’ indeed presupposes a determinate understanding of a given time sequence, e.g., a ‘day’. But secondly, this is not incompatible with what Heidegger actually says; nor is it incompatible with the generative thesis.

It is not just the pre-interpretedness of world-time times that makes the average day intelligible to Dasein – plainly, such sequences possess no internal or necessary coherence, at least of the order of a simple transitive law. Rather their intelligibility derives precisely from the fact that it is Dasein which understands, *a priori*, the *significance* of the sequence of times confronting it. Dasein brings the day into an essential unity – *it alone historizes* its daily routine, bringing what is disjoint and elliptical into a reflexive temporalising structure that encompasses and makes sense of such disparate contents. To say that temporality generates world-time is just to say that it makes an understanding of such public, co-temporalised, non-transitive sequences possible.

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NOTES
It might be objected that Blattner does not make any such claim, because he clearly distinguishes between world-time and ordinary time. But consider Blattner’s interpretation of the derivation of ordinary time: ‘Ordinary time (the continuous ticking away of empty, purely quantitative moments of time) can be explained by world-time (the qualitative sequence of socially meaningful times…) [because] ordinary time is leveled off world-time; it is world-time, but considered in abstraction of some of world-time’s core features’, p.19. This is true, of course, but Blattner construes leveling to mean, in addition: if we strip world-time of its content, then what we are left with is not just a pure sequence of contentless nows, but a structural homologue equivalent to a depleted world-time. On the basis of this, he infers that if world-time is to open the path of derivation to ordinary time, then it must be sequential in the same way – but as we shall see, it need not.

22 See for instance The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic: ‘The existence of Dasein is determined by the for-the-sake-of-which. It is Dasein’s defining characteristic that it is concerned with this being, in its being, in a specific way. Dasein exists for the sake of Dasein’s being and its capacity-for-being’ (MFL, p186)

23 MFL, p. 192 (my emphasis).

24 Ibid., pp 148-9. In brief: no pragmatic now could be an involvement at all were it not for the fact that (a) it had a teleological structure, which brought it to an end; (b) a retentional structure that made available the equipmental means it can rely on to perform it; and (c) a present, stretched between these two poles, in which to do it.


26 Ibid., p 175-6.

27 Ibid., pp 181-2.

28 Ibid., p 183.

29 BP: 259. See also, Heidegger, Basic Problems, section β p 261 – ‘the structural moments of expressed time: significance, datability, spannedness, publicness’.

30 Heidegger, BT: 416.469.

31 This form of time has, at best, for us, a merely ‘analogical’ presence – for instance, it shows up as ‘clock time’
It merely ‘represents’ the movement (‘passage’) of ‘occurrence time’.

I don’t have the luxury of space to fully develop this idea of an autonomous conception of time, and how that autonomy has its roots in the derivation of ordinary time. Still, one possible way into the problem is this: one might extrapolate from Heidegger the following path to autonomy, which reverts to the way Dasein tends, in naturalizing time, to ‘reify’ it. The ground for an explicit reification of time is already, I would argue, implicit in the phenomenon of dating. Through dating, Dasein establishes a reflexive relation to the time of its involvements – to the time it ‘posits’. For instance: in assigning time, I do two things – firstly, I self-ascribe time, i.e., the time I take to perform a task; but secondly, in assigning time, I also invariably attribute time – I see time ‘in’ the task itself. Time attribution, then, might be seen as the noematic act-correlate of time ascription, which occurs in the process of dating. Now, if in the process of assigning time, I also naturalise time, then I also – in this attitude – tend to cover-up the noetic aspect of dating. Specifically, I cover-up time of ascription, leaving only a reified attributed time: the ‘time’ I attribute to things. From here it is a relatively small step to the idea, expressed by Heidegger, that in perceiving time in this way, I can also perceive the Now as a thing.

32 BP: 259.
33 Blattner 1999: 162. See also, Heidegger, BT: 409.461.
34 Ibid., p 174.
35 Note: this does not entail that tasks never line up to form transitive chains of related activity – some may do so, others may not. It just means that it is not necessary to the success of the argument for them to do so.
36 Note: this does not entail a denial of any sequential rule governing discrete chains of tasks; obviously, some tasks do indeed imply a specific order of presentation, for example, the sequence of tasks involved in starting up a car without stalling it. However, such ‘reasons to iterate’ are, if anything, existentiell rather than existential.
37 Ibid., p 41, my emphasis
38 See ibid., p 272: ‘Dasein is not the world, but rather an individual person’.
39 Ibid., p 40.
40 Ibid., p 41, my emphasis.
41 Ibid.

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